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ABSTRACT
Literary Laughter in Augustan Poetry: Vergil, Horace, and Ovid
Caleb Michael Xavier Dance
This dissertation examines literary laughter in Latin poetry and, specifically, the ways in
which textually-witnessed laughter functions as a guide to reader response and as a genre marker
in select Vergilian, Horatian, and Ovidian poems.
The introduction first describes the Latin vocabulary of laughter and the risible and then
introduces  the  texts  of  Augustan  poetry  to  be  examined.  The  remainder  of  the  introduction
surveys theoretical treatments of laughter that appear in Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero and underlie
three prevailing modern explanations of laughter: the superiority, relief, and incongruity theories.
My inquiry is divided into two complementary parts, to each of which I devote three
chapters.  Part  I  (Chapters  1,  2,  and  3)  explores  laughter's  function  as  text-directed  literary
criticism—what I call a textual laugh track.  My approach emphasizes that the vocabulary of
laughter  and  the  risible  as  used  by  Vergil,  Horace,  and  Ovid  often  functions
metacommunicatively, offering to the reader a set of directions for how to respond to particular
texts.  Part  2  (Chapters  4,  5,  and  6)  considers  laughter's  role  as  a  conspicuous  piece  in  the
assembling of specific generic puzzles. Horace's  Satires, Vergil's  Eclogues, and Ovid's  Amores
all  feature  the  vocabulary  of  laughter  and  the  risible  in  their  verses,  and  they  utilize  this
vocabulary  to  various  genre-determined—and  genre-determining—ends.  My  objective
throughout the dissertation is to present laughter as a dynamic human behavior that, through its
appearance in Augustan literature, not only offers inroads to a specific “cultural psychology” but
also proves itself an illuminating point of contact between the ancient and modern world.
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INTRODUCTION
In Book 2 of Cicero's  De oratore, during a discussion about the place of laughter and
humor in oratory, the character Julius Caesar Strabo sets forth several questions: “Concerning
laughter, there are five things which are to be asked: 1) what it is; 2) from where it comes; 3)
whether it befits an orator to want to provoke it; 4) to what extent; and 5) what the classes of the
laughable are.”1 His response to the first question (the one concerning the nature of laughter)
immediately  follows,  but  it  is  more  teasing  disclaimer  than  proper  answer:  upon  raising
supplemental questions about laughter's essence and power and unique physical manifestations,
Caesar concludes that such topics have no bearing on the current discussion. “And even if they
were pertinent, I would nevertheless be fine  not knowing what  even those who claim to know
don't know.”2 
I offer a similar disclaimer: I do not know why humans laugh, especially when those
explanations offered by expert  thinkers and scholars for thousands of years have been found
unsatisfactory  enough  to  warrant  new  or  revised  accounts  of  laughter  from  subsequent
generations of expert thinkers and scholars. There exist numerous hypotheses from a variety of
disciplines  that  attempt  to  explain  human  laughter  (offering  evolutionary,  psychological,
physiological, and sociological accounts), but a general consensus is nevertheless lacking. To
appreciate the depth of the “mystery” of laughter, one need only consider that the reasons people
laugh are sometimes unknown to the “laughers” themselves, not to mention the outside observers
of laughter. Should we expect  to be able  to explain laughter as a human behavior when we
cannot even account for our own individual experience of the phenomenon?
1 De or. 2.235: de risu quinque sunt, quae quaerantur: unum, quid sit; alterum, unde sit; tertium, sitne oratoris
uelle risum movere; quartum, quatenus; quintum, quae sint genera ridiculi. 
2 De or. 2.235: et, si pertineret, nescire me tamen id non puderet, quod ne illi quidem scirent, qui pollicerentur.
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I  am  reminded  of  a  friend  who  is  (and,  by  his  own  admission,  always  has  been)
particularly susceptible to inexplicable laughter. As a child, he would realize that he was often
the only person laughing on any given occasion, and when asked why he was laughing, he would
offer the reply, “Oh, it's an inside joke.” It was not until some time later that he learned that an
“inside joke” is not simply a joke  inside one's own head. He had no idea that an inside joke
includes other people and relies upon “insiders” to appreciate it. Nevertheless, he offered his
explanation simply because it was an explanation, and it was satisfactory enough to those asking;
my friend, by his own recollection, was never asked to articulate additional explanations for his
inexplicable bouts of laughter.
People desire, and even demand, explanations for human behavior, seeking a cause for
most any effect. When that “effect” is laughter—a predominantly social behavior with often-
paradoxical,  simultaneous,  and instantaneous repercussions,  such as  inclusion  and exclusion,
flattery and insult, sympathy and anger—the desire for a “causal” account is all the greater. And
so it is perhaps surprising that the broadest, least “scientific” explanation is often one of the most
persuasive:  if  one asks  a  friend why she laughed at  something,  a  common (and remarkably
acceptable)  response  will  be,  “Because  it  was  funny.”  The  psychologist  Edmund  Bergler
formulates this explanation as the “popular theory” of laughter: “[O]ne laughs when and because
something is funny, and something is funny because and when one laughs.”3 
The  deliberate  circularity  of  the  “theory”  simply shifts  the  question to  what  “funny”
means. Is “funny” a synonym for “humorous”? What about the difference between “funny ha-
ha”  and “funny peculiar”?  Those who study laughter  agree  that  laughter  and humor  do  not
overlap cleanly, despite the fact that the two words are often used interchangeably. Consider the
laughter that may accompany indignation (a “scoff”) or the wide variety of things that one deems
3 Bergler (1956) vii.
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humorous without  recognizing them with laughter.  The two topics (laughter  and humor)  are
nevertheless often conflated, even to the extent that some common “laughter theories” are also
referred to as “humor theories.”
The explorations contained in the chapters that follow, although they concern laughter
and  humor  and,  by  necessity,  draw  upon  several  hypotheses  about  laughter,  are  not  about
laughter  per se  but  about  the  use of laughter  in  literary texts.  Here a  parallel  with Cicero's
excursus on laughter in De oratore proves illustrative. In Cicero's work, the topic of the dialogue
is the nature of oratory and so laughter's role and proper deployment in oratory are foregrounded
in  the  passage  on  laughter  in  Book  2.  Though  one  might  wish  that  Cicero  had  made  his
characters discuss the philosophy of laughter, such a discussion would have fallen outside the
scope  of  the  work  and,  as  Caesar  suggests  in  De  oratore 2.235,  would  likely  have  been
inconclusive. Likewise, in my own discussion, the literary effects of laughter in select works of
Vergil,  Horace,  and Ovid will frame the exploration, but a thoroughgoing explanation of the
behavior of laughter is not attempted. 
Because my inquiry is of a literary nature, I use the Latin vocabulary of laughter and the
risible as a point of entry into—and deliberate limitation within—an exploration of how and to
what end laughter is used in poems by these Augustan authors. My two main areas of inquiry,
which, though distinct, overlap and converge, are 1) laughter's function as text-directed literary
criticism and 2) laughter's role as a genre-specific occurrence.  Though I often speculate as to
what prompts a textual laugh or what effect a specific occasion of laughter has, I shy away from
attempting to construct a grand, unified theory of laughter. Instead I draw upon those theories of
laughter that have been established (and reestablished) over the last two millennia as they seem
most applicable. Thus I assure the reader now that the nature of laughter as a human behavior
will not be unlocked or “discovered” in these explorations. Rather, I intend to offer some insight
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into how writers in the ancient world, and, more specifically, literary Romans of the Augustan
age, engaged with laughter.
And so, much like Caesar in his discussion of laughter in De oratore, I feel compelled to
enumerate my paths of inquiry for this introductory chapter and to be content to leave certain
questions (and, when not the questions themselves, their answers) to other scholars. In setting
forth an “orientation to” laughter in the pages that follow, I consider the following questions: 1)
what is the vocabulary of laughter and the risible in Greek and Latin; 2) why are Vergil, Horace,
and Ovid being read through the lens of laughter; and 3) what are the theories of laughter with
which Vergil, Horace, and Ovid may have been familiar. My considerations of these questions, as
circumscribed as the scope of an introduction requires them to be, will offer a suitable launching
pad for the topics explored in the chapters that follow.
QUESTION 1) WHICH WORDS AND WHY?
THE VOCABULARY OF LAUGHTER AND THE RISIBLE
The English vocabulary of laughter offers a fitting parallel to the vocabulary of laughter
in Greek because,  for both languages, laughter  only tells half  of the story.  One can refer to
cackles, snickers, chuckles, chortles, yuks, and guffaws without making any mention of smiling,
sneering, beaming, or grinning.  Of the latter  grouping of words, the most common term for a
facial expression involving movement of the lips is “smiling,”4 but a smile, when situated amidst
the  other  terms  in  its  semantic  cohort,  communicates  a  more  precise  (i.e.,  more  positive)
psychological state than a laugh.5 English and Greek make use of etymologically distinct terms
for smiles and laughs, and yet the behaviors of smiling and laughing (and the corresponding
terms  in  literature)  often  appear  in  tandem.  Mild  amusement  may  provoke  a  smile,  but  an
4 I base this assessment upon the fact that “smile” is the only word that appears in the definitions of all the other
words. OED s.v. sneer, beam, grin.
5 OED s.v. laugh, smile.
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increase in amusement may elicit a laugh (with the smile typically remaining apparent). Because
the behaviors are linked but still  distinct, a smile may linger on the face after an outburst of
laughter.  The  result:  “the  visual impressions  of  laughing  and  smiling  can  be  thought  of  as
forming a (blurred) continuum.”6
I mention the following basic Greek terms because they feature in the examination of
ancient laughter theories that I offer in the final section of this introduction. The Greek verb for
laughing is γελᾶν (from which English receives the word “gelastic”), and just as English utilizes
prepositions to differentiate between laughing  with and laughing  at someone,  Greek attaches
prepositional prefixes to γελᾶν in order to indicate the nature of the laughter being described. To
laugh approvingly is ἐπιγελᾶν, to laugh scornfully is καταγελᾶν or διαγελᾶν. The unprefixed
Greek γελᾶν ultimately does not specify good-natured laughter, derisive laughter, or any other
type of laughter on its own. Just laughter.7 Consequently, when γελᾶν appears in a literary work,
an examination of  its  context  is  necessary if  one wishes  to  determine the disposition of the
character laughing or of the individual observing the laughter.
Similarly the word  μειδιᾶν  is used for a physical act of smiling, but the attitude of the
“smiler” (good-natured or otherwise) is not reliably communicated by the word alone, nor do
prefixes help as much with  μειδιᾶν as they do with  γελᾶν. For example, the  ἐπι- prefix that
softens γελᾶν does nothing so consistent with μειδιᾶν, and ἐπιμειδᾶν can indicate approval as
well  as  scorn.8 As  with  unmarked literary  laughter,  the  context  of  a  literary  smile  typically
provides important clues as to what psychological state the textual smile indicates.9
6 Halliwell (2008) 520, (his emphasis and parentheses).
7 The noun γέλως and the verb γελᾶν have similar semantic ranges. The adjective γελοῖον is examined in the
discussion of the laughter theories in Plato and Aristotle.
8 LSJ s.v. ἐπιμειδάω.
9 There is  a  larger  vocabulary for  laughter,  smiling,  and  the risible  in  Greek,  but it  does  not  feature  in  the
following discussion. See Arnould (1990) 287 for the index of her terms for laughter and crying.
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The fact that Greek employs etymologically unrelated terms for laughter and smiling may
not be remarkable to English speakers for whom this is also the case, but it would likely attract
the attention of a native speaker of Spanish (reírse vs. sonreírse), French (rire vs. sourire), or
Italian (ridere vs. sorridere). Likewise in Latin, the words for laughing and smiling operate on an
unmistakable literary continuum as well as a behavioral one. It is for this reason that I collapse
both of these concepts and their corresponding terms into the vocabulary of explicit laughter in
Augustan literature.
The Latin verbs that indicate the act of laughing are ridere and cachinnare. Ridere is the
unmarked term for  laughter,  and  cachinnare marks  loud,  immoderate,  or  derisive  laughter.10
Their corresponding nouns are risus and cachinnus. Ridere is often prefixed with prepositions to
specify the “direction” (and a coordinate change in “type”) of laughter, e.g., deridere = to laugh
“down,” scorn;11 arridere = to laugh “at” (in an approving manner); irridere = to laugh “against”
(in ridicule).12 Thus ridere behaves much like the Greek term γελᾶν and the English “laugh.” All
three terms similarly communicate plain laughter,  in all  its ambiguity.  The similarities break
down,  however,  when  one  considers  that  the  verb  ridere,  unprefixed  though  it  may  be,  is
sometimes thought to indicate smiling, in which case the potential semantic range of the one
term would double in size, with the same verb being used for vocalizations and unvoiced facial
expressions.13 The Greek differentiation between smiling (μειδιᾶν) and laughing (γελᾶν)—both
10 OLD s.v. rideo and cachinno. See also the Commentum Cornuti on Persius 1.12 (15): cachinnus autem est risus
lasciuior cum uoce.
11 A detailed treatment of derideo (vs. rideo) appears in the first section of Chapter 3.
12 Ridere  also seems  to acquire different meanings—to “distribute itself” differently—through the case that  it
takes: ridere + accusative can mean “to laugh at” while ridere + dative maps a favorable sense onto the laughter,
along the lines of “to laugh for” (e.g., the sea's laughter for Venus in Book 1 of Lucretius' proem to De Rerum
Natura: tibi rident aequora ponti (v. 8)). Henry (1878) states the difference more cautiously in his note on Aen.
4.128: “[T]he object which is smiled at in the bad sense, i.e., which is derided, is invariably not put in the dative,
but in the accusative” (628). He does not conclude that all occasions of ridere + accusative convey derision.
13 OLD s.v. rideo 2 and 3. One of the often cited passages of ridere meaning “to smile” is Catullus c. 61.212, but I
see no reason that the mention of the child's mouth (semihiante labello in v. 213) precludes a vocalization of
laughter.
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of  which  terms  an  educated  Roman would  know—would  seem a  thing  of  the  distant  past.
Granted, this would only make for confusion on the verbal level. Whether ridere was meant to
indicate a laugh or a smile would be easily clarified by the context in which the verb appeared.
My  use  of  the  modal  verb  “would”  throughout  the  previous  sentences  betrays  my
resistance to reading ridere as indicating a smile; a prefixed form of this verb (i.e., subridere = to
“under” laugh = to smile) adequately accounts for this semantic territory.14 Therefore, my default
interpretation of the unprefixed  ridere  is  as an audible  expression—a laugh.15 Yet  the literal
presence of laughter (ridere) in the Latin word for smiling leads me to include subridere among
the prefixed words for laughter mentioned previously.  These four terms—ridere,  cachinnare,
risus, and cachinnus—in their unprefixed and prefixed forms comprise the vocabulary of explicit
laughter by which I conduct my examination of laughter in Augustan literature.
The vocabulary of the risible includes words etymologically related to the vocabulary of
the explicit laughter (such as  ridiculus16) as well as words that have a similar semantic range.
These words are  iocus  (iocosus),  dicax,  and  sal  (salsus),  all  of which have lexical meanings
proximate to wit, jokes, and/or playfulness.17 Additional terms invaluable to an understanding of
literary aesthetics in the age of Augustus, such as facetus, lepidus, and, as I argue in the case of
Vergil's Eclogues,  ludus, occasionally appear in the context of laughter in Augustan poetry, but
14 OLD s.v. subrideo.
15 See Varro, Menippean Satire fr. 277 (from the Marcipor) where, following Astbury's printed text (which aligns
with Cebè's for the crucial section hiantis to audio), the laughter is clearly meant to be audible: quid? qui uident
et circumstant, non rident? – credo ridere: hiantis uideo, ridentis non audio. (Cebè suggested text is quicquid
est,  rident  et  circumstant.  – Non rident.  –  Credo ridere – Hiantis uideo,  ridentis non audio.)  See also the
reference to the Persius scholia in n. 10 above,  where the use of  uoce implies that both  risus and  cachinnus
involve vocalization, though I believe that risus is more exclusive to laughter than the verb form ridere.
16 OLD s.v. ridiculus.
17 These words have been gathered from their frequent appearance alongside ridere and ridicula (and other terms
for the risible) in De oratore 2.216-290 and in the specific Vergilian, Horatian, and Ovidian texts I study in the
chapters  to  follow.  Cicero's  vocabulary of  laughter  and  the  risible is  not  coterminous with  the  vocabulary
employed by Vergil, Horace, and Ovid, in part because the glossary of terms available to an author composing in
prose is larger than what can be accommodated in Augustan hexameter and elegiac couplets. But metrics alone
are not an adequate explanation; Cicero never uses the hexametrically-viable  cachinnare  in his  excursus de
ridiculis.
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these words maintain a greater  semantic  distance from laughter  and the risible and are only
considered on select occasions.18 The vocabulary of the risible is considered at length only in
contexts where explicit laughter appears. 
QUESTION 2) WHY THESE AUTHORS? AND WHY LAUGHTER?
EXPLANATION OF A METHOD
Even  with  this  restricted  lexicon  (as  compared  to  the  numerous  terms  for  laughing,
snickering,  chuckling,  chortling,  and  guffawing  in  English),  the  contexts  in  which  laughter
appears in the poems of Vergil, Horace, and Ovid are as varied as the contexts in which people
laugh in the 21st century. But a “live” laugh, experienced firsthand, may be accompanied by non-
verbal or situational cues that aid in its interpretation. With literary laughter, a reader has only the
text  to  interrogate  as  she  attempts  to  answer  the  question  of  why  laughter  appears  and  to
construct  or  deconstruct  a  narrative  that  accounts  for  the  laugh.  The question  itself  and the
discovery (or creation) of an answer allow the reader to enter into dialogue with the text, to
respond to it,  and to investigate the background and interactions of the participants,  be they
author,  speaker,  addressee,  character,  or  even the  implied  reader.  Is  the  reader  meant  to  be
included in this laughter? Is the laughter appropriate? Is it deliberately ambiguous? If so, what
does this ambiguous behavior contribute to the literary work? In short, a textual laugh is a thread
the reader can tug upon to unravel the text and examine various elements of its composition.
By restricting  my inquiry  in  the chapters that follow to passages in Augustan poetry
where terms for laughter appear, I do away with the potential challenge of guessing when an
audience laughed. I likewise skirt the subjective and slippery analysis of “humor.” I instead focus
on selections in which laughter is textually witnessed or, by way of terms for the risible, strongly
18 Krostenko (2002) groups these and several other terms (e.g., uenustus and bellus) into the “Language of Social
Performance.”
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implied.  With  these  passages  as  my starting  point,  I  attempt  to  reconstruct  explanations  for
specific occasions of laughter and to explore how an author's deployment of laughter within a
literary  work  offers  potential  answers  to  various  questions  of  reader  response  and  generic
identity. My reasons for selecting these two paths of inquiry are explained in greater detail in the
introductions to the two halves of the study (“Chapters 1-3: Ridere Response” and “Chapters 4-6:
Jocular Genres”).
Vergil, Horace, and Ovid have attracted the attention and admiration of readers for as
long as their  works have been known and are important  contributors to  the Western literary
tradition. I am far from alone in regarding their poetic works as varied manifestations of mastery.
Each work, book, verse, and word—and, similarly,  every appearance of a term for laughter—
appears to have been carefully weighed by its original author and has, in the years since its
original composition, been weighed in turn by innumerable scholars. Consequently, the Augustan
age is home to much of the most thoroughly researched and published-upon Latin literature from
antiquity and presents a distinct challenge to any scholar who wishes to break new ground while
researching the literature of this time period.
I have selected laughter as the focus of my study, in part, because no one has studied
textual  laughter  (by  way  of  the  vocabulary  of  laughter  and  the  risible)  as  an  inroad  to
considerations of reader response and genre in the poetry of these authors. Indeed, there exists no
comprehensive work on laughter in Latin literature as a whole. A sustained treatment of laughter
in the ancient world was altogether lacking until Stephen Halliwell's Greek Laughter: A Study of
Cultural  Psychology  from  Homer  to  Early  Christianity  was  published  in  2008.  This  work
expertly examines occasions of laughter in Greek literature through the lens of specific authors
and  genres  and  explores  laughter's  ability  to  illuminate  elements  of  Greek  culture.  Its  only
shortcoming (if it can be considered as such) is that it does not—and, of course, could not—treat
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every occasion of laughter in the literature of his designated time periods (e.g., elegy and pastoral
receive no dedicated attention). 
Erich Segal's Roman Laughter: The Comedy of Plautus (1967) is not about laughter itself
but about Plautine comedy. In fact, an indistinct line between the topics of laughter, humor, and
comedy has led to the publication of numerous books and articles with “laughter” in their titles
but with content focused elsewhere. Studies of laughter in articles and (portions of) monographs
nevertheless offer important interpretations of specific occasions of laughter as well as valuable
methodological models. Dominique Arnould's  Le rire et les larmes dans la litterature grecque
d'Homere a Platon  (1990)  examines laughter's significance in the literature of a specific time
period,  and she focuses upon a specific vocabulary.19 As her title indicates, she also examines
tears and crying, and she draws numerous parallels between the two behaviors. The collection Le
rire  des  anciens (1998)  contains  contributions  on  Greek  and  Latin  texts,  but  treatments  of
laughter occasionally blur into treatments of comedy or humor. Le rire des Grecs: anthropologie
du rire en Grece ancienne (2000) is far more faithful to its titular claim of examining laughter,
but  the  vast  majority  of  the  contributions  treat Greek  texts  and  culture. Sardonic  Smile:
Nonverbal Behavior in Homeric Epic  (1995)  by Donald Lateiner explores the large volume of
information  communicated  about  characters  through  descriptions  of  physical  bodies.  Daniel
Levine's  articles  from the  mid-1980's  on laughter  in  the  Odyssey  examine laughter's  role  in
characterization  and  narrative.  On  topics  in  Latin  literature,  Anthony  Corbeill's  Controlling
Laughter: Political Humor in the Late Roman Republic (1996) deftly explores political humor
and invective (primarily  via Cicero) in the Late Republic but,  like Segal,  pays little heed to
laughter itself.  Brian Krostenko's  Cicero,  Catullus, and the Language of Social Performance
(2001)  proposes that a specific set of lexemes,  some of which overlap with the vocabulary of
19 Arnould (1990) 138-142, 158-164, and 287.
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laughter, were used to evaluate style and wit in the late Republic and examines their function in
works by Cicero and Catullus.  The Function of Humour in Roman Verse Satire: Laughter and
Lying  (2006)  by Maria Plaza makes a compelling case for humor's centrality to Roman verse
satire,  although  she,  like  many  other  scholars,  frequently  uses  humor  and  laughter
interchangeably.  However,  her  doctoral  dissertation  Laughter  and  Derision  in  Petronius'
Satyrica: A Literary Study (2000) employs a “linear close reading of all passages that contain
explicit  mention of laughter and derision” that shares methodological  territory with my own
study.20
Embedded  in  portions  of  the  aforementioned  works  are  important  observations  and
theories about the function of laughter (and humor) in Greek and Latin literature, but treatments
of explicit laughter in works by Roman authors are a considerable minority in an already small
population. My study is intended to begin to remedy the dearth of research on this topic. I utilize
close readings of Latin texts from the restricted time period of the Augustan era with an eye
toward accounting for the function and significance of laughter in these texts.
Some of my reasons for picking these authors and texts will hopefully become more clear
as the study progresses. The reasons I note presently are both practical and self-serving. From a
practical  standpoint,  it  would  be  difficult—although not  impossible—to examine the  role  of
laughter in texts that lack laughter. The Augustan era presents readers with an abundance of
works composed in “low” genres to which, as the following exploration of laughter theories in
Plato  and  Aristotle  suggests,  laughter  and  the  laughable  were  considered  particularly
appropriate.21 Additionally, Vergil, Horace, and Ovid, by nature of their multigeneric corpora, are
20 Plaza (2000) outlines her method in her Abstract (from which this quotation is drawn) and Introduction, p. 3.
21 On Aristotle, see, e.g., Grant (1924) 25: “To a philosopher, then, who did not regard pleasure as the highest
good, laughter and the types of literature whose purpose it is to excite laughter, could not be regarded as worthy
of as much consideration as more serious things.” She later places iambic, comedy, mime, satyr dramas, and
philosophical diatribe/dialogue at the bottom of the totem pole (40). Volk (2010) 40 sets the “high” genres of
epic, tragedy, and panegyric against the “low” of bucolic and elegy.
11
of particular interest in exploring possible answers to comparative questions about genre. As for
the self-serving component to my selection, I have chosen to explore many of the works that I
most enjoy reading . . . and rereading. Vergil, Horace, and Ovid reward both of these activities,
but demand the latter.
My interest in literary laughter, however, is not exclusive to the works of Vergil, Horace,
and Ovid, nor is it  reserved solely for works of ancient literature. The study of a laugh in a
literary text offers unique insight into the specific text and into the very experience of reading,
inviting readers, as I argue in the pages to follow, to interact with the text in subtle and perhaps
even reflexive ways. I am fascinated by laughter in all its inexplicable and infectious glory, and
to the extent that it is often considered a universally and uniquely human attribute, I believe that
laughter proves itself a valuable point of contact with the ancient world. 
QUESTION 3) HOW DID THE ANCIENTS THINK ABOUT LAUGHTER?
LAUGHTER THEORIES IN PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND CICERO
In contrast to my reluctance (and inability) to propose a unified theory of laughter, there
have  been  many  authors  and  scholars  for  whom  laughter  has  been  a  behavior  warranting
examination and explanation. The earliest of the inquiries from Classical antiquity materialize in
selected works of Plato and Aristotle,  yet  even these accounts of laughter  and the laughable
appear as concentrated explorations situated in broader discussions, much like the account of
laughter's oratorical function in De oratore. None of these ancient “theories” appears in a work
with a title such as “On Laughter” or “Concerning the Nature of the Ridiculous,” and yet works
with such a specific focus seem to have existed, if we are to believe De oratore's Caesar Strabo.
At the  dramatic  date  of the dialogue in  91 BCE (and presumably at  the time of  the work's
composition in 55 BCE), these works were associated with Greek authorship: “And so when I
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saw certain Greek books written about the laughable, I arrived at a certain hope that I would be
able to learn something from these.”22
Alas,  no such works  survive.  Caesar,  acting as  the  primary spokesperson in  Cicero's
exploration of laughter, suggests that their value was limited anyway. After recognizing certain
Greeks for their remarkable wit, he offers a blunt critique: “As for those who have tried to hand
down an account of this thing [sc. the laughable], they have appeared so manifestly witless that
nothing of  theirs  is  laugh-worthy except  their  witlessness  itself.”23 For  our  part,  we modern
readers must content ourselves with purple (laughter)-passages from Plato's Republic, Philebus,
and Laws and from Aristotle's Poetics,  Rhetoric, and Nicomachean Ethics. Before the passages
from these works are examined in greater detail, it must be pointed out that even though Plato is
credited with offering the first “theory” of laughter, laughter certainly had not gone altogether
unexamined before Plato  put  pen to  papyrus.  As Steven Halliwell's  monograph dedicated to
Greek  laughter  demonstrates,  there  is  ample  material  worthy  of  discussion  in  the  “literary
laughter”  that  appears  in  the  centuries  before  Plato  and Aristotle.24 Several  particularly  rich
occasions of literary laughter will make appearances in the chapters that follow because of their
lasting influence on retellings in Latin literature.
For the present, however, a distinction is drawn between explicit analyses of laughter and
implied ones. In the following summary of several influential accounts of laughter, the theories
examined are those that were articulated before Vergil, Horace, and Ovid composed their verse:
those  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  Cicero.  This  “chronological  prejudice”  is  observed  for  a
combination of practical and theoretical reasons. On the practical front, there are so many studies
22 De or. 2.217:  itaque cum quosdam Graecos inscriptos libros esse uidissem de ridiculis, non nullam in spem
ueneram posse me ex eis aliquid discere.
23 De or. 2.217: inueni autem ridicula et salsa multa Graecorum; nam et Siculi in eo genere et Rhodii et Byzantii
et praeter ceteros Attici excellunt; sed qui eius rei rationem quandam conati sunt artemque tradere, sic insulsi
exstiterunt, ut nihil aliud eorum nisi ipsa insulsitas rideatur.
24 Halliwell (2008).
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of laughter from so many fields that treating each study individually (not to say exhaustively)
would constitute a lengthy project in itself. The most recent psychological, neuroscientific, and
evolutionary explorations of the phenomenon of laughter and smiling would require voracious
study if only to acquire an elementary understanding of the theories, let alone the situating of
these theories in the fields from which they hail. A 2009 article on laughter and other “nonverbal
emotional vocalizations” is a mere four journal pages in length but cites thirty-two references—
twenty-four  of  them  published  in  the  preceding  nine  years  or  “in  press”  at  the  time  of
publication.25 Another recent (2010) article that proposes a new theory of smile recognition (and
contains responses from other scholars) cites well over 500 works in its list of references, with
many of these published since 2000.26 Thus a practical reason for not pursuing a comprehensive
survey of laughter-explanations is  that doing so would take me far  afield from my intended
avenue of exploration.
A theoretical reason for treating ancient explanations of laughter at greater length than
recent ones is that ancient accounts of laughter remain tremendously influential. The theories of
laughter  offered  by  and often  attributed  to  Hobbes,  Freud,  and Kant  echo core  elements  of
ancient theories and demonstrate that certain arguments from the ancient world had the power to
persuade,  no  matter  the  time-period.  In  most  modern  theories,  arguments  from the  ancient
authors have been rearticulated or condensed, strengthened or simply stated more plainly, such
that the latent power of the original arguments is all the more apparent.27 This is not to assert that
modern theorists  have  conceived of  nothing new when it  comes to  thinking critically  about
laughter but to argue that many of the most compelling observations on laughter had already
been voiced by the time Vergil, Horace, and Ovid composed their poems.
25 Sauter (2010).
26 Niedenthal et al. (2010).
27 The reappearance of these theories is also undoubtedly evidence of the education these scholars received.
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Lest I overplay my “ancient aces” (a not-uncommon tendency among those who study
the ancient world), I believe the modern theories of laughter proposed since antiquity and before
the scientific “boom” in laughter research of this past quarter-century are important not only for
their distillation of ancient ideas but also for their organization and systematization of something
akin to a field of “laughter study.” The classification and consolidation of theories offered by
various scholars  over  the  past  several  centuries  proves  invaluable to  discussions of  laughter
insofar  as  it  provides a  shorthand  for  referring  to  trends  in  laughter  research  rather  than to
individual scholarly arguments and minute refinements of prior theories. Three particular trends
have come to dictate much of the vocabulary employed in scholarly discussions of laughter and
humor, especially in studies of literature and the social sciences. Consequently, these trends have
assumed the status of “canonical theories” of laughter. 
The theories can be summarized as follows: 1) the superiority theory urges that we laugh
at what is bad or what is “below” us; (2) the incongruity theory is based upon the idea that we
laugh when we become aware of incongruity between two or more things (one of which is often
our own expectations);  and (3) the  relief  theory treats  laughter as a  release from emotional,
psychological, or even physical tension.28 Versions of these theories in the early stages have been
observed in the laughter-related writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero.  Despite the extensive
pedigree of these canonical theories of laughter, most people—scholars of laughter and everyday
“laughers” alike—would agree that no one of the theories adequately accounts for all  of the
diverse occasions of laughter.29 In the end, human beings laugh in response to too many different
stimuli  for  a  single  psychological  state  to  offer  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  laughter  as  a
behavior.
28 See Monro (1951) for a summary and critique of these theories in their various instantiations.
29 Morreall  (1982)  summarizes  the  specific  inadequacies  of  each  theory  when  it  is  accepted  as  a  singular
explanation. The theory he proposes has other inadequacies.
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Should you ask an individual to explain why humans laugh or to define “the laughable”,
you would be lucky to receive a response consistent unto itself—even if the individual whom
you asked was Plato, Aristotle, or Cicero. As I examine the theoretical treatments of laughter set
forth  by  these  authors  in  the  following  section,  I  draw  attention  to  the  variability  in  their
explanations of laughter and the laughable as an illustration of the puzzling complexity of the
behavior of laughter.
3.1 PLATO'S SCATTERED LAUGHS
Laughter surfaces on a number of occasions in the Platonic corpus. The passages treated
in the following pages are not simple occurrences of laughter (of which there are many) in the
dialogues but explicit discussions of the phenomenon of laughter (of which there are fewer)
among  the  dialogues'  participants.30 In  the  course  of  these  discussions,  certain  theoretical
explanations  of  laughter  and the  laughable  are  advanced by various  figures.  As always,  the
dialogic  nature  of  Plato's  work  precludes  the  possibility  of  ever  declaring  that  “Plato  the
philosopher” adopts a specific stance on laughter, but the perspectives on laughter that his texts
present need only be considered on their own merits. Any discussion of laughter offered in a
Platonic text is valuable precisely for the fact that it offers what may have been a contemporary
attitude toward laughter.
Socrates' remarks on laughter in  Book 3 of the Republic  (388e5-9) do not amount to a
delibrate and comprehensive theory, but they offer an early sampling of resistance to certain
types of laughter:
   Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ φιλογέλωτάς γε δεῖ εἶναι. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὅταν τις ἐφιῇ ἰσχυρῷ
γέλωτι, ἰσχυρὰν καὶ μεταβολὴν ζητεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον. 
   Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. 
30 Halliwell  (2008)  276-302  offers  a  thorough  exploration  of  Socratic  laughter  through  Plato's  ambivalent
treatment of it in various dialogues, arguing that “we should view with strong scepticism any claim to identify a
one-dimensional Platonic verdict on laughter” (277-8).
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   Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνθρώπους ἀξίους λόγου κρατουμένους ὑπὸ γέλωτος ἄν τις ποιῇ,
ἀποδεκτέον, πολὺ δὲ ἧττον, ἐὰν θεούς. 
   Πολὺ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς. (Resp.. 388e5-9)
  “But  they [the  guardians]  must  not  be laughter-lovers.  For it  seems that whenever
someone succumbs to strong laughter, such a thing requires a strong change.” 
   “I agree,” he [Adeimantus] said. 
“Nor, if someone should portray men of note being overcome by laughter, should
it be acceptable. And much less so, if he should portray gods in such a way.” 
    And he said, “Certainly.”
In his interchange with Adeimantus, Socrates does not prohibit the guardians from all laughter
but from excessive indulgence in laughter, or “laughter loving” (φιλογέλωτάς in 388e5). His
focus is on “strong laughter” that brings about a “strong change,” and to illustrate his point, he
cites a Homeric occasion of “unquenchable laughter” (ἄσβεστος .  .  .  γέλως) that  is said to
overwhelm the gods in Iliad 1.599. 
The argument is not against laughter  per se but against laughter of a certain unbridled
type. Other types of laughter are implicitly acceptable, if not demanded. In his prohibition on
literary lamentation in the section immediately preceding the discussion of laughter,  Socrates
uses a compound of γελάω to suggest that the guardians should scorn (καταγελῷεν in 388d3)
excessive mourning.31 There, laughter functions as a desirable tool of social correction, or, at the
least, as a readily-acknowledged public display of disapproval.32
The “strong change” to which Socrates refers in 388e6 is a psychological rather than a
physical  one.33 Socrates here makes no mention of the physiological changes brought  on by
laughter;  he  is  concerned  with  loss  of  self-control,  not  breath-control.  That  Socrates  treats
31 Resp. 388d2-7: δεἰ γάρ, ὦ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡμῖν οἱ νέοι σπουδῇ ἀκούοιεν καὶ μὴ καταγελῷεν
ὡς  ἀναξίως  λεγομένων,  σχολῇ  ἂν  ἑαυτόν  γέ  τις  ἄνθρωπον  ὄντα  ἀνάξιον  ἡγήσαιτο  τούτων  καὶ
ἐπιπλήξειεν, εἰ καὶ ἐπίοι αὐτῷ τι τοιοῦτον ἢ λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσχυνόμενος οὐδὲ καρτερῶν
πολλοὺς ἐπὶ σμικροῖσιν παθήμασιν θρήνους ἂν ᾄδοι καὶ ὀδυρμούς.
32 Halliwell (2008) seems to subscribe to the interpretation of καταγελῷεν as corrective tool when he paraphrases
the argument as follows: “Ideally [. . .] the young Guardians would know how to use ridicule against targets that
deserved their scorn, but would avoid gratuitous, addictive laughter in their own behavior” (301).
33 There is another reference to “strong change” (μεταβολὴ ἰσχυρὰ) in the  Republic  at 553d8, this time in the
context of the psychological change of a young man from being a lover of honor to being a lover of money.
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examines excessive tears immediately before he examines excessive laughter is no coincidence.
Just as public lamentation is a loss of self-control with psychological resonance and sociological
ramifications,  so  too  is  “strong  laughter”;  the  physical  behavior  represents  a  psychological
state.34 Socrates' argument is noteworthy precisely because it treats laughter as a behavior that
can  be  separated  from  comedy  and  from  humor.  In  treating  laughter  as  the  product  of  a
psychological  experience,  Plato's  Socrates  lays  the  groundwork for  further  theorizing  of  the
psychological  elements of this  physical  behavior.35 The argument also draws attention to the
“social” aspect of laughter—the fact that laughter often occurs in a public sphere (real or literary)
and warrants policing.
A more explicit engagement with laughter's social function arises in two passages near
the beginning of Book 5 of the Republic (452d3-e2 and 457a10-b5):
   Resp. 457a10-b5:36
ὁ δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ γυμναῖς γυναιξί, τοῦ βελτίστου ἕνεκα γυμναζομέναις, ἀτελῆ
τοῦ γελοίου σοφίας δρέπων καρπόν, οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφ' ᾧ γελᾷ οὐδ' ὅτι
πράττει· κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον
καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν.
But the man laughing at  women who, for  the  best  reason, train naked, “plucking an
unripe fruit of wisdom of ridiculousness,” doesn't know, as it seems, what he laughs at or
what he's doing. For indeed it is said—and will have been said—most beautifully, that the
beneficial is beautiful, but the harmful is base.
34 In the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, Demeter is said to “turn” (ἐτρέψατο in 203) in an example of a pronounced
psychological change that is brought on by laughter. This passage is treated briefly in Chapter 5.
35 Plato offers another version of this discussion toward the end of the Republic (605c-606c), where he goes into
greater detail about the effects of representations of grief and humor (he focuses on both poetic and theatrical
representations). Socrates grants that representations of sadness or the ridiculous may offer a certain pleasure to
the ”perceiver” (viewer/listener), but stresses that they simultaneously weaken the perceiver's resistance to these
behaviors, making it more likely that he will indulge in behavior in his own life similar to that represented. As
my own choice of terms indicates, Socrates does not draw firm distinctions between his vocabulary for humor,
laughter, and comedy (e.g, γέλοιος in 606c2 and κωμῳδικός in 606c3). Moreover, his point is primarily about
the risks of mimetic presentation; he takes it for granted that laughter at “shameful” things is undesirable. The
unique components of this argument (as compared to the one at 388e, discussed above) are the references to
“laughter-making”  (γελωτοποιεῖν  in  606c6)  and  “buffoonery”  (βωμολοχία in  606c7)  as  well  as  the
conclusion  that  giving  free  rein  to  laughter  on  individual  occasions  has  a  tendency  to  become a  habitual
tendency.
36 I adopt the text in Halliwell (1993) 62-64. The Greek phrase that is translated in quotes is an adapted fragment
of Pindar (fr. 209 Schroeder).
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   Resp. 452d3-e2:
Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οἶμαι χρωμένοις ἄμεινον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ
τοιαῦτα ἐφάνη, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρύη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
μηνυθέντος ἀρίστου· καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείξατο, ὅτι μάταιος ὃς γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται
ἢ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ὄψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς
γελοίου ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἄφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὖ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ
σκοπὸν στησάμενος ἢ τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
But since, as I see it,  all  these sorts of things made it  clear to those taking part  that
stripping off clothes was better than staying covered, what was laughable then before the
eyes fell away because the best thing was made known by way of explanations; and this
proved that the man who considers something other than badness to be laughable is a
fool, as is the man who attempts to arouse laughter by looking toward some aspect of the
laughable other than an aspect of foolishness or badness, and so again is the man who
gives serious attention to setting up some other standard of beauty than one of good.
In the course of his conversation with Glaucon, Socrates argues that what is generally considered
“laughable” is in large part a function of acculturation or a product of incorrect judgments, while
what is  properly laughable should be restricted to what  is  actually bad  (κακόν)  or senseless
(ἄφρον).  In  some  respects,  Socrates'  position  against  laughter  and  the  laughable  in  this
discussion  with  Glaucon seems much less  tolerant  of  laughter  than  the  one  he  takes  in  his
discussion with Adeimantus in Book 3. Occasions for laughter have been restricted to occasions
of ridicule.
The Greek γελοῖον, as Socrates uses it, reflects the same ambiguity as the English terms
one would use to translate it: the laughable, the ridiculous, the risible.37 The adjective γελοῖον is
etymologically inextricable from laughter, but that which is “laughable” or “ridiculous” does not,
strictly  speaking,  require  the  action  of  laughing  (as  would  be  expressed  by  a  verb)  or  an
37 The first two of these English words (“laughable” and “ridiculous”) have a dismissive or derisive connotation.
Consider  the fact  that  something designated “laughable”  could often be  called “scoff-able,”  and something
“ridiculous” is often “preposterous.” The most neutral adjective for describing laughter is probably the Greek-
derived “gelastic.” This allows one to describe something that entails laughter without dictating the valence of
the laughter. The act of calling something laughable does not necessarily effect or enact laughter, but the act of
calling something ridiculous does, in some sense, manifest the ridicule that is latent in the term. I believe that
this reflects the fact that “ridiculous” in English has acquired a lexical significance that is considerably more
distant from laughter than the term “laughable.”
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occurrence of laughter (expressed by a noun). What is  γελοῖον is a worthy  object of laughter,
where the object is what is laughed at or ridiculed. Plato's Socrates asserts that an individual who
is best-informed by reason (τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μηνυθέντος ἀρίστου in 452d5-6) will know that
only what is truly bad should be ridiculed. The laughable or ridiculous is ideologically severed
from an actual  occasion of laughter.38 But  the term  γελοῖον as  it  appears in  Book 5 of the
Republic does not require laughter.
There  is  a  flip-side  to  this  semantic  rift:  something that  prompts  laughter  is  not,  by
Socrates'  reckoning,  necessarily  “laughable.”  In  his  summary  of  the  “Pro-Nude-Female-
Guardians-Training”  argument  at  457a10-b5,  Socrates  imagines  a  person  who  laughs  at  the
women who exercise  nude.  The  “laughing  man,”  however,  laughs  at  something  that  is  not
actually “γελοῖον,” and thereby he demonstrates ignorance of his own actions. A baby who
giggles and leads those around her to laugh is neither morally bad nor foolish in some censurable
way. Thus she would not be  γελοῖον under Socrates'  interpretation,  even though laughter is
manifest throughout such a hypothetical scenario. The definition of γελοῖον, restricted though it
may be, allows room for laughter precisely because laughter can exist independent of what is
laughable. 
The semantic range of  γελοῖον has thus been restricted in Plato to a specific class of
morally unsound stimuli. Socrates suggests that the term γελοῖον is properly applied only to that
which is κακόν or ἄφρον, but he does not pretend that these terms are all synonymous. There are
presumably bad things that are not “laughable”—things that are more severe, more abhorrent,
38 Of course, the laughable and laughter are not mutually-exclusive. A person could laugh at something that fits
Socrates' definition of the ridiculous. The aspiring “laughter-maker” in 452d7 (ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν) is
surely attempting to provoke a laugh and not merely to identify what is ridiculous.  Nightingale (1995) 176-8
overstates her point when she says of this passage that “Socrates explicitly criticizes comic poets for dispensing
ridicule in a fashion that is ignorant and contrary to truth.” With the exception of the use of κωμῳδεῖν in 452d1
(which I believe to be more figurative than literal), there is no mention of poetry or written/stage composition.
Socrates' point includes comedy but is not restricted to it.
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and in need of more serious censure. The labeling of something as “laughable” does not indicate
that  laughter  occurred;  it  simply  suggests  that  laughter  of  some  type  would  be  a  fitting
response.39 Whatever the “lexical drift” that distanced τὸ γελοῖον from ὁ γέλως, laughter must
have been “present” to an ancient reader in both written words, much like “laughable” can hardly
be  spoken  or  read  by  a  native  English-speaker  without  calling  to  mind  the  word  “laugh.”
Socrates' use of  γελοῖον in Book 5 of the  Republic confirms a conceptualization of laughter
introduced in Book 3 as a psychologically demonstrative behavior.
Throughout  the  Republic,  Socrates presents  laughter  as  a  socially-influential  behavior
that is inseparable from an individual's psychological motivation. His designation of something
as  properly “laughable” requires  a  moralizing association with  laughter,  while  that  which is
incorrectly cast as “laughable” reflects subjective appearances and cultural relativity rather than
reasoned thought. The man who is imagined laughing at the female guardians as they train in the
nude nicely summarizes Plato's engagement with laughter and the laughable in the Republic: that
man's laughter is a judgment. His judgment, however, is incorrect. He laughs at something that
he thinks is laughable, but because the training of the female guardians is an intellectually sound
idea and is not morally reprehensible, he laughs ignorantly. To anticipate the direction that Plato's
considerations of  laughter  take in  his  other works,  this  confused man becomes an object  of
derision  himself—an  embodiment  of  the  laughable.  The  Philebus involves  Socrates  in  a
discussion in which he attempts to tackle head-on a definition of the laughable—τὸ γελοῖον.
In  Philebus  48c8-d3 Socrates presents an initial definition of  τὸ γελοῖον in which he
states  that  the  laughable  is  πονηρία  .  .  .  τις—“some  kind  of  vice.”  The  laughable  person
embodies the vice of self-ignorance. The term πονηρία echoes the ethically-charged treatment of
39 The flip-side  here  does  not  hold true:  all  designations  of  something  as  laughable  may,  under  the  Platonic
reading, be a manifestation of censure, but not all occasions of laughter must entail censure. 
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τὸ γελοῖον in Book 5 of the  Republic  where to be considered laughable is to exhibit a moral
deficiency of some sort (Resp. 452d3-e2, see above). Such moralizing language stacks the cards
against any positive rendering of the laughable. Ignorance is κακόν, or a “bad thing” (as Socrates
gets Protarchus to acknowledge on at least three separate occasions: 48c2, 49a5-6, and 49e7-8),
and the laughable person is ignorant (48c8-d3). Plato's Socrates is consistent across dialogues in
his treatment of the laughable as a state that no one would willingly seek out.40 
The outlook on γελᾶν (vs. τὸ γελοῖον) in the Philebus is different. After Socrates and
Protarchus (re)establish  that  ignorance  is  a  bad  thing  (49e7-8),  Socrates  asks,  “And are  we
pleased or distressed whenever we laugh at it?” (Χαίρομεν δὲ ἢ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ' αὐτῇ
γελῶμεν;). This is the first appearance of a finite verb form of  γελᾶν in the discussion,41 and
Protarchus' confident reply (“It is clear that we are pleased”) plays a pivotal role in Socrates'
conclusion  that  there  is  a  mixture of  pleasure  and pain in  comedies.  This is  because  in  the
remainder  of  the  conversation,  laughter  (γελᾶν)  is  treated  as  a  manifestation  of  pleasure
(ἡδονή).
Socrates'  and Protarchus'  agreement  in  Philebus  49e7-8 that laughter  is  a  “pleasure,”
40 Socrates immediately acknowledges that another factor in his definition of the laughable entails an individual's
ability  to  retaliate  to  laughter.  In  the  following  passage,  the  people  being  discussed  are  those  who  lack
knowledge of themselves:
Ταύτῃ τοίνυν δίελε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσι μετ' ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελώμενοι
τιμωρεῖσθαι,  γελοίους  τούτους  φάσκων εἶναι  τἀληθῆ φθέγξῃ·  τοὺς δὲ  δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι  καὶ
ἰσχυροὺς  φοβεροὺς  καὶ  ἐχθροὺς  προσαγορεύων  ὀρθότατον  τούτων  σαυτῷ  λόγον  ἀποδώσεις.
ἄγνοια γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἐχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά— βλαβερὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πέλας αὐτή τε καὶ ὅσαι
εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσιν – ἡ δ' ἀσθενὴς ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἴληχε τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν. (Phlb. 49b6-c5)
---
Now make the division in this way: as many of them as are weak and, upon being laughed-down, unable to
avenge themselves, if you say these man are laughable, you will speak truly; but those who are able to
avenge themselves and are strong, if you call these men terrible and hateful, you will be giving yourself the
truest reckoning of them. Ignorance in strong men is hateful and shameful—it and also the phantoms of it
are  harmful  to  one's  neighbors—but  for  us,  weak  ignorance  has  obtained  the  place  and  class  of  the
laughable.
Despite  the  rather  convoluted syntax of  the  section,  Socrates'  proposed definition of  a  laughable  man
remains simple: the laughable man is ignorant about his wealth, his physical appearance, or an aspect of his soul,
and he is too weak to retaliate against those who laugh at him. 
41 The participle καταγελώμενοι appears in Phlb. 49b7-8.
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especially  in  the  examination  of  hedonism that  the  Philebus comprises,  is  remarkable.  The
conversation  with  Protarchus  is  peppered  with  appearances  of  the  adjective  γελοῖον and  a
handful of inflections of the verb γελᾶν. The terms could easily blend into a general mishmash
of laughter and the laughable, but the two words approach laughter from different directions—
γελοῖον from the “receiving-end” and γελᾶν from the “laughing-end.”And  γελοῖον  seems to
be a  bad  thing  (κακόν), while  γελᾶν  is  a  pleasure  (ἡδονή). Are  these  two  concepts
contradictory? Pleasure is not, by definition, an intrinsic good . . . that is, unless you are speaking
with a hedonist. Deliberately or not, Socrates sets up an argument in which the undisputed status
of laughter as a “pleasure” raises different questions altogether: how good can  γελᾶν really be if
τὸ γελοῖον is morally reprehensible?
Socrates'  definition of the laughable is the centerpiece of the passage, and it  tends to
attract the most scholarly attention.42 The conclusions that some scholars draw from Socrates'
definition are mistaken in one particular way: the conflation of  τὸ γελοῖον  and  γελᾶν.  For
example,  Arnould  (1990)  summarizes  Socrates'  argument  much  as  I  have,  but  she  does  not
maintain the distinction between laughter and the laughable: “Le rire est une douleur de l'âme,
car  il  traduit  une  forme de  φθόνος et  le  φθόνος est  une  λύπη.  On rit  de  quelqu'un  (il  est
γελοῖος, il fait rire), note Socrate dans le Philebe, parce qu'il se croit plus riche, plus beau, plus
grand, meilleur, qu'il n'est. Cette ignorance de soi est un mal qui provoque le rire d'autrui si celui
qui  ignore  son mal  n'a  aucune puissance.  Elle  devient  dangereuse,  s'il  a  du pouvoir.”43 She
collapses the two in her parenthetical aside. However, as evidenced in Book 5 of the  Republic
(457a10-b5), laughter and the laughable  do not correspond; the terms share the same roots but
bear different fruit.
42 Halliwell (2008) 278 summarizes the scholarship that has tackled this passage (and the shortcomings of that
scholarship).
43 Arnould (1990) 118.
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In Plato's Laws, the final Platonic work in which laughter is explicitly theorized, laughter
and  the  laughable  are  repeatedly  treated  alongside  behaviors  that  provoke  laughter  or  are
designated  as  laughable,  such  as  comic  performances  and  iambic  poetry.  Theoretical
pronouncements  are  made,  but  the  practical  uses  and  implications  of  laughter  are  again
foregrounded. The  theoretical  discussions  of  laughter  and  the  laughable  in  the  Laws are
generally embedded in treatments of those occasions that might “contain” laughter in Plato's
world.  Similar  to  the  Philebus,  in  which  τὸ γελοῖον is  associated  with  stage  comedy,  the
mentions of the laughable in Books 7 and 11 of the Laws gravitate toward examinations of the
role  that “comedy” (broadly construed) is  to play in the well-governed city.  As a result,  the
meanings  of  ὁ γελώς and  τὸ γελοῖον and  κωμῳδεῖν at  certain  points  in  the  work  seem
completely distinct from one another, while at other times they seem to blur together.
In Book 5 (732c1-4),  the  Athenian discourages immoderate  laughter  (γελώτων .  .  .
ἐξαισίων) and encourages decorous behavior (εὐσχημονεῖν). The difficulty in interpreting this
passage lies in constructing a positive argument when the bulk of the passage functions as a
deterrent; the Athenian does not assert that individuals should laugh moderately, but he also does
not call for prohibition against all laughter. It seems plausible to state that the Athenian believes
laughter  to  be  a  pleasant  experience  that  should  be  enjoyed  in  moderation.  He  thus  echoes
Socrates' uncontested assertion in Phlb. 50a7-10 that laughter is a form of pleasure (ἡδονήν),44
and even though the Athenian's argument is not framed positively, he nevertheless casts laughter
in a positive light.
The Athenian offers a similarly equivocal concession in Book 7 (816d3-817d8), this time
in  reference  to  the  laughable.  His  initial  point  is  significant:  one  cannot  understand  serious
44 There seems to be a correspondence of concepts between the Athenian's discussion of ignorance (732a3-b2),
which immediately precedes the discussion of laughter in Book 5, and Socrates' definition of τὸ γελοῖον in the
Philebus as a form of self-ignorance
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matters without laughable ones. Yet this statement is immediately qualified by the argument that
follows, only to be eventually overwhelmed in a discussion of comic and tragic theater. The
starting point is nonetheless important to the extent that it privileges an intellectual appreciation
of τὸ γελοῖον. The question of the practice of τὸ γελοῖον is what directs the conversation to a
consideration  of  who  will  act  in  comedic  performances.  The  Athenian's  arguments  that  the
rendering of laughable things deprives an individual of virtue (816e2-5), and that only slaves and
foreigners are to perform comedies—and then only as negative exempla (816e5-10)—create for
the reader a dog-pile of unfavorable associations (foreigners, slaves, and loss of virtue),  and
distract  from the  very  concept  upon which  all  of  these things are  piling:  the desirability  of
knowledge of the laughable. The inclusion of such a discussion of the laughable demonstrates the
Athenian's belief in the importance of such knowledge and of its role in the well-governed city.
In Book 11 (934c8-936a5), the Athenian traces a conception of the laughable through
such varied  terrain  as  madness,  slander,  and poetry,  although the  fluid manner  in  which  he
transitions between topics makes the reader unaware of how much ground is being covered. One
of the more puzzling passages is the exploration of the crucial role that  τὸ γελοῖον plays in
slander. The explicit argument regarding  τὸ γελοῖον in these passages is that habitual slander
requires the slanderer to aim for the laughable, much to the detriment of his own character. The
implicit argument is more involved: as the Athenian sees the matter, an appeal to the laughable is
not, in and of itself, a sufficient “goal” in a slanderous exchange. The man prone to such slander
is merely engaging in ridicule, and he fails to advance a constructive argument or substantial
indictment of his opponent.45 For this  man, his  ridiculous,  abusive language comes up short
45 I draw this conclusion from the Athenian's requirement at 934e4-6 that an individual involved in an argument
must both teach (διδασκέτω) and learn (μανθανέτω) from his opponent:  ὁ δὲ ἀμφισβητῶν ἔν τισι λόγοις
ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διδασκέτω καὶ μανθανέτω τόν τε ἀμφισβητοῦντα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἀπεχόμενος πάντως
τοῦ κακηγορεῖν.
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because it becomes its own end. The preferable alternative is that a gesture toward the laughable
accomplishes something more than being merely laughable. 
Despite this relationship between slander and  τὸ γελοῖον,  the Athenian paints a more
forgiving portrait of the laughable when he collapses it into a broad conception of “comedy.”
Comic productions as well  as iambic and lyric poems of a certain type fall  under the same
heading, and even though the Athenian uses the verb  κωμῳδεῖν to indicate what all of these
types  of  composition  do,  the  terminology  he  uses  before  settling  on  this  term  has  fewer
associations with genre. At 935d4-5 the Athenian speaks of τὴν . . . προθυμίαν τοῦ γελοῖα εἰς
τοὺς  ἀνθρώπους  λέγειν—“a  zeal  for  saying  laughable  things  about  people.”  He  further
subdivides this into the “playful” (παίζειν) and “not playful” (μὴ παίζειν), where the playful is
characterized as lacking the undesirable passion of θυμός while still appealing to the laughable:
καὶ παίζοντι μὲν ἐξέστω τινὶ περί του λέγειν γελοῖον ἄνευ θυμοῦ (935d6-7). This playful use
of the laughable is ultimately permitted to certain poets with certain audiences.
The depiction of τὸ γελοῖον in the Republic and the Philebus as an altogether bad thing
or a  manifestation of  envy  is  thus first  softened in  Book 7 of  the  Laws when the Athenian
advocates knowledge of the laughable and allows into his well-governed city renderings of the
laughable  by  slaves  in  comic  performances.  But,  as  discussed  above,  this  appears  to  be
something of a backhanded compliment. In Book 11, τὸ γελοῖον is further softened by the fact
that a playful aspect of it is identified and deemed permissible. Far from being stripped of its
power by the restrictions imposed upon it,  τὸ γελοῖον is  made to  occupy a more desirable
position in Book 11 than anywhere else in the Platonic corpus.
It would be a gross overstatement to assert that laughter and the laughable are reconciled
in Plato's Laws. The Athenian uses two distinct terms throughout his discussions, and a passage
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such as  that  in  Book 5 which  attributes  a  measure of joy to  laughter is  a  far  cry from the
suggestion that renderings of the  laughable are inconsistent with a virtuous life, as appears in
Book 7. Nevertheless,  γελᾶν and  τὸ γελοῖον are seen to share some common ground in the
Laws, an effect achieved by way of the Athenian's concessions to the laughable. By allowing the
laughable to inhabit a more playful space,  the Athenian depicts  τὸ γελοῖον as a potentially
good-natured experience—an expression of positive  emotion.  The meanings of  ὁ γελώς, τὸ
γελοῖον, and κωμῳδεῖν all remain distinct, but the laughable and “comedy” are portrayed in the
Laws as having more in common with each other and even with laughter than they do elsewhere.
The semantic rift between laughter and the laughable is not repaired, but it is in some sense
bridged. 
It would be foolhardy, if not futile, to attempt to articulate a unified Platonic theory of
laughter from the three texts in which Plato offers considerations of laughter and the laughable.
Not one of these dialogues contains a conclusive treatment of laughter, and even if a section of a
dialogue seems to offer such a treatment (e.g., the investigation of the laughable in the Philebus),
the specific discussion is eventually subordinated to a larger argument, and laughter remains
something of a loose end.
Any positive representation of laughter in the discussions of the Republic, the Philebus,
and the  Laws appears as a concession, which is to say that the status quo for laughter and the
laughable within Plato's philosophic discourse is predominately negative.  Yet this conclusion
does not do justice to an ongoing tension in Plato's texts, namely that between the arguments
expressed  within a  dialogue and those built  into the  frame of  the  dialogue itself.  There  are
numerous occasions of laughter in the Platonic corpus which are elicited in the course of friendly
conversation  and  playful  banter,  and  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  these  seemingly-positive
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depictions with the critical theories of laughter which they frame. One might be able to distill a
theory from these “literary” depictions of laughter, but I will not attempt to do this with Plato;
my  intention  in  exploring  Plato  has  been  to  identify  ancient  theories  of  laughter—not  to
determine his own perspective on laughter, if such a determination is even possible. It is through
my examinations of the poetry of Vergil, Horace, and Ovid that I intend to elucidate a “theory” of
representations of literary laughter.
In examining Plato's comments on laughter, I have repeatedly highlighted the difference
between Plato's representations of laughter (γελᾶν) and the laughable (τὸ γελοῖον), and I have
urged that despite their etymological ties, Plato uses the verbal/nominal and adjectival forms to
convey different semantic concepts rather than syntactical ones. I devote this attention to the
semantic deviation of τὸ γελοῖον and γελᾶν because the predominately negative significance of
τὸ γελοῖον contributes to the widespread interpretation of Plato as the first Western philosopher
to offer a version of one of the primary explanations of laughter: the superiority theory.46 
According to the superiority theory as it is broadly conceived (namely, through the lens
of later theories of laughter), people laugh at what is bad or what is “below them,” and in so
laughing, they assert  their superiority,  be it  intellectual,  moral,  physiological, or otherwise.  I
believe that the theory has its most precise Platonic formulation in the passage from Book 5 of
the  Republic  discussed above (452d3-e2). There, the man who considers something other than
“the bad” to be laughable is labeled a fool, as is the man who attempts to rouse laughter at the
expense of something other than what is foolish or bad. With the two words Socrates uses to
gloss  τὸ γελοῖον in this passage,  τὸ κακόν and  τὸ ἄφρον, a  spectrum of Greek inferiority is
conveyed,  from  the  physical  or  moral  failings  expressed  in  τὸ  κακόν to  the  intellectual
46 The superiority theory receives its most precise formulation in Hobbes' reference to “sudden glory” and his
mention of superiority and inferiority (treated in the following pages). 
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shortcomings of τὸ ἄφρον. Another instantiation of the superiority theory of laughter is evident
in the passage from Book 3 that precedes Socrates' argument against excessive laughter; Socrates
suggests  that  the  guardians  should  “laugh-down”  (καταγελῷεν in  388d3)  immoderate
lamentation. The superiority of the “laugher” over the laughable is never expressly articulated by
Socrates, but the repeated invocation of the moral and intellectual shortcomings of τὸ γελοῖον
invite such a conclusion.
Similarly  in  the  Philebus,  the  seed  of  the  superiority  theory  is  apparent  in  Socrates'
treatment and definition of  τὸ γελοῖον,  which he construes as a product of (self-)ignorance
(Phlb. 48c8-d3 and Phlb. 49a5-6). In Book 7 of the Laws, laughable behavior is initially treated
as irreconcilable with a virtuous life (Leg.  816e2-5), and in Book 11, the laughable must be
softened and groomed for limited-inclusion in the εὔνομος πόλις. Τὸ γελοῖον remains a mark of
inferiority.
The distinction that Plato maintains between laughter and the laughable complicates this
otherwise simple picture. Laughter (ὁ γέλως) can arise independently from the laughable (τὸ
γελοῖον), and vice versa. In episodes from the Republic and the Philebus discussed previously, it
is apparent  that  laughter  is  a  fitting  response  to  something  designated  laughable—not  a
necessary one. 
Because a designation of someone or something as “laughable” is not a necessary and
sufficient condition for laughter, the presence of laughter is not a necessary or sufficient reason
for  labeling  something  bad,  even  if  the  designation  of  something  as  laughable  is  sufficient
reason. Plato himself has Socrates hypothesize an occasion of (“wrong”) laughter in response to
the nude exercising of the female guardians; he argues that this proposed training regimen is
neither laughable nor bad (Resp. 452a7-457b5). As for the scornful laughter of the guardians in
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Book 3 of the Republic (καταγελῷεν in 388d3), the use of the prefixed form of the verb γελᾶν
invites the reader to consider that the unprefixed form is semantically distinct and may express
something softer than scorn or superiority. This depiction of laughter as something other than an
expression of exultant scorn holds true in numerous other passages already discussed, such as
when laughter  is  treated  as  a  clear  manifestation  of  pleasure  (Phlb.  50a7-10)  or  a  potential
expression of joy (Leg.  732c1-4),  not  to mention the frequent  occasions of friendly laughter
exchanged in the narrative portions of Plato's dialogues.47
I make the preceding argument to advance a more cautious approach to Platonic laughter
rather than a drastically different one. In truth, the objections I have enumerated can easily be
addressed by regarding the superiority theory in Plato as a “theory of the laughable” instead of “a
theory of laughter,” a somewhat unstartling modification in light of the extent to which Plato
treats  τὸ  γελοῖον.  Yet  the  superiority  theory  is  not  widely  understood  as  a  theory  of  the
laughable. The theory receives its most famous explanation in a passage from Thomas Hobbes'
Human Nature: “[T]he passion of laughter is nothing else but  sudden glory arising from some
sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or
with our own formerly.”48 In the Leviathan, Hobbes repackages the point: “Sudden glory is the
passion which maketh those grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act
of their own, that pleaseth them, or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by
comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves.”49 In reading the two quotations against
one another, one can see that Hobbes treats “sudden glory” as the emotional, psychological, or
intellectual impetus of the physical behavior known as laughter. Though it has been suggested
47 The interpretation of  laughter  as  a  “pleasure” or  a  “joy” and the interpretation of  laughter  as  a  display of
superiority are not mutually exclusive. The presence of “congenial” laughter in the dialogues still remains the
best argument against a blanket application of the superiority theory to Plato.
48 Hobbes (1840) 46. Human Nature, Ch. 9, para. 13. Textual emphases are his.
49 Hobbes (1839) 46. Leviathan, Pt. 1, Ch. 6, para. 42. Textual emphases are his.
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that Hobbes “was clearly not silly enough to regard nervous giggles or polite laughter . . . as
fitting  what  he  says,”  Hobbes  remains  consistent  in  his  depiction  of  laughter—and  not the
laughable—as an expression of self-congratulatory superiority.50 
In addition to the superiority theory, elements of the relief theory of laughter are evident
in Plato's discussions about laughter and the laughable. The relief theory treats laughter as a
release from tension—emotional, psychological, intellectual, physical, or combinations thereof.
Plato presents laughter not so much as a relief from a named tension but as a balance to more
serious pursuits. In Book 7 of the Laws, the Athenian declares the interdependence of τὰ γελοῖα
and τὰ σπουδαῖα: “For without laughable matters, it is impossible to understand serious ones—
and likewise for all opposites—if one wants to be wise” (816d9-e2). The Athenian's emphasis
here  is  on  knowledge  of  the  laughable  rather  than  a  practical  application  of  it,  though  he
ultimately makes space for certain laughable productions in the well-governed city. A similar
conception of laughter as a counterbalance to seriousness is attributed by Aristotle to Gorgias in a
passage  discussed  in  the  following  section.  It  is  sufficient  to  note  here  that  neither  Plato's
Athenian nor Aristotle's Gorgias asserts that laughter offers a “relief” from seriousness, but both
texts suggest that laughter and the laughable lend perspective to seriousness.
Some  assumptions  are  required  to  observe  a  more  conventional  relief  theory  in  the
Platonic corpus, and so I offer the following argument with all due caution. Insofar as ἡ παιδιά
may be thought to share “semantic space” with  τὸ γελοῖον (as the verb  παίζειν does in  Leg.
935d6-7, discussed above),51 Socrates presents a version of the relief theory at  Phlb.  30e6-7:
“For, Protarchus, play sometimes offers relief from seriousness.” The term ἀνάπαυλα explicitly
conveys the sense of relief, although ἡ παιδιά (“play”) rather than τὸ γελοῖον is offered as a
50 Ewin (2001) 29. Ewin concludes, quite persuasively, that “It is not the laughter that is of concern to Hobbes, but
the passion that the laughter expresses” (40).
51 Another lexical possibility for παιδιά is “wit, jesting.” LSJ s.v. παιδιά.
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balance to seriousness (ἡ σπουδή).  The connection, however, remains unsatisfactory.  Even if
παιδιά is tied to the laughable, the relief theory is a theory about laughter, not the laughable. We
must  wait  for  Aristotle  to  draw a  direct  connection  between  laughter,  play,  and  relaxation.
Components of the relief theory are nevertheless hinted at in Plato's dialogues, even if an explicit
version of the relief theory is not articulated.
In the course of drawing out the differences between laughter and the laughable as they
are presented in the Republic, the Philebus, and the Laws, I emphasize that these interpretations
should not necessarily be interpreted as Plato's own outlook on laughter but only as a possible
outlook at the time that Plato was composing and living. Moreover, even though some of the
Platonic perspectives on laughter can be made to fit into considerably later explanations such as
the superiority and relief theories, Plato does not present theories with these names, nor does he
offer  a  unified  theory  of  laughter  and  the  laughable.  The  less  dialogic  and,  arguably,  less
enigmatic  approach  that  Aristotle  offers  in  his  philosophical  works  functions  as  a  fitting
counterpoint to Plato as ancient theories of laughter were further posited and further articulated.
3.2 ARISTOTLE'S SUPERIORITY RELIEVED
Aristotle's  theoretical  pronouncements  on  laughter  and  the  laughable  are  scattered
throughout  his  corpus  and,  much  like  Plato's  reflections  in  the  passing  on  laughter  in  the
Republic,  the  Philebus,  and  the  Laws,  are  embedded  in  examinations  of  other  topics.  The
ostensible  reason for Aristotle's lacunose treatment of laughter in his extant works is that he
examined laughter and comedy at length in a now-lost second book of the Poetics.52 Impressive
52 Aristotle himself suggests as much in, e.g.,  Rhet.1371b33:  διώρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ
ποιητικῆς. McMahon (1917) 2 notes, as evidence of a plurality of books on the Poetics, that “the definite article
is used in the plural.”
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attempts have been made to reconstruct the lost work based upon the Tractatus Coislinianus, but
any consensus as to whether the Tractatus is an accurate reflection of Aristotle's own work has
yet  to be reached.53 Consequently,  for an understanding of Aristotle's  position on laughter,  it
seems most prudent to examine his comments on laughter and the laughable in his undisputed
corpus. Thorough examinations of the laughable (as a concept more expansive than τὸ γελοῖον)
and of “comic theory” have been offered by Grant (1924) and Parker (1986). My focus will
continue to fall on explicit references to laughter and the laughable.54
I begin by noting that Aristotle's comments on laughter and the laughable are sometimes
cited as evidence for his espousal of a superiority theory of laughter.55 In the following pages, I
advance an interpretation of  τὸ γελοῖον and  ὁ γέλως in Aristotle that is less monolithic and
emphasizes his “less superior” treatments of these concepts. While laughter and the laughable are
repeatedly portrayed in Aristotle's reflections as potentially painful, destructive, and/or ugly, and
while the laughable, at least within the bounds of comedy, is described as having a share in the
shameful,  Aristotle  resists  any  identification  of  laughter  and  the  laughable  as  “bad”  in
themselves. On the contrary, his willingness to align laughter with notions of play, relaxation,
and pleasure coordinates with aspects of the relief theory of laughter.
Among Aristotle's lengthiest  treatments of laughter and the laughable is Chapter 8 in
Book  4  of  the Nicomachean  Ethics  (1127b33-1128b4).  This  passage  examines  a  particular
53 Grant (1924)  32 states that  the  Tractatus  “follows the Aristotelian tradition at  least,  if  it  does  not  directly
represent it.”  Janko (1984) and most recently Watson (2012) base reconstructions of a second book of  the
Poetics on the  Tractatus Coislinianus, which Watson regards as the “epitome” (p. 9) of the Aristotelian text.
Halliwell (2008) 392, by contrast, does not consider the Tractatus to be a “reliable guide to the lost second book
of Aristotle's Poetics.” In a broader survey of all theories of laughter with which the Augustan poets might have
had contact—setting aside the authenticity of the text as a representative reflection of Aristotle's position on
laughter or comedy—the Tractatus would certainly feature. I have excluded it from the present survey because
little  of  relevance  to  the  current  discussion  of  the  three  canonical  theories  distinguishes  it  from positions
articulated in Platonic, Aristotelian, and Ciceronian texts.
54 For fuller treatments of Aristotelian “comic” theory with attention to its impact on Latin literature, see Grant
(1924) and Parker (1986).
55 E.g., Morreall (1983) 5 and Plaza (2006) 7. Plaza also asserts that “all humour theories which have come down
to us from antiquity belong to the Superiority category” (7).
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virtuous “example of the mean” of harmonious social interaction, “there being relaxation in life
and, in this, a passing of time with play” (οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ
διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, 1127b33-34). Those embodying the mean are regarded as the “adept”
or  “witty”  (εὐτράπελοι),  those  “going  to  excess  in  the  laughable”  are  identified  as  the
“buffoonish”  (βωμολόχοι),  and  those  being  deficient  in  laughing  matters  as  the  “boorish”
(ἄγροικοι).  Aristotle  notes  that  people  have  trouble  keeping  distinct  the  characters  of  the
εὐτράπελος and  the  βωμολόχος,  “because  the  laughable is  prevalent  and most  people  are
pleased more than necessary by play and jesting” (ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν
πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ). In other words, people's
enjoyment of laughter clouds their judgment of its propriety. He even goes so far as to speculate
that proper jesting may be undefinable (ἀόριστον), “because different things are hateful and
pleasant (μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ) to different people.”
The passage offers a short meditation on the polyvalence of laughter and the laughable.
Laughter is characterized as a slippery behavior that, as Aristotle notes, can mean significantly
different things to different people. The appropriate cultivation and deployment of laughter is
never  explicitly  asserted  to  be  a  distinguishing  characteristic  of  “adept”  individuals
(εὐτράπελοι).  Instead,  Aristotle  states  that  these  people  play  “harmoniously”  (ἐμμελῶς
παίζοντες) and demonstrate tact (ἐπιδεξιότης) and propriety (τινα πρέποντα) in speaking and
jesting. Those who deviate from the mean of εὐτραπελία in either direction, however, do so with
respect  to  their  use  of  laughter.  Aristotle  notes  that  overindulgence  in  the  laughable  and  a
singleminded focus on raising laughter mark a deviation toward excess (1128a5-7 and 1128a33-
b1), and an inability to say anything laughable or to endure the saying of such a thing by others
(1128a8-10) involves a deviation toward deficiency. Thus Aristotle implies that an apt use of
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laughter  and  proper  treatment  of  the  laughable  befits  the  liberal  (ἐλευθέριος)  individual.56
Moreover,  the  figure  embodying  adeptness  (εὐτραπελία)  offers  the  most  appropriate  social
contributions in times of relaxation and play. And, as Aristotle states in his conclusion of the
passage at 1128b3-4, “it seems that relaxation and play in life are necessary.”
 One can immediately see how Aristotle's  situating of laughter and the laughable (via
εὐτραπελία) in the context of relaxation (ἡ ἀνάπαυσις) bears a resemblance to the relief theory
of laughter.  One of the most  concise versions  of the  relief  theory is  articulated in Sigmund
Freud's  Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious:  “We would say that laughter arises when the
sum total of psychic energy, formerly used for the occupation of certain psychic channels, has
become unutilizable so that it can experience absolute discharge.”57 Freud goes on to explain,
using an anecdote from Mark Twain, that laughter can discharge energy that has been reserved
for another  emotion (for  example,  pity),  the  expression of which emotion has,  for  whatever
reason, become superfluous.58 Although many of the earliest versions of the relief theory rely
upon  an  outdated  conception  of  human  biology,  the  basic  principle  hinges  on  an
acknowledgment, still prevalent today, that tension can be released or relieved through laughter.
Near the end of the  Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes a case for the importance of
play and rest, but he maintains that they are both inferior to the pursuit of happiness, which is a
serious matter and an end in itself:
ἀναπαύσει  γὰρ  ἔοικεν  ἡ  παιδιά,  ἀδυνατοῦντες  δὲ  συνεχῶς  πονεῖν  ἀναπαύσεως
δέονται.  Οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις:  γίνεται  γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς  ἐνεργείας.  Δοκεῖ  δ᾽  ὁ
εὐδαίμων βίος κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν εἶναι: οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω
τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς[. . .]. (1176b35-1177a4)
56 Grant (1924) 27 regards the passage “as one of the most important in the development of the theory of the
laughable. In it the ill-natured and good-natured jests are clearly distinguished and called by the names which
pass over into Latin, the illiberal and liberal jest, that which harmonizes with the character of the free man and
that which does not.” She tracks these ideas through Cicero's De oratore, Orator, and De officiis in the second
chapter of her work.
57 Freud and Brill (1916) 226.
58 Freud and Brill (1916) 374-376.
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For play is like to relaxation, and people, because they are unable to work continuously,
need relaxation. But relaxation is not an end in itself: for it occurs on account of activity.
But the happy life seems to be lived according to virtue: and this is a life with a share in
seriousness and not in play. We say that serious matters are better than laughable ones and
ones with a share in play [. . .].
With his categorical statements about the superiority of serious matters at the end of the passage,
Aristotle seems to leave little room for play and laughter in his worldview, yet he argues not for
the elimination of these behaviors but for their subordination.59 Laughter and play and relaxation,
while not proper ends in themselves, are necessary means to Aristotle's pursuit of the highest
good of happiness (ἡ εὐδαιμονία) and a life lived according to virtue (κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν).  As an
occasional  relaxation—or  relief—from such a  serious  pursuit,  which  Aristotle  acknowledges
cannot possibly continue unabated, people might reasonably play and, yes, even laugh, so long as
these things are done moderately.  In this way, the argument aligns well  with the differences
between “adeptness” and “buffoonery” explicated in Book 4 of the Ethics (1127b33-1128b4).
Halliwell (2008) draws upon the passage in Book 4 of the Nicomachean Ethics at length
in  a  section  of  Greek  Laughter entitled,  “How  Aristotle  makes  a  virtue  of  laughter,”
supplementing his examination with a sentence from the Rhetoric in which “adeptness” among
young men is defined as “educated hubris” (ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν, Rhet.
1389b11-12). He concludes that the Aristotelian approach to laughter has a dynamic range:
All this reveals that Aristotle sees the 'spirit' of laughter as extending along a spectrum
which his model of deficiency/virtue/excess reduces to ethical order: at one end of the
spectrum, the hubristic, shaming underside of laughter runs riot, while in the virtuous
middle range the impression of offensiveness (hubris) is 'educated' and moulded, through
shared codes of play, into a medium of reciprocated friendship. Where genuine eutrapelia
is achieved, the appearance of hubris will be nothing more than playful pretence. It will
replace the risk of pain with the reality of pleasure [. . .].60
59 Grant (1924) 25 speculates that, “From this idea perhaps arose the theory of the genres [. . .] according to which
the different types of poetry such as lyric, epic, tragedy, and comedy, were ranked highly or not in proportion to
their seriousness.”
60 Halliwell (2008) 324.
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Halliwell's  comments about “reciprocated friendship,” “playful  pretence,”  and “the reality  of
pleasure”  identify  a  positive  aspect  in  Aristotle's  portrayal  of  laughter  when  modeled
appropriately by the “adept” individual. Perhaps this is less surprising in light of the fact that the
Greek term εὐτραπελία contains a prefix εὐ- that, at least on first-reading, grants the concept a
positive cast.61 Additionally, despite the fact that laughter's (and jesting's) destructive potential is
implicit  in descriptions of decorous laughter as “not giving pain” (μὴ λυπεῖν in 1128a7 and
1128a26), the references to play (ἡ παιδιά), relaxation (ἡ ἀνάπαυσις), delight (τέρπειν), and the
pleasant (ἡδύ) reinforce the possibility of virtuous laughter through the passage. 
Halliwell also takes pains to diminish the role of hubris in the “adept” individual's use of
laughter and the laughable. As I note in my previous remarks on Plato's Philebus, the collocation
of pleasure with laughter does not by necessity preclude feelings of superiority, but the idea of
“educated  hubris”  in  Aristotle  emphasizes  the  possibility  of  scaling  back  or  molding  any
superiority  that  hubris  may  entail.  What  remains  at  the  end  of  this  passage  from  the
Nicomachean Ethics and at the end of the Ethics as a whole is an ideal of laughter for Aristotle
that is grounded not in assertions of superiority or critiques of badness but in friendly social
intercourse, play, and pleasant relaxation that aids in the serious pursuit of happiness. In this
sense, his treatment of “flawed” laughter has more in common with a superiority theory, but his
treatment of “ideal” laughter more closely resembles a relief theory.
Similar references to “ideal” laughter appear in other passages from Aristotle's Rhetoric.
While discussing pleasure (ἡ ἡδονή) in Chapter 11 of Book 1, Aristotle takes for granted that
laughter is pleasant in the course of pursuing a logical proof about laughable things:
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα ἄνεσις, καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων,
ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα [. . .]. περὶ μὲν
οὖν ἡδέων εἰρήσθω ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις φανερά.
61 The adjective form is, according to LSJ, used “in a bad sense” in authors like Isocrates and Plutarch. 
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(Rhet. 1371b35-1372a1)
Likewise, since play and all relaxing and laughter are pleasant, it is necessary also that
laughable things—men,  words,  and deeds—are pleasant  [.  .  .].  Concerning, then,  the
pleasant, let these things be said: the painful things are apparent from the opposite of
these things.
Plato's  semantic  rift  between  laughter  and  the  laughable  seems  to  have  disappeared  as  the
laughable acquires a significantly more positive coloring. That Aristotle is referring to laughter
and the laughable when they are properly used—i.e., in their ideal forms—is confirmed by the
universally “pleasant” description he grants them. Moreover, laughter's potential to cause pain is
expressly  denied,  because  pleasant  things  (to  which  class  laughter  and  the  laughable
emphatically belong) are the opposite of painful things (τὰ λυπηρά). 
In a description of the characteristics of mild men (οἱ πρᾶοι) in Chapter 3 of Book 2 of
the  Rhetoric (1380b2-5), Aristotle compares these men to the angry men he has treated in the
previous chapter:
καὶ ἔχοντες δὲ ἐναντίως τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι πρᾶοί  εἰσιν, οἷον ἐν παιδιᾷ, ἐν
γέλωτι,  ἐν ἑορτῇ, ἐν εὐημερίᾳ,  ἐν κατορθώσει,  ἐν πληρώσει,  ὅλως ἐν ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ
ἡδονῇ μὴ ὑβριστικῇ καὶ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἐπιεικεῖ. (Rhet. 1380b2-5)
And those who feel the opposite of being angry, it is clear that they are mild, as when at
play, during laughter, at a feast, in good times, in success, amidst fulfillment, and when
wholly in painlessness and pleasure sans offense and in fitting hope.
 
The accompaniments of laughter are all emphatically pleasant, and negative concepts of pain and
offensiveness are only mentioned for their absence: ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ ἡδονῇ μὴ ὑβριστικῇ. 
A term shared  between  these  passages  from Aristotle's  Rhetoric,  besides  laughter  (ὁ
γέλως) itself,  is play—ἡ παιδιά.62 Variations on relaxation and pleasure also appear in each
passage. In the selection from Book 1 of the  Rhetoric,  ἄνεσις, a synonym for  ἀνάπαυσις, is
placed between play  and laughter;  and pleasure (ἡδονή),  a  word cognate  in  the Greek with
62 This is accompanied by related vocabulary for pleasure and the pleasant: ἡδέα and ἡδονή.
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pleasant things (ἡδέα),63 is listed in the passage from Book 2 alongside laughter and play. The
confluence of laughter, pleasure, relaxation, and play in the Rhetoric and the positive depiction
that  these  concepts  are  given  makes  particular  sense  in  a  rhetorical  treatise.  The  power  of
laughter in oratory was certainly not unknown to Aristotle. He credits the sophist Gorgias with a
noteworthy bit of advice on the role of laughter in agonistic rhetorical exchanges: “And Gorgias
said that it is necessary to destroy the seriousness of opponents with laughter, and laughter with
seriousness,  and  he  was  right”  (καὶ  δεῖν  ἔφη  Γοργίας  τὴν  μὲν  σπουδὴν  διαφθείρειν  τῶν
ἐναντίων γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ, ὀρθῶς λέγων [. . .]).64 Gorgias' juxtaposition of
seriousness  against  laughter  bears  a  striking  similarity  to  Aristotle's  own  juxtaposition  in
Nicomachean Ethics 1177a3-4 of “serious matters” against laughable ones and play (βελτίω τε
λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς). Yet Gorgias' rhetorical sentiment does
not entail the same subordination of the laughable to the serious that Aristotle's ethical statement
demands. For Gorgias, seriousness and laughter are equally necessary in rhetorical exchanges.
Remarkably, Aristotle voices his agreement.
The Poetics offers one of Aristotle's most direct approaches to the laughable and a simple
reminder that some degree of superiority remains associated with his depiction of the laughable:
Ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἴπομεν μίμησις φαυλοτέρων μέν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν
κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημά
τι  καὶ  αἶσχος  ἀνώδυνον  καὶ  οὐ  φθαρτικόν,  οἷον  εὐθὺς  τὸ  γελοῖον  πρόσωπον
αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης. (1449a32-37)
Comedy is (just as we have said) mimesis of meaner things, not, however, corresponding
with badness altogether; rather, the laughable is part of the shameful. For the laughable is
a certain defect and deformity that is harmless and not destructive, as, for example, the
laughable mask is something shameful and distorted but not painful.
This  definition  of  τὸ  γελοῖον is  noteworthy  for  the  implicit  distinction  it  draws  between
63 Chantraine (1980) s.v. ἥδομαι.
64 Rhet. 1419b4-6.
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“comedy”  and  the  “laughable.”  The  terms  share  semantic  space  in  that  τὸ  γελοῖον is
instrumental to the defining of comedy as well  as to the embedded description of the comic
mask, but they differ in that the laughable is not a type of mimesis.
One can immediately understand how subsequent laughter theorists might draw upon this
passage  as  evidence  of  Aristotle's  belief  that  laughter  indicates  superiority.65 Aristotle's
definitions of comedy and the laughable are burdened with terminology implying inferiority.
When the laughable is defined as “part of the shameful” and “a certain defect and deformity,” the
implication  is  that  people  see  such  defects  and  deformities  as  beneath  them,  and  laughter
communicates their  superiority.  But a brief consideration of the rhetorical  progression of the
passage allows for a softer reading of τὸ γελοῖον.
There is no softening the fact that the domain of comedy is comparatively mean when set
against that of tragedy, but as soon as Aristotle declares in  Poetics  1449a32-33 that comedy is
“mimesis of lower things,” he proceeds as if endeavoring to blunt the force of this assertion. He
first notes that comedy does not take as its subject badness  per se  (οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν
κακίαν),  and  he  then  acknowledges  that  the  laughable  is  a  component  of  the  shameful.
Importantly,  Aristotle  does  not  assert  that  the  laughable  is  shameful,  rather,  he  saves  his
ontological statements for the following sentence wherein he declares that the laughable is a
defect  and  a  deformity.  Yet  even  these  assertions  are  softened  as  he  emphasizes  that  the
laughable  is  not harmful,  not  destructive,  and  not painful.  The  reader  may  very  well  be
wondering  what  the  laughable  really  is.  Absent  from Aristotle's  definition  are  any  positive
elements  of  τὸ γελοῖον.  Where  are  play,  pleasure,  and relaxation?  Perhaps  Aristotle  subtly
introduces  these  and other  associations  of  the  laughable with  his  mention  of  the “laughable
65 Plaza (2006) 7 offers no further explanation than the following sentence: “The next version of the Superiority
theory is sketched by Aristotle in his  Poetics  5.1449a, where he defines the laughable as that which is ugly
without being painful.”
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mask.” In calling to the reader's mind the visual trappings of comedy with his mention of the
comic mask, Aristotle concretizes the theoretical discussion of comedy in an instant, constructs a
performance venue with masked actors on stage, and places the reader of the Poetics as spectator
in it. As the reader imagines himself contemplating the effect of the comic mask in this festive
theatrical atmosphere, notions of play, pleasure, and relaxation may effortlessly follow.
Whatever the merits of this last suggestion, Aristotle's explicit references to laughter and
the laughable in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Rhetoric, and the Poetics are certainly not in line
with a uniform superiority theory of laughter. Halliwell (2008) observes that, “Concern with the
nature and boundaries of appropriate laughter enters the  Ethics  [. . .] not as a free-standing or
abstract theme for moral reflection but as a dimension of real social interaction.”66 The point is
all the more applicable to Aristotle's practically-leaning works on rhetoric and literary theory as
he remains perpetually aware of laughter's function in “the real world.” Aristotle demonstrates an
additional awareness that laughter in the real world can have vastly different motivations and
effects. For example, a disconnect exists in the Ethics (1127b33-1128b4) between the laughter of
the buffoon, the laughlessness of the boor (both of which would fall under my designation above
of “flawed” laughter),  and the “ideal”  laughter of the “adept” individual. But even “flawed”
laughter—part of the shameful though it may be—stops short of sharing in what is truly “bad,”
and the laughter that Aristotle suggests is objectionable, such as that of the buffoon or the boor, is
bad not in essence but in application.  Otherwise the virtuous mean would not  accommodate
laughter at all. 
Laughter's essence, to judge from its many pleasant accompaniments as listed in Rhetoric
1371b35-1372a1  and  Rhetoric 1380b2-5,  shares  conceptual  ground  not  only  with  laughable
things (which is itself a signficant departure from the predominantly negative Platonic depiction
66 Halliwell (2008) 308.
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of τὸ γελοῖον) but also with pleasure, relaxation, and play, all of which concepts are set against
seriousness  in  Aristotle's  works.  Ultimately,  the “ideal”  laughter  that  Aristotle  depicts  in  his
works has much in common with a relief theory of laughter that emphasizes laughter's potential
to contribute positively to a happy life and to aid in periods of relaxation and—a concept to
which I return in Chapters 4, 5, and 6—play. These and additional aspects of laughter and the
laughable are revisited in greater detail in works by Cicero, and it is to these that I now turn.
3.3 CICERO'S PROLIFERATION OF THEORIES
Marcus Tullius Cicero offers his first and fullest treatment of laughter and the laughable
in Book 2 of De oratore, a work that openly acknowledges debts to Plato and Aristotle in form
and content.67 The dialogic structure that the work adopts, including setting and components of
the narrative, is self-consciously lifted from Plato's  dialogues,68 while Aristotle's service as a
model is even more explicitly confessed: “Therefore I have written, in the Aristotelian custom
(Aristotelio more), insofar as I wished, three books in argument and dialogue on the orator (de
oratore)”69 Cicero's indebtedness to Plato and Aristotle is particularly apparent in that portion of
67 Leeman, Pinkster, and Rabbie (1989) offer a thorough treatment and commentary on this section of De oratore
in “Inventio G: Witz und Humor (2,216b-290)” (172-333), including diagrams of the divisions and distinctions
in vocabulary adopted by the various speakers (178-80) and a discussion of “Die Terminologie des Lächerlichen
bei Cicero, besonders in De or.” (183-8).
68 De or. 1.28: postero autem die, cum illi maiores natu satis quiessent et in ambulationem ventum esset, [dicebat]
tum Scaevolam duobus spatiis tribusve factis dixisse "cur non imitamur, Crasse, Socratem illum, qui est in
Phaedro Platonis? nam me haec tua platanus admonuit, quae non minus ad opacandum hunc locum patulis est
diffusa ramis,  quam illa,  cuius  umbram secutus  est  Socrates,  quae mihi videtur  non tam ipsa acula,  quae
describitur, quam Platonis oratione crevisse, et quod ille durissimis pedibus fecit, ut se abiceret in herba atque
ita [illa], quae philosophi divinitus ferunt esse dicta, loqueretur, id meis pedibus certe concedi est aequius. Cf.
Att. 4.16.3. Fantham (2004) argues persuasively in her chapter on the structure of De oratore (“Constructing the
Dialogue,” pp. 49-77) that “Cicero set out in this, his first dialogue, to emulate the form and manner of Plato's
early and middle dialogues” (50), though she also indicates the unsuitability of Socratic elenchos as an end-goal
for Cicero's work (53-4).
69 Fam. 1.9: scripsi igitur, Aristotelio more, quem ad modum quidem volui, tris libros in disputatione et dialogo 'de
oratore' [. . .]. Fantham (2004) concisely indicates how Cicero's emulation of Aristotle is evident not only in his
choice of content but also his departure from the Platonic tendency to construct a straw man (17-8), and she
explores Cicero's debts to Aristotle at greater length in the chapter “Rediscovering Aristotelian Invention” (161-
85).
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the work which examines the role of laughter and humor in oratory, the  excursus de ridiculis
from 2.216 to 290, wherein  Cicero  dramatizes  a  conversation  between distinguished Roman
orators about laughter and jokes. Many of Plato's and Aristotle's observations on laughter are
revisited, explicated, and pushed in new directions. Mary Grant dedicates the second chapter of
Ancient Rhetorical  Theories of the Laughable  (1924) to “The Laughable in Cicero,” and her
detailed and readable study of the  excursus  along with that of Leeman-Pinskter-Rabbie (1989)
frees me to be selective in my treatment of Cicero's original contributions to ancient theories of
laughter.  I  focus  in  particular  and at  greater  length  on  parallels  to  and deviations  from the
Platonic and Aristotelian passages I have examined in the preceding pages. In the process, I also
begin to acquaint readers with the Latin vocabulary of laughter and the risible “in action.”
The structure of the inset conversation about laughter, wit, and humor is summarized at
De oratore 2.235 when Julius Caesar Strabo (henceforth “Caesar”) outlines the five questions
with which I open this  introductory chapter.  After posing these questions, Caesar spends the
remainder of the discussion answering them in varying degrees of detail, devoting, for example,
little time to explaining the nature of laughter while paying significant attention to laughter's
proper use and cultivation by an orator. 
Curiously, laughter has been the focus of the conversation for nearly twenty chapters by
the time Caesar poses his questions in 2.235, and even though the material most pertinent to our
own inquiry appears  in  response to  these questions,  the chapters that  transition  to this  inset
conversation (216-234) offer an introductory portrait of laughter more generally. The discussion
of laughter and wit proceeds from a broader consideration, led by Antonius, of the proper use of
emotion in oratory (185-216). As he concludes his remarks on emotion, Antonius argues, in a
passage reminiscent of Gorgias' pronouncement (as reported by Aristotle) on the use of laughter
and seriousness as counterbalances to one another, that an audience's emotional responses, when
43
undesired by the speaker, should be combated “by opposite emotions (contrariis commotionibus)
so that benevolence may be lifted away by hatred, envy by pity.”70 He states that a joke or a
witticism is  pleasant  and useful  in  this regard,  and,  after  quickly asserting that  wit  is  not  a
teachable skill, Antonius hands the topic off to Caesar.71 
Caesar agrees: Quare mihi quidem nullo modo videtur doctrina ista res posse tradi—“For
which reason this matter certainly seems to me in no way able to be imparted by instruction”.72
Such a disclaimer does not mean that the inquiry is over, despite the fact that Caesar has also just
disparaged previous attempts to establish a theory de ridiculis (217). Caesar proceeds to identify
two types of wit,  cavillatio and dicacitas,  and acknowledges that each has a trivial name: “But
really this entire idea of provoking laughter is trivial.”73 With Caesar's rapid shift from terms for
the laughable (ridiculis and ridicula in 217) to terms for laughter (ridere in 217 and risus in 218),
distinctions between the meanings of these words become hazy. As Caesar presents the matter,
what is ridiculum elicits laughter, and to laugh at something is to acknowledge it as laughable.
The  fluid merging in  Caesar's  terminology for  laughter  and the  laughable reveals  an
approach in Cicero that is distinct in some ways from his Greek predecessors—terminological
divergences  that  will  be  examined as  the  vocabulary  of  laughter  and the  risible  comes into
sharper focus. Suffice it to say that in the current discussion of Cicero, the caution I exercised in
separating laughter and the laughable in Plato will, by and large, be abandoned, a move that is
perhaps  less  surprising  in  light  of  the  shift  toward  a  reconciliation  of  the  concepts  already
apparent in the works of Aristotle. Differences of vocabulary and language aside, the argument
70 De or. 2.216: illa autem, quae aut conciliationis causa leniter, aut permotionis vehementer aguntur, contrariis
commotionibus auferenda sunt, ut odio benevolentia, misericordia invidia tollatur.
71 An explicit term for laughter or the laughable is absent from Antonius' set-up, although three such words occur
in chapter  217 when Caesar  takes over (ridiculis,  ridicula,  and  rideatur).  Grant (1924) 100-131 presents a
detailed “Analysis of Terminology” for terms used by Cicero in this passage of De oratore, with her stated goal
being to “gain more precise information on his theory of the laughable” (100).
72 De or. 218.
73 De or. 219: quippe leve enim est totum hoc risum movere.
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that Caesar espouses in his introduction “that witticisms are greatly and frequently beneficial in
speaking” does  not  appear  at  all  in  Plato's  discussions  of  laughter.74 Plato,  at  his  most
accommodating to laughter and the laughable, has the Athenian of the  Laws advocate only a
theoretical—not practical—knowledge of the laughable.75 As for Aristotle, his brief remarks at
Rhetoric 1419b3-9 regarding the value of the laughable in oratory hint at Cicero's argument, but
Aristotle cautiously attributes the concept to Gorgias and devotes to it only six lines rather than
seventy chapters. Whether because of changes in the landscapes of oratory and philosophy or
because of changes in the times and places for which Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were writing,
the Roman orator pushes his discussions of laughter and the laughable in additional and more
diverse directions than either of the Greek philosophers.  Yet the points of similarity between
Cicero's,  Aristotle's,  and  Plato's  theoretical  discussions  of  laughter  still  outnumber  the
differences. These similarities become apparent when Caesar explicitly describes the source of
laughter and thus offers a fitting point of entry into Cicero's “theory of laughter.”
Caesar, after setting the agenda for the discussion of laughter in De oratore 2.235, claims
not to know a satisfactory answer to his first question regarding the nature of the behavior—a
judicious move, considering that a satisfactory answer to this question is still wanting.76 To his
second question about the source of laughter (unde sit in 2.235), Caesar's response is concise and
authoritative:
locus  autem  et  regio  quasi  ridiculi  –  nam  id  proxime  quaeritur  –  turpitudine  et
deformitate quadam continetur; haec enim ridentur uel sola uel maxime, quae notant et
designant turpitudinem aliquam non turpiter. (De or. 236)
However  the  place  and  domain,  so  to  speak,  of  the  laughable—for  it  is  our  second
question—is delimited by a certain unseemliness and ugliness; for those things (either
alone  or  most  especially)  provoke  laughter  which  mark  out  and  designate  some
74 De or. 227: quare tibi, Antoni, utrumque assentior, et multum facetias in dicendo prodesse saepe . . .
75 Cf.  Leg. 816d9-e6, when the Athenian says it is necessary to understand (μανθάνειν) the laughable so as to
avoid doing such laughable things (ὅσα γελοῖα).
76 De or. 235: atque illud primum, quid sit ipse risus . . . viderit Democritus.
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unseemliness in a not unseemly manner.
Plato and Aristotle would be proud. Echoes of the Platonic interpretation of  τὸ γελοῖον from
Resp. 452d3-e2 and Phlb.48c8-d3 and of Aristotle's definition of comedy and the laughable from
Poetics  1449a30 resonate throughout  this  Ciceronian passage.  Caesar  does  not  designate the
laughable as “bad” or “evil,” as Plato does, but the locus ridiculi is indisputably indecorous, as
the repeated appearance of turpitudo attests. Caesar's definition almost sounds like a paraphrase
of Aristotle's identification of τὸ γελοῖον in the Poetics as “a certain defect and deformity that is
harmless and not destructive,” with Caesar's  deformitas  offering a winning translation of the
Greek αἶσχος. There are even several  structural  parallels between the sentences,  including the
use of two nouns in each definition (turpitudine et deformitate vs. ἁμάρτημα . . . καὶ αἶσχος),
the  placement  of  indefinite  pronouns  and  adjectives  (deformitate  quadam and  turpitudinem
aliquam vs. ἁμάρτημά τι and αἰσχρόν τι ), and the use of adverbial qualification at the end of
each definition (non turpiter vs. ἄνευ ὀδύνης).
Despite these similarities in word choice and sentence structure, Cicero allows Caesar to
draw an important distinction in his explanation of the source of laughter. Whereas Aristotle
equates (ἐστιν)  τὸ γελοῖον with “a certain defect and deformity” in  Poetics  1449a30, Caesar
does not identify the laughable itself as unseemly. His definition is cautiously mediated through
the  presentation  of the  laughable.  This  presentation  of  unseemly things  in  a  markedly “not
unseemly” fashion provokes laughter (notant et designant . . . non turpiter). As if already teeing
up an answer to his third question (“Does it befit an orator to wish to raise a laugh?” 77), Caesar
approaches his definition of the laughable with oratory in mind. Indeed, Caesar has declared his
belief in laughter's suitability to oratory just moments (i.e., chapters) earlier.78 Caesar's attention
77 De or. 235: tertium, sitne oratoris velle risum movere.
78 De or. 227.
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to presentation as he defines laughter and the laughable has an additional implication already
alluded to above: if the ridiculum resides in the appropriate presentation of an unseemly thing,
then the unseemly thing is not  necessarily  itself laughable, nor is the laughable, by definition,
unseemly.
This is a remarkable philosophical leap in the treatment of laughter and the laughable in
antiquity. In mediating the ridiculum through presentation, Caesar intimates that the laughable is
a product of cognition—an intellectual construction, and not an essential nature. The recognition
of the laughable and the subsequent stimulation of laughter are exercises in forms of designation,
be  they  interpersonally  linguistic  or  intrapersonally  conceptual.  Thus  Caesar  defines  the
laughable in such a way that its handling by an orator or by another cognitive agent is essential;
decorous presentation of the proper material leads to laughter. Things don't provoke laughter;
people provoke laughter.
But why would people, and more specifically an orator, provoke laughter? Caesar focuses
on the practical psychological effects of laughter as he asserts that an orator should provoke
laughter:
It is clearly fitting for an orator to raise laughter, either because lightheartedness imparts
upon the individual who excites it good will; or because we all admire sharpness, often
placed in a single word, especially by a person on the defense though sometimes even by
a person on the attack; or because it cracks an opponent, because it hinders, trivializes,
deters, or refutes him; or because it indicates that an orator himself is a man of polish,
skilled and witty, especially because he tempers and relaxes sadness and severity, and he
often dissolves disagreeable matters—ones not easily diluted by argumentation—with a
joke and a laugh.79
Though the locus of the laughable is circumscribed by unseemliness and ugliness, Caesar frees
79 De or. 236:  est  plane oratoris mouere risum; uel  quod  ipsa hilaritas beneuolentiam conciliat  ei, per  quem
excitata  est;  uel  quod  admirantur  omnes  acumen  uno  saepe  in  uerbo  positum  maxime  respondentis,  non
numquam etiam lacessentis;  uel quod frangit  aduersarium, quod impedit, quod eleuat,  quod deterret,  quod
refutat; uel quod ipsum oratorem politum esse hominem significat, quod eruditum, quod urbanum, maxime quod
tristitiam ac seueritatem mitigat et relaxat odiosasque res saepe, quas argumentis dilui non facile est, ioco
risuque dissoluit. 
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laughter and the laughable from a simple Platonic identification with τὸ κακόν or what Aristotle
calls “a certain defect and deformity.” He offers a variety of reasons for an orator to make use of
laughter,  the  first  of  which,  with  its  invocation  of  lightheartedness  (hilaritas) and  goodwill
(benevolentia), is far from the underbelly of indecorousness which he says lends material to the
laughable.  Caesar's  second reason is  predominantly  aesthetic  in  his  attention  to  acumen  and
admiration, and even though he concedes that such sharpness may provoke appreciation when
wielded by an attacker, he privileges its use by someone on the defensive. Not until his third
reason does Caesar  turn his  attention to laughter's  more combative powers,  all  of which are
couched within the domain of rhetoric. With his final reason, Caesar returns to the domain of
aesthetics as he suggests that the ability  to deploy jokes and laughter  puts a shiny luster of
urbanity on the orator.  Such an orator uses laughter to battle  sadness, seriousness and, most
generally, “disagreeable matters”.
After stating that the province of the laughable is contained by turpitudo and deformitas,
Caesar could have explained why orators ought to utilize laughter by focusing on the proper
identification of the unseemly in political, judicial, or personal affairs. Instead Caesar abandons
unseemliness for the time to list instead the benefits of laughter, which he portrays as something
of an orator's panacea. Caesar's drastic shift in his treatment of laughter may be unexpected, but
it is not contradictory. When he defines the locus ridiculi, Caesar is talking about the source of
laughter.  When  he  urges  laughter's  use  by  an  orator,  he  talks  about  laughter's  effects.  In
discussing these effects, Cicero's Caesar articulates the most succinct and specific presentation of
a “relief theory” of laughter to date.
As discussed in the previous summaries of Plato's and Aristotle's writings on laughter and
the laughable, the relief theory treats laughter as a release from tension. Plato's Athenian in Book
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7 of the  Laws, Aristotle's Gorgias from the  Rhetoric, and Aristotle himself in Book 10 of the
Nicomachean Ethics and the first two books of the  Rhetoric set out precursors of this theory
when  they  present  laughter  as  a  balance  to  seriousness,  but  both  stop  short  of  designating
laughter or the laughable a form of relief  per se.  Caesar's language, however, as he lists the
desirable effects of laughter's use by an orator, is attuned to the release from tension that laughter
offers. The verbs frangit, impedit, elevat, deterret, and refutat take adversarium as an object, and
should one dispute that such a thorough destruction of one's adversary would bring relief to a
speaker, Caesar's next argument is more explicitly gauged toward relief. The  skilled and witty
orator  uses  jokes  and  laughter  to  temper  and  relax  sadness  and  severity—to  dissolve  the
disagreeable.  Again,  the  verbs  are  key:  mitigat,  relaxat,  and  dissolvit  present  laughter  as  an
oratorical massage.
The entire discussion of laughter and the laughable in De oratore is itself presented as a
form  of  relief.80 Immediately  before  Caesar  begins  his  explication  of  laughter  in  earnest,
Antonius says,  “Indeed,  I  have a  few things left  to say,  but,  nevertheless,  since  I'm already
exhausted by the labor and journey of my argument, I will take a break (requiescam) in Caesar's
speech as if in some most-ideal lodge.”81 Caesar, when he draws his speech to a close, returns to
Antonius' simile: “But now you, Antonius, who said that you would happily relax (acquieturum)
in this lodging of my speech, just as if you were diverted into the Pomptine Marshes and not
some lovely and healthful locale, I recommend that you judge yourself to have rested (requiesse)
long enough and that you go on to finish the remaining journey.”82 Caesar's self-critique aside,
80 Fantham (2004) 186 makes the observation that “As humour brings a relief from tension in oratory, so we may
expect discussion of humour to provide some relaxation of tone in the dialogue,” but she stops short of tying her
observation to a broader theory of laughter.
81 De or. 2.234: et Antonius “perpauca quidem mihi restant," inquit "sed tamen defessus iam labore atque itinere
disputationis meae requiescam in Caesaris sermone quasi in aliquo peropportuno deuersorio.”
82 De or. 2.290: sed iam tu, Antoni, qui hoc deuersorio sermonis mei libenter acquieturum te esse dixisti, tamquam
in Pomptinum deuerteris, neque amoenum neque salubrem locum, censeo, ut satis diu te putes requiesse et iter
reliquum conficere pergas.
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the  lengthy  treatment  of  laughter's  rhetorical  role  in  Cicero's  De  oratore behaves  as  a
metaliterary argument for the relief theory of laughter. The participants in the dialogue offer their
discussion of laughter as a relief from the seriousness of oratory that comprises the rest of the
work.
In  De  oratore  221,  immediately  after  Caesar  distinguishes  between  cavillatio  (a
prolonged use of irony throughout a speech) and dicacitas (a brief, typically biting use of wit), he
praises Crassus for not making use of dicacitas in a speech on behalf of Curius. He argues that
Crassus spared  the dignity of an opponent  and,  in  so doing,  preserved his own.83 Aristotle's
distinction in the  Ethics  between liberal and illiberal jests is still very much alive. In fact, this
distinction is articulated most clearly (and in the vocabulary that has determined our own English
translations to represent it) in Cicero's later, briefer discussions of jokes, laughter, and oratory in
De officiis and Orator.
In De officiis 1.104, Cicero draws a distinction between two types of joking:
duplex  omnino  est  iocandi  genus,  unum  inliberale,  petulans,  flagitiosum,  obscenum,
alterum elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum, quo genere non modo Plautus noster et
Atticorum antiqua comoedia, sed etiam philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti sunt,
multaque multorum facete dicta, ut ea, quae a sene Catone collecta sunt, quae vocantur
ἀποφθέγματα. facilis igitur est distinctio ingenui et inliberalis ioci. alter est, si tempore
fit,  ut si remisso animo, <vel severissimo> homine dignus,  alter ne libero quidem, si
rerum turpitudo adhibetur et verborum obscenitas. 
There are altogether two types of joking, one illiberal, petulant, shameful, obscene, the
other elegant, cultured, clever, witty; to the latter type are related not only our Plautus and
the ancient comedy of the Athenians but even the books of the Socratic philosophers, and
the many cleverly said words of the multitude, such as those which have been collected
by the elder Cato, which are called apophthegms. Consequently it is a simple distinction
between the clever and the illiberal joke. One is, if used fittingly, worthy, so to speak, of a
relaxed spirit or a most serious man, the other is not even worthy of a freedman if the
unseemliness of topic and the obscenity of words are employed.
The man who utilizes the first type of joking, the genus inliberale, is reminiscent of Aristotle's
83 De or. 221: parcebat enim aduersarii dignitati, in quo ipse conseruabat suam.
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βωμολόχος. He who utilizes the  elegans and  ingeniosum  type of joking, on the other hand,
bears a striking resemblance to the Aristotelian figure displaying εὐτραπελία.  Cicero does not
use the term  liberalis to designate the second man, but the conclusion is definitive: there are
classless jokes and classy ones, and only the latter befit individuals of Cicero's ilk. And what is
laughter's role in this discussion? One might think that the guffaws that an illiberal jest elicits
flag such jokes (and those who deliver them) as obscene. However, in this passage about jokes,
laughter is altogether absent. Cicero uses no explicit terms for laughter, nor does he argue that
one  genus iocandi provokes more or different  laughter  than the other.  He refers only to  the
manner—the  spirit—in  which  a  joke  is  presented.  This  proves  to  be  one  of  Cicero's  most
significant  contributions  to  “laughter  theory”:  he  often  (though  not  always,  as  will  be  seen
shortly) separates laughter, as an audible, physiological response, from who or what provokes it.
After all,  laughter would presumably be an acceptable response to both the illiberal  and the
liberal jest. Laughter, to the Roman orator, is a tremendously variegated entity, and its suitability
is determined not simply by the frequency with which it is sought but by the spirit in which it is
cultivated and the context in which it is elicited.
Cicero  also  comments  briefly  on  laughter  and  the  laughable  in  Orator 87-88  as  he
identifies two forms of wit (sal) that are suitable to the plain style:  facetiae and  dicacitas. In
Orator, facetiae is described as being utilized in narrative (in narrando) and is thus synonymous
with Caesar's description of  cavillatio from  De oratore 218.  Dicacitas, employed “in sending
and casting forth a joke [ridiculo]” (Or. 87), retains the name and same pointed function first
ascribed to it in De oratore.84 The ridiculum in Orator is further subdivided and recommended
for a speaker's use, but with a warning to avoid using a joke too frequently, too obscenely, too
84 Or. 87: in iaciundo mittendoque ridiculo.  Τo translate ridiculo as “ridicule” lends an overwhelmingly derisive
charge to the passage. A “laugh” in the modern, colloquial usage (i.e., “That's a laugh!”) seems a more accurate
translation.
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petulantly, or otherwise on the wrong occasion or against the wrong personages; such misuse
reflects poorly on the speaker (Or. 88). Cicero specifically cautions against allowing laughter to
usurp  the  place  of  hatred when a  crime is  at  issue:  admonemus tamen  ridiculo  sic  usurum
oratorem [. . .] nec in facinus ne odii locum risus occupet.85 His juxtaposition of laughter and
hatred depicts laughter not as an expression of feelings (as it is in Plato Resp. 388e5-9) but as an
emotion itself, a rare conflation by Cicero of the physical behavior of a laugh and the emotion(s)
it may be thought to reflect.86 
In any case, Cicero again establishes Aristotelian boundaries on desirable and undesirable
approaches to laughter and the laughable, and he spends the bulk of the passage elaborating the
undesirable approaches.  The illiberal  joke may reflect  excess (e.g.,  jesting too frequently) or
untimeliness (e.g., aiming for a laugh when the circumstances are too serious) or numerous other
unsuitable elements. According to Cicero, this kind of joke has no place in oratory. The liberal
joke,  on the other  hand, is  what remains when the illiberal  joke is  excised from the picture
(quibus  exceptis  in  89).  Defined  through  negation,  the  liberal  joke  may  be  used  when  the
improper speaker, audience, and venue are avoided. Because the liberal joke is not “positively”
delineated and is only tacitly endorsed, the specter of Aristotle's  βωμολόχος haunts Cicero's
discussion in Orator. Cicero's treatment of the laughable, not unlike Aristotle's treatment of the
figure  embodying  εὐτραπελία,  is  ultimately  a  comment  upon  the  indecorous  facets  of  the
laughable.
Throughout  much  of  the  discussion  of  laughter  in De  oratore,  Caesar  focuses  on
occasions when orators should avoid “witticisms when there is no need for them” (De or. 2.229).
Antonius, upon observing this tendency, articulates a desire to learn about when an orator should
85 Or. 88.
86 This  apparent incongruity  acquires  even  more  resonance  in  Cicero's  De  oratore, where  the  discussion  of
laughter proceeds naturally from Antonius' comments on emotions.
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make use of the laughable  rather  than avoid it.87 Though Caesar  obliges for the bulk of the
discussion  (especially  the  latter  half  from  2.250-90),  he  interrupts  his  early  comments  on
“oratory-approved” laughter with several descriptions of inappropriate and undesirable uses of
laughter. His initial preoccupation—seemingly involuntary—with warning against certain forms
of laughter portrays laughter as distractingly volatile. 
Take, for example,  De oratore 2.240-3, wherein Caesar presents and endorses several
examples of the clever (facetum) jest. He immediately transitions from this description of well-
deployed  wit  to  an  illustration  of  poorly-provoked  laughter.  The  three  chapters  that  follow
(2.244-7) are populated with predominantly negative examples of the laughable “in speech” (in
dicto). Even when Caesar first establishes the domain of the laughable at De oratore 2.237-8, he
invokes  boundaries  that  anticipate  those  delineating  the  illiberal  joke  in  Orator  88-89:  “For
neither  manifest  wickedness  (and  what  is  conjoined  with  crime)  nor  in  turn  manifest
wretchedness, when stirred up, is laughed at: for people want wicked men to be wounded by
some force greater than that of a joke; and they don't want wretched men to be mocked unless
they are, by chance, boasters. [. . .] And so those things are most easily mocked which are worthy
neither of great hatred nor of the greatest pity.”88 There are certain people and occasions that are
unsuitable for laughter. Consequently, both of these passages (2.237 and 2.240-7) conclude with
mentions of “restraint” (moderatio in 2.238 and 2.247).
Caesar's attention to restraint demonstrates that there are desirable occasions to arouse
laughter which must be carefully distinguished from numerous undesirable occasions. The orator
recognizes  this  and  exercises  all  due  caution  and  discipline  in  his  use  of  laughter  and  the
87 De  or. 2.229:  sed  hoc  praeceptum praetermittendarum est  facetiarum,  cum  eis  nihil  opus  sit;  nos  autem
quomodo utamur, cum opus sit, querimus, ut in aduersarium [. . .].
88 nam nec insignis improbitas et  scelere iuncta nec rursus miseria insignis agitata ridetur: facinerosos enim
maiore quadam ui quam ridiculi uulnerari uolunt; miseros inludi nolunt, nisi se forte iactant. [. . .] itaque ea
facillime luduntur, quae neque odio magno neque misericordia maxima digna sunt.
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laughable. The scurra, a figure Caesar contrasts with the orator in 2.247, does not.89 The scurra
is the Latin equivalent of a βωμολόχος—a buffoon, and Caesar's use of the Latin term (the only
time the noun appears in De oratore) reveals Aristotle's imprint on this section of his argument.90
Cicero,  via  Caesar, is  gesturing toward a  doctrine of  the mean:  a  true  orator exhibits  ratio,
moderatio, temperantia, and raritas (2.247) where the laughable is involved. Juxtaposed with the
scurra, the Ciceronian orator cultivates only the appropriately laughable, and in so doing, he
becomes  the  embodiment  of  Aristotelian  εὐτραπελία (as  it  appears  in  the  Ethics)  or,
alternatively, εἰρωνεία (from Rh. 1419b.5).
The most noteworthy exception to Caesar's call for moderatio in pursuit of laughter is the
one that Caesar himself makes at 2.239, just as he has finished articulating his prohibition against
jests on occasions when hatred or pity is the more appropriate response. “Also in ugliness and
bodily faults there is agreeable enough material for joking; but we ask the same thing which must
be asked in the other matters: to what extent? In this, not only is there a warning not to say
something witless but also, if you can say something really funny, an orator must avoid two
things: that the joke be either buffoonish or farcical.”91 In other words, it is fine to make fun of an
ugly or disabled person . . . in a refined manner? In fact, yes. The physically unfortunate are fair
game for mockery as long as some degree of restraint is observed. Of course, the notion is not
89 Caesar also uses forms of scurrilis in 2.244-6.
90 An argument could be made for the untranslatability of  scurra based on a passage in Book 1 of  De natura
deorum wherein Cicero relates that Zeno of Sidon “said that Socrates himself, the father of philosophy, was an
Attic scurra, and he used the Latin word”—Zeno quidem [. . .] Socraten ipsum, parentem philosophiae, Latino
uerbo utens scurram Atticum fuisse dicebat (93).
91 De or. 2.238: est etiam deformitatis et corporis uitiorum satis bella materies ad iocandum; sed quaerimus idem,
quod in ceteris rebus maxime quaerendum est, quatenus; in quo non modo illud praecipitur, ne quid insulse, sed
etiam, si quid perridicule possis, uitandum est oratori utrumque, ne aut scurrilis iocus sit aut mimicus. Corbeill
(1996) observes of this passage that “the directness with which Strabo introduces this new category, following
as it  does a  careful  delineation of  how the orator  should avoid mocking the unfortunate,  indicates that  the
Romans could conceive of bodily deformities as a category separate from accidents of nature” (22). Corbeill
uses additional passages from  De oratore to argue (in pp. 23-30): 1) that the ultimate reason for restraint in
Ciceronian discussions of physical peculiarities is rhetorical rather than ethical; and 2) that this is evidence of
distinctly Roman values concerning physical deformities.
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particularly  agreeable  to  modern  sensibilities.  Caesar  provides  an  example  at  2.245  in
anticipation of his  second call  for  moderatio  at  247. Philippus,  in the course of a trial,  asks
permission to examine a witness whom Caesar describes as being of diminutive stature (testis
perpusillus).  The individual  presiding over  the trial  says,  “Only briefly,”  to  which Philippus
replies, “You'll find no fault; I'll ask very little” (non accusabis; perpusillum rogabo). Caesar
acknowledges that the line was funny, but there was one problem: a juror for the case was even
shorter than the witness, and “all the laughter was redirected against the juror—the joke seemed
wholly buffoonish” (omnis est risus in iudicem conuersus: uisum est totum scurrile ridiculum).
The buffoonery was in the circumstances—not content, much like Aristotle's “flawed”
laughter in the Ethics.92 As Caesar presents the situation, even though Philippus' comment was
laughed at, the laughter careened off of its intended target in the wrong direction, and Philippus
should have held his  tongue. That Philippus'  cheap shot provoked laughter in the first  place
apparently  warrants  no  further  attention  by  Caesar.  Physical  shortcomings  are  depicted  as
innately laugh-worthy. Though Caesar does not mark these lines as a theoretical treatment of
laughter,  the explicit  tolerance  he grants to  jokes that  indicate  deformitas  and  corporis uitia
establishes  this  statement  as  a  Latin  antecedent  of  a  “superiority  theory”  of  laughter—more
specifically the theory offered by Hobbes approximately 1700 years later. Hobbes asserts  1) that
laughter  arises  when  one  person  recognizes  his  own  superiority  “by  comparison  with  the
infirmity of others”;93 and 2) that people's laughter may be caused “by the apprehension of some
deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves.”94 Hobbes'
use  of  the  words  “infirmity”  and  “deformed”  is  ambiguous  insofar  as  the  words  are  not
exclusively physiological; they may also be applied to moral deficiencies.  Nevertheless, both
92 Cf. Corbeill (1996) 29: “Strabo implies that Philippus' witticism would have been perfectly appropriate under
other conditions.”
93 Hobbes (1840) 46. Human Nature, Ch. 9, para. 13. The emphasis is mine.
94 Hobbes (1839) 46. Leviathan, Pt. 1, Ch. 6, para. 42. The emphasis is mine.
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words vividly describe the physical realm, with “deformed” carrying a particularly visual, and
implicitly corporeal, resonance.
In Caesar's anecdote recounting Philippus' courtroom comment, physical shortcomings
are treated as a potential  source of an easy,  derisive laugh. It is irrelevant that an individual
displaying such faults  may not be responsible for them. At 2.262, Caesar recounts a case in
which Crassus insulted a trial opponent, Lamia,95 whom Caesar himself describes as  deformis:
“'Let us hear,' Crassus said, 'the pretty boy.' When the laughter had died down, Lamia said, 'I was
not able to fashion my looks, but I was able to fashion my intellect.' Then Crassus said, 'Let us
hear  the  clever  boy,'  at  which  the  laughter  was  far  more  aggressive.”96 The  ridicule  is
devastatingly thorough. Lamia is first laughed at for being deformis. When he tries to diffuse the
laughter by disavowing responsibility for his physical appearance, he directs attention to his own
intellect. Then his intellect is immediately disparaged by Crassus. The laughter that follows is all
the more hardy. Caesar does not present Crassus as having done anything wrong. In the course of
staging  the  story,  Caesar  even  plants  an  excuse  for  the  sharpness  of  Crassus'  comment  by
pointing  out  that  Lamia  had  been  obnoxiously  interrupting  Crassus.  After  telling  the  story,
Caesar  observes,  “Indeed  those  things  (sc.  comments)  are  charming,  whether  in  serious
expressions or, as here, in witty ones.”
As the name of the superiority theory of laughter implies, people laugh at what is inferior
—what is “below them.” In the case of Philippus' deliberate insult of the testis perpusillus and
unintentional insult of a juror in the trial, the men being laughed at are quite literally below those
who laugh with regard to physical stature. Certainly the superiority theory does not rely upon an
actual,  spatial  interpretation  of  superiority,  but  the  illustration  is  nonetheless  helpful.  The
95 I thank Jim Zetzel for pointing out the additional layer of the joke in Lamia's “monstrous” name.
96 “Audiamus” inquit “pulchellum puerum” Crassus; cum esset arrisum, “non potui mihi” inquit Lamia “formam
ipse fingere, ingenium potui”; tum hic “audiamus” inquit “disertum”: multo etiam arrisum est uehementius. 
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superiority theory depicts laughter as traveling “downward,” and, as the examples presented by
Cicero's Caesar attest, this laughter, in attacking flaws for which an individual may not even be
responsible, is far from friendly. But Caesar only presents this “downward” laughter as one type
of laughter which is offered in response to a particular brand of jokes. As noted above, the relief
theory of laughter is also at work in many of his examples involving laughter. In the final thirty
chapters of the  excursus de ridiculis  in  De oratore,  Cicero examines another explanation for
laughter that does not appear as an explicit theory in Plato and is only hinted at in Aristotle.
At  2.248 of  Cicero's  De oratore,  Caesar  begins  to  classify  and  enumerate  the  many
rhetorical  maneuvers  that  provoke  laughter.  The  remainder  of  the  discussion  comprises  his
catalog, which Janko (1984) divides as follows:
A. From diction B. From content
1. The ambiguous (amphibolia) 1. Narratives (fables, anecdotes)
2. The unexpected 2. Comparisons
3. Word-play (παρονομασία) 3. Mimicry or caricature
4. Quotation of verses, proverbs 4. Exaggeration or understatement
5. Taking words literally 5. The telling detail
6. Allegory 6. Irony
7. Metaphor 7. Innuendo
8. Irony 8. Assumed incomprehension
9. Antithetical expressions 9. Hinted ridicule
10. The illogical
11. Personal retorts.
Although  Janko  considers  these  subheadings  to  be  approximations,  they  represent  a  rather
exhaustive treatment of the passage.97 Caesar does not offer any particular subheading as a theory
unto itself, but a broader theory begins to takes shape as he utilizes the same explanation for
several different sources of laughter. I would like to direct particular attention to numbers 2 and 5
in the “From diction” column and to number 10 in the “From content” column. These “sources of
97 Janko (1984) 165. Most, though not all, of Janko's subheadings appear to come from the marginal passage titles
offered in Sutton and Rackham's Loeb edition (1942) of De oratore: Books I and II.
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laughter” play upon defied expectations;  the audience  expects one thing and the orator says
another.
At De oratore 255, Caesar makes his first explicit case for the laughter-raising potential
of frustrated expectations: “But you know that the best known source of the laughable is when
we expect one thing and another is said. Here our mistake (noster error) provokes laughter for
our very selves. And if ambiguity is also mixed in, it becomes wittier.”98 He immediately shares
an example of defied expectations that are enhanced by wit, and to designate this particular genre
of the laughable, he uses the phrase illud genus ridiculi praeter exspectationem—“that type of
joke that is contrary to expectation”.99 The phrase praeter exspectationem, in addition to being a
concise description of Caesar's previous example,  also seems to appear in the earliest  extant
Latin rhetorical work: the Rhetorica ad Herennium.100 When the author of this work suggests that
raising a laugh can function as an apt ice breaker for the orator toiling with a fatigued audience,
the phrase  praeter  expectationem appears within a list of possible ways to provoke laughter.101
The syntax of the passage is challenging, a difficulty compounded by the uncertainty of the text
(the  division  into  two  words  are  editors' suggestions;  the  manuscripts  read
praeterexpectatione).102 Despite these textual problems, one confidently assumes that the author
98 Sed scitis esse notissimum ridiculi genus, cum aliud exspectamus, aliud dicitur: hic nobismet ipsis noster error
risum mouet: quod si admixtum est etiam ambiguum, fit salsius.
99 De or. 255.
100 It is tempting to identify this phrase as a calque for  παρὰ προσδοκίαν (e.g., the subheading in Sutton and
Rackham's Loeb translation (1942) 389 and the note in Achard's Budé translation (1997) 10, n. 48),  but the
Greek  phrase  is  not  attested  with  certainty  before  Cicero.  The  phrase  appears  in  a  rhetorical  context  in
Demetrius'  On Style (Ch. 152:  Ἔστι δέ τις καὶ ἡ παρὰ προσδοκίαν χάρις),  but  the dating of  Demetrius'
rhetorical work is a matter of considerable debate. Grube (1964) maintains that  On Style should be dated to
approximately 270 B.C.E., while other scholars have tended toward a date in the Common Era (for which see
the  summary  of  the  scholarship  in  Paffenroth  (1994)  280,  n.  2  and  her  own  conclusion  that  the  text's
composition should be dated to the first century C.E. (281)). Chiron (2001) thoroughly examines all previous
scholarly arguments as well as the text itself and advocates for a date of composition in the first century B.C.E.
before the Latin rhetorical works appeared (371). The Greek phrase also appears in the Alexandrian scholia of
Aristophanes's works, but it is used to refer simply to defied expectations with no apparent rhetorical resonance.
101 Rhet. Her. 1.10.
102 Editors' (Marx (1964) and Achard (1997)) willingness to emend the text to  praeter exspectationem may stem
from the modern acceptance of paraprosdokian as a rhetorical term. Unless these two Latin words together were
already regarded as a rhetorical trope (functioning effectively as an indeclinable noun), their appearance in list
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is  writing  about  laughter  provoked  by  an  unexpected  (praeter  exspectationem)  saying  or
behavior. Appearing alongside this source of laughter in the  Rhetorica ad Herennium's  list are
terms that also appear in De oratore: imitatio deprauata occurs in De oratore 242 and falls under
number 3 of Janko's “From content” column, and ambiguum occurs in  De oratore 255, quoted
above,  and falls under  number 1 of Janko's  “From diction” column. Though Cicero's  list  of
laughter's  sources  in  De oratore  and the more concise list  that  appears in  the  Rhetorica ad
Herennium are  far  from identical,  their  occasional  overlap  raises  intriguing—and ultimately
unanswerable—questions. Did Cicero use the Rhetorica ad Herennium in his composition of De
oratore? Or do the two works share a common source? Would this source have been in Greek or
Latin? We may receive a clue in Chapter 11 of Book 3 of Aristotle's Rhetoric, wherein Aristotle
refers in different ways to defy expectations (e.g., τοῦ προσεξαπατᾶν and παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως
in 1412a20 and 1412a21, respectively) but does not use any single phrase with the consistency
that would mark it as a set phrase or shorthand for a widely-held rhetorical trope. The germ of
the trope is nevertheless present in Aristotle, and even if no other Greek treatment of a genre of
the laughable that so concisely conveys the notion “contrary to expectation” can be confidently
dated before the appearance of  praeter exspectationem in the Rhetorica ad Herennium and De
oratore, it is unlikely that the idea of defying expectations never coalesced into a set rhetorical
device  in  the  interim  between  Aristotle's  Rhetoric and  the  Rhetorica  ad  Herennium.  It  is
nevertheless tempting to credit Cicero, through his repeated use of the term in De oratore (as will
be seen below), with the popularization of the concept in Latin rhetorical literature.
Five chapters after  his  first  example of a  joke that is  praeter exspectationem,  Caesar
explains why some people consider it witty “when you seem to understand something according
form as in Rhetorica ad Herennium is ungrammatical. The apparatus criticus of Marx's Teubner (1964) notes
Schuetz addition of dicto (8)—a grammatically sound emendation that provides an anchor for the prepositional
phrase.
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to the word (ad uerbum), not the sense (ad sententiam).”103 He then warns that jokes that rely
upon taking a statement literally can be “either chilly or, when something else is expected (cum
aliud exspectatum), then witty”. He continues: “For, as I said before, our mistake (noster . . .
error) naturally delights us: on account of which, when we have been deceived, so to speak, by
our  expectations  (cum  quasi  decepti  sumus  exspectatione),  we  laugh.”104 Error plays  an
explanatory role in both of these examples, as the individual who laughs has prepared for one
event only to be met by a different one.
Caesar shares an extended example of laughter provoked by defied expectations near the
end of the discussion, and, much as at De oratore 255, he declares that this source of laughter is
exceptional: sed ex his omnibus nihil magis ridetur, quam quod est praeter exspectationem, cuius
innumerabilia sunt exempla (“But of all these examples, nothing is laughed at more than what is
contrary to expectation, of which countless examples exist”).105 The final anecdote he offers to
illustrate this point is again from the courtroom. In cross-examining a witness named Silus who
testified to having heard something damning of the defendant,  Crassus asks the witness two
questions introduced by “Is it possible that . . .” (potest  (fieri) ut). Silus readily agrees to both
possibilities Crassus puts forth—that he may have heard his evidence from someone speaking in
anger or that he may have misunderstood; he seems eager to cast doubt on his own testimony and
diminish its potential influence. Then Crassus asks Silus a third question: “'Is it even possible,' he
said,  'that,  indeed, what  you say you heard,  you never heard at  all?'”106 Caesar immediately
opines  on  the  completed  anecdote,  “This  was  so  unexpected  (praeter  exspectationem)  that
103 This idea is anticipated in Aristotle's reference to ἐν τοῖς γελοίοις τὰ παραπεποιημένα (Rhet. 1412A28).
104 De or. 260: haec aut frigida sunt aut tum salsa, cum aliud est exspectatum. natura enim nos, ut ante dixi, noster
delectat error:  ex quo, cum quasi decepti  sumus exspectatione, ridemus. Caesar's apologetic  use of  decepti
draws out a peculiar component of certain occasions of defied expectations in oratory: a speaker is required, in
some sense, to dissimulate—to create expectations with the intention of leaving them unfulfilled.
105 De or. 284.
106 De or. 285: “potest etiam fieri,” inquit “ut omnino, quod te audisse dicis, numquam audieris.”
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everyone's laughter overwhelmed the witness.”107
The  link  between  a  comment  that  is  praeter  exspectationem and  universal  laughter
(omnium risus)—or  nearly  universal  laughter,  because  the  witness  Silus  presumably did not
laugh—is stated causally. In all of his examples that invoke the phrase praeter exspectationem,
Cicero's Caesar makes clear  that defied expectations are  a common source of laughter.  This
causal link between the unexpected and laughter is the most thorough ancient version of what is
popularly called the “incongruity theory” of laughter, a theory which is commonly attributed to
considerably later thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer, and is still adapted
to suit more recent linguistic theories of laughter.108 In  Critique of Judgment, Kant offers the
following  formulation  of  the  incongruity  theory:  “In  everything  that  is  to  excite  a  lively
convulsive laugh there must be something absurd (in which the Understanding, therefore, can
find  no  satisfaction).  Laughter  is  an  affection  arising  from the  sudden  transformation  of  a
strained  expectation  into  nothing.”109 It  will  be  immediately  clear  that  there  is  a  practical
problem  with  this  theory  insofar  as  laughter  is  not  the  only  potential  response  to  defied
expectations. If a young child expects a new bicycle as a birthday gift and instead receives a
book, any parent will be lucky to hear laughter after the present has been opened. Similarly, an
unexpected death rarely occasions laughter.
Whatever  the  shortcomings  of  the  incongruity  theory  of  laughter,  its  prototypical
107 De or. 285:  hoc ita  praeter  exspectationem accidit,  ut  testem omnium risus  obrueret.  With  the  punch-line
delayed until the final clause and packed into just two words (numquam audieris), Caesar's retelling preserves
the surprise of Crassus' words for his own audience. Of course his efforts are perhaps unnecessary: Crassus
himself is a participant in the discussion and probably had not forgotten his own unexpected turn of phrase.
Moreover, it is likely that many—if not all—of Caesar's interlocutors, through some previous familiarity with
the story, whether personal or second-hand, would have been “expecting the unexpected”. Thus the audience
most susceptible to surprise by Caesar's anecdote would have been the readership. Such an argument could be
made for many of the laugh-worthy stories that  Caesar recounts,  but in maintaining the chronology of this
particular episode and describing it in such detail, Cicero (via Caesar) aims to recreate the response with which
Crassus' comments were first received:  omnium risus. Such rhetorical maneuvering by the author of a text is
explored in the following chapter exploring laughter and reader response.
108 Attardo (2009).
109 Kant (2007) 133. Textual emphases are his.
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appearance in Cicero's  De oratore is undisputed. Thus all three trends that have assumed the
status  of  canonical  theories  of  laughter  in  modern  research  on  laughter  and  humor  are
adumbrated in the Ciceronian text. Cicero's recognition that superiority, relief, and incongruity
all offer occasional explanations for laughter—even if his strongest statements tend to emphasize
notions of superiority—also functions as a tacit acknowledgment from antiquity that no one of
these theories is a sufficient explanation of laughter unto itself. And when such figures as Plato,
Aristotle, Cicero, Hobbes, Freud, and Kant have somehow been unable to explain laughter in any
comprehensive sense, it seems best to conclude that the question of laughter is perhaps too big
and too complex for answering with a single theory, if at all.110 Therefore, I will take a different
approach and will consider the complex question of laughter through the lens of literature. In the
chapters to follow, I explore how laughter can direct reader response and can reflect and create
generic identity in select works of Vergil, Horace, and Ovid.
110 Stewart (1994) concludes his “sketch” of laughter among the Greek philosophers with the following paragraph:
“It has become clear to me that we cannot think simply about laughter in general, but we must think about
laughter at  a person, laughter  at  a thing, laughter  with  a person, laughter  about  a person and about an event,
laughter in reaction to words, laughter in reaction to tickling [. . .], laughter which spreads from person to person
by a kind of contagion or infection, and finally that mysterious laughter [. . .] that arises when we feel that all is
going well and we are happy in our world. Surely no single cause can be found, no single theory can be devised,
that will explain this vast phenomenon of laughter” (37).
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PART I: RIDERE RESPONSE (CHAPTERS 1, 2, AND 3)
LAUGHTER AS LITERARY CRITICISM
The  presence  of  laughter  in  a  text,  whether  narrated  (“She  giggled  sweetly.”)  or
represented (“Hahaha!”), invites a distinct brand of reader involvement and interpretation. Just as
heads turn toward an outburst of laughter in a crowded room, readers naturally want to know
why someone in a text is laughing. What is the “story” behind a snicker or snort? Of course, the
story of a literary laugh is a variable script, and a snicker comes from a different place than a
snort.  Yet  the  idea  that  a  laugh  “comes  from”  someplace  else  demonstrates  the  common
perception that laughs—textual or otherwise—are “caused”; they follow from a statement, an
action, or, in the most general case, a tone or atmosphere within a work. As a result, laughter may
be anticipated long before a given laugh becomes textually manifest. Another consequence of
laughter's presumed existence in a causal chain is that, when an unexpected laugh bursts forth
from a text, a reader may read back from the occasion of textual laughter in order to determine
its origin. In the following three chapters, I consider occasions of textual laughter in Vergil's,
Horace's, and Ovid's poems, and I propose ways in which these laughs can be fruitfully unpacked
through a focus on reader response. The question that drives my explorations is, “Why would a
reader laugh at a text?" This approach to reader-oriented literary criticism through the lens of
laughter emphasizes that the vocabulary of laughter and the risible deployed by the foremost
Augustan poets often functions as an inbuilt critical mechanism—a set of directions for how to
respond to a text.
The fact that laughter's presence in a work may invite readers into a unique interpretive
dialogue with that text was well known to such a studied orator and politician as Cicero. His
excursus de ridiculis, discussed in the introduction, sets forth the practical value of provoking
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laughter  in  a  rhetorical  setting.  The characters involved in  the  discussion in  Book II  of  De
oratore are political figures to whom the power of eliciting an audience's laughter is well known.
These speakers recognize laughter's ability to create and enforce identity as well as its inherent
risks and volatility. The topic of humor (and, to a lesser extent, laughter) in oratory has been
explored rewardingly and at length by scholars of political invective.1 Laughter's relationship to
literary criticism in general and reader response more specifically has not received the same
attention.2 
I consider, in the course of the following three chapters, two answers to the question of
why a reader would laugh at a text. The first answer is found in the words of an Augustan poet
himself when Horace, in his literary epistles, suggests that people in general, and literary critics
more specifically, laugh at what is bad. Poets regard laughter as an indictment or (more rarely) a
seal of approval. This indictment or approval may speak volumes about the generic context in
which it appears or about the individual who offers it, but, in the current chapter and to the extent
possible, I set aside these genre and narratological concerns and examine the use of laughter and
the laughable as instruments of aesthetic critique.3 An exhaustive treatment of “critical laughter,”
even within the restricted corpus of Augustan poetry, would prove tedious and repetitive, but the
Horatian examples I explore in Chapter 1 reveal a poetic  awareness of the unique nature of
laughter: a single behavior that can be utilized for multiple, even conflicting, critical responses.
The second response to the question of why a reader would laugh in response to a text is
one I outline throughout Chapters 2 and 3. I investigate Vergil's, Horace's, and Ovid's use of
laughter as a form of metacommunication, a term Amy Richlin adopts in The Garden of Priapus
1 Corbeill (1996) focuses on humor in the political sphere during the Late Roman Republic.
2 The reasons are more straightforward than one may suspect. The occasional nature of a political speech and the
patent need to persuade an audience make the practical value of humor and/or laughter in such speeches more
apparent.
3 In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I examine laughter's relationship to genre.
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to refer to an indirect relay of information that draws upon readers' expectations and knowledge
of literary traditions.4 In the case of laughter, I hypothesize that the presence of laughter  in a
poem offers information about the suitability of a laugh as a response to the poem. A reader's
laughter may be encouraged when a laugh occurring within the text demonstrates that something
under discussion warrants laughter, whether that specific something is clever or absurd or worthy
of scorn. Conversely, laughter could be discouraged if the textual laughter were revealed to be
somehow inappropriate for the occasion. In both cases, a laugh becomes a subtle vehicle for
encouraging  or  deterring  a  specific  response  on  the  part  of  the  reader.  Metacommunicative
laughter makes it possible, if only momentarily, for the author (or speaker) to “drive the bus” of
interpretation.
4 Richlin (1992) 64  argues that a poem's meter functions as a form of metacommunication to the extent that it
conveys immediate and important information about the poem's expected content.
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CHAPTER 1: LAUGHING MATTERS
LAUGHTER AND NEGATIVE CRITICISM IN HORACE'S LITERARY EPISTLES
The  Ars Poetica, one member of the small family of works of explicit ancient literary
theory, offers an attractive starting-point for a discussion of poetic criticism during the Augustan
era.1 Horace's work is composed in verse and treats verse as the primary object of criticism, yet
he begins the poem with a surprising analogy from the visual arts (vv. 1-5):
humano capiti ceruicem pictor equinam
iungere si uelit et uarias inducere plumas
undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,
spectatum admissi, risum teneatis, amici? 5
If a painter should wish to connect an equine neck 
to a human head and to introduce variegated feathers 
to limbs gathered from everywhere, so that a woman
beautiful on top would taper repulsively into a black fish,
after being allowed to look on, friends, would you repress a laugh? 5
Horace creates a monster. The amalgamation sprawls across four lines with words entangled
around one another and extra limbs (Greek κῶλα or Latin membra2) tacked into the middle of
the  description.  The  tortured  word  order  and  syntax  graphically  represent  the  incongruous
appearance of the imagined painting. The response imagined to greet this spectacle is a laugh, as
risum  sits conspicuously in the middle of verse 5,  set  off  by a strong metrical caesura after
admissi. Laughter is the first indicator of critical judgment in the Ars Poetica. But why a laugh,
and what does it tell us about how Horace expects his addressees (or readers) to interpret the
hypothetical painting?
1 See Laird, ed. (2006) xi-xii for a list of texts of ancient literary criticism spanning from Homer to Augustine. A
more conservative selection could be effected by restricting the list to complete works rather than passages
within works, though this would subject such a fundamental text as Aristotle's Poetics to the risk of exclusion
because of the lost second book. In any case, the fact that Horace's Ars Poetica is in verse makes it all the more
exceptional.
2 LSJ s.v. κῶλον A.II (3): “Rhet., member or clause of a περίοδος.” Cf. Cic. Or. 211.
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The  laugh,  or  rather,  its  suppression,  is  posed  as  a  question  (“Would  you  repress  a
laugh?”), the answer to which is an implied “No.”3 The painting is presumed laugh-worthy, and
powerfully so.  What  stimulates the laughter  is  implicitly forceful.  Horace,  however,  uses no
word for “good” or “bad” in these first lines, nor does he adopt any other consistent vocabulary
to convey aesthetic evaluation. The term turpiter appears in v. 3, but is offset by formosa in v. 4.
Risus, unmodified by adjective or adverb, functions as its own critical expression. Its charge is
established through context.
That the question of restrained laughter in v. 5 designates the painting as objectionable is
eventually confirmed (vv. 6-22):
credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum
persimilem, cuius, uelut aegri somnia, uanae
fingentur species, ut nec pes nec caput uni
reddatur formae. "pictoribus atque poetis
quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas." 10
scimus, et hanc ueniam petimusque damusque uicissim,
sed non ut placidis coeant immitia, non ut
serpentes auibus geminentur, tigribus agni.
inceptis grauibus plerumque et magna professis
purpureus, late qui splendeat, unus et alter 15
adsuitur pannus, cum lucus et ara Dianae
et properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros
aut flumen Rhenum aut pluuius describitur arcus;
sed nunc non erat his locus. et fortasse cupressum
scis simulare; quid hoc, si fractis enatat exspes 20
nauibus, aere dato qui pingitur? amphora coepit
institui; currente rota cur urceus exit?
Believe, Pisones, that this painting would be similar to
a book, whose appearances, like the dreams
of a sick man, are fashioned fleeting, so neither foot nor head
are rendered in one form. "To painters and poets
3 Rudd (1997) 121 translates teneatis as if referring to ability: “[C]ould you stifle your laughter?” However, the
standard translation of  a  future-less-vivid (or  “future 'ideal'”)  conditional  typically  employs “would”  in the
apodosis: cf. Woodcock (1959) Sect. 193. The difference between the two interpretations is not trivial, but to
either  question (“would”/“could”),  the  same response is  nevertheless  understood.  My translation  (“would”)
grants a greater role to an individual's will to either constrain or express laughter, thus allowing laughter to
function more voluntarily. This “voluntary” interpretation resonates with the critical behavior of laughter in the
passage. 
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has always been granted equal power of whatever daring." 10
We know, and we seek and grant this pardon in turn.
But not so that rough may mingle with calm, not so that
serpents may pair with bird, sheep with tigers.
To grand beginnings in general and those declaring great things,
the one and other purple patch which shines far and wide 15
is patched on, when a grove and an altar of Diana
and the winding of water rushing through lovely fields
or the river Rhine or a rainbow is described.
But this was not the place for these things. Perhaps you know how
to paint a cypress; what of it, if the man paid to be painted 20
hopelessly swimming from his shattered ship? An amphora 
is begun; why does a mug come off the spinning wheel?
Horace draws a connection between the painting and a book that exhibits the same incongruous
characteristics,  and the words  aegri and  uanae  (v.  6) hint  at  the undesirability  of both.  The
negative criticism continues with Horace's confession that poets seek pardon (ueniam in v. 11)
for their daring creations. A claim of pardon presumes an offense to be pardoned. In vv. 12-3, the
negative result clauses describe scenarios that Horace would like to avoid, and these descriptions
are reminiscent of the incongruous monstrosity of the opening verses. With each new sentence
after the rhetorical question in v. 5, the readers who answered “No” and admitted their inability
to  refrain  from laughing  are  granted  reasons to  become  more  confident  with  that  response.
Horace remains nonetheless vague, rapidly shifting between images and posing questions back to
back (as in vv. 19-22) without providing explicit answers. Only in v. 23 does Horace convey his
standards for creation in a positive manner: denique sit quiduis, simplex dumtaxat et unum—“In
short, let it be anything you want, so long as it is simple and one.” Singularity and unity are
Horace's professed ideals, but the reader does not have to wait until verse 23 to learn that the
description with which the Ars begins falls short of the ideal. The laughter of verse 5 sets this
ball rolling.
One might wonder how the reader knows to answer “No, I would not repress a laugh” in
v. 5. Has Horace tapped into a universal point of critical agreement even before articulating it? A
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reader familiar with Plato's and Aristotle's appeals to unity in the context of art criticism could
identify  that  the  unnatural  image  of  vv.  1-5  is  not  in  keeping  with  certain  Greek  critical
standards.4 Yet  Greek,  Etruscan,  and  Roman  artists  deliberately  and  painstakingly  created
representations of hybrid entities like gorgons, sphinxes, chimaerae, harpies, and Scylla. On the
one hand, an encounter with a lifelike artistic representation of a composite entity like the one
described by Horace would not be as dangerous or life-threatening as an actual run-in with any
of the aforementioned monsters; Horace's  “beast” lacks any means to attack.5 Nevertheless, a
viewer's ability to approach a painted grotesque like the one in Ars Poetica vv. 1-5 without risk
of bodily harm could prompt an emotional or psychological response similar to that associated
with  viewing  an  unapproachable  monster  at  close  quarters:  an  apotropaic  relief.6 When  the
viewer recognizes her ultimate safety and identifies the disconnect between feeling threatened
and being threatened, this moment of recognition could move her to laugh.7 She does not laugh
despite coming face to face(s) with the hybrid image but because of the encounter.
But this laughter,  should it  occur, and which could just as easily be provoked by the
representation of a threatening beast that actually exists, is not at all like the laughter that Horace
4 Brink (1963) 78 briefly summarizes Plato's mentions of “wholeness” in Gorgias 503e-4a and Phaedrus 263-4
while pointing out that the Platonic criticism is not exclusively applied to poetry. Nevertheless, at  Phaedrus
264c, Plato has Socrates urge against a “headless” or “footless” argument with a negative result clause (ὥστε
μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν)—a passage to which Horace undoubtedly alludes in v. 8-9 (ut nec pes nec
caput uni / reddatur formae). Aristotle in his Poetics defines a tragedy as being a representation of some perfect
and whole (ὅλον) happening of a certain magnitude (1450b23-5).
5 One might compare the chimaera,  a divine, fire-breathing monster with the head of a lion, the body of a goat
(with a goat's head coming out of the back—this second head breathes fire), and the tail of a headed-serpent or
dragon. So ingrained, even in modern aesthetics, is a resistance to incongruity that some scholars assert that the
beast was illogical or laughable. Roes (1934) 21 states that “to the eye the image is as objectionable as to the
mind,” though she apparently operates on the assumption that the goat head must have been unidirectional. In
his  article  from  the  OCD s.v.  chimaera,  Alan  Griffiths  observes,  “[I]n  art  the  eponymous  central  head
(sometimes a protome with forefeet) which protrudes uneasily from the lion's back may be made less risible by
allowing it to perform the fire-breathing which Homer and Hesiod describe.” Both Roes and Griffiths seem to
miss the point that the monster must have been all but impossible to attack, with the lion fighting in front, the
snake in back, and the goat covering the flanks by spitting fire. 
6 Clarke (2007) 63-81 treats apotropaic laughter with attention to "often misshapen and hypersexual" images like
the evil eye and phalloi (67). The grinning faces of gorgons are unfortunately absent from his study.
7 See the introduction for explanations of the relief and incongruity theories of laughter.
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rhetorically summons in v. 5. Horace's amalgam differs from a gorgon, sphinx, chimaera, harpy,
and, despite some similarities, even from Scylla herself, because all of these other monsters are
supposed to  be  incongruous.8 This  particular  painting,  at  least  as  Horace  portrays  it  in  the
opening verses of the Ars Poetica, should not. The fifteen lines after Horace raises his question
of laughter show him reflecting upon unity and coherence in a variety of media, although his
brief comments (vv. 21-2) on pottery are particularly telling: "An amphora / is begun; why does a
mug come off the spinning wheel?" (amphora coepit /  institui; currente rota cur urceus exit?).
The intention of the artist is implicitly relevant insofar as the mug—as a mug—may be beautiful.
The failure lies in the fact that the end product does not resemble its beginning. 
With his declaration in v. 23 that a work should be simplex . . . et unum, Horace retrojects
a final qualitative evaluation onto the disjointed painting from the poem's opening. The painting
is bad—κακός, just not the evil  κακός of a monstrous beast, like Homer's chimaera (Il. 6.155-
203) or Vergil's Scylla (Aen. 3.420-432). Horace presents an aesthetic κακός that invites a critical
response: a laugh of superiority.  To use the words offered by Cicero's  Caesar in  De oratore
2.238,  the  incongruous image described in  vv.  1-5  of  the  Ars Poetica  is  a  manifestation  of
deformitas (ugliness) and corporis uitia (bodily faults). The unintended lack of coherence in the
painter's creation is itself a uitium, and this uitium provokes laughter.
Quintilian  draws the  connection  between  physical  faults  and aesthetic  ones  when he
interprets Horace's passage in his Institutio Oratoria:
cui  simile  uitium  est  apud  nos  si  quis  sublimia  humilibus,  uetera  nouis,  poetica
uulgaribus misceat—id enim tale monstrum quale Horatius in prima parte libri de arte
poetica fingit:  "humano capiti  ceruicem pictor equinam iungere si uelit" et  cetera ex
diuersis naturis subiciat. (Inst. 8.3.60)
8 A viewer  expects  incongruity  when looking  at  a  representation  of  Scylla;  internal  incongruity  defines  the
monster,  with the paradox being that  a congruently rendered Scylla—e.g.,  an image of  a “unified” woman
labeled “Scylla”—would actually be incongruent with a viewer's expectations (“externally incongruous”).  On
the opening image as evoking Scylla, see Oliensis (1991) 107-109.
70
A defect similar to this is before us if someone mixes the lofty with the lowly, the old
with the new, the poetic with the vulgar—for it is such a monster which Horace fashions
in the first part of his Ars Poetica: “If a painter should wish to connect an equine neck / to
a human head” and he appends other things of various natures.
The uitium to which such mixtures of diction are compared (i.e., the antecedent to the relative
pronoun  cui)  is  the  blending  of  dialects,  which  Quintilian  calls  sardismos.9 Quintilian  lists
stylistic “dos and don'ts,” and like Horace, the bulk of his observations pertain to rhetorical and
literary  criticism.  Here  he  states  in  no  uncertain  terms  that  the  mixing  of  unlike  things—
vocabulary from different registers—is in fact a uitium, and by way of Horace's Ars Poetica, he
uses  artistic  and  poetic  criticism as  points  of  reference.  Laughter  goes  unmentioned  in  this
passage, but Quintilian demonstrates his own agreement with Horace's sentiments when it comes
to word-choice. Let a work be simplex . . . et unum. If it is not, one can imagine Quintilian asking
his readership: risum teneatis?10
My conclusion that Horace, in the opening lines of the poem, offers criticism as a primary
function of laughter may be anticlimactic in light of the foregoing discussion of monsters and
incongruity. Even in the initial reading of v. 5 it seemed evident that incongruous creations can
lead to laughter. As is often the case with Horace, however, the matter is not so simplex, and we
will  return  to  this  passage  at  the  end of  Chapter  3  for  further  interpretation.  For  now it  is
sufficient to mark as our point of departure that Horace recognizes laughter's power as a critical
tool and, more specifically, an indicator of negative criticism. This power of laughter is invoked
elsewhere in the  Ars Poetica, and its function takes on a more definitive critical shape as the
Horatian voice explores other perspectives of the literary-critical composer, or the “poet-critic.” 11
9 Inst. 8.3.60.
10 At Inst. 8.3.48, Quintilian makes a similar criticism about calling things by incongruous names, but he allows it
if the intention of the speaker is to raise a laugh.
11 Brink (1963) 153. Brink distinguishes between 1) “external” critics who write about poetry without producing
poetry and 2) “poet-critics” who play the dual role of writing poetry and writing about poetry. Brink identifies
Horace's  Ars Poetica as the work of a poet-critic  par excellence.  Horace's occasional disavowal of the title
“poet” is examined in Chapter 4.
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During a discussion of poetic aesthetics and their impact on emotion in vv. 99-113 of the
Ars Poetica, Horace turns repeatedly to laughter:
non satis est pulchra esse poemata; dulcia sunto,
et quocumque uolent animum auditoris agunto. 100
ut ridentibus adrident, ita flentibus adflent
humani uultus. si uis me flere, dolendum est
primum ipsi tibi; tum tua me infortunia laedent,
Telephe uel Peleu; male si mandata loqueris,
aut dormitabo aut ridebo. tristia maestum 105
uultum uerba decent, iratum plena minarum,
ludentem lasciua, seuerum seria dictu.
format enim natura prius nos intus ad omnem
fortunarum habitum; iuuat aut impellit ad iram
aut ad humum maerore graui deducit et angit; 110
post effert animi motus interprete lingua.
si dicentis erunt fortunis absona dicta,
Romani tollent equites peditesque cachinnum. 
It's not sufficient for poems to be pretty; let them be sweet,
and let them lead the heart of the hearer wherever they wish. 100
As human faces laugh with those laughing, so they cry with those crying.
If you want me to cry, you yourself must be pained first;
then your misfortunes will wound me, Telephus
or Peleus; if you will have spoken scripted words poorly,
I'll either nod off or laugh. Grim words befit 105
a gloomy face, ones full of threats befit an angry one,
wanton ones a playful one, serious speech a stern one.
For nature first shapes us internally for every state
of fortune; either it delights or drives to anger
or forces us to the ground and chokes us with heavy grief; 110
Then she bears out the mind's movements with tongue as interpreter.
If a speaker's words are out of tune with his fortunes,
the Roman knights and infantry will raise a cackle.
Horace reminds the Pisones of poetry's ability to move an audience—an ability he presents as a
mandate (agunto in v. 100).12 He invokes the infectiousness of laughter: human faces behave
sympathetically,  laughing  at  laughter  and  weeping  at  weeping.  Any  sense  of  “acting”  as
“pretending” is absent. The poet-actor must first feel the emotion he aims to convey (dolendum
12 Grant and Fiske (1924) 32 acutely observe that Horace calques on the Greek rhetorical ideal of ψυχαγωγεῖν
with animum . . . agunto in v. 100. See also Brink (1963) 184.
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est  /  primum in vv. 103-4). Only then will an audience see his face or hear his words in the
proper  light.  The  passage  loosely  echoes  Plato's  Ion where  the  young  rhapsode  declares,
“Whenever I say something pitiful, my eyes are filled with tears; and whenever I say something
frightening or terrible, my hair stands straight up with fear and my heart leaps.”13 In a precursor
to modern “method acting,” Ion speaks of an actor who is sympathetic with the character (or, at
least, with the verses through which the character is represented). Horace's formulation differs.
He  requires  the  emotion  to  be  accessed  first  in  order  for  the  external  manifestation  to  be
persuasive (primum . . . tum in v. 103).
 The transition between the internal/emotional and the external/physical becomes cyclical
when the audience is taken into consideration. The external displays of an actor, his visage and
words together (and the two must necessarily be in accordance, as in vv. 105-7), communicate an
antecedent  internal  state.  This  external  communication  creates  a  feedback  loop  in  Horace's
promised response to  poorly delivered  lines:  male si  mandata loqueris,  /  aut  dormitabo aut
ridebo (vv. 104-5). The audience, comprised of humans subject to the same natura (v. 108) as the
actors, will demonstrate an internal, critical response in a physical manner—here, with the sleep
or laughter promised by Horace, who styles himself a stand-in for an audience. 14 The physical
behavior  expresses  an  emotional  or  intellectual  response,  and laughter  is  one  such behavior
communicating a negative assessment. Similarly, Horace hypothesizes a situation in vv. 112-3 in
which the words of an actor are inconsistent with his condition. The inevitable result: universal
guffaws. The laughter of v. 113, charged as the term cachinnus already is with connotations of
loud  volume  and  abrasiveness,  becomes  overwhelming  when  shared  among  all  the  theater
attendees,  front-row and  nose-bleed  sections  alike  (equites  peditesque  in  v.  113).  As  in  the
13 Plat.  Ion 535c5-8:  ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅταν  ἐλεινόν τι  λέγω, δακρύων ἐμπίμπλανταί  μου οἱ  ὀφθαλμοί·  ὅταν τε
φοβερὸν ἢ δεινόν, ὀρθαὶ αἱ τρίχες ἵστανται ὑπὸ φόβου καὶ ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ. 
14 Funke (1976) 198  observes  that  Plato's  Ion also recognizes laughter  as a response to bad oral  presentation
(“schlechten Vortrag”) in 535e4-6.
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opening of the Ars Poetica, Horace does not draw explicit attention to what an audience thinks
but to what an audience does. A physical response rather than an abstract internal assessment—
or, more accurately, a physical response as a representation of internal assessment—attracts his
attention. Laughter is a fitting reaction to bad poetry, regardless of whether that poetry is poorly
composed or poorly delivered.15
In a passage from the latter half of the  Ars Poetica (vv. 354-360), Horace confirms the
status of laughter as a form of negative criticism. He utilizes laughter to comment on the extent
to which poetic shortcomings should be forgiven:
ut scriptor si peccat idem librarius usque,
quamuis est monitus, uenia caret; ut citharoedus 355
ridetur, chorda qui semper oberrat eadem;
sic mihi, qui multum cessat, fit Choerilus ille,
quem bis terque bonum cum risu miror; et idem
indignor quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus;
uerum operi longo fas est obrepere somnum. 360
Just as a library scribe, if he continuously makes the same error,
although he has been warned, goes unforgiven; as a harpist 355
is laughed at who always flubs on the same string,
thus to me that man who often errs becomes Choerilus,
whom, when he's good now and then, I wonder at with a laugh; and likewise
I am upset whenever good Homer takes a nap;
but it is alright for sleep to sneak up on a lengthy work. 360
The comparisons illustrated are not quite balanced: the positive exemplum of the individual who
rarely errs is offered only in the context of poetry and only in the figure of Homer. 16 Negative
exempla, on the other hand, are supplied in the person of the scribe, the harpist, and the poet
Choerilus. The musician is first to receive the critique of laughter for his persistent errors when
the passive verb (ridetur in v. 356) marks the subject citharoedus as the sole object of laughter.
15 Brink (1963) 187 acknowledges that “the adverb male may grammatically go either with mandata or loqueris,”
though he ultimately places it with the participle. I am inclined to take male with the verb, so Horace addresses
the actor and then declares what his response will be.
16 Brink (1963) 364 remarks that Horace's comparison of other  arts and poetry “prefers essentials to external
neatness."
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That  the  laughter  functions  as  negative  criticism  is  confirmed  by  the  relative  clause  with
oberrat.17
The second occasion of laughter in v. 358 is a less straightforward example of laughter as
negative criticism.  The writer  who frequently makes mistakes is  equated with the notorious,
second-rate epic court-poet to Alexander the Great, Choerilus, whom Horace says he admires
with a laugh (cum risu miror in v. 358) on the rare occasion that he gets something right. Homer,
who is set against Choerilus to represent poetic composition that shows only the occasional flaw,
is  said  to  nod  off  (dormitat in  v.  359)  from  time  to  time,  a  failing  that  incites  Horace's
indignation. After all, Horace is not claiming to approve of errors but only to tolerate them in
moderation.  In  Homer's  case,  Horace  quickly  acknowledges  that  such  flaws,  which,  in  a
continuation of his sleepy metaphor, he collapses into the noun somnum, are tolerable in a work
of great length. As in v. 105 (aut dormitabo aut ridebo),  Horace pairs sleep and laughter to
communicate a dyad of negative criticism, but a small variation is introduced. Here in v. 359,
sleep is a behavior attributed to the poet himself (Homer). The laughter in v. 358 remains the
response of the critic (Horace). The metonymy involved in Homer's soporific characterization is
easy to follow: when the poet sleeps, his poetry sleeps as well. The unstated assumption is that
the  audience/reader  may  doze  off  too,  just  as  Horace  had  threatened  in  v.  105.  A different
variation takes place with the laughter with which Horace greets Choerilus' rare successes in
v.358. The risus is not the pointed guffaw of negative criticism but is provoked by an encounter
with Choerilus when he is  bonus.  Horace stops far short  of offering unqualified admiration,
because the  critical  context  (qui  multum cessat in  v.  357)  demands that  the  verb  not  signal
respect. As a consequence,  miror  is best read to indicate surprise.18 What of the laughter then,
17 Because this laughter occurs in the  ut portion of the comparison, it is initially difficult to determine whether
Horace is being merely descriptive or normative.
18 OLD s.v. miror 1a and 4. Brink (1963) 365 classifies Horace's response as “amused surprise.” Horace uses the
term in a similar way at Ep. 2.1.72.
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and how does it qualify Horace's bewilderment? 
The  phrase  cum risu  seems  to  convey  pleasure.  Horace's  laughter  shows  him to  be
enjoying himself, however unexpectedly, when he reads Choerilus at  his infrequent best—an
experience perhaps familiar to anyone who has happened on an unexpected literary nugget in a
mountain of scrawled debris. A single “Hah!” may escape the lips, leaving the reader unsure of
whether she deliberately said it or whether it was an unconscious reflex. This is the reaction that
Horace compresses into three words: cum risu miror. And while the laughter conveys pleasure on
Horace's part, this laughter is not positive literary criticism per se. The laugh that immediately
precedes  it  in  v.  356—the  ridetur of  negative  criticism—is  in  response  to  a  perpetually
blundering musician. The inversion of this negative critique would be laughter that recognizes
and praises a  flawless poet.  Choerilus is  not  this  poet.  Even though Horace  suggests  that  a
recognition of good prompts his laughter, it is understood that Horace  always expects more of
the bad from Choerilus. The disjoint between what Horace anticipates (i.e., malum) and what he
seldom, and thus unexpectedly, reads (i.e.,  bonum) provokes his  risus and his surprise—a crisp
illustration  of  how  perceived  incongruity  may  provoke  laughter.  In  other  words,  Horace's
laughter  is  more  precisely  attributed  to  a  sustained  experience  of  reading  than  to  a  critical
pleasure derived from the specific material read. His surprise-cum-laughter shows him to have
been drawn out of an assessment of one good passage into a consideration of that  passage's
incongruity with the rest of the poet's work.
A distinction is implicitly drawn between what the reader experiences and what Horace,
as poet-critic, believes is intended, an echo of Horace's remarks about the amphora-turned-mug
in vv. 21-2. The “intentional fallacy” is not fallacious in the eyes of the poet who writes about
poetry. Horace does not identify laughter as a deliberate aim of Choerilus when the bad poet
occasionally  offers  up  a  respectable  line  of  poetry.  One  may  ask  if  Choerilus  would  have
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welcomed  Horace's  surprised  laughter.  Presumably  not.  The  question  also  bleeds  into  a
consideration of genre. Though I discuss at length in Chapter 4, 5, and 6 the hypothesis that
laughter  functions  as  an  indicator  of  positive  critical  reception  in  light  of  certain  poetic
conventions and within specific genres, it is uncontroversial to note here that the court poetry
with  which  Horace  associates  Choerilus  would  not  quantify  its  success  in  laughs.19 Horace
elsewhere makes an effort to emphasize the weightiness of such poetry.20
In Epistle 2.1, Horace offers an epistolary poem to Augustus about literary criticism, and
he obliquely advises the emperor not to entrust the record of his  virtus to an unworthy poet
(indigno  . . . poetae in v. 231). He illustrates the point with a reference to Choerilus, whose
output Horace dismisses as “such a laughable poem”—poema / . . . tam ridiculum.21 Choerilus'
name and reputation are invoked to discourage Augustus from allowing any hack-poet to smear
his “splendid deeds with a loathsome song.”22 There is no reason offered in Horace's portrayal of
Choerilus to believe that the failed poet cultivated laughter as a response to his poetry. Yet both
times Horace refers to “that Choerilus” (Choerilus ille in  A.P. 356 and  ille /  Choerilus in  Ep.
2.1.232-3)23, he draws upon the vocabulary of laughter and the risible. Either Horace finds the
poet's work altogether laughable (as at Epistle 2.1), or he laughs on the unexpected occasion that
it is good (as at A.P. 356). In both cases, the poet-critic utilizes laughter for negative criticism. If
the laughter does not pointedly recognize bad poetry, it appears in a sustained form of criticism
where a laugh is not censorious in its specific application but in its broader contextualization.
In Epistle 2.2, another of Horace's poems that takes literary concerns as its focus, Horace
19 In Ep. 2.1.232-4, Horace states that Choerilus was a chosen poet of Alexander the Great.
20 In Horace's  address to Julius Florus about the literary goings-on on Tiberius'  campaign in  Ep.  1.3,  Horace
indicates with his choice of verb (sumere) that to write of the accomplishments of Augustus (res gestas Augusti
scribere sumit in v. 7) is no small task. The first word of the next verse is bella, gently invoking the idiom of
sumere bellum (e.g., Liv. 8.4.3).
21 Ep. 2.1.237-8.
22 Ep. 2.1.236-7: fere scriptores carmine foedo / splendida facta linunt.
23 Rudd (1989) points out that “ille suggests notoriety” (208).
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makes the point explicitly and concisely:  ridentur mala qui componunt carmina—“Those who
compose bad poems are laughed at” (v. 106). Horace marks the authors themselves as objects of
derision, but the deficient quality of their poetry is the root issue. These incompetent versifiers
are  contrasted  with  those  who  are  eager  to  create  “proper (legitimum)  poetry,”  whom  he
describes as making the effort to excise unworthy words from their poetry, to seek out the right
terms, dusty though they may be, and to create new vocabulary when necessary (vv. 109-119).
Attention to words and terms (uerba in v. 113 and uocabula in v. 116) is the mark of a good poet.
The bad poet, self-deluding and uncritical, provokes laughter not only because he writes bad
poetry but because he praises himself  nonetheless.24 Laughter is the critical  response to both
faults.
As the previous discussion demonstrates, the poet-critic in Horace's literary epistles (2.1,
2.2,  and  the  Ars  Poetica)  draws  repeatedly  upon laughter  to  communicate  negative  literary
criticism.  Before  I  turn  to  my  next  topic  of  exploration—the  use  of  laughter  as  a
metacommunicative tool to direct reader response, I want to consider why Horace adopts this
particular behavior to convey negative criticism (and by “consider why,” I mean that I wish to
pose more questions than I  can possibly answer).  Why is  laughter  offered as an appropriate
response to bad poetic production? Is it significant that laughter is paired (twice) with sleep as a
critical response? Two of the occasions of critical laughter Horace offers in the Ars Poetica are
framed as first-person responses (ridebo in v. 105 and cum risu miror in v. 358). Are these self-
characterizations by the poet-critic or do they indicate what would be a common response by a
wider reading public? Does the use of laughter say something about the performative context of
the works of poetry, e.g.,  that the poems are recited publicly or are of a particular genre? Is
24 The sequence of the verses emphasizes the obliviousness of “those who compose bad poems.” Even after they
are laughed at (ridentur  in v. 106), they nevertheless rejoice (gaudent) in their delusions. It is as if they think
their critics are laughing  with them, and they are pleased by the laughter. Horace uses the verb  gaudere  in
parallel with laughter in Satires 1.4.78, a passage discussed in Chapter 5. 
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laughter's use as a critical expression meant only to be descriptive or also normative? 
Attempting to answer these questions requires one to draw upon the theories of laughter
discussed in  the introduction,  namely the superiority,  incongruity,  and relief  theories.  In  Ep.
2.2.106, Horace presents laughter which reflects the “sudden glory” of superiority that manifests
itself whenever second-rate poetry is delivered.25 Poets who write such poems are ridiculed for
the explicit reason that their compositions are mala, much like musicians who consistently err in
the same way are laughed at in  A.P.  356. The incongruity theory is also at work in Horace's
literary critiques, such as at A.P. 112-3 when poetry that is absona—literally “inconsonant”—is
greeted with universal laughter. The boundaries between laughter in response to incongruity and
laughter to express superiority undoubtedly blur in this particular passage because the poetry that
is  absona is  implicitly  inferior,  but  Horace  nevertheless  focuses  his  attention  upon  the
incongruity of words with the fortunes of those who express them, and this is what he presents as
the cause of laughter. Verses 112-3 also hint at possible answers to other questions posed in the
previous paragraph. Horace's reference to “Roman knights and infantry” (equites peditesque in v.
113) offers a reply to the question of performative context; it locates the passage in the theater, a
setting already hinted at in the references to tragic actors in vv. 96 and 104. Though Horace's
prescriptions regarding good poetry apply to any poetic composition that draws upon character,
be it theatrical (comic and tragic), epic, lyric, or otherwise, Horace paints a picture in vv. 112-3
of  a  public  performance  that  elicits  a  public  response.  The  passage  likewise  universalizes
laughter as a critical response. Despite the fact that Horace threatens laughter in the first-person
on other occasions in the Ars Poetica and may at those points be telling the Pisones and his wider
readership about his own critical tendencies, he here presents a laugh responding to incongruous
25 A more extensive discussion of the superiority theory can be found in the Introduction, pp. 28-31. The phrase
“sudden glory” is used by Hobbes in his iteration of this theory.
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poetic composition as a behavior shared among Romans of all social standings. As for the final
“canonical”  theory  of  laughter,  the  relief  theory  may  be  operative  when  Horace  claims  to
“wonder with a laugh” (cum risu miror  in v. 358) at the rare “good” bits of Choerilus' poetry,
though,  as  discussed  in  the  introduction,  the  relief  theory  often  works  in  concert  with  the
incongruity  theory.  Horace  laughs  as  an  expression  of  psychological  relief  and  tempered
approval when he reads a good passage of Choerilus, but this relief is itself prompted by the
expectation of more drivel from the court-poet. And while the laughter in v. 358 is descriptive,
some of the laughter of superiority is also construed predictively. When Horace says that he will
laugh in v. 105 (ridebo) or that the audience  will  laugh in v. 113 (tollent  . . . cachinnum), the
implication is that laughter, twice the apodosis of vivid conditionals,  is the natural response.
Consequently it can be promised as it is.
While answers to many of the questions posed above can be found in, or suggested by,
the theories of laughter, either individually or in combination with one another, the remaining
questions—“Why  laughter?”  and  “Why  laughter  and  sleep  together?”—are  more  unwieldy,
perhaps  because  of  their  generality.  To  make  my  question  more  specific,  I  might  ask  why
laughter and sleepiness are construed as fitting responses to bad poetry rather than heckling or
walking  out  of  a  performance,  both  of  which  are  typical  responses  to  “bad  composition”
nowadays.  But  because laughter and nodding off  are  also present-day indicators of  negative
critical reception, that query really invites a different question that is not about laughter at all:
“Where  are  booing and walking  out  in  Horace's  critical  quiver?”  My juxtaposition  of  these
critical behaviors that do not feature in Horace's poems with laughter and sleep does highlight a
distinctive component of the two reactions that Horace does promise. Unlike the decision to
leave a bad performance or to heckle a dreadful poet,26 laughter and sleep are behaviors that can
26 For evidence of heckling, cf.  Satires  1.10.76-77:  nam satis est equitem mihi plaudere, ut audax, /  contemptis
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occur involuntarily or “naturally.” These behaviors occur universally. An audience member may
not “decide” to laugh or fall asleep but may do both of these things nonetheless. For his part,
Horace portrays laughter and sleep as reactions he can predict (e.g.,  aut dormitabo aut ridebo
A.P. 105),  but  the  fact  that  the  behaviors  in  themselves  are  “natural”  (i.e.,  physiological
happenings)  and  could  be  involuntary  (in  a  way  that  booing  never  could  be)  makes  them
potentially less offensive.27
To leave behind sleep and restrict the following speculations to laughter alone, I propose
that Horace uses laughter to cultivate a more playful approach to his role as poet-critic. This does
not mean that Horace does not take literary criticism seriously, nor is it to suggest that he does
not value literature as an earnest pursuit in itself. As explored in Chapter 4, Horace in his guise as
satirist  recognizes laughter's practical value for approaching “serious” matters.  Nevertheless,
with Horace as my springboard, I hazard the following hypothesis on the function of laughter
and literary criticism:  Horace offers laughter  as if  a  response to  play.  Thus Horace's  use of
laughter in his literary criticism designates the literature under discussion as a manifestation of
“play.”28 If  a  work  of  literature  does  not  present  itself  as  “playful"  or  "in  jest,"  a  reader's
aliis, explosa Arbuscula dixit.
27 Edmonson  (1987)  offers  evidence  to  the  contrary:  “[Laughter's]  phonetic  features  appear  to  be  organized
expressly to enable an individual to vote audibly and identifiably in a group context,  and thus to make his
feelings known in response to a certain range of situational cues. And each individual has the option of coding
his presence and pleasure or displeasure, as well as participation or non-participation in a more or less complex
proposition  presented  by  the  context.  The  sounds  of  laughter  must  thus  encode  a  range  of  interpretable
messages,  feigned or  sincere,  revealing and  sometimes involuntary.  [.  .  .]  The laughter  utterance is  thus  a
multiple-track  statement,  more  akin  to  music  than  to  speech”  (28).  Yet  Edmonson's  argument  is  from the
perspective of anthropological linguistics and emphasizes the specificity of various laughs based upon the vowel
that  is  vocalized  (e.g.,  he-he  vs.  ha-ha  vs.  ho-ho).  Some  such  variety  is  undoubtedly  encoded  in  Latin
vocabulary's ability to differentiate between a chuckle (subrisus) and a cackle (cachinnus), but this leaves a vast
quantity of laughs to be illustrated by the unmarked risus. Stated differently, literary laughter conveyed by the
vocabulary of laughter and the risible (as opposed to  transcribed laughter) has  “fewer tracks”  than an oral
utterance. When Edmonson concludes on the next page (29) that “[laughter] therefore stands opposed to the
autism of weeping, surprise, expletive and command, and lies closer to the shared interjections of cheering and
booing, of socially shared joy and anger,” his comments are best applied only to the oral (rather than literary)
occurrence of laughter.
28 Richlin (1992) offers a summary of landmark anthropological scholarship on “play,” beginning with Huizinga's
Homo Ludens (1955), in which the Dutch cultural-historian argues that play, rather than a means to an end, is an
end in itself. Richlin notes that Huizinga's theory “ignores content” (74), and so she refines his argument by
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classification of  it  as such would function  as a  default  critique.  The end-result  is  similar to
someone saying, “Oh, I thought you were joking,” after she realizes that the statement of her
interlocutor was not intended to provoke a chuckle . . . or an audience emerging from a theater
having thought that the tragedy they just watched was a comedy. In other words, the complete
misinterpretation of a literary effort brands that effort unsuccessful. To laugh in response to a
poorly executed tragic characterization, as Horace threatens to do in A.P. 105, is to designate the
characterization  a  jest.  If  the  characterization  is  intended to  provoke  a  laugh,  then  the  jest,
confirmed by a laugh, is successful. If not, Horace's “natural” response speaks for itself. 
Laughter's “natural” and involuntary status establishes the origin of the laughter in the
source  text.  The  blame  falls  on  the  poet  rather  than  the  critic.  If  someone  boos  a  poetic
production, one can say that the “booer” qua critic has motives beyond critical appraisal. Why
else  engage  in  a  conspicuous  public  display?  The  booer  willingly  (perhaps  even  eagerly)
performs his disapproval. But a laugh that sneaks up on a reader (A.P. 358) or masters an entire
audience (A.P. 113) could be a natural litmus, conveying more about the poem than about those
who laugh. This may be a better way to interpret Horace's threat in A.P. 105 (aut dormitabo aut
ridebo), which is to say not as a threat at all. The poet-critic tells the Pisones that his spontaneous
reaction to poorly written or delivered lines will be either (aut) falling asleep or (aut) laughing.
He  does  not  specify  the  form  his  response  will  take  because  he  does  not  “choose”  it;  an
unscripted onset of drowsiness or a case of the chuckles, depending on the particular deficiencies
of the poem, chooses him.
The fact that “bad” in the world of Horatian literary criticism may lead to laughter while
noting that “the genesis of individual forms of play cannot be considered arbitrary, and the content of each form
must  have  some relation  to  its  genesis,  even  if  the  repeated  form seems purely  joyful,  without  purpose.”
Huizinga  (1955)  119 also asserts  that  poetry  came from,  and  remains,  a  form of  play.  For a  summary  of
Huizinga's argument and an evaluation of his (contemporary) critics, see Anchor (1978). I postpone a fuller
treatment of play theory (or "ludism") until Chapter 5.
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“bad” elsewhere in the Roman world (e.g., treason) is met with more severe censure echoes some
of the questions raised by Socrates' use of γελοῖον in Book 5 of the Republic.29 The designation
of particular things as bad and therefore laughable does not mean that laughter is the natural
response to all things bad. It may seem banal to point out that there are different registers of
badness,  but  this  is  to  highlight  a  semantic  ambiguity that  is  common to  Greek,  Latin,  and
English alike. In English, "bad" can mean poorly executed ("That's a bad song"), evil ("He's a
bad man"), and, thanks in part to the popularity of a Michael Jackson song, bad can even be a
variation on good (sometimes pronounced "baaad" to mark a contrast with the negative sense).30
At A.P 104 and Epistle 2.2.106, Horace uses forms of malus to refer to laughable poetry, but this
term too can mean bad in such varied senses as distressing, ugly, poor, and evil.31 We can even
return to the two variations of κακόν mentioned in the discussion of incongruity at the beginning
of  this  chapter  with  the  badness  qua monstrousness  of  a  Scylla  and  the  badness  qua
inconsistency of a work of art. It is this latter type of "badness" to which Horace is attuned.
Because of  his  role  as  poet-critic,  Horace  focuses his  critical  laughter at  a  particular
subset of bad art, namely at bad poetry, but in the opening of the Ars Poetica (vv. 1-22), he casts
a wide net around bad paintings, bad poems, and bad pottery alike. The positive exhortation with
which  he  counters  these  varied  negative  exempla  is  comparably  broad:  “In  short,  let  it  be
anything you want . . ." (denique sit quiduis in v. 23), and the indefinite quiduis allows "it" really
to be whatever.  The reader  and the  Pisones can create  what  they please,  but  "create"  is  the
operative word.32 The “bad” to which Horace refers—the “bad” that can provoke laughter—is
geared toward a creative aesthetic. 
In the current discussion, I have treated only Horace's use of laughter for negative literary
29 See the discussion in the Introduction, pp. 18-20.
30 A single term with two antithetical definitions is known by some as an “antagonym.” Cool word, huh?
31 OLD s.v. malus.
32 LSJ s.v. ποιέω A 4 for the use of the verb to refer to the creation or composition of literature.
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criticism and not any similar use by Vergil or Ovid—the other authors whose poems comprise
my  study.  The  primary  reason  for  this  is  that  neither  Vergil  nor  Ovid  offers  such  explicit
modeling of literary criticism in his  corpora. It is difficult to be more explicit about laughter's
role in negative criticism than Horace's coupling of  ridentur  with the terms  mala carmina  in
Epistle  2.2.106. Note, however, my repetition of “explicit” in the preceding sentences. There
exist other uses of literary laughter and subtler forms of literary criticism in Horace, Vergil, and
Ovid alike. All of these poets demonstrate through their works that, just as a “real laugh” can be
provoked  by  any  number  of  experiences,  there  are  various  stimuli  that  can  lead  to  literary
laughter. More specifically, there are ways to elicit a laugh from a literary audience other than
writing bad poetry. For example, one could simply write the word “laughter” to set a laugh in
motion.
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CHAPTER 2: LAUGHING AT LAUGHTER
METACOMMUNICATIVE LAUGHTER IN ECLOGUE 3
SECTION I: METACOMMUNICATION DEFINED
In  the  previous  chapter,  I  mention  an  example  of  contagious  Horatian  laughter  (Ars
Poetica, vv. 104-105):
ut ridentibus adrident, ita flentibus adflent 101
humani uultus. si uis me flere, dolendum est
primum ipsi tibi; tum tua me infortunia laedent,
Telephe uel Peleu; male si mandata loqueris,
aut dormitabo aut ridebo. 105
As human faces laugh with those laughing, so they cry with those crying. 101
If you want me to cry, you yourself must be pained first;
then your misfortunes will wound me, Telephus
or Peleus; if you will have spoken scripted words poorly,
I'll either nod off or laugh. 105
The syntactical parallelism Horace creates between descriptions of sympathetic laughing and
crying (ut ridentibus adrident, ita flentibus adflent) invites these behaviors to the same playing-
field,  although  the  laughter,  appearing  as  it  does  in  the  first  clause,  is  given  home-field
advantage.  The explanatory  ut clause  casts laughter's  infectiousness  as the stable  part  of the
claim; that laughter can traverse “the fourth wall” of a theatrical stage is offered as a given.
Laughter's contagious nature then operates as a potted argument for the contagiousness of crying,
as Horace turns to tears in his discussion of tragic characterization (si uis me flere . . . in v. 101).
When Horace says he will nod off or laugh in response to bad writing, he is citing examples of
discrepant  responses  when  corresponding  ones  are  desired.  If  an  actor  has  just  mangled  a
monologue  (or  delivered  a  poorly  written  monologue),  laughter  will  be  manifest  proof  that
tearful behavior onstage has failed to accomplish its purpose. Negatively critical laughter of this
sort is now familiar from the previous chapter as Horace has offered one answer to the question
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of why a reader might laugh at a text. 
The laughter of vv. 101, on the other hand, is not qualitatively charged, positively or
negatively. It is laughter provoked by laughter, an example of what I theorize is the ancient laugh
track. The theory is simple to state but difficult to prove, my hypothesis being that an author will
use the language of laughter and the risible to trigger a specific reaction in the reader. But how to
confirm this? Unlike explanations of the modern laugh track, there are no treatments of such a
use of literary laughter by ancient authors.1 Horace's ridentibus adrident represents the argument
literally as well as conceptually, but his words are about human faces,  humani uultus (v. 102),
and not words themselves. The spread of laughter from a literal representation of it (i.e., a term
for laughter) to an actual laughing response might be observable in a modern readership given
proper research. The existence of a similar response by an ancient audience would be a matter of
speculation.
This speculation, while not empirically demonstrable among ancient readers, is by no
means  unfamiliar  to  a  literate  audience.  Consider  the  last  time  you  laughed  in  response  to
something you read. Perhaps what provoked your laughter was unintentionally risible, like the
snippets of Choerilus' poetry that Horace acknowledges with the laughter of negative criticism in
the Ars Poetica. On the other hand, maybe you read something that was meant to provoke your
laughter, like a clever pun nestled in the headline of a newspaper article or a playful letter from a
close friend. Your friend's note might begin, “I just laughed at . . .”, and as soon as you read those
words,  you  prepare  yourself  to  be  amused—even  to  laugh.  This  is  metacommunication,  or
1 The topic has been of interest to social psychologists since the mid-1970s, though "canned laughter" was first
used in a television show in 1950 (Sacks (n.d.)). For laugh tracks and social conformity, see Nosanchuk and
Lightstone  (1974).  For laughter  as  a  "situational  cue,"  see  Fuller  and  Sheehy-Skeffington (1974) 534.  The
authors also venture an application to television laugh tracks: "With regard to the implications of these results
for the practice of dubbing laughter onto radio and television programmes, it appears that the practice has some
validity"  (534).  See  Lawson  et  al.  (1998)  for  refinements  regarding  different  evaluations  of  laughter  that
subjects believe to be canned rather than live and Platow et  al. (2005) for experimentation suggesting that
subjects smile and laugh more when the recorded laughter is believed to be “in group” (i.e., generated by peers).
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“communication about communication.”2 The primary layer of communication is embedded in
the literal meanings of the words that your friend uses.3 This layer provides the basic information
that your friend laughed. The secondary layer draws upon your (and your friend's) knowledge of
stories that begin with laughter and are presented as “laugh-worthy.” This layer informs you that
your friend's story occupies a particular conceptual frame. Expectations are then set regarding
how the content of the primary layer of communication should be interpreted.
The concept of the “play frame” has its roots in psychology and communication theory
but  has  since  been applied  to  humor  theory.4 A speaker  can establish  a  play frame through
explicit  verbal  communication  (e.g.,  “Here's  a  good  joke  .  .  .  ”)  or  through  various
metacommunicative cues, such as tone of voice or body language (e.g., One friend gamboling
toward another while smilingly saying, “I'm gonna get you!”).5 In the remainder of this chapter, I
explore literary laughter's metacommunicative potential,  namely, the idea that terms denoting
laughter and the risible are often forms of communication that transcend their immediate verbal
meaning  to  direct  reader  response.  Laughter's  paralinguistic  status  may  contribute  to  its
suitability as a metacommunicative tool, and so too may the social nature of laughter, but these
2 I note Richlin's use of this term on p. 65 n. 4.
3 Terms referring to “primary” orders (and, thus implicitly, “secondary”) resemble Bakhtin's (1994) 82 use of
such  terminology  in  his  differentiation  of  speech  genres.  Bakhtin  presents  “secondary”  speech  genres  as
conceptually akin to metacommunication: “Secondary (complex) speech genres—novels, dramas, all kinds of
scientific research, major genres of commentary, and so forth—arise in more complex and comparatively highly
developed and organized cultural communication (primarily written) that is artistic, scientific, sociopolitical,
and so on. During the process of their formation, they absorb and digest various primary (simple) genres that
have taken form in unmediated speech communion.” Bakhtin's “unmediated speech communion” is, in a word,
communication. Literature, even when it integrates this communication, is metacommunication.
4 Bateson (1956) and Fry (1963) both refer to "play frames" in their respective works. I use the phrase as I believe
they  do,  without  the  significant  weight  of  "play  theory."  Fry,  whose  area  of  interest  is  humor  theory,
acknowledges his debt to Bateson and restates many of Bateson's observations, but his own treatment of human
metacommunicative cues makes explicit mention of laughter. The term "metacommunication" seems to have
fallen out of vogue, though it has enjoyed a recent resurgence in internet articles about dog behavior.
5 Fry (1963)  126 says  of  these  signals,  “They are  dependent,  for  their  existence,  for  their  content,  for  their
structure, upon the situation they are both part of and signals about. They are one with the continuous ongoing
behavior.” A paradox arises from the fact that the cue that marks a situation, such as a claimed threat, as unreal
(e.g.,  smiling  or  exaggerated  movement)  must  be  believed  to  be real  or  offered sincerely in  order  for  the
“correct” cue—i.e.,  the cue that  says "this is  unreal"—to be received. This resembles the paradox between
“internal incongruity” and “external incongruity” discussed in Chapter 1, p. 70 n. 8.
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are  considerations  for  linguists  and  behavioral  psychologists  to  examine.  The  hypothesis  I
explore is that a laugh in a text, while serving the primary function of communicating a laugh
within the work, often serves the secondary purpose of alerting a reader to the suitability of
laughter as a response to the text.
SECTION II: A CATULLAN DIVERSION
A detour from the Augustan poets to the poetry of Catullus is helpful insofar as Catullus
offers ideal evidence of laughter “planted” in a Latin poetic text. The use of similar techniques
by Horace, Vergil, and Ovid is easier to detect and to appreciate in light of the laughter that
Catullus works into several poems. Catullus' c. 53 presents a self-contained demonstration of
how laughter may function as a cue for a corresponding reader response:
risi nescio quem modo e corona,
qui, cum mirifice Vatiniana
meus crimina Calvus explicasset,
admirans ait haec manusque tollens,
'di magni, salaputium disertum!'
I just laughed at someone from the crowd
who, when my Calvus had wonderfully
set forth the crimes of Vatinius,
raised his hands in admiration and said the following:
“Great gods, what a literary widdle wit-ster.”
This  is  the  letter  from  your  friend,  the short  note  scribbled  and  sent  immediately  after  a
humorous  experience.  There  is  no  stated  addressee,  and  the  speaker  remains  nameless.
Familiarity  between  speaker  and  reader/addressee  is  assumed.  Laughter  bursts  out  with  the
speaker's first word, and a tone of the risible is instantly established.  The laughter has already
come and gone in the course of Catullus' first line, and the reader must immediately play catch-
up on the narrative. The narrative is in fact told in reverse and condensed into a single sentence.
First there is laughter, and its explanation follows. The occasion is a judicial speech by  meus
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Calvus, delivered so remarkably as to provoke an exclamation from a member of the audience.
This exclamation, offered in verse 5, seems to have played a key role in provoking the speaker's
laughter.
The  speaker  implicitly  understands that  a  laugh  occurs  in  a  temporal  sequence;  it  is
provoked by something (e.g., an entertaining or uncomfortable story), and it may then provoke a
similar response (e.g., another laugh) or a completely different one (e.g., anger or shame). The
explanation  of  the  laugh—its  “narrative”—would  seem  limited  in  such  a  short  poem.  But
imagine a readership that is familiar with an orator named Calvus who participated in a trial
against  Vatinius.  Or  perhaps  there  was  a  public  figure  who  frequently  used  the  rare  word
salaputium, thus opening himself up to mockery by mimicry. In fact, the speaker offers several
possible  “reasons”  for  the  laughter  as  the  poem  unfolds.  The  speaker  may  laugh  at  the
unidentified person in the crowd (nescio quem in v. 1), what the person said (v. 5), the mention of
Calvus (v.2), or the recollection of the Vatinian crimes (v. 4). Suddenly the laugh's “story” has
extended beyond the five lines of text and interwoven itself with public affairs. 
The word salaputium is presumably integral in making the speaker laugh, but this ἅπαξ
λεγόμενον is not without its challenges of interpretation.6 My translation draws on the presence
of sal (a familiar term of the risible in Catullus) as the first syllable of a compound, though I also
include in my translation Seneca's reading of the word as alluding to Calvus' diminutive size. 7
Perhaps the speaker laughs because he recognizes that the anonymous exclamation was delivered
in a tight, well-balanced line of metrical verse—a ready-made “line” in perfect hendecasyllables.
6 Weiss (1996) summarizes the textual history of this term and offers a very persuasive and confident reading of
salaputium as meaning “salt-purification” or “refinement of wit” (358), finally concluding that the joke is an
ethnic/dialect one (359). I make no attempt at conveying the ethnic joke in my translation. Hawkins (2012) adds
that  salaputium also  functions  as  a  programmatic  term with  neoteric  resonances  and  elements  of  stylistic
polemic (6-11).
7 See Seneca's aside on Calvus in Controversiae VII.4.7: erat enim parvolus statura, propter quod etiam Catullus
in hendecasyllabis vocat illum 'salaputium disertum.'
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For the sake of the present discussion, why the final line made the speaker laugh is less important
than the fact that the exclamation could, and presumably did, excite laughter. 
Like  the  amusing  story  in  your  friend's  letter,  Catullus'  poem  invites  retelling.  The
speaker ambiguously positions himself somewhere “in the crowd.” He is everyone and anyone
who may have been present, and he simply acts as the mouthpiece for another man's witticism.
In  incorporating  the  exclamation  into  his  own account,  the  unnamed  speaker/poet  invites  a
secondary speaker  to  repeat  the entire  poem—not  merely the punch-line.  The verses can be
recited verbatim in the 1st-person (although a secondary-speaker is then obliged to align himself
with  the  level  of  familiarity  implied  in  meus  Calvus).  The  identities  of  speaker  and  reader
collapse into one another when the text is read or recited. As the reader declares, “I laughed” in
speaking the first word, the text not only invites the reader to imagine himself or herself in the
account but forces the reader to take ownership of it. A claim of laughter is on the lips of anyone
who hears the poem and repeats it, casually or formally, to another addressee. 
Does the poem actually make the reader laugh? In the case of a modern audience, the
answer is probably, “No.” Without a clearer understanding of the significance of salaputium or of
the particulars of the Vatiniana crimina, an immediate understanding of the account is lost to us.
But one can reasonably suppose that an ancient reader either laughed after hearing someone else
recite the poem or laughed while  (or after)  he himself  read or recited it.  In either  case,  the
versified account of a laugh would provoke an actual laugh, shifting from recitation or reading to
realization. Laughter is implied before, acknowledged during (risi in v. 1), and invited after every
reading of the poem. The laugh—its source, occurrence, and reception—is in a cyclical dialogue
with the readership. Through the reader, the laughter becomes self-propagating.
In Catullus' c. 56, the poet plays with both the idea and the sound of laughter:
o rem ridiculam, Cato, et iocosam,
90
dignamque auribus et tuo cachinno!
ride quidquid amas, Cato, Catullum:
res est ridicula et nimis iocosa.
deprendi modo pupulum puellae 5
trusantem; hunc ego, si placet Dionae,
protelo rigida mea cecidi.
A laughable affair, Cato, and funny,
worthy of your ears and your cackle!
Laugh as you, Cato, love Catullus:
The affair is laughable and too funny.
I just caught a little boy bumping 5
my girl; him, I (if it pleases Dione)
with us all in a row, struck with my stiffy.
The vocabulary of the risible chiastically embraces the vocabulary of laughter in the first four
verses: the adjectives ridicula and iocosa modify the “affair” in the first and fourth lines, while
cachinnus  and  rideo  (lines  2  and  3)  demand  explicit  laughter.  The  final  three  verses  (5-7)
presumably describe the res to which “Catullus” refers.8 The narrative structure is bipartite. The
first  part  declares  that  something  funny  happened.  The  second  part  explains  what  that
“something” was. The seven lines appear to constitute a simple “joke” poem, but in fact c. 56
uses the laughter for which it calls and the difficult-to-picture joke to engage the reader in a more
elaborate dialogue with laughter. The poem endeavors (in more than one way) to create laughter.
The atmosphere of the poem is conversational and familiar as the speaker first exclaims
about the humorous “affair” and then repeatedly addresses (in the vocative) and engages with
(using 2nd-person verbs) a man named Cato. Who this Cato is, or whether he is a historical
figure at all, is unknowable,9 but the naming of an addressee effectively collapses the poem's
individual  reader into the name  Cato.  The third line (quidquid amas  [.  .  .]  Catullum)  gently
8 Scott (1969), who establishes several interesting paths of inquiry raised by this poem (including the identity of
Cato and a number of textual concerns), finds the situation described in vv. 5-7 patently unfunny (26). On the
contrary, I believe that the frank glance into the speaker's bedroom could certainly offer a laugh-worthy vignette.
9 Though it is likely that a contemporary of Catullus would immediately know to which Cato this refers, the
ambiguity may in fact be deliberate. Although a more logical correspondent/addressee may be Valerius Cato, a
known member of Catullus'  poetic  coterie,  the reading of  Cato  as referring to the moralist  Marcus Porcius
would also be humorous.
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invites the reader into the speaker's group of friends by way of Cato; some love, if only a little, is
assumed  by  the  indefinite  quidquid.  The  speaker  also  offers  his  name:  Catullus,  and  the
juxtaposition of the two names reinforces the affinity of the figures. Cato and Catullus approach
the second half of the poem from a common perspective, and the reader is drawn in as well,
wearing the name and identity of  Cato.  The shared orientation of the reader (via  Cato)  and
Catullus toward the  “affair”  is  an important  consideration where laughter  is  concerned.  The
object of laughter has been identified, and all parties can laugh “in the same direction.”
What “thing” is in that direction and even how many people are involved are points of
some disagreement. The presentation of the “affair” is complicated by both textual difficulties
and narrative ambiguities. Housman and Thomson identify the  ἅπαξ λεγόμενον trusantem as
masturbation and imagine the speaker catching the “little boy”  of  the girl  (with  puellae as a
genitive)  hard  at  work  on  himself.10 Others  believe  that  the  scene  describes  an  improvised
threesome  and  interpret  trusantem as  a  sexual  act  that  the  “little  boy”  is  performing  (or
attempting to perform11) on the girl. Under this reading, puellae is a dative object.12 The unique
use of  protelo in v. 7 and the textual variant  pro telo  (“instead of a spear”) offer little aid in
clarifying the action. The second interpretation seems more persuasive. The girl appears to be a
familiar  of  the  speaker—perhaps  the  same  unnamed  puella who  appears  elsewhere  in  the
polymetrics.13 The boy, on the other hand, is a  delicatus puer,  as Housman proposes. As for
protelo, I agree with Uden's (2007) conclusion that “in a row” makes less sense where only two
people are involved.
10 Housman (1931) 402:  Catullus amicae puerum delicatum, quem masturbantem deprehenderat, opportunitate
data percidit.
11 Claes (2002), 84 states that the “infantile boy is incapable of virile penetration,” citing Giangrande (1970), 97 n.
40 who seems to treat  truso  and  trudo synonymously.  Giangrande cites truditur  in Martial XI 46.3,  where
impotence and conative attempts at thrusting are stressed, though masturbation is implied.
12 Ellis (1889) and Tanner (1972). See also Uden (2007) 12, who summarizes and interprets the textual difficulties.
13 See carmina 2, 3, and 8.
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I believe the poem is humorous, though any attempt to persuade a reader of this would
most likely be in vain.14 I will content myself with pointing out some ways in which the poem
could be funny. The easiest explanation is that the sexual scene is itself humorous. The speaker
invites Cato and the reader to take a glimpse behind (typically) closed doors where “Catullus”
turns  a  sexual  transgression  against himself  into  a  laugh-worthy  image.  After  catching  his
girlfriend with a male who is emphatically portrayed as a nonthreatening little boy (pupulum), he
promptly joins in the sexual act rather than otherwise punishing the boy or girl. Alternatively,
perhaps the speaker is role-playing. The use of protelo may call to mind a livestock animal that
the speaker “strikes” as if punishing it with a whip, thus casting the speaker in an agricultural
role.15 The speaker could even be assuming the role of a sacrificial priest, an interpretation that
has the distinct appeal of accounting for the religiosity of si placet Dionae (v. 6).16 The speaker
desires to please Dione (or, more fittingly, her daughter Venus) by “sticking” a victim, and he
invokes the goddess' name in a show of (mock?) piety.
The poem may also be funny in “metapoetic” ways. Consider, for example, the apparent
lack of balance between the two parts.  The first  four lines are  self-referential  and internally
balanced. Each verse is comfortably end-stopped with a strong sense-break coming at the end of
the fourth verse. The second half of the poem, on the other hand, contains only three verses, the
syntax of which is jumbled, as if mirroring the disorder or haphazard nature of the final sexual
acrobatics. The fifth and sixth verses are enjambed, illustrating that the boy and girl are stuck
together at that point. The conclusion of the poem after cecidi in line 7 leaves the reader feeling
14 I refer the reader to E.B. White's opening paragraph in the essay "Some Remarks on Humor" (173-181) in The
Second Tree from the Corner  (1954): “Analysts have had their go at  humor, and I have read some of this
interpretative literature, but without being greatly instructed. Humor can be dissected as a frog can, but the thing
dies in the process and the innards are discouraging to any but the pure scientific mind” (173).
15 For the use of  protelo in an agricultural context, see Cato (apud Nonius 363, 10) where “three oxen in a row
(protelo) lead one plow” (protelo trini boves unum aratrum ducent).
16 Commentators seem to be content to interpret this phrase as a stand-in for si dis placet. See Ellis (1889) 199-200
and Merrill (1893) 91.
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as if the poem has ended one verse early—prematurely even Such an unexpected end could itself
be humorous. An interpreter of the poem can even call upon unfulfilled expectations in the case
of the reader who sees nothing humorous in the last three verses: the hasty, unfunny conclusion
of the poem acquires an ironical humor after the effusive set-up in the first four verses.
Even for the reader who detects nothing humorous or laugh-worthy in the verses, c. 56
creates the laughter that it demands. As is often the case with Catullus, the poem should be read
aloud to be adequately appreciated.  The first  line employs two distinct sonic effects with its
repetition of r's and hard c's (along with t's and final m's, though these are less marked). The
sonic  effects  are  maintained  throughout  the  subsequent  three  verses,  primarily  through  the
repetition of entire words and phrases.  Ridicula  and  iocosa are repeated in different cases but
maintain the same metrical sedes. The vocative Cato in verse 1 is displaced by nimis in line 4 but
then inserted into verse 3 where it appears coupled with Catullum. The sonic repitition of r's and
hard c's onomatopoeically mimic the laughter for which the speaker calls. The Latin cachinnus
and Greek καχάζω are believed to be etymologically related onomatopoeic representations of
laughter, a conclusion that is all the more reasonable if one accepts the possibility that the Greeks
and Romans, like us, occasionally laughed with an aspirated “ha-ha” sound (i.e, χα χα).17 Thus
the repetition of c's throughout the passage, especially those in close proximity to one another
(e.g., Cato, et iocosam in v. 1, Cato, Catullum in v. 3, and cecidi in v. 7) forces the oral reader to
continue to perform this laughter. 
How the repetition of r's enacts laughter requires a consideration of the use of laughter in
Catullus' c. 42:
17 LSJ, OLD, and Chantraine relate καχάζω and cachinno. See also Halliwell (2008) 245. However, Kidd (2011)
451-3 urges caution in citing χα χα as Greek onomatopoeic laughter, referring to the cultural complexity of the
Greek Magical Papyri in which the interjection is found. Fry (1963) 33 intriguingly refers to the "legend among
professional funnymen" that the k-sound induces laughter. Unfortunately, like many legends, it is difficult to
find corroborating evidence for Fry's statement.
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quae sit, quaeritis? illa, quam videtis
turpe incedere, mimice ac moleste
ridentem catuli ore Gallicani.
circumsistite eam, et reflagitate, 10
'moecha putida, redde codicillos,
redde putida moecha, codicillos!'
non assis facis? o lutum, lupanar,
aut si perditius potes quid esse.
sed non est tamen hoc satis putandum. 15
quod si non aliud potest ruborem
ferreo canis exprimamus ore. 
Who is she, you ask? That one whom you see
walking sloppily, and like some annoying comedienne,
laughing with the lip of a little French poodle.
Surround her, and demand them back, 10
“Foul tart, return our tablets,
return, foul tart, our tablets.”
Do you not value this a bit? Mudpit! Whorehouse!
Or if you are able to be anything worse.
Nevertheless, this must not be thought sufficient. 15
As to which, if all else fails, let us wring
out the blush from the dog's brazen face.
In this poem, the speaker  demands that his  poetry aid him in effecting the return of certain
writing tablets, and while making these demands, the speaker insults the woman who refuses to
return his poetry.18 He also establishes a correspondence between the woman's laugh and the
mouth of a dog—a point reinforced by lupine and canine references in v. 13 (lupanar) and v. 17
(canis). As in c. 56, the consonance at work with the r's in  ridentem and  ore creates a sonic
effect.19 The comparison highlights a constellation of associations between the letter r, laughing,
and dogs.  The simplest  connection is  the alliterative one operative between r  and words for
laughing: the terms risus and ridere begin with r's, as does the adjective ridiculus.20 The second
side of the triangle, the association between the letter r and dogs, is explicitly observed in Persius
18 Fraenkel (1961) notes the resemblance these verses have to occasions of Plautine flagitatio (49-51).
19 In his own attention to the sonics of the poem, Frankel (1961) hears contempt in the repetition of m's in v. 8
(47). He notes the sonic effect of r's in vv. 16-17 but not in these verses.
20 I also have a pet-theory that the long-i in the first syllable of these terms and the fact that pronouncing the letter
r requires one's mouth to be open force the mouth into an apparent open-mouth smile.
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via the  canina littera  of  Satire 1.109-10. One speaker in Persius' knotty dialogue says to the
other, “Here the canine letter sounds from the nose.” Though it is unclear who is speaking and
how the  comment  fits  into the  immediate  context,  the  sound to  which the  speaker  refers  is
certainly the rolling r of a growling dog.21 The connection between r's and dogs appears even
earlier in Lucilius fr. 3 wherein the satirist describes the letter r, “which an excited dog speaks
more plainly than a man.”22 That Persius is nodding to his satirical predecessor with his canina
littera  is confirmed when Persius calls upon Lucilius by name just  four lines later in 114-5:
“Lucilius tore the city, you, Lupus, you, Mucius—he broke his molar on those guys”—secuit
Lucilius urbem, /  te Lupe, te Muci, et  genuinum fregit  in illis.  Is it  coincidence that Persius'
speaker  depicts  Lucilius  as  a  man  rending  his  opponents,  fighting  with  every  tooth  in  his
mouth?23
Not only can laughing and dogs each be connected to the letter r, but, as Catullus' c. 42.9
suggests, laughing and dogs can also be associated with one another—the final correspondence
in  the  triangle.  In  Plautus'  Captivi,  the  parasite  Ergasilus  laments  the  state  of  the  parasite's
“profession” and comments on a tough reception he received on a visit to the forum:
nemo ridet; sciui extemplo rem de compecto geri; 
ne canem quidem irritatam uoluit quisquam imitarier, 485
saltem, si non arriderent, dentes ut restringerent.
No one laughed; I knew right away that the matter had been set up by agreement;
No one wanted to imitate an excited dog even, so as 485
at least to show their teeth if they wouldn't laugh.
Perhaps this is a genuine lament about the plight of poor “street performers” or a metatheatrical
21 Kißel (1990) 255-6 collects scholiastic references to the verses (which mention the letter r) before summarizing
difficulties of interpretation that arise from ambiguous changes in speaker. 
22 Lucilius: <r littera . . ..> inritata canes quam homo quam planius dicit.
23 Anderson (1958) translates the phrase from Persius 1.109-10  sonat hic de nare canina / littera  as, “Here [in
satire] there is the nasal sound of the canine letter” (195) and believes that Persius is comparing himself to a
growling dog. I wonder if this mention of the  canina littera is instead meant to refer to laughter rather than
aggressive snarling. The connections between laughter and satire are explored at greater length in Chapter 4.
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reflection on the comic challenges encountered by the stock character of the parasite. Ergasilus
reports that after he invited himself to a meal among some strangers in the forum, he was met
with steely silence (quasi  muti  silent in  480).  No one laughed,  nor did anyone even fake a
chuckle or feign a smile. The absent smile is imagined as comparable to an irritated dog baring
its teeth.24 As Ergasilus speaks, he gives voice to the canine; verses 485 and 486 contain several
appearances of the  canina littera:  irritatam, imitarier,  arriderent, and restringerent.  It  is  not
clear  whether  the  passage  is  marking  this  dog-like  smile/laugh  as  simply  insincere  or  also
derisive.  Nevertheless,  in  these  three verses,  the  acts  of  laughing/smiling  form a triangle  of
associations with dogs and with the letter r. As Catullus demonstrates in c. 42 and c. 56, these
associations continue to manifest themselves in verse after Plautus.
Thus the onomatopoeic effect of c. 56 draws upon the recurrence of both r's and c's.
These letters mimic the laughter for which they stand. And so c. 53 and c.56 are poems in which
Catullus deploys the vocabulary of laughter and the laughable to invite a specific interpretation
and actually create the laughing response for which the poems call. In using the vocabulary of
laughter and the risible, the poet invites—even forces—any reader who recites the poems aloud
to satisfy his  demands with,  at  best,  a genuine laugh or,  at  the very least,  with the laughter
encoded in the sounds of the poems themselves.
SECTION III: LAUGHING WITH THE NYMPHS IN VERGIL'S 3RD ECLOGUE
Catullus deftly models two different uses of metacommunicative laughter,  the first  of
which draws upon the use of words that signify laughter (e.g., risi and cachinno in c. 53 and c.
56), while the second relies on the sonic effects of particular consonants and syllables (e.g., r's
24 The charge of  irritatam does not seem to be that  “no one impersonated an  angry  dog” from an emotional
perspective. It would be odd if Ergasilus were  complaining that no one was upset by his parasitic endeavors.
Even if the implication is that only angry dogs bare their teeth, the appearance and sounds produced by the dog
(rather than its emotional state) are the most lucid points of the comparison.
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and c's in c. 56). The sonic properties of verses were undoubtedly of interest to Horace, Ovid,
and Vergil, but of the occasions of metacommunicative laughter I examine in the works of these
poets, all but one draw upon complete words rather than sounds. In any case, both the transcribed
words for laughter (ridere,  risus,  cachinnare,  cachinnus, etc.) and the sounds of laughter that
may be hidden in lines of poetry are fundamentally different from laughs “in the wild.” A written
laugh in Horace is still a manifestation of poetic diction—an occasion of careful and calculated
word choice. This laugh does not bubble up spontaneously in the way that a vocalized laugh
escapes one's lips. 
Setting aside written communication, let us consider an exchange between two kids. One
child attempts to provoke the second child's laughter. In response, the second child stares down
the first and deadpans, “I'm laughing soooo hard.” The comment hinges upon an obvious but
important  distinction  that  is  not  unique  to  poetry  or  literature  but  can  be  applied  to
communication more broadly: saying “I'm laughing” differs substantially from actually laughing.
The first is verbal communication. The second is non-verbal (though still oral).25 The difference
exists just as certainly with words spoken or written in Latin and Greek. Stated simply, laughter
itself can be deliberate or spontaneous, but written laughter is (almost always) premeditated.26
The effect of a written laugh is similar to that of written dialogue. Few people speak as
fluidly as any of the interlocutors in Cicero's  De oratore or any characters in Plautine comedy,
but dialogue, when written well, simulates how we  think we speak. Palmer (1954) makes the
following observations about what distinguishes oral from written dialogue:
Spoken  language  is  distinguished  primarily  from writing  by  the  greater  intimacy  of
contact  between  speaker  and  hearer.  The  give-and-take  of  dialogue  increases  the
emotional  tension,  which  reveals  itself  in  interjections,  exclamations,  forcefulness,
25 A strict division is difficult to maintain in works in which people speak while laughing. Lateiner (1995) includes
smiles and laughter in the spectrum of nonverbal behavior which he examines in the Odyssey. 
26 One modern exception may be instant-messages on a cellphone or computer. A competent typist can fire off
“Hahahhahahaha” almost as quickly as the coordinate sounds are vocalized. (I typed that really quickly!)
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exaggeration,  insistence,  and  constant  interruption.  The  speed  and  spontaneity  of
conversation reduces the element  of reflection.  Sentences are not  organized into self-
consistent logical structures, but meaning is conveyed by fits and starts with parentheses,
afterthoughts,  and  those  changes  of  construction  which  grammarians  catalogue  as
anacolutha,  contamination,  and  the  like.  Perhaps  most  important  is  the  fact  that
conversation takes place in an elaborate context of situation which often makes detailed
and  explicit  linguistic  reference  unnecessary  and tedious.  Hence  colloquial  speech is
characterized  by  its  allusiveness,  by  deictic  elements,  abbreviation,  ellipse,  and
aposiopesis.27  
In “oral” and “written” laughter, the difference is more pronounced. The involuntary nature of
(much) laughter means that a written laugh, when written into the wrong situation or even the
right situation  at the wrong time, risks seeming contrived. A typical laugh, as discussed at the
beginning  of  this  chapter,  responds  to  something  preceding  it  and  influences  something
subsequent. A written or narrated laugh is no different; the circumstances surrounding it typically
exist  in a causal chain.  Hence the comparison with written dialogue.  A written laugh, like a
comment in a conversation, must be properly contextualized if it is to seem natural. It should
occur spontaneously and realistically, though not so spontaneously as to appear random, nor so
realistically  as  to  rely  upon “deictic  elements,  abbreviation,  ellipse,  and aposiopesis”  for  its
understanding. In other words, a written laugh, like successful literary dialogue, will seem most
real to a reader when it is actually artificial, when all of the information that would come from
actually being present before, during, and after an outburst of laughter is distilled in the narrative.
With laughter as with speech, there exists a disjoint between how we believe we behave
and how we actually behave. In  Laughter: A Scientific Investigation  (2000), the psychologist
Robert Provine employed a form of guerrilla research to gather “real-life” laughter-related data.
He and a  team of  his  students sat  in  malls,  classrooms, and other social  spaces  where they
eavesdropped on conversations in order to record, among other things, 1) what preceded laughter
in  a  given  exchange  and  2)  who  of  the  participants  in  a  conversation  laughed.  To  anyone
27 Palmer (1954) 74.
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assuming that  a  joke or  funny statement  typically  precipitates  laughter,  Provine's  results  are
surprising.  He observed that  less than 20% of the laughter in his  sample was in response to
attempts at humor. There was indeed some laughter in response to “funny” stimuli, but this was
rare when set against the laughter that followed commonplace conversational statements. Provine
also  noted  that  speakers  laugh  more  frequently  than  their  audience,  an  effect  that  was  less
pronounced with a male speaker and female audience.  That any of Provine's results  may be
surprising reflects the difference between how we think we laugh and how we actually laugh. In
narrated laughter, this difference is all the more exaggerated.
If a written laugh is to seem natural, the poet must take the emotional and psychological
temperature of a given passage—Palmer's “context of situation”—and treat the laughter as part
of a conversational exchange. He must plant what provokes the laughter so that the laughter
appears to be the natural result of what comes before it and, depending on the centrality of the
laugh to the episode, the natural cause of what  comes after.  A seemingly spontaneous laugh
within  a  work is  the  product  of  careful  premeditation on the  part  of  the poet,  far  from the
unscripted laugh we imagine to occur in social situations. 
When a poet wants to elicit an actual laugh from the reading audience, how can that poet
let the reader know that laughter is an appropriate response to the situation being presented? That
the incongruity on display is laughable rather than laudable or lamentable? That the words being
spoken by a character are a joke and not earnest speech? In other words, how is the frame of
laugh-worthy “play” introduced? I put forth textual laughter as a potential answer to all of these
questions.  Much as  Catullus invites and creates  laughter  by incorporating  the  vocabulary  of
laughter into c. 53 and c. 56, the Augustan poets Vergil, Horace, and Ovid alert readers to the
tone of specific poetic passages and prepare a particular response by using the vocabulary of
laughter and the risible. Unsurprisingly, a lengthy poem with few occurrences of the vocabulary
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of laughter is more likely to contain verses that do not engage with laughter than a short poem
with a single word denoting laughter, like Catullus' c. 53. Nevertheless, a single occurrence of
laughter can carry great weight.  In the following examination of  Eclogue  3, one occasion of
textual laughter occurs near the poem's beginning, but it sets the tone for much of what comes
afterward.
Vergil's  3rd Eclogue presents the poetic  ἀγών of  Menalcas and Damoetas.28 The two
herdsmen trade verbal jabs in the poem's opening:
Menalcas
Dic mihi, Damoeta, cuium pecus? An Meliboei?
Damoetas 
Non, verum Aegonos; nuper mihi tradidit Aegon.
Menalcas 
Infelix o semper, oves, pecus! ipse Neaeram
dum fovet ac ne me sibi praeferat illa veretur,
hic alienus ovis custos bis mulget in hora, 5
et sucus pecori et lac subducitur agnis.
Damoetas 
Parcius ista viris tamen obicienda memento.
novimus et qui te transversa tuentibus hircis
et quo—sed faciles Nymphae risere—sacello. 9
Menalcas
Tell me, Damoetas, whose herd? Is it Meliboeus'?
Damoetas
No, rather Aegon's; Aegon just handed it over to me.
Menalcas
Poor sheep! Always unfortunate flock! While the master
himself cherishes Neara and fears lest she prefer me to him,
here a strange guardian milks his sheep twice each hour, 5
and the vitality is stolen from the flock, the milk from the lambs.
Damoetas
Be careful yet: such slights should be offered more sparingly to men.
We know both who got you when the goats looked sidelong
and in what shrine, though the willing nymphs laughed. 9
The nature of the speakers' relationship in the opening exchange is complicated by the fact that
28 If one accepts Coleman's (1977) 14-21 chronology of the poems, Ecl. 3 was among the earliest of Vergil's poems
and can be tentatively dated to 42-41 B.C. (18). Consequently, the laughter in 3.9 is the earliest appearance of
the vocabulary of laughter and the risible in the works I examine.
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this is the first time the reader of the Eclogues encounters Menalcas and Damoetas “in person.”
Each character's name is familiar from Corydon's lament of  Ecl. 2, wherein Corydon refers to
Menalcas as a previous lover (v. 15), and a dying Damoetas is remembered for having given
Corydon a pipe (Damoetas . . . dedit olim / et dixit moriens in vv. 36-7), but despite the fact that
Damoetas and Menalcas are known separately from Ecl. 2, nothing in the previous poems has
prepared the reader to understand a relationship between them.29 When Menalcas calls Damoetas
by name in the first verse of Ecl. 3, he offers evidence that the two are familiar to one another.
Perhaps very familiar. The imperative with which Menalcas addresses Damoetas (Dic mihi in v.
1) not only implies a relationship that could accommodate such a terse address but also suggests
that Menalcas may be in the position of authority. On the other hand, the rusticity of cuium could
undermine any implied dominance if understood as a mark of ignorance rather than a means of
setting and characterization.30 
Whether Menalcas is accusing Damoetas of theft or simply alleging that there is no way
that  Damoetas  could  possess  his  own  sheep,  Damoetas  does  little  to  clarify  the  power
relationship in his brief reply of one verse. His repetition of Aegon's name in verse 2 parries any
accusation or insult without addressing it as such: the sheep belong to another man and were
entrusted to him. In response, Menalcas declares that Damoetas milks the ewes too often, a direct
insult of Damoetas' treatment of the flock (vv. 3-6). Damoetas squares his shoulders to this jab
and, in v. 7, reveals himself to be, for better or worse, Menalcas' peer if not his superior (viris in
v. 7); he takes his turn using the imperative (memento) to warn Menalcas to watch his mouth, and
29 Damoetas' appearance as a living speaker in the second verse of  Ecl. 3 is a jarring experience of the skewed
internal chronology of the Eclogues, though one may also wonder if names and characters are supposed to be
consistent  across the poetic book. In any case,  this is  also a feature of Theocritus'  bucolic  corpus wherein
Daphnis, whose death in Id. 1 is treated at length, appears as a speaking character in later idylls.
30 Henderson (1998) 224 considers the ambiguity of Menalcas' opening verse and asks (without answering), “Is
the insinuation that Damoetas is known well enough to the speaker for him to be sure that the animal(s) cannot
be 'his'?”
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he fires off an insult of his own. He knows all about Menalcas' indiscretions, and the goats and
laughing nymphs are witnesses too.
The laughter of the nymphs in v. 9 (sed faciles Nymphae risere) is the only occasion of
the vocabulary of laughter and the risible in the poem, and it  is  designedly placed near the
opening  of  the  poem.  When  the  nymphs  laugh,  they  construct  a  frame  of  play  around  the
Damoetas'  comment  and  retroject  this  frame  onto  the  beginning  of  the  exchange.  Hints  of
playfulness in the preceding verses (1-8) reveal themselves in hindsight,  including Menalcas'
pathetic address of the sheep in v. 3, his self-aggrandizement in v. 4, and Damoetas' depiction of
the goats watching Menalcas in v. 8. The laughter communicates to the reader that Menalcas, at
the  time  to  which  Damoetas  refers,  was  doing  something  worthy  of  the  nymphs'  laughter.
Damoetas (tastefully?) elides the verb, but the context invites the reader to imagine a sexual act
—and a laughable one at that.31 
Sexual  insults  are  not  without  precedent  in  pastoral  exchanges  between  shepherds;
comparable examples appear in Theocritus' Id. 4 and Id. 5, both of which are models for Ecl. 3.32
A versified  slight  in  Idyll  5 is  noteworthy for  the  similarities  it  bears  to  the  passage  under
discussion in Vergil. The two competitors in the amoebean exchange of  Idyll  5 are Lacon and
Comatas. Comatas claims a didactic role in v. 37 (ἐγὼν ἐδίδασκον), in response to which Lacon
asks when he (Lacon) has ever learned anything from Comatas. Comatas does not mince words
in his reply.
Κομάτας
ἁνίκ' ἐπύγιζόν τυ, τὺ δ' ἄλγεες· αἱ δὲ χίμαιραι 
αἵδε κατεβληχῶντο, καὶ ὁ τράγος αὐτὰς ἐτρύπη.
31 See Coleman (1977) 100-1 n. 7-8 and Clausen (1994) 95.
32 Ecl. 3 bears its strongest similarities to Id. 4 in the first 6 verses. However, when Damoetas gives as much as he
takes beginning in v. 7, the eclogue becomes much more like Id. 5. For specific line by line comparisons of Ecl.




When I screwed you, and it pained you; and these she-goats
bleated loudly, and the he-goat drilled them.
The speaker unflinchingly asserts that Lacon was not only educated in a sexually passive manner
but that his education was a painful one.
In Eclogue 3, Menalcas is young enough to be under the watchful eye of his parents (vv.
32-4).  Damoetas,  apparently  working  for  himself,  may  be  slightly  older,  but  a
pedagogical/pederastic  relationship  is  not  manifest  in  their  interactions  (despite  the  fact  that
Damoetas may share such a relationship with Corydon in Ecl. 2).33 Because Damoetas does not
insert himself into his sexual indictment of Menalcas, the relationships between the two pairs of
shepherds in the Vergilian and Theocritean poems do not parallel one another precisely. 
The invocation of animal audiences to the sexual acts in Ecl. 3.8-9 and Id. 5.41-2 offers
an alternative point of similarity. Damoetas' reference to the goats who tentatively (transversa in
v. 8) watch Menalcas' sexual act echoes Comatas' reference to the goats whom he inspired, with
the act he claims to have perpetrated against Lacon, to their own sexual act. In each case, the
goats are called upon as witnesses who testify merely by their presence. They are accompanying
“details” that corroborate the strength of the speaker's memory, as if the speaker were saying, “I
remember because you were wearing a new tunic and carrying your gnarled staff.” In a basic
sense,  the  goats  support  the  speaker's  claims  by  contextualizing  them.34 But  Damoetas  and
Comatas both go one step further by describing how the animals demonstrate an awareness of
the  human  sexual  happenings,  whether  through  oblique  disapproval,  as  in  Ecl.  3,  or  direct
imitation, as in  Id.  5. The disapproval implicit  in the goats'  sidelong spectatorship in  Ecl.  3,
33 Hubbard (1995a) 55 detects “the pederastic teacher-student interaction, familiar from Theocritus' Idyll 5” in the
relationship of Damoetas and Corydon described in Ecl. 2. He nevertheless teases out the pederastic tension of
Menalcas' and Damoetas' interactions as a representation of tensions in poetic tradition (60-67).
34 Of course, that the goats' reactions offer any “proof” of Damoetas' or Comatas' claims is funny in itself. In a
situation where it is one shepherd's word against another's, the flocks would be surprising witnesses.
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however, does lend a different sting to Damoetas' dig: Menalcas' behavior, whatever it was, made
the goats blush.35
A difference between the two slights—Comatas' and Damoetas'— is that Comatas paints
a  picture  that  could  be laughable  (and  presumably  was),36 while  Damoetas  eschews  this
ambiguity: the nymphs did laugh. The sexual act in Eclogue 3 is implied, but the laughter of the
audience is stated as fact. In replying, Menalcas does not deny or even acknowledge the bulk of
Damoetas' thinly veiled accusation. He adopts the nymphs as the implied subject of his own verb
and asserts that they were actually laughing when they saw him laying waste to Micon's “grove”
with his “wicked sickle.”37 
Tum, credo, cum me arbustum uidere Miconis 
atque mala uitis incidere falce nouellas. 
I think it was at that time when they saw me cutting into
Micon's grove and tender vines with a wicked sickle.
35 Coleman (1977) 111 n. 7-8: “This was too much even for the lusty goats, but not for the 'easygoing' nymphs,
who might have been expected to frown on such a desecration of the shrine.”
36 Comatas returns to the anal rape in v. 116-7 and uses an ambiguous word for grinning (σαίρω) to characterize
Lacon's response:
Κομάτας
ἦ οὐ μέμνασ’, ὅκ’ ἐγώ τυ κατήλασα, καὶ τὺ σεσαρώς 
εὖ ποτεκιγκλίζευ καὶ τᾶς δρυὸς εἴχεο τήνας; (116-7)
---
Comatas
Or don't you remember when I pounded you, and you, grinning [σεσαρώς],
wagged your tail well and grabbed onto some branches of an oak tree?
The violence operative in the verb κατήλασα and Lacon's role of passivity (as well as the framing of these lines 
within the exchange of invective taking place in Idyll 5) make it unlikely that Lacon would have actually taken 
any pleasure in such an encounter; at least part of the insult lies in the suggestion that he did. The placement of 
the adverb εὖ allows for a flexible reading of Lacon's participation in the encounter. Perhaps he moves his body 
in such a way as to indicate that he has previous experience in the position and is indulging in it. Or perhaps 
Comatas is saying that Lacon simply moved well for him (regardless of whether or not Lacon was willing). 
Dover (1989) 104 argues for Lacon's complacency in the act when he observes that “the insulting element here 
is that Lakon enjoyed playing the woman's role (holding onto a tree, like the young wife in Aristophanes) [. . .].” 
Comatas does not say that Lacon was resisting (by pushing away or fighting) but was rather gripping nearby 
branches. It is unlikely that σεσαρώς indicates a good-natured smile, whatever Lacon's disposition (as Comatas 
depicts him). At best, it is a deviant sexual grin. At worst, a pained grimace.
37 Cf.  Cat.  c.  56.7  (p.  91)  for  the  use  of  a  verb  of  cutting  (cecidi)  to  indicate  a  sexual  act.  Adams  (1982)
accommodates falx and its diminutive falcula in The Latin Sexual Vocabulary with a helpful explanation: “The
curved shape of the sickle might seem to undermine a metaphorical application of the word, but it was no doubt
the pointed nature of the object which was in the writer's mind” (24). Menalcas' joke may also play upon an
upending of Priapus' usual responsibilities as protector of gardens. Priapus, in statue form, was used in gardens
to ward off troublemakers with his own falx, for which cf. Verg. G. 4.110 and Tib. 1.1.18.
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These verses have the makings of another sexual  joke, although Menalcas is now careful to
portray himself in the active role. The particulars are difficult to discern (i.e., What do the “grove
and  tender  vines”  of  Micon  represent?),  but  fittingly  so,  in  light  of  the  indirect  nature  of
Damoetas' provoking accusation. Menalcas also anticipates the conventions of the subsequent
poetic competition of Eclogue 3 (vv. 60-107), limiting his response to two verses and recasting
content from Damoetas' insult as his own. His reuse of the nymphs laughter from Damoetas'
comment demonstrates an agreement about tone—a willingness to play along with the idea that
laughable things happened.  He could have denied laughter  altogether and taken (or feigned)
offense, but he opts to play the game and enter with Damoetas into the frame that the elder
herdsman has constructed (or proposed) with his sexual joke and the nymphs' laughter. 
But how does Menalcas know that the laughter Damoetas mentions, couched as it is in an
insult, is an invitation to play? The laughter in v. 9 is coupled with a clue to internal reception.
The adjective faciles, grammatically modifying the nymphs, carries the sense of an adverb and
renders the nymphs' laughter a display of “ease” or compliance. Were the nymphs not  faciles,
their laughter, occurring as it does in response to the sexual desecration of a shrine, would more
likely read as disapproval or derision, like a cackle forecasting severe punishment. Instead, the
nymphs,  in  laughing  as  Damoetas  says  they  did,  sanction  Menalcas'  behavior.  It  is  as  if
Damoetas is saying that the nymphs must have smiled approvingly on the occasion of the liaison
if,  in  the  time  since  the  sexual  pollution,  Menalcas  has  not  met  with  more  serious  divine
consequences.  By  mentioning  the  nymphs'  laughing  reception  in  the  first  place  and  then
characterizing  it  as  “lighthearted”,  Damoetas  permits  his  own  threat  and  insult  to  remain
lighthearted—playful and suggestively reprehensible of his target without being crippling. In a
nonmetrical poetic universe or a theatrical one with stage directions, he could have achieved a
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similar effect by laughing as he spoke. Instead, he mitigates an accusation of desecration by
calling up a laugh track provided by the nymphs. For his part, Menalcas allows the insult to roll
of his back. The laughter of the nymphs reverberates in his verses, but as he asserts his own
masculinity,  Menalcas  has  the  nymphs  laugh in  his  favor.  Through laughter,  he  accepts  the
invitation to playfulness that Damoetas extends.
Such playfulness forecasts the continued banter, insults, and even the riddling exchange
at the conclusion of the poem. In vv. 9-11, both herdsmen have welcomed the nymphs' laughter
into their verses and established certain conventions within the game The lively give-and-take
progresses through mutual accusations of theft, pockets of poetic boasting and bashing, and a
detailed discussion of the wager's terms, all before both poets summon Palaemon to settle the
seemingly escalating interchange by playing judge. Immediately after Damoetas urges Palaemon
that "the matter is not a small one" (res est non parva  in v. 54), the judge-to-be reminds the
herdsmen (and the reader) of their idyllic setting: "Speak on, seeing that we are sitting in the soft
grass"--Dicite, quandoquidem in molli consedimus herba (v. 55). Whatever tension has arisen in
the verses immediately before the competition begins, Palaemon dissolves it with his observation
that the herdsmen are seated comfortably in the midst of a locus amoenus. Only after reminding
the competitors that they are surrounded by flourishing beauty (vv. 56-59) does he lay out the
rules for the competition.
Palaemon focuses  on fear  of  love's  sweetness  and experience  of  its  bitterness  in  the
judgment he voices in the closing verses—et vitula tu dignus et quisquis amores  /  aut metuet
dulcis aut experietur amaros (109-11), but the rapid fire amoebean contest between Damoetas
and Menalcas is more sportive than lovesick, peppered with crisp sexual jests (vv. 76-7), poetic
parroting (vv. 88-91), and thematic call-backs (e.g., the references to Apollo and Phyllis in vv.
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104-7).38 The  riddles  themselves  are  puzzling  in  more  ways  than  the  expected  one:  neither
contestant attempts to answer the other's.39 Even Palaemon as arbitrator, speaking immediately
after both riddles are posed, refuses to take a stab at them, using the same words with which he
refuses to pick a winner to the contest—“It's not my responsibility to settle such great disputes
between you” (non nostrum inter uos tantas componere lites in v. 108). If Palaemon were only
sidestepping the judgment of the contest itself,  the singular  litem might have been sufficient.
Lites recalls the plurality of riddles that precede his calling of a draw.
Who answers  a  riddle  with another  riddle? What  questions do not  have answers?  In
“Virgil's  Third Eclogue:  How Do You Keep an Idiot  in  Suspense?” (1998),  John Henderson
considers the implications of the singers' final couplets:
Since  this  is  a  one-off,  for us,  there  is  nothing to  discount  the notion  that  Damoetas
actually had hopes that Menalcas had never come across that old favourite, the ploy of the
baited riddle. It might be a poser for any second fiddle to decide if the response should be
to attempt an answer. Presumably that is a mistake no one would ever make twice, for
riddles  are  archetypal  hermeneutic  traps,  which  illustrate,  in  nuce,  just  the  kind  of
aporetic play within language in use that the preliminary dialogue exposed to view: a
riddle has an answer. A riddle does not have an answer—it has more than one answer. The
answer is the answer I choose to tell you after you have taken your pick. Even if I do not
cheat on you, and you will never know the answer to that question, still the answer to my
riddle is, in any case, my answer to it, the one I choose to make mine. Like an oracle, the
power-play of a riddle is therefore a mug's game. Except that it is possible to duplicate it,
instead, as Menalcas does.40
As Henderson does too; his reference to “aporetic play” works in tandem with his titular riddle
("How do you keep an idiot in suspense?”), an answer to which he offers in the final line of his
article: “I'll tell (on) you later—”.41 While Henderson explores aporetic play in the context of
poetic intertextuality and interpretation, the aporetic play in the riddles of Ecl. 3 may also be seen
38 Coleman  (1977)  127 n.  109-10  remarks  on  Palaemon's  attention  to  the  theme  of  bitter-sweet  love  to  the
exclusion of various other themes.
39 Wormell (1960) anticipates one of Henderson's conclusions, albeit in less riddling language, when he proposes
that each riddle is constructed so as to have two possible answers: “This may be why no answer is attempted”
(29).
40 Henderson (1998) 225.
41 Henderson (1998) 228. Italics and parenthesis are (unsurprisingly) the author's own.
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to close the play frame when the amoebean exchange ends. If the nymphs' playful laughter that
Damoetas mentions at v. 9 (and Menalcas implies in v. 10) operates as a metacommunicative
signal that the poetic characters are engaging in a game or an extended joke, then the riddles are
the punchlines.42
Whether  or  not  the  laughter  within  Eclogue 3  leads  to  a  laughing  response  by  the
readership is impossible to say.43 The laughter of v. 9 is instead a fork in the road of reader
response, inviting the reader to travel in one of two directions: toward laughter or not toward
laughter. To remain at the fork is to stop the journey altogether and to cease reading, but I believe
that the reader who continues reading and contemplates the nymphs' laughter is invited to engage
with the text in a distinct manner. Regardless of whether this reader laughs with the nymphs or
does not laugh, whether she believes she understands why the nymphs laugh or professes total
ignorance, she invests herself in the tone of the passage and, by extension, of the poem as a
whole.44 How  the  laughter  and  tone  interact  may  remain  up  for  grabs;  laughter's  inherent
indeterminacies are still hard at work, both in the narrated laughter of the 3rd Eclogue and in any
laughter excited outside of the text. 
One may rightly point out that a reader can always assess tone in the manner I have just
suggested. She can laugh at (or with) a text even when words for laughter do not appear in it.
Even so, my analysis of the role of laughter in Vergil's Eclogue 3 asserts that the appearance of
the vocabulary for laughter in this text communicates more information than the narrative claim
that some nymphs laughed. The term ridere signposts a judgment from the reader that, absent the
42 Huizinga (1955) 105-118 offers a lengthy examination of riddles as a form of play and competition.
43 Holland (1975a) offers an early example of a subjectivist and psychoanalytical approach to reader response:
“[A]ll of us, as we read, use the literary work to symbolize and finally to replicate ourselves. We work out
through the text our own characteristic patterns of desire and adaptation. We interact with the work, making it
part  of  our own psychic economy and making ourselves  part  of the literary work—as we interpret  it.  For,
always, this principle prevails: identity  re-creates  itself”  (816-817).  Holland's  5  Readers  Reading (1975b)
considers how “five readers came up with five dramatically different readings” of the same literaray description.
44 As with a modern laugh track, the decision not to laugh is a response in itself, though, as I argue, one that is
harder to support.
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term, she otherwise might not be aware she is making. In other words, if the conventions of
reader-oriented literary criticism dictate that a reader is necessary to formulate the meaning of a
text, the vocabulary of laughter invites the reader to become aware of her participation.
Laughter's early appearance in the 3rd Eclogue within a genre-conforming sexual joke,
laughter's demonstrated “infectiousness” as it spreads from verse 9 to 10, the recurrence, after
laughter's  mention,  of  playful  competition  throughout  the  poem—all  of  these  attributes  of
Eclogue  3 suggest  that  the  nymphs'  laughter  is  more than  a  parenthetical  concession amidst
shepherding  banter.  The laughter  of  verse  9  offers  relevant  information about  its  immediate
context, namely, the spirit of Damoetas' insult, but it also colors the tone of what precedes and
follows it in the poem. The laughter opens a mutually agreed-upon play frame that lightens the
agonistic to-and-fro of the shepherds and proceeds to a mutually agreed-upon conclusion in the
unanswered riddles of the poem's end. I above likened textual laughter to a fork in the road of
reader response, and I suggested that laughter succeeds as a trigger to reader response regardless
of  whether  the  triggered  response  is  sympathetic.  Nevertheless,  an  abundance  of  signs  in
Eclogue 3 invite the reader to take the fork toward laughter, the first sign being laughter itself.
This is laughter as a form of metacommunication: the laughing nymphs signal that laughter is a
behavior in keeping with the context in which it appears and with the poem as a whole.
In its 110 verses, Eclogue 3 contains passages to which a laugh would seem an ill-fitting
response.  Playfulness, prevalent though it  may be in the poem, is placed in tension with the
“bitter loves” that Palaemon mentions in his final judgment (amores / . . . amaros in v. 110-1),
and a casual survey of the names that appear in the contest proves that the herdsmen dwell upon
their love-objects at length. Perhaps the point does not warrant mentioning, but a single occasion
of the vocabulary of laughter and the risible does not render laughter a desirable response to
every  part  of  a  poem. A laugh may be  an altogether  inappropriate  response  to  some poetic
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passages, like a giggle that escapes during serious conversation, and different laughs (e.g., joyous
or scornful) may suit specific sections of a poem better than others. Careful consideration must
be paid to where the laugh is “planted” in the text, because laughter that functions as a form of
metacommunication  in  a  poem will  typically  communicate  information about  the passage  in
which it appears, just as a good laugh track for a TV show will cue laughter when something
laughable happens on screen. An occasion of textual laughter with no apparent tie to its context
would be like a laugh track that is out of sync with its sit-com. But the textual laugh track may
allow for greater flexibility in its application. A textual laugh can be read forward, as I have
suggested with Eclogue 3, but it can also be read backward onto text that precedes it—or it can
be read repeatedly, over and over again, until it acquires greater power through repetition. In the
following explorations of Horace's use of deridet in Epistle 2.1.263 and Ovid's frequent use of
laughter in passages of the Ars Amatoria, I consider how metacommunicative laughter can take
any number of forms: sneers, cackles, and tears included.
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CHAPTER 3: LAUGHTER THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
HORACE'S EPISTLE TO AUGUSTUS AND OVID'S ARS AMATORIA
SECTION I: INVERTED DERISION IN HORACE'S EPISTLE TO AUGUSTUS
In a passage treating laughter and negative literary criticism near the end of the Epistle to
Augustus (Epistle  2.1),  Horace  reminds  Augustus  that  Alexander  the  Great  chose  poorly  in
relying upon the laughable poetry of Choerilus to commemorate his deeds.1 Shifting from this
critique of the Macedonian ruler to  contemporary concerns,  Horace praises Augustus for his
prudent favoring of the poets Vergil and Varius, but he promptly recuses himself from writing
poetry that might be grouped with theirs. He explains why in vv. 260-263:
sedulitas autem stulte quem diligit urget, 260
praecipue cum se numeris commendat et arte;
discit enim citius meminitque libentius illud
quod quis deridet quam quod probat et ueneratur.
Obsequiousness, moreover, foolishly burdens him whom it loves, 260
especially when it recommends itself by metrical arts;
he learns more swiftly, remembers more willingly, that
which he laughs at than what he approves and honors.
Deridet in v. 263 marks Horace's final use of the vocabulary of laughter and the risible in the
poem, the earlier uses occurring at v. 121 (ridet), v. 194 (rideret), and v. 238 (ridiculum). In this
section, I briefly consider the differences in meaning between the verbs deridere and ridere and
then examine the significance of this final use of the vocabulary of laughter as the only occasion
of prefixed ridere in the poem. I conclude, by situating the laughter in its broader context (with
an eye on the  ongoing discussion of  metacommunicative laughter),  that  deridet is  part  of  a
dramatic swing in the epistle's tone.
Cicero implies in  De optimo genere oratorum  4.11 that orators who provoke laughter
1 Ep. 2.1.237-238. This passage is briefly discussed on p. 77.
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(derideantur) in a courtroom case are failures. In the very next clause, he indicates that laughter
described with the word ridere (rideretur) would be a mark of the successful attainment of Attic
oratorical  qualities.2 For  the  orator  who provokes  a  laughing response,  Cicero  distinguishes
between negative laughter (critical or derisive) and positive laughter (approving or desired). 
Cicero's  designation  of  deridere  as  a  term  for  derisive  laughter  overlaps  with  a
disambiguation  of  ridere and  deridere offered  in  Donatus'  4th c.  CE  scholia  on  Terence's
Adelphoe  v. 852. In glossing the word  derides, the scholiast states that the difference between
ridere and deridere is one not of behavior but of tone: Et ridet qui simpliciter ridet, deridet qui
cum alterius irrisione et contemptu ridet. Both explanations include the verb for laughing, but
adverbial  phrases  contribute  the  differences  of  meaning:  ridet is  to  laugh  “simply”  or
“candidly”;3 deridet is to laugh “with mockery or scorn for another.” The scholia do not go so far
as to  echo Cicero's suggestion that  ridere can indicate  positive regard,  but  deridere remains
unquestionably negative.4
2 Opt. Gen.  4.11:  qua re quoniam non nullorum sermo iam increbruit,  partim se ipsos Attice  dicere,  partim
neminem nostrum dicere, alteros neglegamus; satis enim eis res ipsa respondet, cum aut non adhibeantur ad
causas aut adhibiti  derideantur;  nam si  rideretur,  esset id ipsum Atticorum.  The ellipsis  (and logic)  in the
passage is challenging, but it is clear that Cicero, in placing the two words (derideantur and rideretur) in close
proximity to one another, is drawing out differences in meaning. That a designation as an Atticist would be
desirable is confirmed when he goes on to state, “It is typical of the Atticists [to speak] in a great and adorned
and abundant, equally sound style”—et ample et ornate et copiose cum eadem integritate Atticorum est  (Opt.
Gen. 4.12).
3 The adverb  simpliciter is neutral (OLD s.v.  simpliciter  1, 3 and 5) and thus places emphasis on the behavior
itself. It is as if the scholiast is saying, “Ridet simply means 'to laugh.'”
4 The Terentian passage appears near the end of the comedy when Demea informs his brother Micio that he will
soon return to the countryside with his son and that he is willing, surprisingly, to take his son's girlfriend along.
Micio approves, and Demea, as if frightened at having met with the approval of his permissive brother, lists the
chores that the young woman will do.
{DEMEA} ego istuc uidero,
atque ibi fauillae plena, fumi ac pollinis
coquendo sit faxo et molendo; praeter haec
meridie ipso faciam ut stipulam colligat:
tam excoctam reddam atque atram quam carbost. {MICIO} placet:
nunc mihi videre sapere. atque equidem filium 850
tum, etiam si nolit, cogam ut cum illa una cubet.
{DE.} derides? fortunatu's qui isto animo sies.
ego sentio . . .{MI.} ah pergisne? {DE.} iam iam desino.  
---
{DEMEA.} I'll see to it,
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Of course the use of ridere to indicate praise (Cicero) or even candor (Donatus) is by no
means  a  universal  one:  ridere and  deridere can  express  synonymously  negative  forms  of
laughter. As seen in Chapter 1 with Horace's use of laughter for negative literary criticism and in
the introduction with Cicero's various uses of laughter in oratory, the unprefixed term ridere, like
deridere, can—and frequently does—communicate a sense of disapproval, mockery, or general
negative assessment.5 
A Horatian reader  need only look to the other occasions of laughter in the  Letter to
Augustus for additional negatively-charged uses of ridere. This laughter does not communicate
negative  literary  criticism  but  a  wider,  “real  world”  application  of  contemptuousness  and
disregard. In vv. 194-98 of Epistle 2.1, Horace imagines that the philosopher Democritus, were
he alive, would laugh at the inanities of present-day amphitheatrical spectacles and the spectators
who devour them (si foret in terris, rideret Democritus in v. 194).6 He would watch the deafening
there, that she be coated in ash, smoke, and powder
from cooking and grinding; besides these things,
I'll make her gather straw at noon.
I'll turn her as parched and black as charcoal {MICIO.} Very nice.
Now you're seeming sensible to me. And indeed then, 850
even if your son were unwilling, I would force him to bed down with her.
{DE.} You're mocking? How lucky to have such a spirit!
I feel—{MI.} Really? Still? {DE.} Alright, I'm done. 
Micio's comment in vv. 850-1 offers more playfulness and good-natured teasing than mockery or scorn. The
fun-loving  uncle  gets  caught  up  in  his  brother's  newfound  cooperative  attitude  (however  crotchety  its
manifestation), and jokes too liberally. The kernel of the joke is not immediately apparent. Micio's comment
could be a dig at Demea's authoritarian attitude, as if to say, “And when you're done ordering her around, you'll
even order your son to sleep with her.” Or the joke could simply rely upon the childish, incongruous suggestion
that Demea encourage his son to go to bed with his girlfriend when she is at her filthiest. In either case, Demea's
query  derides? indicates  that  he  detects  a  taunt  in  Micio's  comment. The extent of  mockery expressed  be
deridere nevertheless remains unclear, but the term assuredly remains negative in charge. See Martin (1976) 219
for further discussion of this scene. 
5 In the Aristotelian definition of the ridiculous that Cicero assigns to Caesar Strabo in  De or. 236, laughing is
clearly portrayed as negative critical behavior: according to Caesar, laughter is provoked “either alone or most
especially” (haec enim ridentur vel sola vel maxime) by designation of the unseemly (turpitudo). See pp. 45-46
of the introduction for a discussion of this passage.
6 In  his  essay  “On  Democritus  and  Heraclitus,”  Montaigne  states,  “Democritus  and  Heraclitus  were  two
philosophers, of whom the first, finding the human state vain and ridiculous, never appeared in public except
with  a  mocking  and  ribald  expression.”  After  describing  Heraclitus'  propensity  for  weeping,  Montaigne
continues: “I prefer the first humour, not because it is pleasanter to laugh than to weep, but because it expresses
more contempt and is more condemnatory of us than the other” (132-133).
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crowd rather  than  the  games  themselves.7 Horace  also  uses  unprefixed  ridere  earlier  in  the
Epistle  at v. 121 during a characterization (or caricature) of the figure of the poet: “[H]e loves
verse and he pursues this one thing; / losses, fleeing slaves, conflagrations—he laughs at it all”—
uersus amat, hoc studet unum; /detrimenta, fugas seruorum, incendia ridet (120-121). In v. 120,
the poet's positive, affirming feelings—love (amat) and zeal (studet)—are reserved for poetry
alone. For all else, Horace paints the poet with a psychological outlook of laughing disregard.
Insofar  as  the  unprefixed laughs of  Ep.  2.1.121 and of  Ep.  2.1.194 communicate  contempt,
ridere in each passage functions as a synonym for deridere.
The  reason  I  emphasize  that  unprefixed  ridere communicates  negative  assessment,
derision, or scorn in these passages lies in the poet's use of deridere in v. 263 after the unprefixed
verb appears with a manifestly negative sense in its two previous occurrences in the poem. The
semantic distinction drawn by Cicero and Donatus between the unprefixed and prefixed verbs—
that deridere is negative and ridere is (or can be) positive—is inadequate, and Horace's own use
of ridere in Ep. 2.1 demonstrates his willingness to present unprefixed laughter as derisory. Why
does Horace shift to the term deridet at the end of the Epistle?8 What in the meaning of the term
or context of the passage demands the prefixed verb for laughter?9
7 Democritus'  reputation as  the laughing philosopher cannot  be readily explained by extant fragments  of  his
output:  FVS 68 B107a, attributed to Democritus, reads, “It is proper that those who are men not laugh at the
misfortunes  of  men but  lament.”  (<ἄξιον ἀνθρώπους ὄντας ἐπ'  ἀνθρώπων συμφοραῖς  μὴ γελᾶν,  ἀλλ'
ὀλοφύρεσθαι>).  See  Müller  (1994)  for  a  thorough  discussion  of  ancient  evidence  of  Democritus  as  “the
laughing philosopher” and his later overlap with Diogenes and Cynic philosophy. Halliwell (2008) 351-8 offers
a cogent presentation of the (truly fragmentary) evidence of Democritus' biography and philosophy. By the 1 st c.
CE, the source or ultimate validity of such an enduring reputation was less important than the reputation itself.
Roman authors like Seneca and Juvenal portray the philosopher as a figure who laughed at human foolishness.
Seneca (Dial. 9.15.2) proposes that Democritus' laughter was inspired by the folly ( ineptia) which the Greek
philosopher perceived in human actions. Juvenal (10.28-53), in a passage that echoes Horace's description of
Democritus, marvels that Democritus could shake with continuous laughter, perpetuo risu (10.33), without the
ample fodder of Roman culture. Seneca and Juvenal, like Horace, leave no room for praise, let alone approval,
in Democritus' laughter.
8 I find unpersuasive (and insulting of poets' abilities) those arguments for word-choice that stand solely upon
metrical grounds. 
9 In a note on Horace's use of depugnare in Ep. 2.1.184, Brink (1982) 219 states that Horace found de compounds
“expressive.” Unfortunately the commentator does not elaborate on what these compounds express, or else we
would have at least one theory about why Horace uses deridere in v. 263 rather than ridere. Brink also observes
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Horace uses deridere in the Epistle to Augustus to designate a difference of degree from
ridere  rather  than  one  of  kind.  The  de prefixed  verb  is  not  the  negative  counterpart  to  an
otherwise positive ridere, but a definitively negative form of the ambiguous unprefixed verb. It is
true that both appearances of ridere in Epistle 2.1 convey derisive laughter, but each appearance
requires examination in order for a negative charge to be confirmed. A new appearance of the
verb ridere, when bolstered by the appropriate context, has the potential to represent a positive
response,  like  the  laughter  Cicero  grants  to  a  successful  Attic  orator  in  Opt.  Gen.  11,  or  a
negative response, like the laughter Horace assigns to the myopic poet and Democritus in Epistle
2.1. Deridere does not require the same interrogation of positive versus negative charge; the term
plainly communicates negative laughter. Horace uses  deridere  in v. 263 to make an assertive
declaration of derision with this particular laughter. 
Yet in those writings that Horace presents as sermones (which include his epistles),10 the
reader does well not to trust the authorial voice blindly, especially when this voice confidently
asserts  a point.  A reader may find that the passages in which the Horatian speaker  makes a
forceful argument precede moments of disruption, as if he were setting the table for a formal
dinner, ladling food into the serving dishes, and then grabbing hold of the tablecloth and yanking
before anyone takes a bite. Horace uses laughter—and specifically the charged sense of deridet
in v. 263—to effect such a destabilization in the concluding verses of his  Epistle to Augustus.
The immediate context of the laughter illuminates Horace's mastery of creating ambiguity in the
midst  of  overdetermination.  With  this  in  mind,  let  us  turn  to  the  relevant  passage,  paying
particular attention to vv. 260-263:
that the de compound with rideo appears in Classical verse most frequently in the works of comic and satirical
authors (260-1). TLL s.v. notes that derideo is absent from the works of Vergil and Ovid (among others).
10 See Whybrew (2006) who reads Satires 1, Satires 2, and Epistles 1 against one another with an eye on form and
content before stating, “on the basis of this sequential reading of all three  libelli it can be concluded that the
poems of Epist. 1 do belong to the genre of satura” (217).
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nec sermones ego mallem 250
repentis per humum quam res componere gestas
terrarumque situs et flumina dicere et arces
montibus impositas et barbara regna tuisque
auspiciis totum confecta duella per orbem,
claustraque custodem pacis cohibentia Ianum 255
et formidatam Parthis te principe Romam,
si, quantum cuperem, possem quoque; sed neque paruum
carmen maiestas recipit tua, nec meus audet
rem temptare pudor, quam uires ferre recusent.
Sedulitas autem stulte quem diligit urget, 260
praecipue cum se numeris commendat et arte;
discit enim citius meminitque libentius illud
quod quis deridet quam quod probat et ueneratur. 
Nil moror officium quod me grauat, ac neque ficto
in peius uultu proponi cereus usquam 265
nec praue factis decorari uersibus opto,
ne rubeam pingui donatus munere et una
cum scriptore meo capsa porrectus operta
deferar in uicum uendentem tus et odores
et piper et quicquid chartis amicitur ineptis. 270
Nor would I prefer to compose chats 250
that creep along the ground to telling of accomplished 
deeds and swaths of land and rivers and citadels placed
atop mountains and foreign kingdoms and wars ended
throughout the world under your auspices,
and the gates confining Janus, the guardian of peace, 255
and Rome, with you as chief, dreaded by the Parthians—
if only my abilities equaled my desires; but your grandeur
does not allow for a small poem, nor does my modesty dare
to attempt a matter which my strength refuses to bear out.
Obsequiousness, moreover, foolishly burdens him whom it loves, 260
especially when it recommends itself by metrical arts;
he learns more swiftly, remembers more willingly, that
which he laughs at than what he approves and honors.
I've no time for the responsibility which oppresses me! I 
neither wish ever to be displayed in wax with face worse 265
for wear nor to be honored with lines made crookedly,
lest, gifted with such a dull present, I redden, and, together
with my writer, when I'm laid out in a covered case,
I be carried off onto that street which sells incense and perfume
and pepper and whatever is dressed in ill-fitting sheets. 270
Horace compares the chatty and humble genre in which he writes (sermones . . . /  repentis per
humum in v. 250-1 and paruum /  carmen in v. 257-258) to the epic genre in which, if he were
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able, he claims he would like to write (ego mallem / . . . res componere gestas in v. 250-251).
The verses represent a straightforward recusatio until v. 260 where Horace's argument turns from
his chosen genre and abilities to a general critique of a writer's assiduity (sedulitas  in v. 260).
Here  Horace  makes  rhetorical  gestures  toward  aphoristic  concision,  as  if  offering  a  tight
sententia, but the subjects of the verbs and relative clauses change too rapidly for the sense to be
quickly gathered. Even the particle  autem, which offers itself as an explanatory anchor at the
beginning of Horace's generalizing declaration, flirts with ambiguity enough to become a factor
in the passage's interpretation.
Kilpatrick interprets autem (v. 260) as “the turnabout”11 while Brink and Rudd read it as a
“prosaic,” or unemphatic conjunction.12 The different approaches to this term demand different
interpretations  of  Horace's  subsequent  argumentation.  If,  as  Kilpatrick  asserts,  the  autem is
adversative, Horace retreats in v. 260 from the recusatio offered in vv. 250-259.13 On the other
hand, if autem joins the recusatio to what follows (as I translate it), Horace offers an additional
reason  for  his  refusal  to  write  epic:  his  verse  runs  the  risk  of  trivializing  Augustus'
accomplishments and being more memorable for its shamelessness than a reverent approach
would be.14 As Horace shifts to the impersonal third-person in vv. 260-263, it is no longer clear
that he is speaking (or thinking) of himself and his own poetry. In vv. 258-259, he modifies
pudor with meus, but personal pronouns and possessive adjectives disappear from the verses that
follow; adverbs and third-person verbs take center-stage, while nouns and explicit subjects make
themselves scarce.
11 Kilpatrick (1990) 10. His reading reflects a typical adversative use of autem (OLD s.v. 1-2 and especially 1d),
but the use of the term at Ep. 2.1.199 (Horace's only other use in the poem) is amplificatory (OLD s.v. 4) rather
than adversative.
12 Brink (1982) 159; Rudd (1997) 115 does not translate autem: “The centre of stupid and fawning attention finds
it vexatious, / most of all when it seeks his favour through the art of poetry.”
13 Kilpatrick reads the  Epistle  to Augustus as a lengthy letter  of introduction that Horace writes on behalf of
younger poets of his day.
14 Porphyrio: Di[s]cit enim citius <et> maiore studio ridiculos uersus disci[t] et teneri, quam admirabiles. Ergo
in aeternam memoriam foedatus est, quem tale carmen polluerit.
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The lack of precision in the language and meaning of vv. 260-263 is more noticeable
when  compared  with  the  clarity  of  the  verses  that  precede  and  follow  the  four  lines.  The
recusatio beginning in v. 250 ticks off various “epic” boxes with its archaizing diction (duella in
v. 254), interlocking word order (claustraque custodem pacis cohibentia Ianum in v. 255), and
nearly-exclusive  focus  on  martial  matters,  yet  Horace's  sense  and  syntax  stay  accessible
throughout.  Even  when  Horace  makes  explicit  his  refusal  to  tackle  the  topic  of  Augustan
grandeur in vv. 257-259 (and illustrates the point with a stylistic shift from epic to colloquial
language), his meaning remains lucid. Similarly in vv. 264-270, Horace uses familiar vocabulary
and comprehensible syntax to explain why he has no interest in being commemorated in the
work of  an  incompetent  artist.  Despite  the  readability  of  vv.  250-259 and vv.  264-270,  the
sections do not otherwise share a tone. The taut, epic style of the first passage transitions to a
looser, conversational style in the closing passage. The intervening verses of 260-263 differ in
style and substance from the passages that surround them, and it is no coincidence that deridet
makes its appearance in the last of these verses (v. 263).
If only by nature of their location at the end of a recusatio, the verses in which deridet
appears  become  a  tonal  pivot  at  the  end  of  Epistle 2.1.  A shift  in  tone  is  not  altogether
unexpected when an author has just finished explaining why his poetry takes one path instead of
another, but the shift in vv. 260-263 is particularly dramatic. The four verses can be read in two
couplets, the first of which comments upon the burdensome behavior of an obsequious poet,
while the second offers an observation about readers' tendencies to more easily learn and recall
things they deride than things they praise. Yet the first couplet's meaning and relationship to its
context are at first difficult to establish due to a shift to a more sententious style. Sedulitas is the
presumed subject of both verbs in v. 260, but one may initially wonder whether Horace is writing
of  a  poet's  (his  own)  sedulitas  or  that  of  patron seeking out  a  work.  Suetonius  asserts  that
119
Augustus solicited poetry from Horace and thus prompted the poetic epistle under examination.15
My reading of the passage (as  my translation confirms)  is  relatively straightforward:
Horace,  having proclaimed his inability to write  poetry that the majesty of Augustus merits,
assures the emperor that he is eager to please, but he also cryptically declares that this is not an
asset  when the  poet's  desire  to  please  (sedulitas)  stands  to  burden  (urget)  the  object  of  his
affection (quem diligit).  The second couplet  elaborates on how this  burdening will  manifest
itself,  and  the  clear  and  balanced  syntax  render  the  meaning  of  the  couplet  instantly
comprehensible. The lines read smoothly from left to right and in sequence (with the possible
exception of the postponed subject in quis of v. 263). The aphoristic effort, somewhat confusing
in the previous couplet, is here successful. The sentence becomes a complete thought with the
verb  deridet when the relative clause provides a grammatical object  for the verbs  discit  and
meminit(que).  The  sentence  could  end  here  with  the  comparandum to  quod  quis  deridet
understood in ellipse, but Horace leaves no room for misunderstanding. He juxtaposes deridet
with the verbs probat and veneratur, two verbs of approval, and he reinforces for the reader that
deridet can  only  communicate  disapproval  and  negative  assessment.  The  prefixed  verb  for
laughter which, as discussed above, already lacks the semantic ambiguity of its unprefixed root is
defined  by  the  conceptual  antonyms  with  which  it  is  compared.  Such  overdetermination  in
diction  and  argument,  perhaps  an  asset  in  the  composition  of  an  aphorism,  offers  an  ideal
opportunity for Horace to take things in a new direction. The poet sets out just enough dishes for
the reader to forget about the tablecloth immediately before he pulls it from the table, and the last
dish he serves is a platter with deridet engraved in the middle of it. 
15 Suet. Poet. 40. The historian quotes a letter of Augustus to Horace and then identifies Horace's response as the
Epistle to Augustus. After consulting the scholia, commentaries, and colleagues, I offer my translation of the
passage as evidence of my interpretation. Porphyrio offers a simile in explanation of v. 260 that is particularly
colorful: haec sententia generalis eos te<net>, qui prauo obsequio laedunt, quos amant, ut si te amet medicus
inperitus, et nolit tibi alterius inponi medicamina, nisi sua. sed translatio ab his facta est, qui conplexu nimio
quem amant praefocant, ut satius <si>t stulto minus diligi.
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With v. 264, Horace changes the tone and upends the order of the empire in the process.
His first words nil moror are a standard colloquial expression of disregard in Plautine comedy
and a fitting stylistic change of pace after  the  recusatio and weighty pronouncements of the
preceding lines.16 Between the semantic echo of urget (260) with grauat (264) and the syntactical
similarities of quod quis deridet (263) and quod me gravat (264), Horace begins to trade places
with Augustus. He imagines himself the object of incompetent  sedulitas. The remainder of the
poem offers a literary equivalent of that oft-unhelpful interaction in which one person says to
another, “If I were you . . .” Of course Horace's hypothetical situation is absurd before he even
delivers his advice: the advisor is a self-proclaimed lowbrow poet, while the advisee is governing
an empire. As if substituting himself for the emperor were not ludicrous enough, Horace also
conjures his own fawning, sedulous poet bent on writing lousy verse about him. He imagines
himself transformed by and with his poet (cum scriptore meo in v. 268) into literary form, only to
be bustled about  at  a  local  flea market  among strong smells  and other  scraps  of  recyclable
paper.17
The final verses of Epistle 2.1 may be laughable for their presentation of the absurd (as
“poet”  becomes  “emperor”)  or  laugh-worthy  for  their  author's  manipulation  of  tone  (as  the
speaker rapidly shifts from sententious declarations to self-effacing fantasy).18 I simply propose
that,  through  a  conspicuous  use  of  the  vocabulary  for  laughter  (deridet in  v.  263),  Horace
prepares  his  readers—the emperor  included—to laugh in  response  to  the  poem's  concluding
verses. A strongly-charged word for laughter is planted in a stylistically self-conscious passage to
16 The phrase appears in (and throughout) 16 of Plautus' plays (Asinaria v. 643, Aulularia v. 169, Bacchides vv.
153, 989, 1073, and 1186, Captivi v. 16, Casina vv. 545 and 747, Cistellaria vv. 288, 371, 453, 482, 623, and
778, Curculio vv. 453 and 515, Epidicus vv. 350 and 687, Miles Gloriosus vv. 280, 447, and 759, Mostellaria
vv. 746 and 845, Persa v. 767, Poenulus vv. 492, 1273, and 1415, Rudens vv. 583, 852, and 1248, Stichus vv.
206, 424, 429 and 714, Trinummus vv. 337, 511, and 1158, and Truculentus vv. 259 and 792).
17 See Feeney (2002) 185-7 for a broader treatment of these final verses.
18 See Kilpatrick (1990) 11: “Such a humorous conclusion to a serious poem recalls others in which Horace used
humour to defuse a delicate situation and leave the poem's recipient with a smile.”
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communicate a primary sense that people more readily recall  poetry which they deride.  The
sentiment itself is humorous, in part because it could very well be true.19 But the textual laughter
also metacommunicatively  relays  information  about  the  atmosphere  of  the  verse in  which it
appears, the verses that follow it, and even the verses that precede it. Deridet predicts and, at the
same time, enacts a transformation of the poem's tone to a more playful one—and it does so not
despite but  because  the  word  deridere conveys  a  more  stable  (negative)  meaning  than  its
unprefixed counterpart. As the potential for this negative, derisive tone is frustrated and inverted,
the potential for play—even extending to language—emerges. This tone of playfulness maintains
itself through what little of the poem remains.
Like the laughter of the nymphs in Vergil's  Eclogue  3, the derisive laughter that eases
poetic recall in  Epistle  2.1.263 is more easily identified as a signal to laughter once the reader
has experienced the material that follows it. Though the term may be subconsciously activated on
first reading, it is particularly eye-catching in hindsight. And Horace does not allow his reader to
progress very far before encouraging her to look back. The Epistle to Augustus ends so soon after
the laughter is cued in v. 263 that the reader, after realizing that the tablecloth formerly on the
table is now clenched in Horace's hands, may still recall that the  deridet-inscribed platter was
among the last dishes placed before everything ended up in the air.
SECTION IIA: CONTAGIOUS LAUGHTER IN OVID'S ARS AMATORIA
Some laughs within a text do not seem to serve any more than a narrative function, but if
an author intends a laugh to communicate reflexively and on multiple levels—that is, to function
metacommunicatively—he  does  well  to  establish  the  laugh  as  unique.  In  the  previous
explorations of Vergil's 3rd Eclogue and Horace's Epistle to Augustus, the use of textual laughter
19 I am thinking of a poem that I saw posted to a door in Columbia University's Hamilton Hall several years ago—
an advertisement for a campus “bad poetry” competition—that read, “Clytemnestra, you killed my dad— / Bad,
bad, bad, bad, bad, bad, bad!” 
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as metacommunication relies upon the presence of a marked vocabulary for laughter in a marked
location. The nymphs' laughter in Eclogue 3 is relayed in the only appearance of the vocabulary
for laughter and the risible in the poem. Likewise, deridet in Epistle 2.1 catches the reader's eye
when it appears after two occasions of unprefixed ridere in the midst of an aphoristic declaration
near the end of the poem. In the third book of the Ars Amatoria, Ovid utilizes the vocabulary of
laughter in a concentrated swath from vv. 279-90 when the praeceptor amoris urges his female
addressees to "learn" laughter and use it to their advantage. Because of the rapid-fire repetition of
laugh-related words and the fact that the passage is about laughter itself, the reader is urged to
laugh along.
The passage appears one-third of the way through the book in the course of a discussion
in which the narrator offers advice to women on how to mask physical shortcomings. 
si niger aut ingens aut non erit ordine natus
    dens tibi, ridendo maxima damna feres. 280
quis credat? discunt etiam ridere puellae,
    quaeritur aque illis hac quoque parte decor.
sint modici rictus paruaeque utrimque lacunae,
    et summos dentes ima labella tegant.
nec sua perpetuo contendant ilia risu, 285
    sed leue nescio quid femineumque sonent.
est, quae peruerso distorqueat ora cachinno;
    risu concussa est altera, flere putes.
illa sonat raucum quiddam atque inamabile: ridet,
    ut rudit a scabra turpis asella mola. 290
If your teeth are black or huge or not naturally
    in line, you will suffer the greatest punishment for laughing. 280
Who would believe it, but girls even learn to laugh
    and in this domain too they seek grace.
Let there be a moderately open mouth, small dimples on each side,
    and let the bottoms of your lips cover the tops of your teeth.
One's sides should not strain with endless laughter, 285
    but the sound should be kind of smooth and feminine.
This one distorts her features with perverse cackles:
    another is so shaken by a laugh, you'd think she weeps.
That one sounds out something raucous and unattractive: she laughs
    like an unseemly donkey hee-haws from a scabby millstone. 290
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The physical defects that Ovid lists in the verses preceding this passage run the gamut from
being small in stature to having ugly feet, a small chest, or bad breath. The last of these prepares
the transition to a discussion of teeth.  Most defects are acknowledged and "treated" within a
couplet or two, but the curse of bad teeth is teased out into a broader point comprising 6 couplets.
The reason is that teeth are on display when someone laughs, and laughter—proper laughter—is
a learnable behavior (discunt  in  v.  281).  Fortunately for readers of the  Ars Amatoria,  it  is  a
behavior that the praeceptor is happy to teach.
In typical Ovidian fashion, the description is thorough. The praeceptor fixates first on the
appearance of the face during laughter, with recommendations offered on the mouth, cheeks, and
lips. He then offers prescriptions on duration and sound (“short and sweet”) before presenting a
handful of negative  exempla  to illustrate inappropriate laughter. Descriptions of twisted faces,
excessive movement, and cacophonous sound culminate in the comparison of a laughing woman
to a braying she-ass. The loose visual rhyme between ridet (v. 289) and rudit  (v. 290) and the
rhymed endings of the hemiepes in v. 290 (scabra and mola) grant the final couplet the ring of a
punch-line,  a  sensation  confirmed  when  the  discussion  shifts  to  a  new  topic  (tears)  in  the
following verses. The description of the donkey (turpis) and millstone draws up a visual portrait
of the asella as she strains at her work. Through this elusive invitation to visualize the donkey,
Ovid also invites his readers to draw connections to the beginning of the description: might there
be large, scabrous teeth in the ugly ass's mouth?20 The portrait of the ugly, abrasively braying
she-ass distills all the previous visual and aural criticism into a unified unappealing image. A
20 Ovid makes an explicit link between scaber and the mouth when, in his description of Fames in Book 8 of the
Metamorphoses  (v.  802),  he  describes  the  monstrous  woman's  mouth  as  having  "jaws  scabby  with  rust"
(scabrae rubigine fauces). In a vivid verse from De Bello Civile, Lucan refers to "swords scabrous with the bite
of black rust" (et scabros nigrae morsu rubiginis enses in 1.243). The confluence of dental (morsu),  visual
(nigrae), and textural (scabros) references in Lucan's passage leads one to wonder if the adjective scaber carries
stronger connections to the mouth and/or dark coloring. If so, Ovid's mention of the mill-stone at the end of the
laughing passage invites a more direct recall of the black teeth with which the passage at v. 279 begins.
124
woman who laughs like a donkey, or looks like a donkey when she laughs, will indeed "suffer
the greatest punishment for laughing" (v. 280).
The vocabulary for laughter appears in one other verse in  Ars Amatoria 3 (in v. 513,
treated  below),  but  it  appears  six  times  in  the  twelve  verses  quoted  above.  Such a  cursory
quantitative argument already suggests that the passage is laugh-centric, but this is to ignore the
carrot dangling before the ass. The passage is laugh-centric because it is about laughter. Only
with  tremendous  difficulty  and  skill  could  someone  write  about  laughter  without  using  the
vocabulary of laughter and the risible.21 Ovid offers in these verses the lengthiest handling in
extant  Augustan  poetry  of  laughter  as  a  self-contained  topic.  With  his  attention  to  details
including dimples (283),22 lip/gum-coverage (284),23 and proper and improper vocalization (286
and 289), he also gives a rich treatment of the combined visible and audible components of the
behavior.
When Vergil describes laughing nymphs and Horace refers to derided, easily-memorized
poetry, the two authors call upon terms for laughter that are otherwise scarce in their respective
poems.  Adopting  the  opposite  tack,  Ovid  marks  his  use  of  the  vocabulary  for  laughter  as
exceptional not for its diction but for its high frequency. The potential metacommunicative effect
of an avalanche of laughter vocabulary is not difficult to recognize. For example, I could tell a
story about a group of children laughing at a silly joke: “First Colleen laughed, and then Lyle
cackled, and Charlotte had just begun to giggle when Keith let loose an ear-ringing guffaw.” By
my third use of the vocabulary for laughter, I would not be surprised to see my listener smiling
21 One suspects Ovid would be up to the challenge, though in such a virtuosic display, poetry or word-play would
eclipse laughter as the subject of the verse.
22 Gibson (2003) points out that, while there is no Latin word for dimples, “lacuna is used by technical writers of a
range of natural bodily hollows”(211).
23 I interpret this line as advising against showing the gums or displaying a "gummy smile," where the ima labella
are the "tips" of the lips, and the summi dentes refer to where the teeth meet the gums. It seems unlikely that the
praeceptor would recommend hiding all of the teeth behind the lips (however appropriate if a  puella were to
have black teeth). It is simply too awkward to smile or laugh in this way.
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and maybe even laughing. Ovid strives for a similar effect by having the praeceptor teach about
laughter itself and use a swell of laughter-related vocabulary in the process.
The  quantitative  argument,  however,  could  have  the  opposite  effect  and  discourage
laughter. A reader can imagine a context that lends my hypothetical cascade of laughs a darker
tone—one that would not lead to a laughing response from a warm-hearted audience. What if the
experience that precipitates Colleen's laughter is not a joke but an unexpected spurt of blood
from the chest of Rupert, a former friend whom she and the other kids have violently stabbed to
death? This is still a metacommunicative use of laughter that, if presented to an audience with a
conventional  idea of  how children respond to aggression and death,  relays  an abundance  of
information beyond the narrated laughter of the kids. If such a narration were to appear early in a
literary work, a reader would begin to make assumptions about character,  genre,  and, in the
broadest sense, tone. Horror and dark comedy might come to mind.24 A children's story would be
off the table. In the foregoing, murderous example, the quantity of the vocabulary for laughter
would  not  necessarily  be  as  important  to  the  passage's  metacommunicative  effect  as  the
behavior's  apparent  incongruity  to  the  situation.  The  description  of  a  single  child  who
enthusiastically laughs after committing a murder would go a long way in establishing tone and
in  communicating  information  beyond  the  primary  layer  of  narrative.  The  addition  of  the
accomplices' laughter would intensify an atmosphere that was already realized. Instead of being
about an individual crazy kid, the narrative would be about a gang of potentially unstable youths.
The preceding comments about textual laughter's ability to discourage a like response is
intended to illustrate that laughter as metacommunication need not always lead to a congruent
reader  response  of  laughter.  Whether  utilized  to  encourage  or  repulse  a  laughing  response,
24 I mention dark comedy to acknowledge that  the apparent incongruity of children behaving like murderous,
pathological adults could still lead to a laughing response from an audience. In such a case, how the laughter
relates to other potentially metacommunicative genre- or character-specific cues would be relevant to reader
response.
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laughter's metacommunicative potential resides in the contagious and involuntary nature, real or
perceived, of the behavior. Either people laugh at laughter,  or, when they do not, they detect
something wrong with the laughter. Though one might detect misogynistic elements in Ovid's
concentrated use of the vocabulary of laughter from vv. 279-90, the poet is not describing a
horrifying situation.25 The  praeceptor amoris  aims to inculcate graceful  laughter (decor  in v.
282) in his addressees, and however unfavorable some of the laughter he describes, he creates a
laugh track that consists of laughter terminology and encourages a similar laughing response in
the poem's readers. To ascribe this "encouragement" to laugh to the quantity of laughter-related
vocabulary alone is to fail to recognize Ovid's command of irony. While inundating the reader
with terms for laughter, Ovid has the praeceptor self-consciously disrupt the notion that laughter
is a reflexive behavior.
Ovid draws upon the implied learnability of laughter to open a play frame in v. 281,
though, with an author as relentlessly playful as Ovid, one might suggest that the poet does not
begin and end discrete playful passages but simply moves between them. The entirety of the Ars
Amatoria is in some sense an extended joke that turns upon the proposed learnability of another
conventionally unlearned behavior, namely, the experience of love.26 When, in the second couplet
of the first book (Ars. 1.3-4), the  praeceptor  compares the  ars involved in  amor to the skills
25 In notes on his translation, Green (1982) remarks of the vv. 250-80, "[T]he clientele of a marriage bureau or
lonelyhearts column is not drawn, by and large, from the well-heeled, the well-favoured or the well-adjusted. At
the same time Ovid clearly used this as an excuse to exercise a carefully controlled vein of genial contempt for
the whole female sex. The short, pallid, scrawny, flat-chested composite figure, with buck teeth and bad breath,
that emerges from these lines is both plausible and drawn with a kind of lingering and venomous passion" (389).
26 Volk (2006) sidesteps the absurdity (though, with it, the joke) on “learned love” when she observes, “The Ars
Amatoria is thus really something like the art of dating, the art of the love affair, and not the art of love. This, of
course,  is  the  reason why it  is  teachable in the first  place:  amor is  for  Ovid not a  feeling but  a  mode of
behaviour,  and  thus  can  be  mastered  by  following the  simple  steps  laid  out  in  his  didactic  poem” (242).
However,  Volk  (2002),  in  an  earlier  and  more  comprehensive  treatment  of  the  sense  of  amor in  the  Ars,
acknowledges that the work exhibits a “play” between amor as courtship and amor as emotion (158-9, 169-70).
For  a  concise  consideration  of  earlier  erotodidactic  texts,  see  Gibson  (2003)  13-19  who  seems  willing  to
collapse instruction on seduction, retention, and even sexual positions into a single tradition with the disclaimer
that “this tradition could not be called a 'genre' in the usual sense, as few works of literary quality seem to have
been cast wholly in this form either before or after the Ars Amatoria” (14). 
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required to pilot a ship or maneuver a chariot, his emphasis on established technical artes renders
the  praeceptor's  stated ambition absurd in  contrast.  The first-time reader may wonder  if  the
praeceptor  knows that love is an emotion and not a conventional means of transport. But the
praeceptor  persists  in the comparison and even restates it  in his  claim, "I  will  be called the
Tiphys or Automedon of Love." In the subsequent verses Ovid places the anthropomorphized,
boyish Amor (puer in Ars. 1.10), fierce and presumably armed (arcu in 1.21), in the chariot with
the praeceptor.27 When in Ars. 3.281 the praeceptor asks quis credat? in anticipation of his claim
that laughter can be taught (and thus learned), Ovid tees up a joke at the expense of an implicitly
gullible readership. He also lends his praeceptor the air of a huckster. Who would believe it? The
remainder of the line (discunt etiam ridere puellae) is indeed unbelievable until softened by the
following verse's clarification that it is  decor  in laughing that the  praeceptor will teach rather
than the ability to laugh. Even to claim this power—the power to teach how to laugh with grace
—is to imply that a student can learn to exercise a questionable degree of control over a behavior
that  is  frequently treated as if  it  were reflexive. The  praeceptor  stops short of claiming that
laughter itself is taught or learned, but he flirts with the joke by delaying any mention of decor
until the very end of v. 282.
In small-scale ring composition, Ovid concludes his treatment of laughter by announcing
the learnability of another behavior typically considered involuntary or reflexive: "To where does
art not extend? Women learn to cry gracefully / and they weep at the time and in the manner they
wish"  (quo  non  ars  penetrat?  discunt  lacrimare  decenter  /  quoque  volunt  plorant  tempore
quoque modo in vv. 291-2). The parallels to v. 281 in syntax and vocabulary are many, from the
verse-opening  rhetorical  question  to  the  reuse  of  discunt  in  the  middle  of  the  line  with  a
27 Ars  1.8:  Tiphys et  Automedon dicar Amoris ego.  Volk (2002) 180-1 draws attention to  the  “leitmotifs” of
seafaring and chariot-riding in the Ars. 
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complementary infinitive. Unlike vv. 281-2, however, Ovid does not make the reader wait long
in order to learn that grace is the goal in crying; the adverb  decenter, appearing at line's end,
renders  the  sentiment  less  jarring.  Nevertheless,  Ovid's  remarks  on  laughter  have  more  in
common with the verses that precede them than with the verses on crying; the advice of the
praeceptor  regarding laughter begins with, and ultimately returns to, a discussion of physical
shortcomings (bad teeth and abrasive cackles) and how to mask them. Crying is not portrayed as
a physical fault, like skinniness and halitosis, nor is it coupled with negative  exempla, like the
portrait of the woman with an asinine cackle. 
Ovid does not delineate sharp divisions between each section of the  Ars Amatoria  but
allows the casual persona of the praeceptor amoris to stitch together seemingly unrelated topics
and  to  maneuver  gradually  through  subtle  transitions.  For  example,  the  considerably  brief
discussion of crying in vv. 291-2 completes a transition of topic first initiated in the praeceptor's
treatment of laughter when he toys with the idea that anything can be learned. However, despite
his claim that women can learn to cry on demand, the praeceptor offers no advice on how to do
this.  Though  willing  to  offer  specific  and  ostensibly  practicable  advice  on  laughter,  the
praeceptor  volunteers little more than a vague anecdotal claim when it comes to crying.28 The
prescriptive approach to laughter sets this advice off from what follows; both the subject matter
and the pedagogical approaches differ.
Like the laughs in Vergil's  Eclogue  3 and in Horace's  Epistle to Augustus, the laughter
mentioned  throughout  vv.  279-90  encourages  a  like  response.  Ovid's  use  of  laughter  as
metacommunication draws upon the high frequency of the vocabulary for laughter in the passage
and the provocative treatment of the behavior itself. The two metacommunicative uses work in
28 In  his  commentary  on  vv.  281-2,  Gibson  (2003)  notes  that  the  praeceptor  uses  "descriptive  rather  than
prescriptive forms in other controversial subject areas" (211).
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concert: first, repeated words for laughter are set out as kindling; then Ovid lights the spark for a
laughing response by subverting, if only momentarily, the conception of laughter's unlearned and
involuntary status (v. 281). He stokes the flame one last time with the climactic she-ass simile in
v. 290, and makes clear that laughter, whether sympathetic (with the praeceptor) or ironic (with
Ovid),  is  an  appropriate  response  to  the  passage.  The  potential  for  irony  lies  in  the  self-
referentiality of the topic. In the midst of undermining the ancient laugh track by portraying the
unnatural as natural and the involuntary as voluntary, Ovid ultimately invites the natural response
by triggering the laugh track.
SECTION IIB: LAUGHING THROUGH OVID'S TEARS
After his mention of women who can cry on demand, the praeceptor proceeds to suggest
that ars can also be applied to speaking (ideally with a lisp, vv. 293-6) and to walking (vv. 297-
310).  The  praeceptor's assertions regarding the learnable nature of graceful laughing, crying,
speaking, and walking would not seem out of place if they were construed as a theatrical coach's
advice to an actress. To produce a typically involuntary behavior on command and to control and
refine abilities like speaking and walking fall within the domain of theatrical ars, and, indeed, the
praeceptor amoris proceeds to treat performance arts in vv. 311-352 when he recommends that
women learn songs, memorize poetry, and train in dance. An eager student, in her rush to find
out what poetry she should learn (the praeceptor qua Ovid hopes the assigned readings include
many of his own works in vv. 339-348), might not even realize that the instructor came up short
on the  topic  of  crying.  The  ars of  tears  is  one  skill  that  women  do not  learn  from him,  a
surprising  fact  in  light  of  the  representation  of  crying  and  tears  as  less  of  a  liability  than
obnoxious laughter and physical faults.29 On the contrary, tears are presented as potential assets.
29 Gibson (2003) suggests that Ovid does not offer advice "in the context of unease about recommending things
which deceived men" (215). See also the previous note.
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In vv. 431-2, the praeceptor acknowledges the appeal of disheveled hair and unrestrained tears
(ire solutis  /  crinibus et  fletus non tenuisse decet); a widow might use both to attract a new
husband at  her former husband's funeral. Likewise in v.  677, the instructor recommends that
women summon tears  (accedant  lacrimae)  in  order  to keep their  male  partners  emotionally
attuned: "Bring it about that we believe we are loved" (efficite . . . ut nos credamus amari in vv.
673-4). Though the praeceptor neglects to offer detailed instruction on how to cry, he does imply
that graceful crying, like graceful laughing, is a skill to cultivate.
The behaviors of laughing and crying frequently appear in tandem in the Ars Amatoria. In
the praeceptor's progression of instructions in Ars. 3.279-92, his comments on tears seem to flow
naturally  from  the  discussion  of  laughter.  Even  within  the  verses  devoted  to  laughter,  the
behaviors  of  laughing  and  crying  are  presented  as  potentially  indistinguishable  under  some
circumstances:  "[A]nother is so shaken by a laugh, you'd think she weeps" (risu concussa est
altera, flere putes in v. 288). Similarities between laughing and crying are apparent when these
behaviors are compared to the other two behaviors which the  praeceptor  claims an ability to
teach, namely, affectations of speech and gait.  For example, speaking and walking, given the
physical  capacity  to  do  both  (and  no  underlying  pathology,  e.g.,  Tourette's  syndrome),  are
voluntary,  while  laughter  and tears  are  often  elicited  involuntarily.  Laughing and crying  are
commonly interpreted as physical responses to emotional stimuli or expressions of "feelings",
but speaking and lisping are rarely assigned emotional resonance in and of themselves. Finally,
laughing and crying are both considered contagious under certain circumstances. A person who
witnesses another person's laughter or tears will  sometimes offer a sympathetic or congruent
behavioral response, either involuntarily or as a conscious show of solidarity. Though a person
may walk to keep up with another or mimic some of the speech patterns of an interlocutor,
walking and lisping are rarely contagious in any conventional interpretation of the word.
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The pairing of laughing and crying is hardly unique to Ovid. As mentioned in the first
part of this chapter, Horace initially presents the two as parallel contagious behaviors in A.P. 101
and then as somewhat antithetical responses to literature in A.P. 102-5. The similar-yet-opposite
behaviors appear together throughout ancient literature, and a thorough treatment of their pairing
falls outside the scope of my inquiry.30 Nevertheless, the Augustan poets, and Ovid in particular,
repeatedly mention laughter and tears in close proximity to one another. In this final section I
propose  that  one effect  of  Ovid's  frequent  coupling of  crying with  laughing is  that  the two
distinct behaviors begin to share a metacommunicative charge. 
If the ancient laugh track, as I have described it, is a product of the metacommunicative
use of laughter, could there be such a thing as a "cry track"? Before I push this line of inquiry
further, I readily admit my belief that a textual cry track, should it exist, would not be as effective
a form of metacommunication as a laugh track.31 Perhaps this suspicion derives from a different
conception of the sociality of crying versus laughing, but tears within a text, though they may
contribute to tone and indicate that crying would be an appropriate response to the passage in
which the tears appear, would, to my mind, be less likely to lead to a congruent reader response
(i.e., actual crying) than a depiction of laughter. But regardless of whether terms for crying can
ever  be  shown  to  be  as  metacommunicatively  active  or  potent  as  terms  for  laughing,  the
argument I wish to put forth is still prompted by the question of why a reader would laugh in
response to a text. I propose that Ovid, on at least one occasion, uses the vocabulary of both
laughing and crying to stimulate a  laughing response. He observes the conventional use of the
two as opposite sides of the same coin, but, by routinely referring to the concepts together and
30 Arnould (1990) is an early and frequently cited example of scholarship that tackles laughing and crying in a
single work, though she too tends to separate the two behaviors.
31 Despite the prevalence of laugh tracks in certain modern television productions (primarily sit-coms),  I have
never had what I would imagine would be the thoroughly uncomfortable experience of watching a sad scene to
the accompaniment of unseen sobbing.
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condensing  their  respective  vocabularies—by  flipping  the  coin  rapidly  and  repeatedly—he
sometimes performs a sleight of hand and forces tears, crying, and the sorrowful emotions with
which they are associated to assume the metacommunicative charge of laughter.
It must be emphasized that Ovid's legerdemain with metacommunication is only made
possible by the fact that Ovid elsewhere observes convention. The trick's impact in some sense is
a metacommunicative manifestation of the incongruity theory of laughter; expectations must first
be set in order for them later to be defied. In the passage from Ars Amatoria 3 discussed above,
crying (vv. 291-2) is mentioned in the couplet following the treatment of laughter (vv. 279-90),
but the metacommunicative cues for laughter appear in the verses that contain the vocabulary of
laughter. After the only other appearance of the vocabulary of laughter in  Ars Amatoria  3, the
praeceptor amoris  presents an argument for why women should avoid mournful behavior. He
does  so  in  such  a  histrionic  manner  that  a  term indicating  extreme  sorrow acts  as  a  final
metacommunicative cue in a crescendo to laughter.
In vv.  511-8,  the  praeceptor asserts  that  sympathetic  behavior  in  facial  proxemics  is
appealing to men. A reserved or melancholy visage is simply hateful:
odimus immodicos (experto credite) fastus:
    saepe tacens odii semina uultus habet.
spectantem specta, ridenti mollia ride:
    innuet, acceptas tu quoque redde notas.
sic ubi prolusit, rudibus puer ille relictis 515
    spicula de pharetra promit acuta sua.
odimus et maestas: Tecmessam diligat Aiax;
    nos hilarem populum femina laeta capit.
We hate (trust the expert) extreme haughtiness:
    often the quiet face contains the seeds of hatred.
Observe the one observing you, laugh softly at the one laughing:
     If he nods, then you return his nods received.
When he has rehearsed thus, that boy—toys left behind— 515
    puts forth sharp arrows from his quiver.
We hate also gloomy women: Let Ajax love Tecmessa;
    The joyful woman captures us, the happy populace.
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The instructor plays synaesthetically with sights and sounds. A motionless face is said to be silent
(tacens, v. 512), and laughter's visible qualities are emphasized by the noiseless actions described
before (specta in v. 513) and after (innuet  in v. 514) the laughter itself. With references to a
reflection  in  water  and  a  mirror  in  v.  506-7,  the  instructor  paves  the  way  for  textual
representations of reflections throughout the passage.32 In v. 513 there are two forms of ridere on
either side of a third word (ridenti mollia ride) as well as two terms for observing looking at one
another, side by side (spectantem specta). In addition to these occasions of standard polyptoton,
horizontal textual reflection occurs within v. 515 when alliterative terms of the same number of
syllables surround the subject (rudibus puer ille  relictis). Vertical reflections occur between v.
511 and v. 517 with the doubled line opening odimus and again between v. 513 and v. 515 with
the s-alliterated verse beginnings. Other intriguing reflections are a loose responsion of letters
between  specta  and  acceptas in vv. 513-4 and, in the same verses, between  ride and  redde.33
Gibson (2003) notes the consonance between maestas and Tecmessam in v. 517 and suggests that
the  praeceptor may  have  been  particularly  attuned  to  the  sounds  of  names  in  a  passage
containing Ajax's name, which is etymologized in Sophocles' Ajax with the αἰαῖ sound of lament.
32 In v. 506, Pallas sees herself in river water while playing the pipes (ut uidit uultus Pallas in amne suos), and in
v.  507,  the  praeceptor explicitly  mentions  the  act  of  looking  in  a  mirror  (uos quoque si  media  speculum
spectetis in ira). Perhaps to forecast the wordplay to come in vv. 511-8, an inverted gamma telestic appears in
the four verses (507-10) that precede this passage:
uos quoque si media speculum spectetis in ira,
              cognoscat faciem uix satis ulla suam.
nec minus in uultu damnosa superbia uestro:
             comibus est oculis alliciendus amor.
(I thank my colleague Mathias Hanses for pointing out this telestic to me.)
33 It  is  also interesting to note that  Ovid's portrait  of  a  woman laughing at  her  laughing love interest  in  Ars
Amatoria 3.513 is in fact a mirror reflection of advice the praeceptor offers to men in Ars Amatoria 2.201-2:
riserit: arride; si flebit, flere memento: 201
    imponat leges uultibus illa tuis.
---
She laughs: laugh back; if she cries, remember to cry: 201
    let that one impose laws on your face.
As in Book 3, laughing and crying are paired, and Ovid has the praeceptor suggest that laws (leges in v. 202)
can be imposed on the involuntary behaviors. 
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With her name alone, Tecmessa gloomily weeps.34
Yet less of a mirroring than a "through the looking glass" effect occurs on the emotional
level.35 The emphatic repetition of hatred (odimus  in vv. 511 and 517 and  odii  in v. 512) in a
poem dedicated to love alerts the reader to a play with opposites, between happy and sad, explicit
laughter and implicit tears. One verse after the praeceptor announces a universal male attraction
to joyful women, the coin flips back toward sadness, as the passage culminates in the description
of two epically and tragically miserable women in vv.  519-24. The words of the thoroughly
uncouth praeceptor remain the reader's guide:
numquam ego te, Andromache, nec te, Tecmessa, rogarem
    ut mea de uobis altera amica foret. 520
credere uix uideor, cum cogar credere partu,
    uos ego cum uestris concubuisse uiris.
scilicet Aiaci mulier maestissima dixit
    'lux mea' quaeque solent uerba iuuare uiros.
Never would I ask you, Andromache, nor you, Tecmessa—
    that either of you be my girlfriend. 520
I can scarcely believe (though I'm forced to because of your progeny)
    that you both bedded down with your husbands.
And I'm sure that the gloomiest wife to Ajax said,
    “My light!,” and whatever words tend to please husbands.
The adjective maestissima echoes Tecmessa's name (as at v. 517) and confirms the identity of the
mulier to which it refers. When read with the remainder of the couplet in v. 524, the adjective
34 Gibson (2003)  proposes that,  through the  name play,  the  instructor  "is  perhaps  suggesting that  [Ajax] and
Tecmessa deserve one another" (306). For the overlap of maestus and tears, cf. Cat. 38.8 and Ov. Pont. 2.3.83. 
35 In Metamorphoses 3.459-62 during Ovid's story of Echo and Narcissus, laughter, tears, and reflections appear in
Narcissus' lament as the boy lists flirtations, all of which he could have learned from the Ars Amatoria:
cum risi, adrides; lacrimas quoque saepe notaui
me lacrimante tuas; nutu quoque signa remittis 460
et, quantum motu formosi suspicor oris,
verba refers aures non peruenientia nostras!
---
Whenever I laugh, you laugh back; I have often noticed your
tears when I cried; with a nod you also send back messages 460
and, as far as I can tell from the motion of your beautiful mouth,
you relate words that do not arrive at our ears!
Ovid's doubling of terms for laughter playfully engages with the idea that a laughing response to laughter is
natural, if not always genuine. 
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also offers itself as the beginning of the metacommunicative punchline. The caricature of the
stereotypical  sad  wife  speaking  affectionately  to  her  husband  is  too  much  even  for  the
praeceptor  to sketch without feeling compelled to mark the sentiment as ironic (scilicet).36 A
term  that,  in  semantic  isolation,  would  otherwise  invite  associations  with  excessive  and
superlative mourning, crying, and tears is planted in the text as a metacommunicative cue for the
incongruous response of laughter.
If one looks back at the passage as a whole from vv. 511-24, the graduality of Ovid's
preparations for inviting laughter through tears and laughter becomes apparent. The vocabulary
of laughter in v. 513 (spectantem specta, ridenti mollia ride) is the earliest metacommunicative
cue. The latter half of the verse offers a concentrated use of laughter-related terms and functions
as part of the playful visual game of textual reflections cleverly signposted in the first half of the
verse. In vv. 513-4, flirtations are mirrored back and forth, and then, in the following couplet (vv.
515-6), the praeceptor introduces Cupid, arrows sharpened, to imply that a love connection is in
the making. But before there is time to celebrate, the instructor's utter loathing for sad women (v.
517)  overwhelms him and  undercuts  any  amorous levity,  only  to  be  positively  reframed as
affection for happy women in the second line of the same couplet. The emotional and behavioral
tone of the passage flips between laughter and tears, hatred and love, earnestness and irony, and
by the time the praeceptor offers his last literary-historical exemplum, a superlative term for grief
effortlessly carries the metacommunicative power of a peal of laughter. Ovid all but demands
that his readers laugh when, in vv. 523-4, he has the praeceptor imagine the saddest woman in
the world exclaiming sweet blandishments to the husband who, he neglects to mention, acquired
36 OLD s.v. scilicet 4. It is possible that such an ironic use of scilicet allows for, or at least encourages, the crossing
of metacommunicative signals in this passage. The praeceptor also uses scilicet at Ars. 3.111 to hammer home
an ironic point about Tecmessa. In a note on the same verse, Gibson (2003) 133 speculates that Ovid may be
using Tecmessa as a means to critique Horace, who refers to her at  Carm. 2.4.5. For a discussion of genre
inversion, see Volk (2006) 250.
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her as war-booty.37 Through his amatory persona in Ars. 3, Ovid explores notions of love through
hatred, happiness through sadness, and, as I argue, the metacommunicative power of laughter
through the language of sorrow.
Whatever the merits of this last hypothesis, I return to laughter as a mainstay of Ovidian
amatory poetry in the final chapter. For now, I restate my basic argument that textual laughter
often functions as a  form of metacommunication that,  at  its  strongest,  stimulates a laughing
response in a reader and, at its mildest,  communicates to the reader that laughter is a viable
response  to  the  text.  Though  I  have  explored  my argument  with  treatments  of  examples  in
Vergil's, Horace's, and Ovid's poetry, many more occasions of metacommunicative laughter exist
in Augustan poetry, Latin literature, and, as I suspect, most any literature with a vocabulary for
laughter and the risible.
 
SECTION III: A CHALLENGE FOR METACOMMUNICATIVE LAUGHTER
Before shifting my focus in the remaining chapters to laughter's relationship to genre in
Augustan poetry, I would like to return to the text with which I began my first chapter: Horace's
Ars Poetica. Rather than resume my former investigation of laughter as a literary critical tool, I
now turn  my attention  to  a  unique  use  of  laughter  as  metacommunication  in  the  last  lines
(particularly in v. 476) of this poem. The final verse reads not as an independent sentence but as
a dangling phrase comparing a mad, reciting poet to "a leech refusing to release the flesh until
full of blood" (non missura cutem nisi plena cruoris hirudo). The use of metacommunicative
laughter  here  is  noteworthy precisely  because  there is  no laughter  in  the  verse.  In  fact,  the
37 As if emotional schizophrenia were not sufficient to keep the passage interesting, Ovid incorporates generic
layers through the women he mentions. Tecmessa, the war-prize of Ajax, certainly cannot be the subject of capit
in v. 518, nor can she be happy if she is to appear in Sophocles' tragedy. Andromache's Iliadic travails are even
better known, but, as Gibson (2003) notes, "It is typically Ovidian to ignore the fact that the widowed and exiled
Andromache had little reason to be a model of hilaritas" (306). 
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relevant vocabulary for laughter appears at the beginning of the poem in v. 5:
humano capiti ceruicem pictor equinam
iungere si uelit et uarias inducere plumas
undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,
spectatum admissi, risum teneatis, amici? 5
credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum
persimilem, cuius, uelut aegri somnia, uanae
fingentur species, ut nec pes nec caput uni
reddatur formae.
If a painter should wish to connect an equine neck 
to a human head and to introduce variegated feathers
to limbs gathered from everywhere, so that a woman
beautiful on top would taper repulsively into a black fish,
after being allowed to look on, friends, would you repress a laugh? 5
Suppose, Pisones, that, just like that painting, there were
a book, whose appearances, like the dreams
of a sick man, are fashioned fleeting, so neither foot nor head
are rendered in one form. 
As I proposed in Chapter 1, Horace alludes to and employs a critical function of laughter in these
verses and those that immediately follow. Incongruous works can provoke a form of negative
criticism  that  is  expressed  through  laughter,  and  Horace  implies  that  his  readers,  internally
identified as the Pisones, would hardly be able to keep from laughing if they were confronted
with such a monstrous composite spectacle as that described in vv. 1-4. The response is presented
as  involuntary  and  seemingly  unrestrainable.  Also  in  Chapter  1,  I  examined  how  Horace
repeatedly presents the vocabulary of laughter in his second book of  Epistles and in the  Ars
Poetica as a form of critical reception for bad art in general and bad literature more specifically.
What, then, does this passage from the beginning of the Ars Poetica have to do with the
end of the poem? It will surprise few that Horace, who plays the dual, oft-simultaneous roles of
poet and critic, is attuned to beginnings and endings. In the Ars, his focus is on the head and foot
of his own work. In v. 1, Horace places the word “head” (capiti) as the second word of the poem.
A reference to a head and foot (nec pes nec caput) follows close on this first one's heels in v. 8
138
when  Horace  makes  a  verbal  gesture  to  unity  (uni,  modifying formae in  v.  9).  A work  is
implicitly defined as unified when its head and foot come together into one form. Thus the last
line of Horace's poem—the foot—warrants some attention.
In the final passage of the same poem, Horace presents a portrait of a deranged poet who
exhibits very unstable behavior:
Nec satis apparet cur uersus factitet, utrum 470
minxerit in patrios cineres, an triste bidental
mouerit incestus; certe furit, ac uelut ursus,
obiectos caueae ualuit si frangere clatros,
indoctum doctumque fugat recitator acerbus;
quem uero arripuit, tenet occiditque legendo, 475
non missura cutem nisi plena cruoris hirudo.
Nor is it apparent why he churns out verses, whether 470
he pissed on his father's ashes or, unclean, he disturbed
a solemn temple; clearly he is mad, and like a bear,
if strong enough to break the obstructing bars of a cage,
the strident reciter routes the unlearned and learned:
truly whomever he has laid hold of, he holds and kills by reading, 475
a leech refusing to release the flesh until full of blood.
The visuals come one on top of the other, and a reader might reasonably ask whether or not the
images  Horace  introduces  in  these  closing verses  observe the ideals  of  simplicity  and unity
which the poet invokes in v. 23 (simplex . . . et unum). A urinating poet, rampaging bear, and a
deadly  recitator become components of an inextricably incongruous mishmash, with the leech
clinging onto the poem's final verse without so much as a word to introduce it. 
But  what  if  Horace  is  actually  making  his  work  "simple  and  one"  by  tacking  an
incongruous image onto the  end? What  if  the  lethal-peeing-poet-bear-leech of  vv.  470-76 is
offered to parallel the feathered-multilimbed-lady-fish-horse of vv. 1-4?38 Let us grant for the
moment that Horace does use two incongruous images to bring the head and foot of his poem
38 Laird (2007) observes of Horace's closing verses that the “rapid conjunction of ideas and images involving
sickness and hybridisation of the human with the bestial does recall the humorous supposition at the beginning
of the Ars Poetica” (136); he goes on to ascribe a thematic ring-composition to the poem as a whole (137).
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into one form. A problem then arises like the one encountered in the discussion of amalgamous
beast  in  Chapter  1.  There  I  suggested  that  a  composite  monster is  in  fact  defined  by  its
incongruity and that a paradox resides in the fact that what is incongruous by definition or design
only becomes "incongruous" when it reveals itself to be, in some way congruent. Is this not what
Horace does? He paints a monstrous image in the opening lines and immediately suggests that
such  an  image would  be  deserving of  laughter.  Moreover,  his  verses  textually  illustrate  the
laughable  incongruity  to  which  he  refers.  He shortly  thereafter  declares  that  a  work can be
anything "so long as it is simple and one" (v. 23). Finally, nearly 450 verses later and just as the
poem is drawing to a close, Horace presents a final composite image of a crazed poet.  The
potential  paradox lies in the idea that when Horace presents his final incongruous image, he
enacts a congruity that, in some sense, renders the explicitly-laughable incongruous image from
the opening no longer incongruous. Like an expertly rendered painting of a Scylla, Horace's Ars
Poetica becomes simplex . . . et unum by way of its incongruity.
Thus the readers who have been indirectly invited to laugh since the beginning of the
poem are left wondering if there is anything remaining to laugh at. The first metacommunicative
cue to laughter is offered with risum teneatis in v. 5, but it is not until the poem's conclusion that
the readers realize that they do not even know the answer to what at first seemed a single, simple
rhetorical question and then seemed to be a metacommunicative plant. Instead, readers are left to
puzzle  if it is significant that the first word of the poem is  humano and the last is  hirudo; if
Horace's  monstrous, chimaeric opening (caput) and his rambling, polymorphous closing (pes)
enact  a  satisfactory  ring-composition;  if  the  standard  Horace  uses  to  suggest  bad  poetry's
laughability at the beginning is instead the standard he strives to realize and consequently upend




PART II: JOCULAR GENRES (CHAPTERS 4, 5, AND 6)
PUZZLING LAUGHTER IN SATIRE, BUCOLIC, AND ELEGY
People tend to associate laughter with specific genres in much the same way that we
associate laughter with specific occasions. Conventional audience reactions to popular film or
television genres offer one way of illustrating this. A disappointed viewer may turn off a studio-
billed  "romantic  comedy"  or  a  network-identified  "sit-com"  thinking,  That  was  a
disappointment; I didn't laugh once. The same viewer watches a "drama" or an "action-thriller"
with little, if any, expectation of laughing. These, however, are audience responses—the viewer's
laughter or lack thereof. What about laughter  within a film? A laugh written into the script or
indicated, perhaps alongside a smile, in a character's stage directions? Is the presence or absence
of laughter within a work associated with specific genres? 
One might reasonably answer "yes," and point to the evidence provided by a laugh track
in TV sit-coms.1 Laugh tracks are often used in television sit-coms, and sit-coms are indeed
comedies  in  name  ("situational  comedies").  But  a  recorded  track  of  laughter  is  hardly  an
unproblematic  occasion  of  laughter  within a  film  or  TV show.  In  the  previous  chapters,  I
hypothesized a literary "laugh track" that is embedded in the text and triggered by the appearance
of the vocabulary of laughter. An aural laugh track for a TV show is typically presented as a
surrogate audience reaction. It is offered as if nested in a different layer than the audio-visual
experience of the show's content, and whether it pretends to be or, in the case of a live studio
audience, actually is an audience response, the laugh track operates both inside and outside a
work. It simultaneously creates, and functions as, part of the spectacle.
The laugh track in comic television has occasionally assumed a different role in the past
1 See Chapter 2, p. 86 n. 1 for a discussion of some of the research on laugh tracks.
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two decades, in particular through a genre of television known by some as "cringe comedy."2 The
BBC's (and NBC's)  The Office, HBO's  Curb Your Enthusiasm, and ABC's  Modern Family  all
eschew the once ubiquitous sit-com laugh track and purport to trust the audience to decide when
something  warrants  a  laughing  response.  By  embracing  a  pseudo-documentary  (or
"mockumentary”)  aesthetic,  this  format  of  comedy  is  identified  in  part  by  the  absence of
prerecorded laughter.  No studio  audience.  No laugh track.  Yet  no one would claim that  the
aforementioned shows contain no laughter. Ricky Gervais' character David Brent in the original
BBC version of The Office routinely makes inappropriate jokes, snickering awkwardly when no
other  character laughs at  his  discomfiting behavior.  In an episode of  Curb Your Enthusiasm
entitled "The Freak Book," Larry David's character (who shares his name with the actor) offers
uproarious and insensitive laughter in response to a coffee table book filled with pictures of
"freaks." And even though the family-oriented (and, to my thinking, less cringeworthy) Modern
Family does away with a laugh track, characters, like the jokester father Phil Dunphy played by
Ty  Burrell,  routinely  voice  assorted  giggles  and  laughs  as  they  go  about  their  day-to-day
interactions. 
The  laughter  offered  by  these  characters  may  lead  to  a  laughing  response  from the
viewership,  but  not  necessarily  a  sympathetic  or  congruent  one—hence,  the  "cringe"  of  this
comedy. These shows offer potential screen parallels to the hypothesis I explore in the previous
chapters about a textual laugh track. The laughs are embedded in the spectacle and not offered in
a separate laugh track.
There are undoubtedly film and television shows that provoke laughter while only rarely
presenting laughter.3 Conversely, there are film and television shows that depict laughs with no
2 Wilson (2012) uses the term "cringe comedy" in reference to Curb Your Enthusiasm in an article entitled "Louis
C.K. and the Rise of the Laptop Loners."
3 Of the popular British dark comedy “Withnail & I,” de Frein (2011) notes, “Not a single instance of laughter
was scripted for any of the characters.” The film does contain brief moments of derisive and drunken laughter,
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apparent objective of provoking an audience's laughter. "Action-thriller" films in which a hero
labors to thwart the evil plans of a villain routinely make use of sinister laughter. The villain's
piercing cackle or plodding (or plotting),  echoing, "muah-hah-hah" designates him or her as
somehow unhinged. Why? Perhaps because the laughter itself is incongruous and asymmetrical.
The baddie laughs at  pain and suffering,  be  it  anticipated  or  already accomplished, and the
baddie laughs alone (with the occasional exception of an accomplice taking behavioral cues from
the temperamental head honcho). Typical victims, on the other hand, do not laugh, especially
when they are experiencing pain and suffering at the hands of the villain. Nor does the typical
audience member  laugh.  Thus,  even though an "action-thriller"  may not  elicit  an audience's
laughter—or "external" laughter, the genre uses "internal" laughter as a behavior that is typical of
a stock character. As a result, a belief that laughter is associated with specific genres in film and
television becomes more complicated when a distinction is drawn between "external" laughter
(i.e., the laughter of audience response) and "internal" laughter (i.e., laughter that appears within
the work itself).
A cursory consideration of two titles of classical scholarship that mention laughter reveals
that  the same distinction can be drawn where literature and genre expectations are involved.
Erich Segal's work Roman Laughter: The Comedy of Plautus is, as the second half of the title
indicates, a treatment of Plautine comedy. Roman laughter, whether as a behavioral or cultural
phenomenon, is not examined at any length in the work, but comedy, being a dramatic genre
commonly associated with audience laughter, is expertly treated.4 To use my distinction between
“external”  and “internal” laughter,  the laughter in Segal's title is essentially "external" to the
book.  The Function of Humour in  Roman Verse Satire:  Laughter and Lying by Maria  Plaza
but the laughter of the audience seems in no way dependent upon it.
4 Segal (1967) states, "Laughter is an affirmation of shared values" in the first sentence of his original preface, but
he promptly turns to comedy in the remainder of the paragraph and the work as a whole.
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explores humor in the satires of Horace,  Persius, and Juvenal, but the author clarifies in her
introduction that “laughter as a physical act” falls outside of the scope of her work. Indeed, Plaza
generally treats laughter as a metonym for humor, and in so doing, she demonstrates that the first
half of her title encapsulates the book's content more accurately than the second. Plaza's laughter,
like Segal's, is “external” to her work; it's a titular stand-in for a typical response to humor rather
than an object of textual inquiry in itself.5
Internal  laughter  or  laughter  "as  a  textual  act"  remains  my point  of  departure  in  the
following three chapters, much as it was in the previous chapters'  treatment of laughter as a
textual cue to reader response. Comedy, satire, and bucolic appear in these pages only insofar as
they correlate to the appearance of the vocabulary of laughter and the risible in the poetry under
discussion, but, as I believe, correlate they do. In what follows, I explore the use of laughter as a
genre-specific  phenomenon  in  books  and  poems  of  Augustan  poetry,  with  the  bulk  of  my
attention focused upon the first book of  Satires by Horace, the  Eclogues  of Vergil, and Ovid's
Amores. My treatment of the poems unfolds in two phases: first, with my noting and interpreting
the appearance or absence of the vocabulary for laughter and the risible in given works; and,
second, with my asserting that such presence or absence appears in generically charged locations
and is thus generically significant in itself. I do not aim to recast the scholarly discussion of
genre  in  a  comprehensive  sense  but  to  explore  a  specific  phenomenon—the  marked  use  of
laughter—in specific works of Augustan poetry and to treat this phenomenon as both a symptom
and cause of wider generic experimentation and play in the works under discussion.
THE GENRE OF GENRE THEORY
An abundance of scholarship has been dedicated to ancient and modern genre theory,
5 For contrast, Plaza's Laughter and Derision in Petronius' Satyrica: A Literary Study (2000) explicitly occupies
itself with “internal” laughter (e.g., p. 3).
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much of which has been completed thoroughly enough that one may opt (as I do) to summarize
and appropriate definitions and arguments rather than lay out what would otherwise amount to an
insufficiently  original  perspective  on  the  development  of  genre  theory.6 If  anything,  my
summation  and  appropriation  err  on  the  side  of  selectivity  so  as  to  provide  the  theoretical
background most pertinent to the texts and ideas with which the present study is concerned. 
The “genre of genre theory” in the current section's title refers to what seems obligatory
background theory in treatments of genre in ancient literature, and the auctores of this metagenre
are Plato and Aristotle. Only foolishly would one deny the existence of conceptions of literary
genres before Plato and Aristotle or the elaboration of these conceptions in the years separating
Aristotle  from the  Augustan  poets,  but  passages  of  the  Poetics  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the
Republic remain  the  most  frequently  cited  extant  theories  of  Classical  genre  and  the  most
relevant to my own discussion of laughter and genre in Augustan poetry. For my part, I stress the
ideas of genre presented in Plato's and Aristotle's extant works from the 4th c. BCE, but I also
acknowledge the  ample  evidence  of  genre  awareness  in  less explicitly  theoretical  work.  No
reader would doubt that Theocritus believed himself to be composing differently from Sappho,
and Sappho from Homer, however many the similarities between their works.7 I designate this as
“genre awareness”, and I focus on the genre awareness on display in the poetry written after
Aristotle's  Poetics and  before  Vergil's  Eclogues so  as  to  shed  additional  light  on  practical
treatments of genre that may have influenced the Augustan poets.
Perhaps modern genre theory so often looks back to the theories set forth in the prose
works of Plato and Aristotle for the very reason that these works approach literary theory in plain
6 Kroll (1924), Cairns (1972), and Conte (1984a) remain the foundational works on genre in Classical literature.
Derrida (1980) and Fowler (1982) offer a glimpse at the broader field of genre criticism. Barchiesi (2001) and
Farrell (2003) present variant surveys of ancient genre theory before recommending new directions in the study
of ancient genre. Samplings of some of these new directions explored in works of Latin literature are available
in Laird, ed. (2006) and Papanghelis, Harrison, and Frangoulides, eds. (2013).
7 See, for example, the anti-Homeric priamel of Sappho's fr. 16.
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speech (setting aside the question of whether Platonic speech is ever "plain").8 Unlike Horace the
“poet-critic” in the Ars Poetica, Aristotle is classified by Brink as an “external” critic who does
not participate in the versified traditions he treats, and, with that being the criterium, we must
describe  Plato  also  as  an  “external”  critic.  Both  philosophers  comment  on  poetic  genre  as
outsiders, both being originally descriptive rather than prescriptive in their systematizations, and
it is unlikely that either thinker believed he was setting forth original laws of poetic genre rather
than observing and recording prevailing opinion. To judge from Plato's Republic and Aristotle's
Poetics, prevailing opinion reflects a trifecta of players in genre differentiation, starting with 1)
variations in the narrative structure (which both Plato and Aristotle observe), and culminating in
distinctions Aristotle draws between 2) the subject matter and 3) the poetic meter of different
works of poetry.
In Book 3 of the  Republic, as Socrates and Adeimantus discuss what sort of literature
would be available in the ideal state, Socrates distinguishes between three different approaches to
narration: pure narration (ἁπλῆ διήγησις), mimetic narration (διὰ μιμήσεως), and a narrative
mixture  of  the  two  (δι᾽ἀμφοτέρων).9 Adeimantus  has  trouble  understanding  what  Socrates
means, and so Socrates selects passages from the Iliad to illustrate pure narration (when Homer
speaks as himself) and mimetic narration (when Homer speaks as Chryses). As these distinctions
finally click for Adeimantus, he volunteers that mimetic narration is the narrative style used in
tragedy (394b), an observation that prompts Socrates to suggest generic parallels for each type of
narration. Socrates notes that mimetic narration is used in comedy as well as tragedy, that pure
narration—or  narration  "through  recital  by  the  poet  himself"  (δι'  ἀπαγγελίας  αὐτοῦ  τοῦ
ποιητοῦ)—is used in lyric dithyrambs, and that a narrative mixture in which a narrator's voice
8 Rosenmeyer (2006) 427 asserts, “Plato is not . . . a literary theorist,” but he treats his pronouncements on genre
at length.
9 Resp. 392d. See the introduction, pp. 16-17.
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(e.g., Homer's) is interspersed with direct quotations of characters (e.g., Achilles') is used in epic
poems, among others (394c).10
Socrates'  broad  delineation  of  generic  types  in  the  Republic (drama,  lyric,  and  epic)
hinges upon a formal component of literature: the narrative mode. Yet narrative mode is not the
formal element cited as a generic determinant in subsequent theoretical treatments of genre, nor
here  should  it  be  considered  a  determinant  as  opposed  to,  more  conservatively,  a  correlate.
Adeimantus and Socrates together in their speech demonstrate that there exist terms for tragedy,
comedy, dithyramb, and epic. The existence of the terminology itself—the fact that tragedy and
comedy carry different names despite using the same narrative mode—suggests that Socrates and
Adeimantus share an understanding of differences between types of poetry that is independent of
variations in narrative structure. In the  Poetics, Aristotle provides alternative explanations for
generic differentiation. Even so, the tripartite division in narrative modes that Plato's Socrates
presents in the  Republic  is revisited in Aristotle's  Poetics, though, tellingly, in a marginalized
manner that redirects emphasis to a poem's metrics. Beginning with Aristotle, Plato's successors
in literary theory stress the role of meter in determining the genre of a literary work. 
Aristotle  models  an  approach  to  genre  theory  that  observes  greater  specificity  and  a
willingness  to  divide  and  subdivide  concepts.  Narrative  mode  is  mentioned  in  the  opening
chapter of the  Poetics  as the last of three respects in which poetic imitations differ from one
another:
ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἔτι δὲ κωμῳδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβοποιητικὴ
καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι μιμήσεις τὸ
σύνολον· διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν, ἢ γὰρ τῷ ἐν ἑτέροις μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τῷ ἕτερα ἢ
τῷ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. (1447a13-18)
10 See Rosenmeyer (2006) 424-5 for our ignorance of what the dithyramb was at the time of Plato's writing. Plato's
Socrates does anticipate some of the ethical  arguments that  appear in Aristotle's discussion of the different
objects of poetic imitation. At 395c he argues guardians should imitate what is appropriate to them, and then
lists good qualities: ἐὰν δὲ μιμῶνται, μιμεῖσθαι τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα [. . .]
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Epic poetry and the creation of tragedy and, still, comedy and the dithyrambic production
and the majority of pipe and lyre pieces all happen to be imitation, in general; they differ
from one another in three ways, for they imitate either 1) in different ways, or 2) different
things, or 3) differently and not in the same manner.
In a passage placing a premium on differences, the use of a more diverse vocabulary by Aristotle
would perhaps have aided in immediate comprehension, though the theorist proceeds to explain
what  each of  the  three  groupings  entails.  The first  grouping  lists  different  forms  of  artistic
production (e.g., music, dance, literature) and, within the more restricted scope of poetic arts,
different uses of rhythm, song, and meter (1447b25). The second grouping refers to differences
in the objects of imitation, the options for which are, quite simply, average people, better than
average (virtuous) people,  or worse than average (vicious) people. The third group, entailing
differences  of  the  manner  (τρόπον)  of  imitation,  offers  Aristotle's  paraphrase  of  the  three
narrative modes listed in the Platonic text of the Republic.
Though Aristotle contributes no apparent nuance to the division of narrative modes (and
perhaps for this reason relegates its treatment to little more than a footnote at the end of his
opening discussion), his first two groupings demarcate an arena for generic theory, and, more
specially,  literary  and  poetic  theory,  that  is  left  only  hazily  circumscribed  in  Plato.  The
description of the different forms of artistic production (Aristotle's first division in 1447a19-28)
allows him to acknowledge the kinship between literary production and other creative arts before
zooming in to restrict his scope to literary arts. Similarly, he acknowledges that  ποίησις using
"bare words" (τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς) comprises both prose and poetry, but, as he shifts his focus to
the nomenclature of metrical  forms, he swiftly and subtly zooms further in  and narrows his
focus, and his reader's attention, to verse:
πλὴν  οἱ  ἄνθρωποί  γε  συνάπτοντες  τῷ  μέτρῳ  τὸ  ποιεῖν  ἐλεγειοποιοὺς  τοὺς  δὲ
ἐποποιοὺς  ὀνομάζουσιν,  οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν  ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ
μέτρον  προςαγορεύοντες·  καὶ  γὰρ  ἂν  ἰατρικὸν  ἢ  φυσικόν  τι  διὰ  τῶν  μέτρων
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ἐκφέρωσιν, οὕτω καλεῖν εἰώθασιν· (1447b13-17)
But people,  by attaching "maker"  to the meter name,  specify elegy-makers and epic-
makers,  calling them poets not according to their  imitation but,  by common consent,
according to their meter. For even if they produce some medical or physics-related work
in meter, they are accustomed to speak of it in this way.
Aristotle  indicates  a  custom (κοινῇ and  εἰώθασιν)  of  identifying  poetry  by  its  meter.  Even
though he subsequently implies that he might favor a different method of classification ("But
there is nothing common to Homer and Empedocles besides their meter, for which reason it is
right to call the former a poet but to call the latter a physical scientist rather than a poet."),11 the
consensus is that different types (i.e., genres) of poetry are designated by names according to the
meters in which they are written.
Whatever Aristotle's ultimate preference, the fact that he sees fit  to mention meter so
early  in  his  treatment  of  the  different  types  of  poetic  representation  forecasts  an  ongoing
awareness  and  privileging  of  metrics  where  genre  is  under  examination  in  the  Poetics.  A
skeptical reader might argue that the early treatment of meter marks the discussion as obligatory,
as if Aristotle were saying, "Most folks speak of genre in this way, and I have to acknowledge it
first,  but  I'm  not  convinced  it  is  the  best  means  for  differentiating  genres."  Indeed,  in  his
subsequent discussion,  Aristotle  introduces a previously unattested and still-influential  theory
regarding different genres, namely, the idea that a poet's character determines, or is reflected in,
the forms his or her poetic creations take.
διεσπάσθη  δὲ  κατὰ  τὰ  οἰκεῖα  ἤθη  ἡ  ποίησις·  οἱ  μὲν  γὰρ  σεμνότεροι  τὰς  καλὰς
ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις  καὶ  τὰς τῶν τοιούτων,  οἱ  δὲ  εὐτελέστεροι  τὰς τῶν φαύλων,
πρῶτον ψόγους ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια. (1448b24-27)
Poetry  was  split  according  to  its  innate  characters;  the  more  honorable  men  were
imitating fine deeds and the deeds of fine men, but the meaner men were imitating the
11 Arist.  Poet.  1447b17-20: οὐδὲν δὲ  κοινόν  ἐστιν  Ὁμήρῳ καὶ  Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ  πλὴν  τὸ  μέτρον,  διὸ  τὸν  μὲν
ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν. Else (1963) 40 observes of these lines that
“interpretations have spread in all directions here,” and, fittingly enough, he proceeds to offer an interpretation
that differs from my own in placing substantially less emphasis on meter.
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deeds of lesser men, first writing lampoons, just as the others wrote hymns and encomia.
The passage presents a genealogy of poetic genres that correspond to the ethical tendencies of
the  poets  themselves.  This  ethical  component  of  genre  is  stressed  throughout  the  Poetics,
although, in passages other than this one, Aristotle places greater emphasis on the character of
the individuals represented within the poetry as a determinant of genre and less emphasis on the
characters of those composing the poetry.12 
Aristotle makes it approximately one sentence beyond his description of poetry's generic
qua  ethical split before he notes that the fitting (τὸ ἁρμόττον) meter for lampoons is iambic
(1448b30-32).13 If his initial mention of the division of poetic types along metrical lines was in
fact obligatory, he seems to recognize that he is writing in an intellectual environment in which
this obligation can never be discharged. Meter repeatedly functions as a keystone—a noteworthy
factor  when  not  a  fundamental  determinant—in  Aristotelian  generic  differentiation  in  the
Poetics. In his treatment of epic, Aristotle observes, "Epic poetry differs [from tragedy] in length
and meter."14 He then sets  forth the proper  scope of an epic work before describing "heroic
meter" and comparing it to other meters:
τὸ δὲ μέτρον τὸ ἡρωικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας ἥρμοκεν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ μέτρῳ
διηγηματικὴν μίμησιν ποιοῖτο ἢ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀπρεπὲς ἂν φαίνοιτο· τὸ γὰρ ἡρωικὸν
στασιμώτατον  καὶ  ὀγκωδέστατον  τῶν  μέτρων  ἐστίν  (διὸ  καὶ  γλώττας  καὶ
μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα· περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων),
τὸ δὲ ἰαμβεῖον καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. ἔτι
δὲ ἀτοπώτερον εἰ μιγνύοι τις αὐτά, ὥσπερ Χαιρήμων. διὸ οὐδεὶς μακρὰν σύστασιν
ἐν ἄλλῳ πεποίηκεν ἢ  τῷ ἡρῴῳ, ἀλλ'  ὥσπερ εἴπομεν  αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις  διδάσκει  τὸ
ἁρμόττον αὐτῇ αἱρεῖσθαι. (1459b31-1460a5)
The heroic meter has been found fitting through experimentation. For if someone should
12 Farrell (2003), in treating this passage, places undue emphasis on the idea that "Genre is thus an expression of
character" (384). He would have been more accurate to note that genre  was an expression of character in its
origin (as the Greek verb tense itself indicates).
13 I was surprised to learn that the term more often used in the Poetics to designate the "fitting" is not τὸ πρεπόν
but τὸ ἁρμόττον.
14 Διαφέρει  δὲ  κατά τε τῆς  συστάσεως τὸ μῆκος ἡ ἐποποιία καὶ  τὸ μέτρον.  (1459b17-18) At 1449b9-20,
Aristotle briefly describes the differences between tragedy and epic in anticipation of this later argument, though
he inverts the order there and mentions meter before length.
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produce  a  narrative  imitation  in  some one  other  meter  or  in  many,  it  would  appear
unfitting; the heroic meter is the most stately and weighty of the meters (for which reason
it  is especially accommodating of foreign words and metaphors; narrative imitation is
thereby beyond others), but the iambic and the tetrameter are kinetic, the latter good for
dancing and the former for action. Still, if someone should mix these, as Chairemon did,
it would be quite out of place. Therefore no one has created a long composition in any
other meter than the heroic one, but just as we said, nature herself teaches the fitting
meter for each to choose.
When Aristotle turns to the explanatory power of nature (φύσις) at the end of the quoted passage,
the simplicity of his argument is laid bare: the content of poetry is "naturally" suited to a given
meter. His line of reasoning is hardly compelling in itself; to assert that an epic-by-content would
simply "appear unfitting" if composed in a meter other than hexameter may well fail to convince
a skeptic who is not beholden to this particular aesthetic. But skeptics do not appear to be on
Aristotle's radar. His readership's agreement is assumed, and the argument here and throughout
the  Poetics  unfolds in such a way that an innate connection between meter and content (the
"objects of imitation") seems a point of natural agreement.
Though several other things are said to occur according to nature in the Poetics (e.g., the
work itself begins with the things that are first "according to nature"—κατὰ φύσιν in 1447a12),
“nature” in the nominative (φύσις) functions as an agent on only one other occasion in the work,
in another passage that pertains to meter and is particularly relevant to the explorations of this
chapter:
τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν
εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον εὗρε· μάλιστα
γὰρ  λεκτικὸν  τῶν  μέτρων  τὸ  ἰαμβεῖόν  ἐστιν·  σημεῖον  δὲ  τούτου,  πλεῖστα  γὰρ
ἰαμβεῖα  λέγομεν  ἐν  τῇ  διαλέκτῳ  τῇ  πρὸςἀλλήλους,  ἑξάμετρα  δὲ  ὀλιγάκις  καὶ
ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας. (1449a22-29)
For at first they [sc. the tragedians] used tetrameter on account of their productions being
like  satyr  plays  and being fit  for  dancing,  but  after  diction  became a  factor,  nature
herself  discovered the innate meter; for, of the meters, iambic is particularly suited to
colloquial speech; proof of this is that we generally speak iambs in conversation with one
another,  but  we  speak  hexameters  rarely  and  only  by  transgressing  the  registers  of
colloquial speech.
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Aristotle's  argumentation,  that  tragic  poets  embraced  iambic  meter  because  it  manifests  the
tendencies of colloquial speech (and he has recently finished telling his readers that tragedy,
being  wholly  mimetic,  is  relayed  through  dialogue),  is  at  least  anecdotally  scientific.15 By
invoking the behavior of Greek speakers, even if he fails to cite quantitative linguistic studies,
Aristotle might reasonably expect to convince another Greek speaker (or reader) of the "natural"
connection between the iambic meter and a genre that imitates speech and conversation. One
suspects,  for  reasons  that  will  become clear  in  the  following chapters,  that  the  speakers  in
Horace's Sermones and in Vergil's Eclogues would disagree.16 
Aristotle writes at length about tragedy and epic in the  Poetics, and his lost treatise on
comedy (to which he refers at  Poetics 1449b22) would have contained much of value to my
treatment of the literary uses of laughter in poetry.17 I have focused my attention in the preceding
pages on his remarks on meter, not only because of an impression that he himself emphasizes
them—both  by the  locations  in  which,  and the  frequency with  which,  he  makes them—but
because meter  and formal  components of  a poem remain the  sine qua non in  treatments  of
generic theory in the work of the Augustan poets.
Though sustained treatments of genre between the time of Aristotle's writings and the
Augustan era are relatively few and far between, there is no reason to suspect that meter became
any  less  important  in  considerations  of  poetic  genre  during  the  intervening  years  of  the
Hellenistic period. Nor is there reason to think that authors writing literature in this period were
15 A similar argument is anecdotally applied to the prevalence of iambic meters in English poetry.
16 This argument could probably be supplemented by a brief return to Aristotle's comments on the lampoon in
1448b30-32. For other Latin authors who might disagree with the “natural” connection between speech and
meter, cf. the passage in Tristia 4.10.23-6 where Ovid says that he can't help but write in meter. 
17 Janko (1984) 63 states, “That a second book of the Poetics was not only planned by Aristotle, but also written, is
clear  beyond doubt,”  before offering supporting evidence of  his claim.  Janko concludes that the  Tractatus
Coislinianus comprises  “Aristotelian  material”  (77),  and  he  goes  to  far  as  to  present  a  hypothetical
reconstruction of  Poetics: Book 2 (92-99). See p. 33 n. 53 in the introduction for a discussion of scholarly
disagreement regarding the relationship of the Tractatus to a lost second book of the Poetics.
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any less aware of generic differences between their own and others' creations—or even unaware
of differences between poems within their own corpora. Whether meter remained the customary
means  of  identifying  poetic  genres,  as  it  seems to  have  been when Aristotle  wrote  Poetics
1447b13-17,  Hellenistic  poets  composed  works  of  varying  lengths,  on  varied  themes,  and
employing a variety of different meters. The extant poems of Callimachus, to whom the  Suda
ascribes “such great diligence that he wrote poems in every meter,”18 include short epigrams of a
single elegiac distich, lengthier iambic poems, hexametric hymns to the gods (the Bath of Pallas
in elegiac couplets being a metrical outlier), a four-book collection of aetiological elegies (the
Aetia), and an epyllion (Hecale) of approximately one thousand hexameter verses.19 Different
meters  correspond  to  different  themes  and,  importantly  in  Callimachus'  oeuvre,  to  varying
lengths of works.20 Formal attributes take precedence.
Callimachus' literary criticism, embedded in poems such as the prologue to the  Aetia,
focuses on the magnitude and scope of poetic projects, and his poems reflect little sympathy for
works of outsize ambition. Yet even though he equates a big book with a bad book (τὸ μέγα
βιβλίον  ἴσον  [.  .  .]  τῷ  μεγάλῳ  κακῷ)21 and  must  have  been  familiar  with  Aristotle's
identification of length and meter as the determinants of epic at  Poetics 1459b17-18 (see n. 14
above),  the hexameter—the presumed meter of “big, bad books”—looms large in Callimachus'
poetry. Callimachus and other Hellenistic authors including Aratus, Theocritus, and Apollonius
disentangle and rearrange meter, theme, and length and demonstrate a more flexible approach to
genre than anything outlined in Aristotelian theory. For example, a Homeric precedent exists for
the use of hexameter in Callimachus' hymns, but his Hecale, with its unexpectedly humble focus
18 Suda: οὕτω δὲ γέγονεν ἐπιμελέστατος, ὡς γράψαι μὲν ποιήματα εἰς πᾶν μέτρον. (Adler number = kappa
227)
19 On the length of the Hecale, see Appendix II of Hollis (1990).
20 Brink (1946) 16-19 summarizes Callimachus' comments on length and criticism of lengthy poetry. 
21 Callimachus fr. 465 Pf.
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and less-than-epic length, frustrates many expectations of epic hexametric verse and establishes
itself as a distinct category of pseudo-epic.22 Likewise, Theocritus' bucolics recast the hexameter
as alternately bawdy and humble; the meter  is  employed to relay such action as the singing
competitions of shepherds and the love-laments of a cyclops.
 The multigeneric activities and innovations of poets like Callimachus and Theocritus
will suffice for the moment as practical evidence that genre and meter remained literary concerns
during the Hellenistic  period.23 Theoretical  treatments  of  genre during  this  period indicate  a
similar awareness. As carbonized texts recovered from the Villa of the Papyri in Herculaneum
have become decipherable due to industrious scholarship and advances in technology, literary
theories held by Philodemus as well as theories attributed in the Epicurean philosopher's text to
various  other  authors  and  texts  (including  Aristotelian  texts  that  are  no  longer  extant)  have
received renewed attention.24 There is little in Philodemus' work to suggest that he subscribed to
substantially different perspectives on genre from those presented in Aristotle, but the fact that he
dedicates any attention  to  treatments  of  genre  and meter  suggests that  the  topic  remained a
source of at least consideration, and more likely debate, in the period. One need only note that
Philodemus'  text  presents  (and  seems  to  argue  against)  the  perspectives  of  theorists  like
Heracleodorus and Crates, who, in Philodemus' telling, were quite radical in their responses to—
and even their rejection of—traditional classifications of genre.25 
Philodemus is a source of Hellenistic literary theories that may have been particularly
influential for the Augustan poets, and, moreover, the Epicurean philosopher may have exerted
22 Hollis (1990) 23-6 defends the “category” of Hellenistic  epyllion and summarizes Callimachus'  hexametric
tendencies.
23 Theocritus' experiments with genre receive additional attention in Chapter 5.
24 See Asmis (1992). For an extensive treatment of genre in Philodemus, see Janko (2011) passim, but especially
356-7 and 363-7.
25 Janko (2000) reads Philodemus as stating that Heracleodorus “denied the relevance of the traditional genre-
divisions and different styles to the merit of poetry; he even denied that of metre, claiming that some prose-
writers were poets” (156). Asmis (1992) 167-9 suggests that a fragment in Philodemus that presents one of his
opponent's thoughts on genre aligns with Philodemus' presentation of Crates' poetics elsewhere in On Poets 5.
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his influence directly.26 A passage  from  PHerc.  Paris  2, a fragmentary Herculanean papyrus
containing  writings  attributed  to  Philodemus,  contains  a  vocative  address  to  Plotius,  Varius,
Vergilius, and Quintilius.27 The fact that Vergil's name appears in this and other fragments of
Philodemus' work is often invoked to suggest that Vergil was the philosopher's student or patron,
though it is sufficient for the present moment simply to note that a personal relationship must
have existed. One implication of such a personal relationship is the possibility that Vergil had
first-hand  familiarity  with  Philodemus'  literary  theory,  whether  with  the  philosopher's  own
thoughts  on  genre  or  with  the  perspectives  of  the  various  other  theorists  he  presents  (and,
typically, refutes) in  On Poems. From here, it is easy to hypothesize how these theories would
have been disseminated more widely among the poets who would leave their marks (and names)
on Augustan literature. Vergil, Plotius (Tucca), Varius (Rufus), and Quintilius (Varus) might have
not only informed their own poetic productions with Philodemean theories but also shared the
understanding of literary theory they acquired from Philodemus with other poets and friends—
friends like Horace. After all, three of these writers (along with Maecenas) are named in Satires
1.10.81 (Plotius et Varius, Maecenas Vergiliusque) as figures whose opinions Horace respects
when it comes to his poetry, and the name Quintilius appears in Horace's Ars Poetica as well.28
Horace also implies a familiarity with Philodemus' poems at Satires 1.2.120-122. Thus, even if
Horace had no personal contact with the philosopher, several authors whom he claims as friends
seem  to  have  known  Philodemus  well  enough  to  warrant  a  “shout  out”  in  his  literature.
Consequently, there is reason to believe that both Vergil and Horace would have been familiar
26 Armstrong, Fish, Johnston, and Skinner (2003). See particularly Armstrong's “Introduction.”
27 Gigante and Capasso (1989) conclude their article assertively: “In conclusione, ci è toccato il síngolare destino
di leggere la prima testimonianza del nome di Virgilio in lingua greca e di confermare la  sua presenza nel
circolo filodemeo di Ercolano” (6).
28 In a note to his translation of Ars Poetica 438, Rudd (1997) identifies the Quintilius mentioned as “Quintilius
Varus of Cremona, the friend of Horace and Virgil” (195). A Quintilius who is particularly dear to Vergil appears
in Odes I.24.
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with aspects of Philodemus' literary theory, as would have the many Augustan poets influenced
by Vergil's and Horace's poems.
Of additional relevance to how the Augustan poets may have thought about genre are
those poetic works composed in the years of the late Roman Republic. Suppose that Philodemus
never spoke to Vergil about poetry—that, however unbelievable the prospect in the case of two
poets, the two men talked about anything but poetry,29 and so Vergil had nothing of Philodemus'
genre theory to impart to Horace, and Horace nothing to share with Ovid—the years of the late
Republic nevertheless produced literary works with which Vergil and Horace were familiar and
from  which  they  and  Ovid  would  have  gleaned  information  that  contributed  to  their  own
personal theories of genre. Identifying the particular marks of an Epicurean thinker whose work
only survives in fragments is  difficult,  but identifying allusions to extant  literature with rich
manuscript traditions is slightly easier (or has simply been done more earnestly and successfully
by centuries of literary scholars). Unfortunately we are still limited in our consideration by the
paucity  of  complete  poetic  texts  surviving  from the  time period;  the  scattered  fragments  of
various  neoteric  poets  are  little  more  help  than  the  fragmentary  papyri  of  Philodemus.
Nevertheless, a lengthy book—or, more accurately, a lengthy collection—offers itself as a case
worthy of consideration, precisely for the reason that its echoes are easily heard in the poetry of
the Augustan era.30 The Liber Catulli, vexed as it is by the issue of dating its composition and
compilation,  reflects  the  efforts  of  deliberate  organization based upon metrical  and thematic
differences between poems, and even if the arrangement of the poems is the work of a later
editor,  the  editor  operated  in  an intellectual  environment  attuned to  meter.31 Of  course,  it  is
29 I find this all the more unlikely in light of Gigante's and Capasso's (1989) suggestion that the work in which
Vergil's name appears is  On Flattery: “dell'adulazione” (5). The Roman poet must have spoken to his mentor
about poetry and may have even played the role of the flatterer.
30 Fordyce (1961) xxii-xxiv succinctly summarizes some of the best textual  evidence of Vergil's  and Horace's
familiarity with Catullus.
31 Conte (1994b) 143 says of the ordering of the poems that “the majority tend to believe, rightly, that this ordering
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tempting to overstate the case: the polymetric poems in the collection are precisely that—poems
in many meters. Catullus himself refers to his iambi in c. 36, c. 40, and c. 54 in such a way that
the term must indicate a thematic classification of abuse rather than a metrical designation; all
three poems are actually composed in hendecasyllables.32 But iambi remains a term that carries
metrical associations, and, despite the fact that it is the “incorrect” name for the meter of these
poems and, to some scholars, not strictly a metrical term in the first place,33 Catullus uses a term
with long-standing metrical resonances as a means to identify genre.34
I have already strayed far beyond the bounds of any conventional “genre of genre theory”
by highlighting occasions of genre awareness in Greek and Latin poetic  production (like the
awareness  present  throughout  the  poetry  of  Callimachus  and  Catullus)  amidst  the  explicit
theories of genre from Classical and Hellenistic Greece. My reason for presenting both implicit
and explicit evidence of Classical genre theory is based upon my belief that a line of “genre
thinking”, however indistinct at points, can be drawn from Plato's comments in the Republic to
the poetry of Vergil, Horace, and Ovid. Indeed, other than the writings of Plato and Aristotle,
who are the primary sources for explicit, extensive, and extant theories of genre in the Classical
world, the most explicit, extensive, and extant remarks on genre in the Classical world appear in
Augustan poetry itself, and these are examined in the pages to follow. Nevertheless, one risks
participating in a gross oversimplification in assuming that the theoretical positions that survive
in Plato's and Aristotle's texts were those thinkers' ultimate and unqualified theories, let alone
theories to which subsequent thinkers universally and uncritically subscribed. Some fragments of
[. . .] is rather the work of others, carried out after the poet's death, when a posthumous edition of his poems was
prepared.” 
32 Though, in the case of c. 42 (adeste hendecasyllabi, quot estis in v. 1), the names and the meters correspond. 
33 See West (1974) 22 for the argument that “[i]ambic metre got its name from being particularly characteristic of
ἴαμβοι, not vice versa.”
34 Morgan (2010) 16 asserts that “we readily talk of the genres of ‘iambus’ and ‘elegy’, after all, although those are
primarily metrical designations.”
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Philodemus'  On Poetry  confirm that Aristotle composed works of literary theory in which he
supplemented (and may have even changed) the positions he sets out in his Poetics. Many more
fragments of Philodemus attest that Plato's and Aristotle's theories were refined and contradicted
outright by later theorists. And throughout all of this theorizing, refining, and contradicting by
those  interpreting  poetry,  poets  themselves  remained  attuned  to  generic  differences  and
continued  to  compose  poetry  in  numerous  formally  distinct  and  (in  the  case  of  iambi and
hendecasyllabi) not-so-distinct genres. But a poem's formal attributes and, in particular, its meter
remain crucial components of genre theory and genre awareness throughout the poetry of Vergil,
Horace, and Ovid.
THE PUZZLE OF GENRE: MULTIGENERIC METERS AND A CALL TO LAUGHTER
In his book Generic Enrichment in Vergil and Horace, Stephen Harrison defines a literary
genre as "a form which can be identified through a particular generic repertoire of external and
internal features."35 He lays out a formal repertoire (title, meter, linguistic register, length and
structure, rhetorical framework, and narrative voice), a thematic repertoire (general theme, plot
conventions,  tone,  and  narrativity),  and  a  collection  of  what  he  calls  explicit  “metageneric
signals”  (authorially  claimed  generic  exemplars  in  the  name  of  individual  auctores,
programmatic  openings,  and  symbolic  metonyms).36 I  find  Harrison's  definition  of  genre
satisfying, not only for its comprehensiveness but also for its flexibility. There is, nevertheless,
something  artificial  in  the  last  of  his  divisions—those  features  of  a  poem  he  designates
“metageneric signals.” Are these truly distinct from the formal and thematic repertory of a poem?
Is, for example, the naming of a poetic  auctor any more of a “metageneric signal” than the
poem's length or tone?
35 Harrison (2007) 11.
36 Harrison (2007) 22-33.
159
Harrison's "meta" term (i.e., "metageneric signals") corresponds with my use of the term
"metacommunication"  throughout  the  previous two chapters,  but  metacommunication  casts  a
wider net. Unless a poem somehow identifies its own genre in an absolute and unambiguous
manner, each feature, external and internal, carries a metacommunicative charge that contributes
to the generic identity of the poem. In other words, barring a conclusive generic determinant
(whatever that may look like), a poem's genre is an amalgamation of all of its various cues. The
concept of metacommunication encompasses the formal and thematic features of a poem just as
comprehensively as it encompasses the "signals" of genre identified by Harrison. The result is
something  of  a  leveling  of  the  formal  and  thematic  features  of  a  poetic  work  as  generic
indicators. Every feature of a poem, external (formal) and internal (thematic) alike, is a form of
metacommunication that collectively participates in the construction of a poem's genre. 
Once you strip away all of the external and internal metacommunicative cues—length,
tone, programmatic passages, etc.—does a generic “identification tag” remain? Probably not. But
might specific cues be stronger than others? I believe so. As discussed in the previous section,
meter  and  genre  are  closely  linked  in  ancient  literature.  In  Aristotle's  Poetics  (1447b13-17,
quoted above), the author declares that poets may be identified by the meters in which they write
(e.g., “epic poets”). To exercise a conservative reading of this passage, meter would be lending
its name through the poet to the genre of the poet's production. A poem in elegiac couplets is
identified as being written by an elegiac poet, and so the genre of this poet's work takes the name
“elegy.” Of course, the middleman of the poet is unnecessary and potentially complicating. What
if a poet writes in a variety of meters? If one simply understands that a poem's meter determines
its genre, the poet's metrical title becomes a corresponding result of genre differentiation rather
than the intermediate cause. In other words, a poem in epic hexameter is an “epic”—as simple as
that. The epic poet is identified as such simply because he composed this poem. Such a direct
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link is particularly clear with respect to the “big” genres of epic, elegy, and iambic, where the
names of the genres and meters are the same.
Horace  himself  remarks  upon  connections  between  epic,  elegy,  iambic,  and  their
respective meters in Ars Poetica vv. 73-88:
res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella
quo scribi possent numero, monstrauit Homerus.
versibus impariter iunctis querimonia primum, 75
post etiam inclusa est uoti sententia compos;
quis tamen exiguos elegos emiserit auctor,
grammatici certant et adhuc sub iudice lis est.
Archilochum proprio rabies armauit iambo;
hunc socci cepere pedem grandesque coturni, 80
alternis aptum sermonibus et populares
uincentem strepitus et natum rebus agendis.
Musa dedit fidibus diuos puerosque deorum
et pugilem uictorem et equum certamine primum
et iuuenum curas et libera uina referre. 85
descriptas seruare uices operumque colores
cur ego, si nequeo ignoroque, poeta salutor?
cur nescire pudens praue quam discere malo?
The accomplishments of kings and leaders and sorrowful wars—
in what meter they can be written, Homer has shown.
In verses unequally paired laments were first enclosed, 75
then, also, the sentiment of a discharged vow;
Still, as to who the founder was who published short elegies,
the grammarians dispute, and to this day the jury is out.
Madness equipped Archilochus with the characteristic iamb;
slippers and lofty buskins took hold of this foot, 80
suited to conversational exchanges, overcoming
the popular din, and natural for moving matters along.
The muse granted to strings to speak of the gods, the boys of gods, 
the victorious boxer, the first horse in the race,
and the concerns of young men and flowing wine. 85
Why am I, if I am incompetent and neglect to preserve
the established turns and colors of works, greeted as a poet?
Why do I, perversely modest, prefer ignorance to learning?
The correspondence between meter and content becomes apparent with the phrase  quo scribi
possent numero in v. 74, though Horace does not prescribe a link between hexameter and “the
feats of kings and leaders”;  the verb  possent only remarks upon the ability  of hexameter to
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accommodate epic content, a point to which I return in the following section.37 Horace proceeds
in the next verse to address the physical appearance of an elegiac couplet on the page (versibus
impariter iunctis in v. 75)—a description that hinges on the metrical form of the genre: elegiac
couplets are unequal because the second line of a couplet has five rather than six feet.38 In v. 77,
the genre  qua  meter is explicitly identified as  elegi, and, if elegies are understood to be more
compact and shorter than epic, an additional reference to formal qualities of the genre may be
operative in the adjective exiguos. Again, as with epic, no connection is prescribed between the
form and its subject matter, but querimonia (v. 75) and sententia (v. 76) appear matter-of-factly
as the first  two subjects “contained” (inclusa est,  v.  76) by elegy.  The next  genre  to attract
Horace's attention is iambic poetry, and he uses the name of the meter at the end of v. 79 and
makes use of the metrically loaded term pedem in v. 80. The connection between iambic meter
and a particular poetic content here takes on a stronger prescriptivist valence (proprio in v. 79).
Following the verses  about  iambic  poetry's  characteristics,  Horace  lists  the  material  of  lyric
poetry before closing off the section with the question he poses in vv. 86-87. He implies that
these genres—the ones described (descriptas) in the previous verses—are, in some sense, the
untouchable and the canonical ones. A poet is not a poet unless he learns them and respects them.
Horace's verses demonstrate that certain topics correspond to certain meters . . . but only
three out of four times. The relationship between genres and their namesake meters is at its most
straightforward with epic, elegy, and iambic, yet the verses dedicated to lyric poetry (vv. 83-85)
show where this relationship breaks down. Lyric is illustrated not by meter but by a performative
or situational feature: the poetry is accompanied by strings (fidibus,  v. 83), a natural enough
metonymy for the  lyra  itself. Metrical terms are altogether absent, and no formal elements of
37 Rudd  (1989)  163  reads  the  phrase  restrictedly:  “[T]his  does  not,  of  course,  imply  that  there  were  other
possibilities; the hexameter was the right metre for the purpose.”
38 See the discussion of Ovid's Amores 1.1 in Chapter 6.
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lyric poetry are mentioned. Horace's decision not to mention meter can hardly be a comment on
meter's (lack of) relevance in lyric poetry. Perhaps, however, meter's variability can account for
its  absence here.  Because the genre encompasses more than one meter,  it  offers noteworthy
evidence of the impossibility of always drawing a direct link between meter and genre.39 The
subject matter and the mention of strings are nevertheless sufficient to delineate the genre. 
Despite the preceding focus on references to meter and content in this short passage of
the  Ars Poetica, these are just two pieces of the puzzle in Horace's descriptions of the various
genres. The sleight of hand performed by Horace in these verses lies in his repeated presentation
of simple, seemingly smooth and comprehensive portraits of genres, that, upon closer inspection,
reveal themselves to be composites of numerous other puzzle pieces. The four genres in this
passage  are  described  by  a  multiplicity  of  features  including  content,  meter,  length,  tone,
performative  context,  and the  names of key poets in the  genre.  Homer and Archilochus are
named as figure-heads for their respective genres, and their names would have been (and still
are)  immediately associated with epic  and iambic.  Indeed, the identification of  vv.  73-74 as
referring  to  epic  is  arguably  only  confirmed  with  the  appearance  of  Homer's  name.  Poetic
“spokespeople”  are  important  enough  to  mention  even  when  unknown,  as  Horace  self-
consciously draws attention to the general scholarly inability to settle upon a comparable auctor
for elegy. And the patron of lyric is none other than the musical Musa herself.
Additional features do not fit neatly into any single formal or thematic classification but
lend color and texture to the descriptions. For example, Horace's attention to how elegy's original
focus shifted over time (primum /  post  in vv. 75-76) may serve as an oblique reference to the
form's couplet construction wherein the hexameter line is first (primum) and the pentameter line
follows (post). Or it may call attention to the fact that the content of elegy continued to shift after
39 See Morgan (2010) 22 for a more general consideration of this breakdown.
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this first thematic shift, and that it looked very different in his own day—when amatory elegy
was quite popular.40 Even Horace's compact description in vv. 81-82 of how the iambic foot
befits spoken exchanges, overcomes the noise of the crowd, and naturally moves content forward
conveys details about the genre's register, performance, style, and momentum. The features that
construct each genre's identity in these verses of the Ars Poetica are sometimes glaringly obvious
—“eponymous” in the case of meter's connection to epic, elegy, and iambic—and, at other times,
as with lyric, metrically undetermined.
Meter is a form of metacommunication alongside all of the other features of a poem, 41
and  the  attention  I  have  dedicated  to  the  subject  in  the  preceding  pages  will  have  already
betrayed my belief that meter has a special metacommunicative charge in the poetry of Augustan
Rome, and a particular relevance to the poems and genres I explore in this chapter. If we return
to the image of genre as a jigsaw puzzle in which every feature of a poem is a piece, meter would
undoubtedly be one of the largest or most distinct pieces—a piece that invites the puzzler to
place it first, to make the other pieces fit around it, and to predict what the final image on the
puzzle will look like when all the pieces are made to fit together. The “meter piece” would likely
have unique tabs and blanks so that, even within the completed puzzle, it would draw the eye.42
So visible is meter within a poem that, upon first reading, a poem's meter is one of its earliest
identifiable features, presenting itself to the reader or listener as early as the first verse 43 and long
before most other features (e.g., length, theme, plot, and potential auctores) are established with
certainty. Horace's own description of elegy in A.P. 75-6 presents lines of alternating length as a
40 The verses  on elegy lack any  mention of  the amatory  verse that  proliferated in  the years  surrounding  the
publication of Horace's  Ars Poetica. In  A.P. 401-403, elegy is associated with martial poetry by way of the
elegist Tyrtaeus.
41 Amy Richlin's use of “metacommunication” in The Garden of Priapus (by which I first came into contact with
the term) refers to meter's potential to communicate information about a poem's expected content. See p. 65 n. 4.
42 Some jigsaw puzzles contain pieces (sometimes called “whimsy pieces”) that resemble a specific animal or
object, like a cat or a lighthouse.
43 Elegiac couplets delay metrical identification until the middle of the second line. Strophic verse forms (such as
the Sapphic stanza) might delay metric identification until the third or fourth verse.
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distinguishing feature of the form, as if the appearance of the poetic text on the page might be
recognizable to a reader before any specific word is read.44 
What happens when one takes the metrical puzzle piece from, say, Homer's  Iliad  and
plunks this “epos  piece” down in a different puzzle? Or one realizes that certain pieces, when
rotated or even inverted, can be cut to fit around the “pentameter piece” from Tyrtaeus' poems?
The remainder of this chapter treats poems that result from such mixing and rearrangement—
poems composed in “multigeneric meters” that lend their rhythms to more than one genre. The
designation  implies  a  divorcing  of  meter  from genre,  but  the  preceding  pages  offer  ample
evidence  of  the  impossibility  of  any  complete  separation  of  the  two,  even  on  the  level  of
nomenclature.  A  meter's  earliest  generic  correspondence  is  typically  preserved  in  the
metrical/generic name used by ancient and modern critics, as the preceding discussion of epic,
elegiac,  and iambic  in  Horace's  Ars Poetica demonstrates.  Thus a  multigeneric  meter  has  a
primary metrical association that, to judge from Horace's  Ars Poetica, is dictated by historical
primacy. When I take hold of the metrical piece from Homer's  Iliad, I am grasping the “epos
piece”, even if the same piece (perhaps with minor adjustments) appears in subsequent genres
and poems.45 Likewise, the “elegiac piece” is the metrical piece that I pull from the poetry of
Tyrtaeus and Mimnermus.
I regard both the epic hexameter and the elegiac couplet as multigeneric meters. Horace's
Satires and Epistles and Vergil's Eclogues use a metrical puzzle piece that looks all but identical
to Homer's, but these are not works of “epic” in the eyes of ancient or modern theorists. Ovid's
Amores are composed in elegiac distichs that are, for the most part, the same as those used by
44 A poem's title, should it have one, is one of few likely sources for earlier information about a specific poem.
45 Although  the  “epos  piece”  can  be  identified  with  different  names—the  “dactylic  hexameter  piece”  or  the
“Homeric  piece”—the  primary  association  remains  with  epic  (e.g.,  Aristotle  acknowledges  the  custom of
referring to  those  who compose  in  hexametric  meter,  regardless  of  the  content,  as  “epic  poets”  at  Poetics
1447b13-17).
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every  elegiac  poet  before  him  (if  perhaps  more  formally  refined),  but,  beside  this  metrical
similarity,  the  Amores bear  little  additional  resemblance  to  early  elegiac  poetry.  Indeed,
according to Horace's  Ars Poetica, there is no reason for readers to associate the elegiac form
with amatory poetry, and there is even one oblique reason not to. In vv. 75-76 and 401-403, when
he lists multiple genres for which elegy is well suited, Horace alludes to funerary epigram, votive
inscriptions, and martial poetry as the material of elegiac verse. Lest any reader accuse him of
forgetting to mention love poetry, he includes the (presumably amorous) “concerns of young
men” (iuuenum curas, v. 85), but he does so among the thematic fodder for lyric poetry.
I  further  elucidate  Horace's,  Vergil's,  and  Ovid's  use  of  multigeneric  meters  in  my
examination of laughter's role in these authors'  corpora later in this chapter, but I now wish to
speculate more generally about what effect is achieved through a poet's use of an established
meter in a context other than the preeminent (or “primary”) one. Having identified both epic and
elegy as multigeneric meters, how is a poem altered when these meters are used in genres other
than their original ones? I do not want to consider the creation of new genres. Such an inquiry,
however  interesting,  would  take  me  further  afield  of  my interest  in  the  role  of  laughter  in
Augustan poetry than this consideration of meter already has. In any case, Horace, Vergil, and
Ovid  all  operate  within  established  poetic  traditions  that  subscribe  to  specific  metrical  and
generic conventions. But these poetic traditions—satire, pastoral, and love elegy—make use of
meters that have strong, historically-antecedent ties to other genres. 
To use Horace's hexameter poetry as an example, Horace's appropriates the “epos piece”
for his generically-puzzling Satires and Epistles, just as his self-proclaimed predecessor Lucilius
has done. But Horace's use of hexamater recommends itself for consideration for the reason that
Horace, in writing a poem about poetic theory and convention in the Ars Poetica, draws attention
to his  own metrical unconventionality.  I noted previously Horace's remarks in  A.P. 73-74 on
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Homeric hexameter's ability to treat specific themes:
res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella
quo scribi possent numero, monstrauit Homerus.
The accomplishments of kings and leaders and sorrowful wars—
in what meter they can be written, Homer has shown.
Horace  is  cautious  not  to  prescribe  a  link  between  hexameter  and  “the  feats  of  kings  and
leaders.” To say that epic themes can be accommodated by hexameter is far from saying that epic
themes  must be treated in hexameter, let alone the reverse—that hexameter must be used for
treating epic themes. The verb  possent allows Horace to grant hexameter a wider application,
with a caution that is, in some sense, obligatory for being conveyed in the hexametric meter
under discussion. The Ars Poetica, construed as one of Horace's epistles, is not an epic. It is not
about the feats of kings and leaders, even if one asserts sophistically that the verses in which
Horace mentions these topics are epic in theme.46 Horace foregrounds the prevailing association
of epic themes and epic hexameter in writing that epic themes are able to be written about in
hexameter, but he leaves the door wide open for satire, pastoral, didactic, and other genres to
build poems around the “epos piece.”
Horace, as he draws attention to his ongoing playfulness with metrical tradition, seems
perpetually aware of the  puzzle  he constructs  with these  verses and,  indeed, with all  of his
hexametric verses. He himself borrows a distinguishing metrical piece from Homer's puzzles and
he surrounds it with new pieces that fit the tabs and blanks but bear different, jarring images on
the printed side. He juxtaposes the golds and silvers of epic with the browns of satire and the red
markings of literary criticism. 
A reader who encounters this juxtaposition for the first time, or, as in the case of A.P. vv.
46 Admittedly, Horace seems to be comfortable contradicting himself elsewhere in his hexameter poems. In  Ep.
2.1.111 and A.P. 305, he ironically remarks (in writing) that he writes nothing at all. 
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73-74, is reminded of it in the midst of a poem, may be struck by the incongruity. She sees how
the “epos piece” looks strange when surrounded by the “autobiographical piece”, the “low-brow
diction piece”, or the “poetically self-denying piece.” And perhaps, when she realizes how all of
these pieces align and misalign at the same time, how they fit perfectly in their not-fitting, how,
in a way, they even resemble the chimerical image with which Horace opens the  Ars Poetica,
perhaps she laughs.
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CHAPTER 4: SURROUNDED BY LAUGHTER IN SATIRE
HORACE'S SATIRES 1
The  concept  of  a  jigsaw puzzle  may offer  a  particularly  apt  analogy  for  the  generic
mishmash of Roman verse satire.  It  is  as if  Horace  has dumped the pieces  from his entire,
impressive literary collection (comprising others' poems along with his own) onto one table, and
he  has  realized  that  the  assortment—what  Juvenal  later  refers  to  as  a  farrago1—can  be
reassembled  to  yield  a  new  image  that  distinguishes  itself  not  despite  but  by  virtue  of  its
variability. 
Horace makes no claims of doing anything innovative, let alone poetic. In Satires 1.4.56-
62, the satirist aligns his project with Lucilius' and then asserts that the words within his poems
—the pieces in his puzzle—hardly bear the markings of a poetic creation:
his, ego quae nunc,
olim quae scripsit Lucilius, eripias si
tempora certa modosque, et quod prius ordine uerbum est
posterius facias praeponens ultima primis,
non, ut si soluas 'postquam Discordia taetra 60
belli ferratos postis portasque refregit,'
inuenias etiam disiecti membra poetae.
From these things which I now write,
which Lucilius once wrote, if you should remove
the set timing and meter, and the word before in order
you should produce later, placing the final words before the first,
you would not—as if you unwound “After foul Discord 60
broke apart the iron-wrought posts and gates of war”—
discover still the limbs of a dismembered poet.
The  irony  of  the  passage  has  not  gone undetected.2 Horace  offers  a  poetic  tour-de-force of
ellipsis,  hysteron-proteron, and suspended syntax in the very lines in which he disavows any
credentials as a poet. By his accounting, his verse is the product of a mere metrical reshuffling of
1 Juv. 1.86.
2 Oliensis (1998) 23-24. Gowers (2012) 167 identifies Horace's claims in these lines as “disingenuous.”
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words that could otherwise be plucked from their current places and reordered with minimal
effort.3 The lines themselves might just as well be the remains of fragmented, colloquial thought,
far from the deliberate composition of an expert versifier. The Ennian passage that the satirist
quotes for contrast in vv. 60-61 carries an implicit poetic “heft” from its martial content (belli in
v. 61), from its emphasis on personified discord and fractured transgression (Discordia in v. 60
and refregit in v. 61), and even from the weight that comes with mentioning an adjective for a
heavy metal (ferratos in v. 61). Horace distances himself from such weight and heft in his role as
satirist.4 He is  just  chatting,  passing  the  time,  and reassembling  pieces  of  everyday  speech.
Puzzle creation might be the poetic act, and puzzle solving might be the interpretive act. Perhaps
puzzle mixing is the satirical act.
The question of genre in Roman verse satire hardly permits a simple summary. When G.
L. Hendrickson in his 1927 article Satura Tota Nostra Est offers an explanation of the oft-quoted
phrase in Quintilian from which he draws his title, he takes pains to divorce the Latin word
satura from the glut of modern associations that the English "satire" carries. As he responds to
other  scholars  and  elucidates  divergent  Latin  and  Greek  etymologies  of  satire,  he  also
demonstrates that  satire's  generic  classification is  already a matter of debate in  the English-
speaking world. His conclusion: "[Quintilian] means that the special type of literature created by
Lucilius, dominated by a certain spirit, clothed in a certain metrical form, fixed by the usage of a
series of canonical writers, and finally designated by a name specifically Latin, is Roman and not
Greek."5 Thus  Hendrickson  offers  a  less  systematic  but  similarly  comprehensive  version  of
Harrison's  definition  of  genre,  complete  with  formal  ("clothed  in  a  certain  metrical  form"),
thematic ("dominated by a certain spirit"), and metageneric elements ("created by Lucilius" and
3 Note that Horace focuses on meter first.
4 The passage reads as a variation on a recusatio. I treat recusationes in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.
5 Hendrickson (1927) 58.
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"fixed by the usage of a series of canonical writers"). The unique component of Hendrickson's
definition (via Quintilian), when these various metacommunicative features are accounted for, is
a “special type of literature [. . .] finally designated by a name specifically Latin.” But this core
identity of satire is not claimed by Horace for his own work; the term satura is altogether absent
from Horace's first book of Satires and does not appear in Horace until the first line of his second
book of Satires.6
When  we  allow  the  verse  satirists  to  speak  for  themselves,  the  metageneric  auctor
Lucilius, whom Horace invokes in  Satires  1.4.57 (quoted previously), binds the genre together
more explicitly than any other specific Latin name.7 The Horatian persona identifies Lucilius as
an on-again, off-again model in Satires 1.4, as well as in 1.10 and 2.1. At the end of his first book
of Satires, he even credits Lucilius as the inuentor (1.10.48) of the mode in which he writes. The
speaker in Persius' first satire situates himself as the recipient of a tradition when he cites both
Lucilius (1.114) and Horace (Flaccus  in 1.116) as predecessors to his own literary creations.8
Juvenal,  the  last  of  the  canonical  Roman verse  satirists,  refers  explicitly  to  "fiery  Lucilius"
(Lucilius ardens) at the end of his first poem (1.165), referring earlier—but only obliquely in
1.20—to  the  native  of  Aurunca  (Auruncae  .  .  .  alumnus).  While  Juvenal  does  not  identify
explicitly with the intermediary figures in the satiric tradition, his description of Lucilius draws
6 Of the absence of satura as a term in Horace's first book, Wheeler (1912) states, “The inevitable conclusion is
not that satura is missing from Horace Satt. i. 4 and 10 because it was not yet an accepted term, but that both its
absence and Horace's vague and periphrastic terminology are merely part of the usual poetic manner of the
Romans and that no inference can be drawn from this manner as to the date at which satura became an accepted
term” (467).  Van Rooy (1965) 64-65 argues, “While it is true that 'sermo' in Lucilius referred to an informal,
discursive way of writing, it probably did not carry the same sort of stigma as the word 'satura' (cf. our 'medley'
or 'hotch-potch'). Certainly, Horace selected Sermones as title—though he made the poem, and not the book, the
unit—because despite Lucilius'  lower artistic standards in regard to form, there was no essential difference
between their  theories  of  the  general  style  appropriate  to  the  writing of  satire  [.  .  .].”  He concludes  that,
“Sermones was not a meaningless substitute for  Saturae as title of Horace's satires” (65).  Williams (1972) 15
avers that  the title  sermones,  rather than  saturae,  “best reflects the conversation style and structure” of the
satires.
7 Rosenmeyer (2006) 435 states that writing in the tradition of a metageneric  auctor is not genre criticism but
“model criticism.” 
8 In his reference to  Flaccus,  Persius describes Horace with language (excusso naso  in 1.118) similar to that
Horace uses to describe Lucilius (emunctae naris in 1.4.8).
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on imagery familiar to readers from Horace (Satires 2.1.39-41).9 A younger sibling in the verse
satire family who is self-conscious about the undeniable success of his older brothers, Juvenal
places himself alongside Horace and Persius as Lucilius' literary progeny without mentioning
either of his “brothers” by name.
The identification of a shared ancestor would seem crucial to establishing literary genus,
as would the identification of other members of the literary family tree.10 When Horace claims
Lucilius  as  his  stylistic  model  and  Persius  makes  mention  of  both  Lucilius  and  Horace  as
predecessors, the boundaries delineating the genre become increasingly distinct. Lucilius may be
the  creator  of  a  new form of  poetry,  but  his  successors,  in  emulating  internal  and  external
features of his poetry, actually confirm the genre's defining characteristics and thus renew and
recreate  it.  In  other  words,  the  claims of  generic  offspring,  rather  than simply  identifying a
predetermined genre, confirm it and continue to shape it.11 The importance of Horace's position
as “first successor” in the order of canonical heirs to Lucilius cannot be overstressed, though we
should also be aware of the extent to which this positioning is accomplished by Horace himself.
By incorporating certain Lucilian precedents and leaving out others, Horace's  Satires  establish
the genre as a plurality of texts and a poetic tradition rather  than the one-off creation of its
founder.
The arguments that follow do not treat Roman verse satire as a whole but Horatian satire
in particular, and I focus on Horace's first book of Satires. My reasons for restricting my scope in
9 Both passages articulate a satirical style. Horace prefers to keep his sword sheathed (ensis / uagina tectus), but
Juvenal's verses depict Lucilius roaring with a “drawn sword” (ense . . . stricto). For a fuller discussion, see
Connors (2005) 129-130.
10 Cf. the elegiac lineage that Ovid traces from Gallus through Propertius and Tibullus to himself in Tristia 
4.10.51-54: 
Vergilium uidi tantum, nec auara Tibullo
     tempus amicitiae fata dedere meae.
successor fuit hic tibi, Galle, Propertius illi;
     quartus ab his serie temporis ipse fui.
11 For a variation on this thought, see Bakhtin (1994) 188: “Genre is reborn and renewed at every new stage in the
development of literature and in every individual work of a given genre.”
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this way are practical as well as theoretical. A treatment of laughter in all of Horace's hexameter
poems could warrant a separate, dedicated study, primarily because of the size of the respective
corpora of the Epistles and Satires but also because of the high frequency with which laughter
occurs in these poems. From a theoretical standpoint, the  Liber Sermonum offers an appealing
entry  point  into a  discussion  of  genre  in  Augustan  poetry,  because  of  its  status  as  an  early
instantiation  of  the  Augustan  poetic  book,12 because  it  is  the  first  book  and  thus  a  sort  of
“boundary  marker”  in  what  becomes  a  two-book  collection,13 and  because  of  the  dialogue
between himself and his generic forebears that Horace creates throughout it. However indebted
to  Lucilius  and  other  predecessors  the  satirist  at  times  claims  to  be,  he  also  takes  pains  to
distance himself from these figures. He simultaneously constructs and deconstructs the first book
of  Satires as  a  generically  self-conscious  text—an outright  declaration  of  a  new genre  that
frequently disavows its own newness. In the remainder of this chapter, I explore how Horace
frequently and meaningfully employs laughter as a part of this declaration. He casts laughter as a
critical component of his satiric program and a feature of satire that is explicitly and implicitly
revisited throughout the book. 
For those seeking an overview of Horatian satire, the temptation is to rush to the fourth
and tenth poems in the first  book of  Satires wherein the speaker declares his influences and
motivations in what have come to be identified as “programmatic passages.” To succumb to this
temptation seems, on the one hand, to precipitate a fragmentation of the book. To resist it is to
fail  to  acknowledge  a  fragmentation  that,  in  the  eyes  of  many  readers,  plainly  exists.  The
dilemma seems fitting in such a puzzling genre. 
12 The dating of the publication of the first book of Satires is often placed early enough—Du Quesnay (1984) dates
it to the winter of 36/35 BCE—that the book might be more accurately designated a product of Triumviral or
Octavian Rome, but I believe the social and political climate that contextualized Horace's Liber Sermonum (and
the nearly contemporary Eclogues) clearly reflects the influence of the future Roman emperor.
13 Cf. the discussion of Book 1 of Ovid's Amores as a generic boundary in Chapter 6
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Fragmentation occurs when the first three poems of the work are interpreted as little more
than a prelude to the remainder of the book. Even those scholars who urge and model a more
patient, holistic approach to the  Liber Sermonum tend to gesture toward the “diatribe satires”
before sitting down with the satiric  persona in the fourth satire to listen to the real story.14 Yet
any belief that the “real story” appears in these particular passages implies that  other stories
appear  elsewhere,  whether  as  incidental  distractions or  deliberate  red herrings.  On the  other
hand,  programs are  typically  treated  as  discrete  portions  of  a  given  text.  Unless  a  program
somehow accommodates a distinction between its declaration (i.e.,  the programmatic passage
itself) and its enactment (i.e., the program “in action” in the rest of the work), fragmentation
becomes a necessary byproduct of a poetic program.15 Poetic programs, however, are never so
detailed,  nor  do readers expect  them to be exhaustive any more  than a  conference attendee
expects to read in her physical program of a specific time set aside for reading the program.
The  text  of  the  Satires contains  lengthy  passages  that  are,  by  common  consensus,
programmatic,  a  fragmentation  that  for  most  critics  exists  plainly  in  Horace's  book.16 The
passages offer moments of poetic self-reflection in which the speaker qua “poet” (or, as Horace
claims at  1.4.40-42,  “scarcely-a-poet”)  writes  of  his  own project  of  composition  and poetic
creation—literary variations on the theatrical concept of “breaking the fourth wall”.17 As the
14 Zetzel (1980), Freudenburg (1993), and Gowers (2012) all do this to varying degrees.
15 In other words,  if the poetry declares its intentions on set occasions, there remain other occasions when the
poetry may enact (or fail to enact) those intentions, but does not continue declaring them. Another problem
arises at the intersection of “program” and “genre.” If a program is a generic prerequisite, the program of a text
in some sense extends beyond the text itself. 
16 A more obvious fragmentation is also evident within the Satires. The first book of Satires contains ten poems.
The eager reader, in rushing to the fourth poem, does not simply skim over a “first section” of “diatribe satires”
but  over  three  discrete  compositions.  There is  no reason to  believe  that  Horace's  poetic  book is  internally
divided by any exigencies of the physical book, such as the length of a papyrus scroll (although the length of the
complete book may have been influenced by such concerns). The reader reasonably assumes that a deliberate
poetic sensibility dictates both the unity of a given poem and the divisions between poems. Whether one prefers
a title of Sermones or Saturae for Horace's first book of Satires, one acknowledges the plurality of the poetic
composition with either title. Van Rooy (1965) states that for Horace, “The unit 'satura' was not the book, but the
poem, each written in continuous metrical form [. . .]” (61), and compares Horace's conception of the word to
that of Lucilius, for whom satura refers to the collective poems—the book.
17 Neither poeta nor poema occurs in the first book of Satires outside of 1.4 and 1.10.
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focus  of  the poetry shifts  from outward to  inward and the  poetry becomes its  own subject,
Horace creates self-consciously metapoetic moments. Writing about writing. Poetry about poetry.
The identification of these passages as accurate declarations of an overarching poetic
program nevertheless requires an a posteriori perspective on the text and an act of interpretation
that draws upon the work in its entirety, similar to an unmarked thesis sentence that only reveals
itself upon rereading.18 An additional challenge involving poetic programs is that not all poems
or poetic books contain programmatic passages. Thus the very articulation of a poetic program,
independent of the program's stated content, constitutes its own piece in the particular puzzle of a
poem's genre.19 
The previous pages present a sampling of the ample evidence that the identification of
genre  in  general,  and  in  satire,  more  particularly,  is  hardly  a  straightforward  endeavor.
Unfortunately,  programmatic  passages  do  not  offer  a  direct  or  uncontroversial  route  to
establishing genre identity. Τhe act of delineating genre based upon a program runs the risk of
circularity, especially if a program is identified in hindsight (as it often is), when the work has
been read, the interpretive act completed, and the puzzle assembled. To some extent, I defer to
scholarly consensus regarding the conventional programmatic passages and poems of Horace's
Liber Sermonum, but, to draw upon the puzzle analogy from the previous discussion of meter
and genre, I tease apart these programmatic passages into their constituent pieces and consider
what holds them together. In this way, I avoid wiping the table clean and beginning the puzzle of
Horatian satire with no pieces on my interpretive surface. 
It would be foolish to attempt to deconstruct and rearrange the puzzle of Horatian satire
in  any  comprehensive  sense.  Too  many  insightful  interpretations  of  the  Satires  have  been
18 Hubbard (1981) remarks that, “Any part of a satire of Horace can be fully understood only once the poem has
been read in its entirety” (320).
19 A further complication in the interpretation of Horace's Satires is that the idea of a poetic program assigns to the
text a deliberateness that Horace's satirical persona disavows (e.g., Satires 1.4.41-42).
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developed in  the  past  century,  and many puzzles  have  been admirably  solved.20 In  drawing
attention to laughter as an indispensable piece—a corner or even a bounding edge—in the poetic
puzzles Horace creates throughout the Satires, I stress how laughter contributes an essential and
destabilizing force to these poems. In the following three sections I focus on three ways in which
laughter corresponds with and highlights other key features of the genre, including 1) Horace's
identification as a pseudo-poet who composes informal, second-person, conversational musings
(the  sermo)  in  Satires  1.1;  2)  Horace's  use  of  apologiae as  a  means  to  programmatic  self-
fashioning in Satires 1.4 and 1.10; and 3) Horace's cautious use of laughter within the narratives
of Satires 1.7 and 1.5.
SECTION I: LAUGHTER AND CONVERSATION IN SATIRES 1.1.23-27
 It would take little time to point out that terms for laughter and the risible are operative in
the widely accepted programmatic sections in Satires 4 and 10. I examine these poems briefly in
the following pages, but I prefer to begin with the beginning of book—with the initial pieces
offered to first-time readers of the Satires. Terms for laughter and the risible, occurring early in
the first poem, are among these pieces.21 
When  Horace22 casually  addresses Maecenas  in  vv.  1-27  of  Satires 1.1,  he  rapidly
oscillates between topics and perspectives at the point in a new text when a reader might expect
an agenda to be laid out:
Qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem
seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit, illa
contentus uiuat, laudet diuersa sequentes?
'o fortunati mercatores' grauis annis
20 Particularly influential contributions to my readings of the Satires are Rudd (1966), Zetzel (1980), Freudenburg
(1993), and Gowers (2012).
21 Though not as early as a reading of Freudenburg's explication of the verses would suggest. Freudenburg uses the
words "laughable" and "laugh" three times in his analysis of vv. 1-12 of Serm. 1.1. 
22 Henceforth referred to,  for the sake of  simplicity and with all  the requisite  disclaimers regarding authorial
identity, as Horace and “the satirist” interchangeably.
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miles ait, multo iam fractus membra labore; 5
contra mercator nauim iactantibus Austris:
'militia est potior. quid enim? concurritur: horae
momento cita mors uenit aut uictoria laeta.'
agricolam laudat iuris legumque peritus,
sub galli cantum consultor ubi ostia pulsat; 10
ille, datis uadibus qui rure extractus in urbem est,
solos felicis uiuentis clamat in urbe.
cetera de genere hoc—adeo sunt multa—loquacem
delassare ualent Fabium. ne te morer, audi,
quo rem deducam. si quis deus 'en ego' dicat 15
'iam faciam quod uoltis: eris tu, qui modo miles,
mercator; tu, consultus modo, rusticus: hinc uos,
uos hinc mutatis discedite partibus. eia,
quid statis?' nolint. atqui licet esse beatis.
quid causae est, merito quin illis Iuppiter ambas 20
iratus buccas inflet neque se fore posthac
tam facilem dicat, uotis ut praebeat aurem?
How does it happen, Maecenas, that no one, regarding the lot
that either reason has granted or chance has thrown his way, lives
content with it, but praises instead those following other paths?
“O those lucky merchants,” says the soldier heavy with
years, his limbs already shattered by great toil. 5
But then the merchant, with the winds tossing his ship, says,
“The soldier's life is better. Why? There's a charge; 
in a moment's time, swift death comes or joyous victory.
The veteran of the courts praises the farmer whenever
a client bangs on his gates before the singing of the rooster; 10
but he, who was dragged from country to city for a court hearing,
proclaims that everyone lives happily in the city.
Other things of this sort—there are so many—would be sufficient
to exhaust talkative Fabius. But I don't want to keep you, so listen
to where I'm going with things. If some god should say, “Behold, 15
I now will do what you want: you who were formerly a soldier
will be a trader; you, once a lawyer, now a rustic. You all,
go your separate ways with your roles exchanged. Quick!
Why are you standing?” They'd refuse, though allowed to be happy.
Is there any reason why Jupiter wouldn't, with good cause, puff up 20
both cheeks at them and say that, from then on, he would 
not be so kind as to offer an ear to their prayers.
The  speaker  begins  with  a  consideration  of  the  “grass  is  always  greener”  mentality—a
characteristic  identified  as  mempsimoiria  (μεμψιμοιρία)  in  Theophrastus'  Characters  and  a
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mainstay topic of Cynic diatribe.23 Though Theophrastus accounts for 29 other possible character
types, the Horatian satirist believes that the outlook of the mempsimoiros is a universal one (Qui
fit,  Maecenas, ut nemo  [. . .] contentus uiuat  in vv. 1-3). He lists the words and thoughts of
disgruntled soldiers, sea merchants, lawyers, and farmers, each one claiming that “the other” has
it better. Then Horace abruptly curtails this train of thought and presents a hypothetical situation.
Offered the opportunity to trade places with a neighbor, he asserts, no one of these people would
take it. Horace proceeds to present to his addressee's ears24—and to the reader's eyes—a jumble
of words denoting laughter, jokes, and play (iocularia and ridens in v. 23, ridentem in v. 24, and
ludo in v. 27):
praeterea, ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens
percurram: quamquam ridentem dicere uerum
quid uetat? ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi 25
doctores, elementa uelint ut discere prima:
sed tamen amoto quaeramus seria ludo [. . .].
Anyway, to avoid rushing through this like some laugher through
one-liners—although what's to keep a laugher from speaking
the truth, just as coaxing teachers traditionally give boys 25
cookies to make them willing to learn their first lessons?—
but let us still seek out serious matters, with play set aside [. . .].
The conversational nature of Satires 1.1 is enacted by the various anacolutha in the verses, as the
speaker gives voice to what seems to be off-the-cuff speech.25 The scattered organization of his
argument  gives the impression  that  he may even be “thinking aloud”:  first,  he claims to  be
avoiding laughter, but then he steps back to imply (note the rhetorical caution of quid uetat in v.
25) that laughter is not an impediment to truthful speech, all before he doubles back again and
23 Thphr. Char. 17.1 Ἔστι δὲ ἡ μεμψιμοιρία ἐπιτίμησις παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον τῶν δεδομένων. “Mempsimoiria is
the undue criticism of one's portion [lit. “of things having been granted”].” The term appears in a fragment of
Bion (fr. 16a Kindstrand) that calls for contentment with one's lot—a point Horace himself articulates at Serm.
1.1.108-9.
24 Cf. audi in v. 14.
25 Palmer's (1954) 74 description of oral dialogue, which I quote in Chapter 1, is an apt description of these verses,
which are, to my thinking, the best imitation of oral speech in the Liber Sermonum.
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explicitly  dismisses  play and,  presumably,  any attendant  laughter  from the serious  things he
intends to pursue with his addressee (amoto quaeramus seria ludo in v. 27).26 But what are these
seria  “we”  are  invited  to  seek  out  alongside  the  speaker?  Will  we  examine  people's
discontentment with their own professions? Their unwillingness to do what they think will make
them happy? Their  complete  ignorance  of  what  brings  happiness  in  the  first  place?  Do we
believe that the wandering satirical persona even knows the answer to these questions?
A cursory inventory of what the reader is offered in the opening verses of  Satires  1.1
shows an abundance of puzzle pieces: a speaker, a named addressee, moralizing commentary, the
illusion  of  speech,  nominatim (yet  relatively  barbless)  criticism,  a  humorous  anecdote,
fluctuation between playfulness and seriousness. A reader familiar  with the remainder of the
poem and the rest of the collection recognizes that these are many of the distinguishing features
of  Horatian  satire.27 These  opening  verses  of  Satires  1.1  also  show Horace  stating  and
simultaneously enacting a defining feature of his satirical program, namely, the literary fiction of
his faux-conversations.  Rather  than writing about  his  own writing,  he speaks about his  own
speech and, importantly, peppers this speech with terms for laughing, jokes, and play in a self-
conscious display of the incongruity the Satires entext.
Before  I  return  to  a  close  reading  of  this  opening  passage,  a  brief  summary  of  the
remainder of Satires 1.1 is helpful. After all, a first-time reader may reasonably feel adrift after
reading the first 27 verses of the poem. In vv. 28-30, most of the cast of characters from the
26 Giangrande (1972) labels this verse “ironic” (9). Note the graphic word order in which play (ludus) is cast aside
together  with  its  participle  (amoto)  to  make  room  for  the  pursuit  of  seria.  Cf.  Ecl.  7.17  for  the  reverse
subordination of seriousness to play (also reflected by graphic word order): posthabui tamen illorum mea seria
ludo. Unlike the Horatian satirist, Meliboeus, the speaker at the beginning of  Ecl. 7, lists the  seria that he is
postponing. Putnam (1995) suggests that Horace's allusion “alerts his reader to the fact that knowledge of [. . .]
Vergilian pastoral poetry [is] crucial for full appreciation of the satiric project on which he is embarking” (313).
Zetzel  (2002) observes  that  the  “attitude  toward  ludus,  at  least  Vergilian  ludus,  is  emblematic  of  Horace's
attitude to the Eclogues as a whole” (48).
27 This is  Horace's  satirical program being stated and simultaneously enacted. He has yet  to concede that  the
satires are written works (a point that he dramatically makes in the very last verse of Satires 1.10), but many of
the other defining features of the genre are present.
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opening lines return. The lawyer has been subbed out for an innkeeper, but the farmer, the trader,
and the soldier all reappear.28 This could prove a source of comfort for the disoriented reader. By
reintroducing several figures from the beginning of the poem, Horace seems to be returning to
the thread of the argument from the opening verses. But something in the argument has changed.
These people do not share the same attitudes as those claiming they wanted to trade places just
twenty verses earlier. The figures in vv. 1-12 all were pursuing different paths (diuersa sequentes
in v. 3). Everyone in vv. 28-32 speaks in unison:
ille grauem duro terram qui uertit aratro,
perfidus hic caupo, miles nautaeque, per omne
audaces mare qui currunt, hac mente laborem 30
sese ferre, senes ut in otia tuta recedant,
aiunt, cum sibi sint congesta cibaria [. . .].
That man who with his hard plow turns the earth,
this faithless innkeeper, the soldiers, and sailors—daring men
who rush across the whole sea, they say that they endure 30
the toil with this purpose: so that as old men they may retire into
safe leisure, when provisions have been heaped up for them.
Distinct identities disappear as the speakers aspire collectively to become financially secure “old
men,” regardless of their professions. A plural aiunt in v. 32 communicates the thoughts of a now
univocal  group.29 Job-specific  discontentment  at  work  in  vv.  4-12  is  now  abandoned,  and
everyone's ultimate motivation is collapsed into a shared purpose of leisurely retirement with
provisions amassed. The passage marks an abrupt shift in the trajectory of the satire to a critique
of  greediness,  signposted  first  with  the  verb  sint  congesta  and  then  reinforced  by  repeated
helpings of “heaping” terminology in the lines that follow (aceruus in vv. 34, 44, and 51). The
focus on greediness maintains itself until vv. 108-9, when Horace identifies greed (auarus in v.
108) as the cause of the discontentment (mempsimoiria) that he described in the satire's opening
28 It is hard to avoid a “lawyer joke”: is it coincidence that the innkeeper is described as perfidus?
29 For comparison, the singular ait was used in v. 5 to quote the speech of one individual.
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verses:
illuc, unde abii, redeo, qui nemo, ut auarus,
se probet ac potius laudet diuersa sequentis [. . .].
To that place from which I set out, I return: that no one, as a greedy man,
approves himself but rather praises those pursuing other things [. . .].
The verbal echoes of the beginning of the satire in vv. 108-9 bring about a closing of the
ring composition in the speaker's argument (qui nemo in vv. 1 and 108; diuersa sequentes in vv.
3 and 109), as does his explicit claim to return to the point from which he had set out ( illuc unde
abii  redeo  in  v.  108).  In  the  remainder  of  the  poem  (vv.  110-121),  Horace  ties  envious
discontentment to greed before abruptly cutting himself (and the poem) off. Although scholars
are  at  odds  as  to  how  smoothly  Horace  integrates  his  nearly-80-line,  poem-devouring
“digression”  into  the  framing  discussion  of  discontentment,  a  reader  may  still  want  to  ask
Horace, unde abisti?—“Where did your digression begin?”30 The answer lies with the laughter in
vv. 23-7. The laughs that are offered and muffled in these verses are the segments of tape that
pretend to hide—and thus draw attention to—thematic and structural seams in Satires 1.1.
The terms for laughter crop up when Horace implicitly apologizes for being too playful—
too “gelastic”—and indicates that he will not persist in doing so: ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens /
percurram (vv. 23-24).  This is the second negative purpose clause offered in the opening 27
verses, the previous one occurring in vv. 14-15 when Horace declares, “But I don't want to keep
you,  so  listen  to  where  I'm  going  with  things”  (ne  te  morer,  audi,  / quo  rem  deducam).
Sandwiched  between  these chattily-aborted  digressions  is  another  digression.  In  vv.  15-19,
Horace imagines a theophany. A god, identified as Jupiter in v. 20, offers to ease everyone's
professional discontentment by granting their wishes and arranging a career swap.31 Whether it is
30 With varying success, according to scholars. See Gower's (2012) introduction to Serm. 1.1 for a summary of the
various arguments regarding Horace's “level of competence” in handling the two themes separately and together
(61).
31 Freudenburg (1993) 43 n. 92 detects elements of stage comedy in this digression and places Jupiter in the role of
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the idea that people do not actually want what they claim to want or the depiction of an angry,
huffing, puffing Jupiter who is ready to shut down the entire Roman prayer economy, Horace's
statements in vv. 23-27 reveal that he thinks he may have said something in the previous verses
that would lead people to picture him laughing.
Undoubtedly,  this  use  of  the  vocabulary  of  laughter  in  Satires  1.1  has
metacommunicative potential, as Horace offers a gelastic variation on a praeteritio. He invokes
laughter retroactively in the process of dismissing it, and he highlights the laughable potential of
whatever he has just said. The effect can be illustrated through a modern-day parallel: imagine
that you have just walked into a room in time to hear a lecturer say, “Alright, now all laughing
aside, I want to make a serious point.” In the event that no smiles can be seen still lingering upon
the  lecturer's  and  audience  members'  lips,  you  would  nevertheless  assume  that  whatever
preceded the lecturer's transition was met with laughter and was likely even intended to raise a
laugh. This second point is particularly relevant to Satires 1.1 and can be seen more distinctly by
a tweaking of the imagined scenario of our lecturer. She does not simply say her praeteritio. She
reads it. The lecturer's remarks, the joke, and her dismissal of it, are revealed to be parts of a
scripted sequence.32 
Horace's hesitating speech and seemingly haphazard shifts in topic in the opening verses
of  Satires  1.1 must be viewed similarly. The piecemeal thoughts and near-digressions are all
planted, all, to some degree, premeditated, and the proof lies in each well-crafted hexametric
verse.33 This incongruity between spontaneity and polish plays beneath the surface of the opening
comic stage director.
32 I suspect that many of us have observed the seams in these scripted moments (e.g., during student presentations
or APA/AIA papers). I see it happen most often with inexperienced high school students who are asked to speak
to adults at fundraisers. The student delivers a well-rehearsed joke and pauses for a response (that may or may
not  arrive)  before  returning  to  his  or  her  notecard  and  reading  something  along  the  lines  of  “But  joking
aside . . .”
33 Cf. Satires 1.10.67-75 wherein the speaker touts the merits of laborious revision.
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lines. We readers are eavesdropping on a conversation that is not really a conversation. Although
words repeatedly occur denoting oral communication (e.g., audi in v. 14 and dicere in v. 24), we
see before our eyes verses on a page. Even if the poem is being recited aloud to us, we are not
the addressees; Horace clearly identifies “Maecenas” as his interlocutor in the first verse. But
Maecenas' name gradually fades into the background, not to appear again in the first satire, and
Horace shifts to a second-person singular personal pronoun (te in v. 14), as if he might really be
speaking  to  “you”—concerned about  delaying each of  us.34 When the  conversational  syntax
comes to dominate in vv. 24-27 and the speaker presents himself as self-conscious about what he
will  say  and  how  he  will  say  it,  ostensibly  unable  to  articulate  a  complete  thought  but
nevertheless writing his fragmented phrases in dactylic hexameter, the incongruity bubbles to the
surface.35 Laughter bubbles up with it.
The truncated thoughts and shifting syntax of the passage mean that Horace's comparison
of laughter and cookies in vv. 23-26 is never sketched in detail. The juxtaposition renders the
comparanda clearly enough: an individual may laugh while speaking the truth, just as teachers, in
presenting their lessons, may motivate their elementary school students with cookies. The use of
a simile that hinges upon teachers and the act of learning (doctores  and discere in v. 26) casts
laughter in a correspondingly positive light, as a means to truth and education. It also harks back
to Lucretius' comparison of his poetry to a honeyed cup of medicine in De Rerum Natura.36 Both
similes  draw upon the  childhood  experiences  of  pueri  (Satires 1.1.25,  DRN  1.936)  and  the
34 See Lyne (1995) 140:  Satires 1.1 “makes extensive use of the Latin idiom of the indefinite second person
singular: the use of 'you' for 'one' is colloquial in English, orthodox grammar in Latin. [. . .] [T]his idiom is of
course ambiguous—and Horace will  exploit  the  ambiguity not  only  here,  but  throughout  the  Epistles.  The
second person singular may be used for indefinite 'one'; but who is to say, if there is an available addressee, that
it does not mean you?”
35 The idea that this incongruity is anything but cultivated does not do justice to Horace's ability to manipulate
style and content independently. Parker (1986) argues of the apparent inconsistencies between Satires  1.4 and
1.10 that, “If Ovid could pare his five books of Amores down to three, Horace, with his insistence on the value
of erasure, is not likely to have pushed for a libellus that did not perform precisely as he desired” (42).
36 The Lucretian simile occurs at DRN 1.935-950 and again at DRN 4.11-25.
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manipulation of these children by better-knowing adults, but the agency of the children in the
two similes marks a point of divergence. The pueri in Lucretius' simile are deceived (puerorum
aetas  [.  .  .]  deceptaque non capiatur,  1.939-941),  admittedly  for  their  own good.  Those  in
Horace's simile are made willing (uelint ut discere  in v. 26). Everything is aboveboard for the
schoolchildren in Satires 1.1. Coaxed but not deceived, they gobble up their cookies and lessons
willingly, and, in this way, Horace incorporates a lesson about pedagogy itself. Young students
do not have to be tricked into learning. Sometimes they simply need an incentive. 
In introducing the instructor's distribution of incentives, Horace hints at an intention to
use laughter in a similar way: as an accompaniment to truth-telling and, by extension, as a bonus
for the addressee who appreciates laughter. He signposts the first appearance of laughter and
jokes in the collection by breaking off mid-thought to defend laughter's merits and to highlight
its unobtrusive impact on efforts to speak the truth.37 The simile of the honest, earnest preschool
teacher  reflects  positively  on  the  objective  and  incentive  alike.  If  laughter  is  an  openly
acknowledged source of motivation rather than an act of deception, truth-telling is an aim that
requires no disguising.
Horace's comparison of the laughing truth-teller to the cookie-slinging, didactic figure in
vv. 24-26 reflects the practice of spoudaiogeloion (σπουδαιογέλοιον)—“serious jesting” or the
“seriocomic.” The term is not attested in Classical literature until Strabo uses it to describe the
Cynic Menippus (Strab. 16.2.29), but the conjoined deployment of seriousness and laughter, and
the coordinate appearance of terms for “laughter” and “seriousness” in close proximity to one
another, are evident in the works of Aristophanes (Frogs 391-392), Plato (Laws 816d9-e2), and
Gorgias (via  Aristotle's  Rh. 1419b4-6),  among others.38 According to Giangrande (1972), the
37 Were laughter more akin to honey on the cup of bitter medicine, wouldn't it make more sense for Horace to
incorporate it silently into his truth-telling mission rather than draw explicit attention to it? Then again,  one can
likewise wonder why Lucretius does not keep his mission secret.
38 I touch upon how these passages in Plato and Aristotle can be viewed as early articulations of the relief theory of
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“formal alliance” of laughter  and moral education occurred in the rhetorical  works of Cynic
philosophers,  particularly  when  late  Cynics  endeavored  to  soften  the  abrasive  approach  to
moralizing  favored  by  earlier  Cynics.39 Horace  might  have  encountered  occasions  of
spoudaiogeloion through  the  works  of  Attic  comedians  as  well  as  through  diatribes  and
character-critiques  authored  by  Cynic  philosophers  like  Bion  of  Borysthenes,  whose  name
Horace tellingly uses in  Epistles 2.2.60 when he describes his collection of  Satires as “Bion-
esque chats” (Bionei sermones).40 
To Horace's question in vv. 24-25, “What's to keep a laugher from speaking the truth?”,
an individual who subscribes to the technique of spoudaiogeloion answers: “Nothing . . . because
the laugher can often do it better.” When the satirist makes a case for the effectiveness of pairing
laughter and seriousness for didactic purposes in the simile in vv. 24-26 of Satires 1.1, he begins
to  distinguish himself  as  such  an  individual.41 But  there  are  reasons  to  hesitate  before
immediately accepting this conclusion.
The  presentation  of  laughter  in  Satires 1.1.23-27 allows  the  satirist  to  create  a  self-
conscious and strained relationship with the behavior as well  as with his  literary medium. I
previously note how Horace's fractured syntax and staccato expressions in this passage are at
odds with their hexametric, poetic packaging. The narrator's self-consciously poetic side, which
deploys terms for laughter, jokes, and play and is lingering behind every fine-tuned verse, is
laughter in the introduction.
39 Giangrande (1972) 8.
40 We have only fragmentary remains of Bion and none of the extant fragments contain the term spoudaiogeloion.
Bion fr. 38A Kindstrand contains the verbs  γελάω  and  σπουδάζω  in close proximity to one another:  Βίων
ἔλεγε  καταγελάστους  εἶναι  τοὺς  σπουδάζοντας  περὶ  πλοῦτον,  ὃν  τύχη μὲν  παρέχει,  ἀνελευθερία  δὲ
φυλάττει,  χρηστότης δὲ ἀφαιρεῖταιa—“Bion said that men who strive for wealth are utterly  ridiculous—
wealth, which fortune provides, illiberality protects, and use takes away.” This fragment introduces a variation
on  spoudaiogeloion according to which seriousness itself is presented as an object of ridicule. Moles (2007)
165-168 makes a clear case for the “Bionian” nature of Horace's Satires.
41 Horace assertively promotes the ideals of  spoudaiogeloion in a passage from the beginning of  Satires  1.10
(discussed  in  the  following pages)  wherein  he  extols  the  merits  of  laughter  for  addressing  serious  topics.
Hubbard (1981) 317-318, in drawing a connection between the two passages, devotes the bulk of his attention to
1.10.11-14 and the different styles of sermo indicated by tristis and iocosus.
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complemented  by  a  haphazardly-conversational  side,  which  finds  itself  tongue-tied  when
speaking about these same topics. If we focus on the conversational fiction and the illusion of
speech, the sentiments and structure of these verses construct an ambivalence in the satirical
persona regarding laughter, jokes, and play. It is as if there is a writing-satirist and a speaking-
satirist.42 For the speaking-satirist,  his  interrupted  praeteritio,  his  rhetorical question, and his
simile-cum-answer all belie an uncertainty about the role that gelastic behaviors will play in the
particular poem and the poetic book.
The incomplete thought that precedes the rhetorical question in vv. 23-24 lays out the
first clues of the satirist's tentativeness toward laughter: “Anyway, to avoid rushing through this
like some laugher through / one-liners [. . .]”43 The statement disappears into the interrupting
question. The sequence allows the satirist to write himself into a reluctant dance with laughter in
which he always keeps the dangerous behavior at arm's length. Setting aside the aforementioned
analogy  of  the  lecturer  who,  with  her  scripted  dismissal  of  laughter,  draws  attention to  the
potential laugh-worthiness of whatever was previously said, we must suspend awareness for the
moment of Horace's poetic frame and inhabit the conversational fiction, as if we were bearing
witness to a spontaneous, spoken praeteritio. As in every praeteritio, scripted or otherwise, the
satirist places the events he intends to avoid before his addressee's eyes. He invites laughter and
jokes onto the poetic dance floor while facing the opposite direction, extending his hand behind
and pulling a face at laughter's expense. 
42 I have thus far drawn attention to the deliberately-versifying, poetic persona of the satirist in this first satire. In
qualifying this persona with the adjective “poetic,” I imply the existence of other personae, although I do not
mean the more obvious personae that Horace adopts in, for example, Satires 1.8 with the speaker Priapus. To
some  extent,  I  am  differentiating  between  Horace's  authorial  and  narrative  personae  (for  which,  see  the
discussion of “face” in the introduction to Oliensis (1998)), but a finer distinction must be drawn. My focus is
on  the  multiple  personae  inhabited  by  the  satirical  narrator,  a  bifurcated  figure  who  writes  and  speaks
simultaneously throughout the first book of Satires. Thus one could identify the author Horace, the satirist who
writes (of whom we catch a retrospective glance, e.g., through the final verse of Satires 1.10), and the satirist
who speaks.
43 Satires 1.1.23-4: praeterea, ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens / percurram.
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Another  locus  of  ambivalence  appears  in  the  simile  of  vv.  23-24.  The  nominative
participle appears to modify the first-person subject of  percurram (v. 23), but the “laugher” is,
strictly  speaking,  the  subject  of  its  own  clause  within  the  simile.44 Horace  stops  short  of
confessing to laughing himself or to telling any jokes—a reluctance similar to the one that the
narrator  maintains  toward  presenting  himself  laughing  throughout  the  Liber  Sermonum.45
Nevertheless, with the condensed simile, Horace invites confusion of the joke-telling “laugher”
with  the  satirist  himself,  hinting  at  the  association  but  abstaining  from claiming  it  outright.
Additional attention to a potential audience's participation in laughable matters is accommodated
by Horace's mention of iocularia in v. 23; jokes could be the stimuli for an audience's laughter,
and these are jokes that the laugher will not rush through. Such is the effect of Horace's laughing
praeteritio:  he  allows  his  addressee  to  imagine  him  laughing  and  telling  jokes,  but  he
simultaneously paints a large, red X through this image. By the conclusion of v. 25, one might
believe that all laughter—the speaker's own and his audience's—will be avoided. 
But the vocabulary for laughter appears again in the very next phrase. Horace asks in vv.
24-25, “[A]lthough what's to keep a laugher from speaking / the truth?”—quamquam ridentem
dicere uerum / quid uetat? The interruption is dramatic. Horace, having pulled laughter onto the
dance floor only to proclaim his intention to ignore it, declares indignantly that one would have
every right to turn around and pull it close. He does not say “I” or “me” or include himself in the
rhetorical question. Even if, as in v. 23, the most likely potential “laugher” is the speaker himself,
the ridentem in v. 24 could refer to anyone. The generalizing, rhetorical question allows Horace
to set the stage for a broad point while maintaining his own distance from the particular behavior.
44 Gowers (2012) 68 glosses the Latin as follows: ne sic (haec ridens) percurram ut qui iocularia ridens percurrit.
She supplies  a  ridens  to  modify  percurram,  and while  this is  certainly  implied,  I  believe  it  is  deliberately
ommitted.
45 Horace elsewhere in the Satires (1.4, 1.5, and 1.10, all of which are treated in the following pages) takes pains to
combat the impression that he aims only to elicit laughter from others or that he laughs alone and for his own
pleasure.
187
The construction also allows Horace to suggest an answer without stating it.  The simile that
follows in vv. 25-26 implies that the speaker considers laughter no obstacle to true speech but,
rather, a potential asset, and yet the reader is left to draw this conclusion for herself. 
The  unstated  answer  to  the  question  seems unproblematic  in  the  broadest  sense;  no
logical necessities prevent the coexistence of speaking the truth and laughing. But one need not
think  long  to  imagine  everyday  situations  in  which  a  laughing  delivery  might  complicate
impressions of truthful communication—for the listener, if not for the speaker. If a mechanic
laughs while telling you that your car is completely safe to drive, you might hesitate a moment
and seek some clarification before climbing behind the wheel. Nevertheless, before the addressee
has  time  to  envision  such  situations,  conversational  momentum propels  the  satirist  into  his
pedagogical simile. 
The  simile  is  an  abstraction—a  rhetorical  evasion  that  does  not  answer  the  general
question but redirects the reader to a narrower conclusion. Even from a syntactical standpoint,
the second half of the simile dangles and clouds the parallelism; a declarative statement functions
as the vehicle for an interrogative tenor. Yes, perhaps in the way that cookies aid educators,
laughter can aid in “speaking the truth.” But this is hardly conclusive proof that laughter and true
speech are an uncomplicated pairing. And what happens to a student's lessons when he or she
eats  too  many  cookies?  A speaker's  excessive  laughter  might  impede  his  efforts  to  speak
truthfully or erode an addressee's confidence that he speaks without guile. 
Horace's  rhetorically  convoluted  approach  to  laughter,  jokes,  and  play  in  vv.  23-27
betrays and enacts his awareness of laughter's complexity, both as a behavior, and as a literary
presence in the beginning of his Satires. He can scarcely finish articulating his intention to avoid
laughter and jokes before he comes to their defense, a defense that is conversationally scattered
and  impulsive  on  the  one  hand,  and  metrically  taut  and  refined  on  the  other.  Despite  the
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arguments he makes in laughter's favor, Horace seems to conclude that laughter will prove too
substantial  a distraction in  his  satire,  and he declares his  intention  in  v.  27 to  proceed with
notions of play, which presumably include the laughter and jokes introduced in vv. 23-26, set
aside. If the vocabulary of laughter and the risible is any indication, he stays true to his word for
the bulk of the poem; a single textual laugh appears in the remainder of Satires 1.1 when Horace
accuses his addressee with the question, “Why are you laughing?”—quid rides? in v. 69.
Horace is wary of the laughter he introduces, defends, and dismisses in the first verses of
Satires  1.1, and the  persona he constructs of a self-interrupting, speaker-cum-versifier reflects
and  creates  this  wariness.  As  the  Liber  Sermonum progresses,  wariness  gradually,  and
conversationally, crystalizes into a direct engagement with the polarizing potential of laughter
and laughter's role in the Horatian satirist's project.
SECTION II: APOLOGIES FOR LAUGHTER IN SATIRES 1.4 AND 1.10
It  has  been  recognized  for  over  a  century  that  Horace's  defense  of  satire  is  also  a
declaration of his program—an act of literary reverse-psychology.46 The charges to which the
satirist responds are always introduced by the satirist himself, either quoted verbatim or implied
in his conversational replies, and a surprising number of the accusations relate to the satirist's
relationship to laughter. I propose that the moments throughout Satires 1.4 and in the beginning
of 1.10 in which the satirist  relates and replies to  criticism of his  relationship with laughter
function  as  moments  of  generic  self-fashioning.  Through  his  apologiae,  the  satirist  frames
laughter as an inextricable feature of his satirical program.
Satires 1.4 is regarded by some as the first programmatic poem in Horace's collection.47
46 See Hendrickson (1900) passim, Dickie (1981) 186, and Gowers (2012) 149: “H. adopts defensive manoeuvres
that define modern satire in the act of effacing it.”
47 Plaza (2006) describes it as “the first of Horace's programme satires” (279) and Gowers (2012) as “H's first
overtly programmatic poem” (147). Hubbard (1981) regards Satires 1.1 as an earlier declaration of program.
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The poem's programmatic status hinges upon Horace's overt literary criticism of himself and of
his generic predecessor Lucilius throughout the poem. Despite its literary focus, a pretense of
oral  communication  is  maintained  in  the  satire,  and  bursts  of  dialogue  surface  at  intervals.
Horace, however, has his own thoughts better organized; he does not interrupt himself in the way
that he did in  Satires  1.1, nor do his digressions, which still meander, derail him for quite so
long. Interruptions are instead cast in the words of interlocutors who speak to and about the
satirist and redirect the trajectory of the poem gradually. These speakers' interjections are, like
everything else in the poem, scripted, metrically-precise constructions by the poetic persona, but
the  illusion  of  conversational  spontaneity  and  real-time  casual  discussion  allows  the  poetic
persona to construct his own identity in the words of others. And when Horace gives voice to the
charges that hypothetical interlocutors lodge against his satires, they—and he— repeatedly fixate
on laughter.
The triangulation between “they,” the satirical persona's “I,” and an implied or explicit
“you” is an important feature of Horace's programmatic apologiae, but it is not always easy to
see how the triangle takes shape in the conversational milieu of a given satire.48 In vv. 22-25 of
Satires  1.4,  Horace  explains  that  he  keeps  his  writings  to  himself  because  they  are  not
particularly pleasing to the general public. His potential readership—the turba of v. 25—is the
target of his moral criticism, and no one likes to be criticized. Horace nevertheless continues:
“Choose (elige) whomever from the midst of the crowd: / he toils either because of greed or
wretched ambition.49 It is not clear to whom Horace addresses the imperative, “Choose!” He has
yet to name an addressee. The opening lines of the poem (vv. 1-13) are filled with declarations
about Lucilius' poetic pedigree and with critiques of his rambling style, but these are declarations
48 See n. 34 for Lyne's (1995) comments on the indefinite second-person singular in Satires 1.1.
49 Satires 1.4.25-26: quemuis media elige turba / aut ob auaritiam aut misera ambitione laborat.
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to no audience in particular. In vv. 14-16, Horace quotes a challenge from Crispinus along the
lines of, “Who can write more,” and it corresponds to his own critiques of Lucilius. Thanking
god that he is a man of few words, Horace launches into a caricature of an unidentified second-
person singular (tu . . . mauis in v. 19 and v. 21) who huffs and puffs like goatskin bellows (vv.
17-21). Porphyrio 1.4.14-15.1 interprets the second-person verb as referring to Crispinus, whose
challenge Horace has just quoted, but it might also refer to Fannius, whom Horace sarcastically
calls “blessed” for his statue and bookcases in the subsequent verse (v. 22).  The second-person
pronoun and verb in vv. 19 and 21 are easily read into the exchanges with Crispinus and Fannius,
but even if these poets are treated to direct address from time to time, they are not Horace's
sustained addressees. The speaker's slights of Crispinus and Fannius place them unambiguously
among the turba who warrant critique.  
Whoever is addressed by the imperative  elige  in v. 25 seems to stand away from the
turba and, in a sense, alongside Horace. If one wishes to identify an actual candidate, the most
reasonable option is Maecenas who is named by Horace as his addressee in  Satires  1.1.1 and
1.3.64 and whose exceptional nature is proclaimed in direct address at the outset of Satires 1.6.
But Maecenas' name appears nowhere in 1.4, and so one must cautiously conclude that Horace
addresses an anonymous individual somewhere between ally and enemy—an everyman to whom
Horace must present and defend himself without mounting an attack. The point is pivotal to any
interpretation of Satires 1.4 as a programmatic apologia. Horace requires a foil as he talks about
his poetry, an addressee to whom he can explain himself while keeping his sword sheathed, and
he identifies this addressee with his order of “Choose!” in v. 25.
In establishing a potential ally in the reader, Horace simultaneously others “them”—the
countless, immoderate people deemed “worthy of blame” (utpote plures / culpari dignos in vv.
24-25). In vv. 27-32, Horace provides examples of their blameworthiness as he circles back to
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the reason he keeps his writings to himself: “All of these men fear verses, hate poets”—omnes hi
metuunt uersus, odere poetas (v. 33).50 A warning is embedded therein: “you” run the risk of
joining “them” if you also begin to fear verse and hate poets. And, as part of “them,” you also
likewise confess yourself to be “worthy of blame.”
The triangle of “they” (Horace's opponents), “you” (the addressee), and “I” (the speaker
Horace)  is  thus  gradually  sketched  in  Satires  1.4,  but  the  poem  enacts  Horace's  effort  to
assimilate “you” and “I” into a collective “we”—to collapse the triangle into a simple binary
wherein the reader is invited to sympathize with the speaker Horace. The last verses of the satire,
wherein Horace says he will force his addressee to join his poetic cause, witness this invitation's
mutation into a threat. Horace speaks of himself as part of a plurality when he compares his band
of poets to a crowd of Jews: “[. . .] and like the Jews, we will force you to join this crowd.”51 The
triangulation narrows to a sharper point as Horace's focus on persuasion increases. He constructs
himself and, by extension, his poetry as under attack, and he sees fit to explain himself to a
potential ally—a willing listener. In this way Satires 1.4 becomes an apologia.52
In vv. 34-38, Horace gives a single voice to his detractors' fear and hatred:
'faenum habet in cornu, longe fuge; dummodo risum
excutiat, sibi non, non cuiquam parcet amico 35
et quodcumque semel chartis illeuerit, omnis
50 The omnes is ambiguous and, appearing as it does first in the line, ultimately influences every noun in the verse.
I translate it here as modifier of  hi  and thus a reminder from Horace that the people he has described in the
previous verses are all a collective of transgressors who share a distaste for poetry that is as universal as their
moral shortcomings. Are we to have in mind the greedy and discontent soldiers, sea merchants, lawyers, farmers
and innkeepers from the opening of Satires 1.1?
51 Satires 1.4.140-143, in particular vv. 142-143: ac ueluti te / Iudaei cogemus in hanc concedere turbam. Gowers
(2012) explains that “the comparison is based on the Jews' reputation for being numerous and evangelical”
(182).
52 Kenney (1962) does not attend to  Satires  1.4 and 1.10 in his explanation of the “pattern of the apology” in
Roman verse satire but instead focuses on  Satires 2.1,  which, in his words,  “has a clearly enunciatory and
apologetic role” (35). I believe his proposed pattern applies to 1.4 and 1.10 as well: “First, a pronouncement,
lofty to the point of bombast, of the satirist's high purpose and mission. Second, a warning by a friend or the
poet's alter ego or the voice of prudence—call it what you will. Third, an appeal by the satirist to the great
example of Lucilius. Fourth, a renewed warning. Fifth and last, evasion, retractation, equivocation” (36). Plaza
(2006) interprets the fifth component as “the concluding joke” (38), and the joke she explores at the end of
Satires 2.1 culminates with laughter.
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gestiet a furno redeuntis scire lacuque
et pueros et anos.'
“He has hay on his horn, keep your distance; so long as he
shakes out a laugh, he spares neither himself nor any friend, 35
and whatever he has once smeared on sheets, he will exult
that all those returning from the bakery and the lake know it,
both boys and old ladies.”
The idiomatic expression of v. 34, while understandable in general, is less clear in its details.
Pfeiffer detects an allusion to the first of Callimachus' Iambi in the phrase longe fuge (v. 34), but
no  reference  to  a  horned  animal  survives  in  the  fragmentary  remains  of  the  Callimachean
passage.53 In  Iambi  13 (203.52-53), a poet is said to be angered “to the horn,” a formulation
appearing in Euripides'  Bacchae 743 and a passage to which Horace may be alluding when he
threatens to raise his horns in Epodes 6.11-12: caue, caue, namque in malos asperrimus / parata
tollo cornua.54 These three references to the brandishing of one's horn (in Euripides'  Bacchae,
Callimachus  Iambi, and Horace's  Epodes) hinge on the anger of the poet, while  Satires  1.4.34
makes no mention of anger. Moreover, neither the Euripidean passage nor Callimachus' fragment
mentions hay. So why would someone avoid the ox with hay on his horns? The scholiast offers a
reasonable explanation: “In Rome, moreover, we still see today that hay that is fashioned into a
ring is placed on the little horn of an ox, by which a sign is given to passers-by to avoid him.”55
The hay is not the irritant but a message to others. The interlocutor's speech, in describing an
archaic public alarm system, triggers the alarm and becomes the hay on Horace's horn. Thus the
idiom in  v.  34  does  not,  in  fact,  critique  Horace  in  any specifics.  It  simply  states  that  his
reputation precedes him. Only then does the interlocutor begin to explain what that reputation
53 Pfeiffer  (1949) 170 on  Call.  Iambi  191.79:  ‘φεῦγε·  βάλλει·  φεῦγ'’  ἐρεῖ  ‘τὸν ἄνθρωπον.’  Clayman (1980)
hypothesizes that the individual who is being fled in Iambi 191.79 is the poet Hipponax “whose words are [. . .]
unwelcome” (15). 
54 Clayman (1980) 47 n. 77. For anger and horns, cf. Verg. Georg. 3.232 and Ov. Met. 8.882. and Ecl. 9.25
55 Porphyrio 1.4.34.3-1.4.35.1: Romae autem uidemus hodieque faenum uelut ansulam fact<u>m in cornulo boui
poni, quo signum datur transeuntibus, ut eum uitent.
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involves. Laughter (risum) in v. 34 is the first particular complaint mentioned.
According to the interlocutor, Horace pursues a laugh without regard for himself or for
others. By Aristotle's definition (nearly verbatim56), he is a βωμολόχος—a scurra. The direction
of the laughter is of no consequence to such a man. Laughter is an end in itself, regardless of its
object or source. He may even be willing to make himself and his friends the targets of laughter,
or he may be unsparing and relentless in his attempts to provoke their and his own laughter. The
poet just needs laughter. That he is a poet is confirmed in v. 36, although the interlocutor does not
ascribe  particular  care  to  this  poet's  production  (e.g.,  illeuerit).  In  any case,  the  poet  loves
spreading his filth  amidst  all  of the gossipy populations—old women and young boys.  It  is
unclear whether they are reading and disseminating his work themselves or are mere indicators
of just how far (i.e., low) it has already traveled, but the interlocutor portrays Horace laughing—
or at least relishing laughter—beyond all bounds of discretion.
The “accuser” is not identified, but the fact that one person speaks rather than a collective
is confirmed when Horace uses singular imperatives in his rejoinder at the end of v. 38: “Come
now, hear a few things in response”—agedum pauca  accipe contra.  Whoever is leveling the
charges, Horace responds as if that person is present before him. But, of course, the accuser is
present. Had Horace assigned a name to this interlocutor, readers might assume that the satirist is
engaging with a particular critic. With an anonymous accuser, the accusations remain unattached,
and readers are given an opportunity to recall that the satirist himself is creating the voice of the
accuser. Horace, in the accusation of his interlocutor, confesses a feature of his poetry that is
potentially objectionable, but he also dictates the terms of the objection. And there among the
first of these terms is laughter—risus in v. 34. When he represents the arguments of an opponent
of  his  satire,  Horace  begins  with  laughter,  describing  it  in  all  its  irresistible  (for  particular
56 See the discussion of Aristotle's theories of laughter in the introduction.
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speakers and audiences) and frustrating (for opponents) glory.
In his response to the anonymous accuser, Horace first argues that he is not really a poet
(vv.  39-63)57 before  explaining  that  innocent  people  have  nothing to  fear  from him (64-70)
because his work is not really shared with the public (vv. 71-78). An interlocutor interrupts again
in vv. 78-79 and prompts an impassioned response from the satirist in vv. 79-93. This accuser,
like  the  one  who  speaks  in  vv.  34-38,  remains  unnamed,  but  a  laughter-conscious  Horace
operates behind both accusation and response:
'laedere gaudes'
inquit 'et hoc studio prauus facis.' unde petitum
hoc in me iacis? est auctor quis denique eorum, 80
uixi cum quibus? absentem qui rodit, amicum
qui non defendit alio culpante, solutos
qui captat risus hominum famamque dicacis,
fingere qui non uisa potest, commissa tacere
qui nequit: hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caueto. 85
saepe tribus lectis uideas cenare quaternos,
e quibus unus amet quauis aspergere cunctos
praeter eum qui praebet aquam; post hunc quoque potus,
condita cum uerax aperit praecordia Liber:
hic tibi comis et urbanus liberque uidetur 90
infesto nigris: ego si risi, quod ineptus
pastillos Rufillus olet, Gargonius hircum,
liuidus et mordax uideor tibi?
“You love to wound,”
one says, “and you do this crookedly and zealously.” From where
do you make this attack on me? Is there an author of these things 80
with whom I have lived? He who back-bites, he who fails to
defend a friend when another is blaming him, he who aims for
the unfettered laughs of men and the reputation of a wit,
who is able to fashion nonexistent things, who cannot keep silent
about secrets: he is the blackguard. Beware, Roman, this man! 85
Often when, on the three couches, you would see foursomes dining,
one of these would love to splatter everyone in any way
besides the guy who supplies the water; later, drunk, him too,
when truthful Liber reveals hidden feelings:
to you, the enemy of blackguards, this man seems cultured 90
and frank. But I, if I laughed because foolish Rufillus 
57 I treat this passage at the beginning of this chapter. 
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smells like menthol, Gargonius like a goat—
do I seem to you to be spiteful and cutting?
The accuser  does  not  refer  to  explicit  laughter  with the  term  gaudes in  v.  78,  but  the  verb
approaches the semantic territory of gestiet in v. 37.58 The satirist's self-indulgent motivations are
on  trial  in  both  accusations.  Indeed,  the  accuser's  declaration  in  vv.  78-79  paraphrases  and
compresses the one from vv. 34-38, the main difference being that the charge that is levied later
in the poem is also more personal—a direct attack in the second-person. 
Horace's reply suggests that the earlier attack—the one that foregrounded a fixation on
laughter—is still very much on his mind: terms for laughter and the risible feature (risus  and
dicax in v. 83 and risi in v. 91) amidst broader considerations of friendship and conviviality.59 He
indicates two different types of laughter in his reply: there is bad laughter (vv. 81-90), but then
there is  his  laughter (vv.  91-93). In describing the bad laughter,  the satirist  demonstrates his
agreement with many of the sentiments announced by his anonymous accuser in vv. 34-38. The
man who treats laughter as an end in itself (dummodo risum / excutiat in vv. 34-35 vs. solutos /
qui captat risus hominum in vv. 82-83) demonstrates an irresponsible use of the behavior. He
neither spares a friend (cuiquam parcet amico in v. 35) nor defends him (amicum  /  qui non
defendit alio culpante vv. 81-82). “Keep your distance,” the first accuser announces (longe fuge
in v. 34); “Beware!” says Horace (hunc tu, Romane, caueto in v. 85).
Even after this  scathing portrait  of a man who abuses friends and laughter  alike,  the
satirist does not disavow laughter altogether. He still laughs—at least conditionally; the nesting
of  risi  in  a  conditional  sentence  allows  him  to  maintain  a  modicum  of  distance  from  the
dangerous behavior. In any case, his is a different type of laughter. His rhetorical question in vv.
58 OLD s.v. gestio (3).
59 Hendrickson (1900) 133 n. 2 argues that vv. 81-85 should be assigned to Horace's interlocutor.  See Hunter
(1985) 489 n. 53 for a summary of the scholarly debate regarding to whom these lines should belong. I follow
Shackleton Bailey's text and give these verses to the satirist.
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91-93 hints that this laughter is not “spiteful and cutting” (v. 93). He laughs because of men with
bad hygiene, not men with bad conceptions of friendship, and he offers for comparison a portrait
of his interlocutor failing to defend a friend adequately (vv. 93-100). Horace declares that such a
defect (uitium in v. 101) has no place in his papers (vv. 100-103). “But if I speak a little too
freely,  perhaps  a  little  too  jokingly  (iocosius),  you  will  grant  me  this  justification  with
forgiveness [. . .],” he states, with the vocabulary of the risible (iocosius) occurring in another
conditional,  although this  one less  cautious—more vivid—than that of vv.  91-93.60 Twice in
fifteen verses he (hypothetically) associates himself with laughing and joking. In the remainder
of the poem, Horace relates a lengthy explanation (v.105-140) of how his upbringing influenced
his satirical practice and caps things off with his threat to “convert” his interlocutor to poetry.
Readers are presented with repeated accusations in  Satires  1.4 that associate Horace, in
his role as satirist,  with laughter and the laughable.  These accusations appear as anonymous
items of hate mail—no signature and no return address, and they present Horace's use of laughter
as predatory and malignant. Yet Horace recounts these letters to his addressee (and his readers)
and, in replying to them (which is to say, in offering his  apologiae), he repeatedly admits to
consorting with laughter. The key difference is that the use of laughter to which he admits is
harmless, and on the off chance that his jokes go a little too far, he begs your forgiveness. But
when the Horatian satirist reads his hate mail aloud, and when the Horatian satirist, doe-eyed and
apologetic, confesses his association with innocent laughter, the reader must recall that the very
same figure is both accuser and defender. Horace sends himself the items of hate mail, all of
which are tellingly composed in the same conversational meter as his Sermones, and he implants
in his reader's mind a “worst-case-scenario.” But before this scenario can linger there for too
long,  he  responds  in  his  own voice  with  an  explanation  far  preferable  to  that  “worst-case-
60 Satires 1.4.103-105: liberius si / dixero quid, si forte iocosius, hoc mihi iuris / cum uenia dabis [. . .].
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scenario.”61 Whether the reader agrees with the accusations in the hate mail or with the satirist's
responses, she ultimately agrees with the satirist that laughter is a central—if contentious—part
of his program.
The  apologiae  that Horace offers throughout  Satires  1.4 are quite literally “speeches in
defense,” a fact made most apparent by the way that quoted attacks erupt throughout the poem
and seemingly compel the satirist to respond on the spot.62 But the apologia that Horace offers in
Satires 1.10 takes shape differently; he opens Satires 1.10 already on the defensive. The verbatim
accusations to which he is initially replying are not quoted, but  he seems eager to revisit and
justify some of his recent remarks  (nempe [. . .] dixi in v. 1) about Lucilius, many of which
resemble comments the satirist makes about Lucilius in Satires 1.4.63 It is as if he is responding
to an attack in which his opponent quoted his own poetry back at him. His first verses rephrase
his criticism of Lucilius' versification from 1.4.8-13, but he tempers the negative critique with an
acknowledgment of his predecessor's great wit (sale multo, v. 3). He goes on to explain in vv. 7-
15 that wit alone does not make good verse:
ergo non satis est risu diducere rictum
auditoris; et est quaedam tamen hic quoque virtus.
est breuitate opus, ut currat sententia neu se
inpediat uerbis lassas onerantibus auris, 10
et sermone opus est modo tristi, saepe iocoso,
defendente uicem modo rhetoris atque poetae,
interdum urbani, parcentis uiribus atque
extenuantis eas consulto. ridiculum acri
fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res. 15
Therefore it does not suffice to part the jaws of a listener
61 From a reader response standpoint, this movement from “bad laughter” to “better laughter” (if genuine) could
occasion a sense of relief that results in actual laughter. A similar discussion in the context of movements from
heavier to lighter genres in recusationes appears in Chapter 6.
62 LSJ s.v. ἀπολογία.
63 This need not mean that Horace replies to actual accusations arising from readers of Satires 1.4. Gowers (2012)
173 explains that a similar move in  Satires  1.4 can be regarded as “fictive intratextual 'stock-taking.'” (She
thanks John Henderson for the “stock-taking” portion of the formulation.)
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with a laugh; yet there is also a certain virtue in this.
One needs brevity, so the thought runs freely and does not
trip itself up with words that burden fatigued ears, 10
and one needs speech, now harsh, often playful,
now maintaining the place of the speaker and poet,
but sometimes of the urbane man, reserving his strength and
thinning it deliberately. A little laugh, by and large, 
cuts weighty matters better and more firmly than sharpness. 15
As  in  Satires  1.1.23-27,  the  satirist  seems  unable  to  critique  laughter  without  immediately
blunting this criticism in subsequent verses. The laughter of one's audience is clearly regarded as
an insufficient objective for a versifier in vv. 7-8 of  Satires  1.10, but Horace scarcely finishes
relating the point before be backpedals to note that eliciting laughter from an audience is no
mean  feat.  In  vv.  11-14,  he  articulates  a  stylistic  rubric  that  encourages  variability,  and  he
indicates that both harsh and playful speech—sermo tristis  and sermo iocosus—are necessities
(v. 11). In the final third of the passage (vv. 13-15), a certain Horatian partiality toward laughter
and playfulness reveals itself. The urbanus man (v. 13) who makes use of the sermo iocusus is
granted an additional half-verse of description that emphasizes his restraint and, by extension, his
considerable  power.  The  verb  parcentis  invites  the  reader  of  the  Sermones  to  recall  the
accusation lodged against the satirist in Satires 1.4.35 that he spares neither himself nor a friend
in  his  pursuit  of  a  laugh:  sibi  non,  non  cuiquam  parcet amico.  This  urbanus man is  more
responsible with his strength.
The  speaker's  sympathies  for the  sermo iocosus  are  ultimately  confirmed  when  he
proclaims that laughter is an effective tool for addressing matters of import. After the urbane man
has taken hold of this style of speech and thinned it appropriately, a diminutive of the risus of v.
7  is  what  remains:  ridiculum  in  v.  14.  The  immediate  meaning  of  the  term  remains  “the
laughable,”  but I  translate  ridiculum  as “a little laugh” in order  to draw out the incongruity
Horace sets out between laughter and the sizable, weighty, and important matters through which
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it cuts. What these magnae res are and why they must be "cut" is not addressed in the immediate
context;64 the focus falls squarely on (“little”) laughter's power. The sententious declaration of vv.
14-15  reads  as  a  general  advertisement  for  spoudaiogeloion,  but  one  that  places  particular
emphasis on the geloion.
The  emphasis  is  maintained  in  the  verse  and  a  half  that  follow this  pronouncement
wherein the vocabulary of the risible is conveyed with the demonstrative hoc:
illi, scripta quibus comoedia prisca uiris est, 16
hoc stabant, hoc sunt imitandi. 
Those men, by whom early comedy was written 16
relied upon this [i.e., the ridiculum]—they must be imitated in this.
I supply ridiculum as the antecedent of hoc in v. 17, although Horace may very well be referring
to the entire sentiment expressed in vv. 14-15. In either case, he stresses the merits of laughter
and the laughable. Moreover, with his mention of comoedia prisca, he nods to the treatment of
comedians with which he began Satires 1.4 and aligns his own work with theirs.65
Horace begins Satires 1.10 by defending recent remarks he made in critique of Lucilius'
poetry,  but his  (resumed) attack on the ur-satirist's  stylistic  shortcomings also functions as a
vehicle for praise of Lucilius' wit. Of course, this praise is not unconditional; abundance of wit
and the laughter it provokes are simply insufficient (non satis est, v. 7)66 to make up for other
shortcomings. Horace's criticism of Lucilius' verse nevertheless doubles as an insistent apologia
for laughter. He identifies wit (sal, v. 4) as praiseworthy (laudatur, v. 4), playful speech (iocosus,
v. 11) as necessary (opus est, v. 11), and the competent use of the laughable (ridiculum, v. 14) as
worth emulating (sunt imitandi, v. 17). 
“It is not enough to provoke laughter,” says Horace in 1.10.7-8, but his repeated pairing
64 Cf. Satires 1.5.28 for Horace's use of magnae res in reference to politics.
65 Parker (1986) 41-54 argues persuasively for the consistency of 1.4 and 1.10 in their representations of Lucilius.
See also Freudenburg (1993) 103.
66 Non satis est also appears in 1.4.54 when Horace writes about what “makes” poetry.
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of satire (and the satirist) in Satires 1.4 and 1.10 with wit, jokes, and laughter demonstrates that
the  behavior  and  its  attendant  vocabulary  remain  a  necessary  part  of  the  satirical  program:
laughter  must be  provoked.  His  responses to  quoted and implied attacks  on his  own use of
laughter assert that a satirist simply needs to use the right kind of laughter, for example, harmless
(1.4.91-93) or “little” laughter (1.10.14), and he needs to use it in the right circumstances, such
as in critiques of minor faults (1.4.91-93). Or are the right circumstances for laughter during
treatments of “weighty matters” (1.10.14-15)? The satirist's presentation of the proper spirit of
laughter  remains  relatively  consistent,  embodying  Aristotle's  ideal  of  εὐτραπελία in  the
Nicomachean Ethics 4.8,67 but the examples he adduces for some of the proper circumstances for
laughter, even when he is explicitly attending to the topic, are not coherent. 
Laughter appears scattered throughout the Liber Sermonum in a variety of situations, as
does the vocabulary for laughter and the risible, and I examine select occasions of laughter in
Satires  1.7 and 1.5 in the final section of this chapter.  In anticipation of those arguments that
follow, a particular detail of the conclusions arrived at in the previous pages warrants restating,
namely,  the  fact  that  Horace  presents  laughter  as  a  fundamental  part  of  his  satiric  program
without admitting to having laughed in his role as satirist. He places accusations of buffoonish
laughter  in  interlocutor's  mouths  and  embraces  first-person  associations  with  laughter  only
conditionally.  While  I  have  represented  these  attacks,  defenses,  and  evasions  as  points  of
programmatic  self-fashioning  throughout  which  the  satirist  incorporates  laughter  while
maintaining control of his text, one may wonder whether they also betray a more deep-seated
caution held by the satirist for the potentially-prickly topic of laughter.
SECTION III: DISPENSING (WITH) LAUGHTER AS GELASTIC CAUTION
67 See the discussion of Aristotle's treatments of laughter in the introduction, pp. 32-42.
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Satires  1.7, the shortest poem in the book and, in the estimation of some critics, little
more than a “B-side” to the rest of Horace's Liber Sermonum,68 contains one occasion of explicit
laughter (ridetur in v. 22) and one instance of the vocabulary of the risible (salso in v. 28). From
the standpoint of plot, the “mock-epic” verbal battle between a proscribed Rupilius Rex and a
Greek named Persius seems little more than a lengthy, 34-verse tee-up for an easy pun.69 
proscripti Regis Rupili pus atque uenenum
hybrida quo pacto sit Persius ultus, opinor
omnibus et lippis notum et tonsoribus esse.
Persius hic permagna negotia diues habebat
Claxomenis, et iam litis cum Rege molestas, 5
durus homo atque odio qui posset uincere Regem,
confidens, tumidus, adeo sermonis amari
Sisennas, Barros ut equis praecurreret albis.
ad Regem redeo. postquam nihil inter utrumque
conuenit—hoc etenim sunt omnes iure molesti 10
quo fortes quibus aduersum bellum incidit; inter
Hectora Priamiden animosum atque inter Achillem
ira fuit capitalis, ut ultima diuideret mors,
non aliam ob causam nisi quod uirtus in utroque
summa fuit: duo si discordia uexat inertis 15
aut si disparibus bellum incidat, ut Diomedi
cum Lycio Glauco, discedat pigrior ultro
muneribus missis: Bruto praetore tenente
ditem Asiam Rupili et Persi par pugnat, uti non 
compositum melius cum Bitho Bachius. in ius 20
acres procurrunt, magnum spectaculum uterque.
Persius exponit causam; ridetur ab omni
conuentu; laudat Brutum laudatque cohortem,
solem Asiae Brutum appellat stellasque salubris
appellat comites excepto Rege; Canem illum, 25
inuisum agricolis sidus, uenisse: ruebat
flumen ut hibernum, fertur quo rara securis.
tum Praenestinus salso multoque fluenti
expressa arbusto regerit conuicia, durus
uindemiator et inuictus, cui saepe uiator 30
cessisset magna compellans uoce cuculum.
at Graecus, postquam est Italo perfusus aceto,
Persius exclamat per magnos, Brute, deos te
68 Perhaps to be read alongside Satires  1.2 and 1.8. Zetzel (1980) says, “[B]oth 7 and 8 are jokes (and not very
good ones at that)” (66). Gowers (2012) 250 highlights some of the negative reception 1.7 has received from
such figures as Dryden, Fraenkel, and Rudd.
69 See, e.g., Rudd (1966) 67.
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oro, qui reges consueris tollere, cur non
hunc Regem iugulas? Operum hoc, mihi crede, tuorum est. 35
The way in which the gall and venum of the proscribed Rupilius King
was punished by the mixed-blood Persius, I suppose
is known to all the bleary-eyed men and barbers.
This Persius was managing big business (he was rich) at
Clazomenae and, beyond, he was managing with King vexing lawsuits, 5
a tough man and one who was able to best King in hostility.
He was confident, proud, with such a handle on harsh speech
that he could outstrip fast-talkers and blowhards on white horses.
I come back to King: after nothing was settled between the two—
(indeed, in this way all man are vexed in a legal case, 10
in the way that brave men are, for whom a hostile war comes:
between Hector son of Priam and courageous Achilles there was
such deadly anger that finally death would divide them
for no other reason than because bravery for each
was most important: if Discord should plague two sluggish men 15
or war should come to unequally matched ones, as to Diomedes
with Lycian Glaucus, the lesser man would yield, and then,
with bribes distributed) with Brutus as praetor possessing
rich Asia, the duo of Rupilius and Persius fights, such that no
better a match was Bachius with Bithus. Into court 20
the keen men rush, each a great spectacle in himself.
Persius lays out his case; he provokes laughs from the entire
court; he praises Brutus and praises his company,
he names Brutus the sun of Asia and the beneficent stars
his companions—with the exception of Rex; that man came as 25
the Dog-star hostile to farmers: he [Persius] was rushing
like a wintry river by which the rare axe is carried.
Then, at the one flowing with great wit, the Praenestine
man throws back insults squeezed from the orchard, a tough
grape-picker, unconquerable, to whom a passerby often 30
had conceded after shouting out “Cuckoo” in a loud voice.
But the Greek, after he had been suffused in Italian vinegar,
Persius shouts: “In the name of the great gods, Brutus, I beg
you, who are accustomed to removing kings, why don't you
butcher this King? This, believe me, is in need of your service! 35
The poem, however, is more complex than the linear narrative it presents, a fact that Du Quesnay
(1984), Henderson (1994), and Gowers (2006, 2012) have gone a long way in demonstrating by
their political readings of the work and, likewise, Buchheit (1968) and Anderson (1972) by their
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literary-critical  explications.70 The  characters  involved,  the  Homeric  allusions,  the  silence  of
Brutus, the self-positioning of the speaker—all of these elements lend depth to an otherwise one-
dimensional anecdote in which two parties contest a case before a judge whose ruling the reader
never learns. Laughter plays an important role in this satire, one that becomes most apparent both
through the explicit laughter that appears in v. 22 and through the laughter that is conspicuously
absent in the wake of the pun in the poem's concluding verses.
“The pun does the opposite of defusing tension,” Gowers declares, but she stops short of
explaining why the concluding pun of  Satires  1.7 fails in this respect.71 It is difficult to assert
what the pun does or does not do when nothing follows the pun—when there is no record of its
reception, neither groans nor giggles. The blank space, the “nothing,” that follows Persius' pun is
the ostensible reason for Gowers' observation, but she stops short of tying this “nothing” to the
absence of laughter. Henderson, on the other hand, speaks to the point: “If there is to be a laugh,
whether of appreciation or of derision, on whatever interpretation or refusal to interpret, the text
has precisely been staged to get rid of it. Any smirks, groans, cackles, hoots, roars, brutific smiles
come, if they come, from the reader.”72 The pun is an open-ended question, after which the poem
is handed off to the reader to decide what response the final joke earns. If the reader decides to
laugh, she does so at her own risk. The only release of tension assured by the text at the end of
the narrative is ambiguous silence—a patch of blank space on the page before a piece of wood
begins speaking at the beginning of Satires 1.8.73
Where laughter is expected, silence seems hardly ambiguous. The assertive formulation
of Gowers' and Henderson's arguments is that the concluding pun of Satires 1.7 creates tension,
70 Buchheit (1968) 528, 542-553: “In [Satires 1.7] sind Homerparodie und Literarkritik besonders eindringlich
verbunden” (542).
71 Gowers (2012) 251-2.
72 Henderson (1994) 157.
73 Anderson (1972) examines the similarities between Satires 1.7 and 1.8.
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and it does so by way of the silence—the “not-laughter”—that follows it. Under day-to-day, non-
literary circumstances, a joke that goes unacknowledged ultimately fails. If a stand-up comic's
pun receives no *buh-duh-pish* from the house drummer, let alone laughs from the audience,
she probably will  not  reuse that  bit.  Even a groan or a snort  in  response to a punning joke
delivered among friends is preferable to silence. In this way, the lack of any evidence of internal
audience reaction to the conclusion of Satires 1.7 could be meant to function as a critique, as if to
say, “This particular wordplay should not be dignified with a response.” 
But Horatian satire does not offer the “day-to-day, non-literary circumstances” of a stand-
up comic or of a typical conversation among friends, despite the conversational fiction espoused
by the satirist. The laughter that is conspicuously absent from the poem's end should not be read
against its expected context alone but alongside the rest of the poem, the poetic book, and the
genre in which the book is written. Horace offers a poem that precludes laughter precisely when
a reader would most expect to hear (or read) it, and he does so after having incorporated explicit
laughter into the previous verses. This vacillating inclusion and exclusion of explicit laughter in
Satires  1.7 raises some of the same questions discussed in the context of  Satires  1.1, 1.4, and
1.10. Who is the addressee, who is the speaker, what is the satirist up to, and with or at whom are
we supposed to laugh? Horace uses the ambiguity of laughter in Satires 1.7 not to answer these
questions but to pose them in a new context.
The occasion of laughter that appears in the work occurs after the satire's participants (the
litigants Rupilius Rex and Persius and the judge Brutus) have been introduced:
Persius exponit causam; ridetur ab omni
conuentu; laudat Brutum laudatque cohortem,
solem Asiae Brutum appellat stellasque salubris
appellat comites excepto Rege; Canem illum, 25
inuisum agricolis sidus, uenisse: ruebat
flumen ut hibernum, fertur quo rara securis.
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Persius lays out his case; he provokes laughs from the entire
court; he praises Brutus and praises his company,
he names Brutus the sun of Asia and the beneficent stars
his companions—with the exception of Rex; that man came as 25
the Dog-star hostile to farmers: he was rushing
like a wintry river by which the rare axe is carried.
The simile in vv. 26-27 is difficult  to parse because the action between the axe and river is
unclear,74 but the verses that precede the simile, with their parallel syntaxes and repetitions of key
words, are simple enough as a vivid narration of past events. Persius is the subject of every
present-tense verb in vv. 22-25 until the clause of indirect discourse in vv. 25-26 wherein he
makes Rupilius Rex (illum) the accusative subject of the infinitive  uenisse  and equates Rex's
arrival with that of the agriculturally-foreboding star Sirius. Persius then resumes his role as
subject of ruebat, although the tense of the verb (imperfect rather than present) marks this as an
intrusion by the storyteller rather than a vivid narration of the events themselves.75 
From a narrative standpoint, the verbs are deceptively complex, and the verb of laughing
is especially troublesome. Although Gowers asserts that  ridetur is an impersonal passive that
allows  the  laughter  “to  continue  throughout  the  contest,”  she  also  angles  the  laughter
proleptically toward Persius: “The audience laughs at the sycophancy of 24-7 before the reader
has a chance to hear why.”76 I agree with some, but not all, of Gowers' points. The laughter in v.
22 is proleptic and metacommunicatively charged (and thus applicable to the entire contest),77
but if the audience is laughing at the sycophancy of Persius, I do not see why the verb should be
74 Rudd's (1997) 30 translation refers to a “wild ravine where an axe but seldom reaches.” Gowers (2012) 259
likewise  suggests  an  involved  interaction  between  an  axe,  the  river,  and  its  surrounding  woods:  “[A]
woodsman's axe is 'rarely borne' either because the ravine is inaccessible and dangerous or because a torrent
would uproot trees on its way and make woodcutting unnecessary.” I imagine that the axe has been left near the
banks of the river by a heedless woodsman, and the flooding river is strong enough to have swept up an object
as heavy as an axe in its torrent.
75 Cf. habebat at the beginning of the satire (v. 4).
76 Gowers (2012) 258-9. Kiessling and Heinze (1961) 134 think it exceedingly unlikely that Horace would use the
impersonal passive with  a: “Ein unpersönliches Passiv aber mit  a dürfte im Lateinischen überhaupt kaum je
vorkommen.”
77 See Chapter 2 for a comparable argument with regard to the laughter at the beginning of Vergil's Eclogue 3.
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read impersonally. Persius is the subject of the verbs on either side of ridetur (exponit  in v. 22
and laudat in v. 23), and he is the implicit subject of ridetur. I do not, however, interpret the verb
as indicating derision. Persius and his words are the stimulus to laughter, but he is not being
laughed at.78 He controls the laughter, just as he controls the speech before and after the verb of
laughing appears. 
Any conclusive explanation for the laughter is,  as usual,  difficult  to identify.  Perhaps
Persius elicits admiring laughs from the audience for rhetorical flourishes that survive embedded
in the speaker's account of the episode; the repetition of laudat and appellat in parallel references
to Brutus and his cohort  may mimic word repetition in Persius'  own speech.79 Likewise,  the
imagery of the stars that is cast as praise for Brutus and then skillfully inverted to cut against
Rupilius  Rex is  credited  to  Persius  through indirect  discourse.  Or  perhaps  Persius  provokes
laughter  because  of  his  torrential  outpouring  of  speech,  flecks  of  spittle  flying  like  the
whitewater  of  the  rushing  river  to  which  he  is  compared.  Perhaps,  if  one  follows  Gowers'
reading, the laughter is at Persius' expense in response to his obsequious opening. The speaker
does not identify the specific trigger to laughter, but it can hardly be coincidental that Persius' wit
receives mention moments after he finishes speaking:
tum Praenestinus salso multoque fluenti 28
expressa arbusto regerit conuicia [. . .].
Then, at the one flowing with great wit, the Praenestine 28
man throws back insults squeezed from the orchard [. . .].
The narrator returns to fluid imagery to describe Persius as the “one flowing with great wit,” and
so both occurrences of laughter-related vocabulary in Satires 1.7 are applied to Persius. Unless
78 For a similar use of the passive  ridetur,  cf.  De or.  2.284, wherein incongruity is recognized as a source of
laughter without being a specific object of ridicule. For contrast, cf. the blundering citharoedus who is laughed
at (ridetur) in A.P. 356 in Chapter 1.
79 Buchheit (1968) 543 refers to Persius' Asiatic style—“asianischem Stil”.
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the speaker is referring ironically to Persius' wit,80 Persius plays the role of the “funny guy.” He
is also characterized and narrated as the poem's protagonist, the avenger (sit . . . ultus  in v. 2)
granted the first and last word in the internal debate.81 His punning exclamation in vv. 32-34 is
the only quoted speech in the poem, and its appearance in the concluding verses frames it as the
fulfillment of the revenge forecast in the opening verses of the poem. After Persius speaks, the
story is over. The addressees have been given what they were promised.
The technique of concluding a potentially laugh-worthy anecdote with a punning final
line is not unique to Horace. Recall Catullus' c. 53, discussed in Chapter 2 in my introduction to
the concept of metacommunication:82
risi nescio quem modo e corona,
qui, cum mirifice Vatiniana
meus crimina Caluus explicasset,
admirans ait haec manusque tollens,
'di magni, salaputium disertum!' 5
I just laughed at someone from the crowd
who, when my Calvus had wonderfully
set forth the crimes of Vatinius,
raised his hands in admiration and said the following:
“Great gods, what a literary widdle wit-ster.” 5
Catullus' short anecdote permits considerably less “coloring” in its 5 lines than Horace's satire of
34  verses,  but  situational  and  structural  parallels  between  the  two  poems  are  immediately
apparent: a legal setting, two figures in conflict, an audience collective, an outburst of laughter,
an unnamed addressee, and a direct quotation at poem's end. A key difference, other than that the
punning speaker in Catullus' poem is an anonymous spectator rather than a participant in the
trial, resides in the different manner in which laughter is deployed in each poem. The speaker of
80 Buchheit (1968) shies away from an ironic reading and identifies sympathy in Horace's approach to Persius:
“Wenn vorher V. 31 griechisches Salz und italische Schärfe einander gegenübergestellt werden, ist Horazens
Sympathie trotz gewisser Einschränkungen auf der Seite des sal Graecum” (546).
81 Of the two litigants, Persius first sets out his case (in vv. 21-26, treated in the previous pages) and then delivers
the poem-ending pun in vv. 32-34.
82 See Chapter 2, pp. 85-97.
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c. 53 confesses laughter for himself in the poem's first word, and in doing so, he shares it with
any addressee who identifies and laughs with him. The speaker of Horace's  Satires  1.7, on the
other  hand,  claims  no  share  in  the  laughter  incorporated  into  his  narrative.  These  differing
approaches to laughter offer insight into Horace's satiric voice in Satires 1.7 and throughout the
Liber Sermonum.
The addressee qua reader of Catullus' c. 53 may laugh because she understands the pun in
v. 5, because she identifies with the speaker (“Catullus”), or even because she adopts a playfully
deprecating attitude toward stories about Calvus. Whatever her reason (and those I have listed do
not exhaust the options), the poem makes it possible for her to laugh without exposing herself
excessively. When she laughs, she has, at the very least, a single, confirmed ally in the poetic
speaker himself. As for Horace's Satires 1.7, the laughter present in (vv. 25) the poem and absent
from its conclusion has various potential trajectories, some of which risk alienating the reader
who shares in the laughter. The reader groups herself with  omnis conuentus  (vv. 21-22) if she
laughs in response to Persius' opening argument, but she must determine for herself whether they
are laughing at or because of Persius. The satire only informs her that audience members within
the poem found something in the proceedings laugh-worthy. However happy she may be to be
laughing amidst company, she is offered few clues as the make-up of this company and even
fewer as the reasons for their laughter.
As for the satire's abrupt conclusion, I have already drawn attention to the fact that the
text confirms nothing but silence following Persius' pun. On the one hand, this textual silence
could  be  a  measured  attempt  on the  part  of  the  narrator  to  solicit  an audience  response  by
crescendoing to a punchline—ending with a bang rather than watering down the joke with an
explanation.  On  the  other,  the  silence  could  also  represent  the  satirist's  implicit  critical
assessment of the pun. Consider,  for example,  how various,  potential  reader responses could
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shape and be shaped by the satire's conclusion. If one believes that Persius' pun aims for laughter,
a laugh elicited from the reader at this point would seem to ally her with Persius. Even a groan
acknowledges the pun as a pun while allowing the reader to give voice to her reservations about
Persius'  punning inabilities.  These  responses empower Persius  in  his  capacity  as  a  joker  by
allowing his wordplay to remain playful. A different reader response would be silence, and this
one is sanctioned by the (lack of) text. In the same way that the text's lack of acknowledgement
of the pun is ambiguous and potentially critical, silence as a reader response communicates the
same indeterminacies, including the additional question of whether the reader “got” the joke at
all.83 
There remains a reader response to the pun that I believe would be even less desirable
than  silence:  scornful  laughter.  An  outside  observer  might  easily  confuse  the  reader  who
embodies  this  response with  the  reader  who finds  Persius'  pun successful.  Both  readers  are
laughing, but their reasons for laughing are entirely different. One reader laughs in recognition of
the  pun's  success.  The  other  derides  the  weakness of  the  pun  and,  by  extension,  the  entire
narrative frame in which it is presented. The butt of the joke in the latter case is not Brutus,
Persius, or Rupilius Rex but the joke itself—and any audience so gauche as to find the episode
worth laughing at in the first place.84
One might shy away from such an ironic reading of the satire. After all, it destabilizes the
poem at its conclusion and casts the satirist in a manipulative narrative role: “Have you heard
this story? It  sounds like it  could be worth a laugh (and some people even laugh in it),” he
begins, before declaring afterward, “It's not though, and if you laughed, the joke is on you!”
83 If commentaries are any indication, I suspect that this response is the prevailing one among modern readers,
many of whom require an explanation of the joke. I wonder if a public recitation of a good translation—perhaps
one that substitutes modern names and figures for the actors—would yield different audience responses than
private reading.
84 It seems to me that scornful laughter would only be a viable response at the conclusion of the poem when the
reader can rest assured that no further twists remain.
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Elements of the very framing of Satires 1.7 nevertheless accommodate this more ironic role for
the satirist.  For example,  the narration of the anecdote forcibly assimilates  the reader to  the
rabble among whom, according to our speaker, the story has already been circulated: the bleary-
eyed men who gossip at the pharmacy and the barbershop (v. 3). The reader does not even need
to laugh in order to be counted as a part of this group; simply knowing the story makes her part
of the confabulating cognoscenti. She may derive some comfort from a belief that the speaker, by
sharing the story with her, does not initially presume her to be among the gossips, but the speaker
also offers her no opportunity to avoid joining their ranks.
To laugh in the middle, after the end, or in response to any other part of the poem, is to
participate in the gossip—to cast a vote for or against Persius, for or against the audience, even
for or against Brutus (and, by extension, Tarquinius Superbus85/Julius Caesar/Octavian). And this
vote must be cast without any clear indication of for or against whom the satirist himself would
vote, or whether he would vote at all. While the first-person narrator of Catullus' c. 53 confesses
his own laughter (risi) in the opening word of the poem and speaks as if an eye-witness to the
events, the reader of Satires 1.7 receives no comparable assurance of the speaker's laughter. The
satirist writes himself into the poem only fleetingly in v. 2 and v. 9 (opinor and redeo) and never
confirms a first-hand account of the episode, however much his editorializing implies one. For
all the reader knows, the speaker is relaying and embellishing a story that he heard when he
received  his  most  recent  haircut.  Horace  cultivates  and  maintains  a  cautious  distance  from
laughter,  first,  when he writes ambiguous laughter  into the  poem and then,  when he denies
textually-confirmed laughter from the poem's end.
The  cautious  approach  to  laughter  modeled  in  Satires  1.7  reflects  a  trend witnessed
85 Countless fine threads bind the satires together. Tarquinius' name appears in vv. 12-13 of Satires 1.6, although
Horace there focuses on Laevinus' role in the expulsion of the king. 
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elsewhere in Horace's  Liber Sermonum: the satirist routinely stands aloof from the laughter he
narrates  as  well  as  the  laughter  he  potentially  solicits.  The  preceding  section  on  laughter's
prevalence in Horace's programmatic  apologiae explored several instances in which he aligns
laughter with his satirical  project without confessing to laughter himself—and without  really
claiming that laughter is his objective. Similarly, outside of signposted programmatic passages,
the Liber Sermonum presents occasions of laughter in which the speaker obscures and minimizes
his own participation. He certainly never exclaims, “I laughed,” in the way the Catullan speaker
of c.  53 does.86 Laughter  is  powerful,  polyvalent,  and potentially  pernicious,  and the satirist
handles it like an explosive that is best directed away from himself. He typically plants it as a
textual  booby-trap  and  waits  for  a  laughing  reader  to  trip  the  wire  and  puzzle  out  the
consequences  for herself.  But  the satirist  rarely sets  his  own feet  and confesses to  laughing
himself. To do so would require him to take a position that might require defending. On the rare
occasions that he handles laughter personally, he does so either conditionally or with the help of
discerning friends.
Horace's  conditional  first-person  laughter  is  treated  in  the  previous  examination  of
Satires  1.4.  In  Satires  1.5 Horace laughs twice in  the company of his  traveling companions
(ridentes in v. 35 and ridemus in v. 57), and these are the only two other occasions on which the
satirist  admits to personal laughter in the collection. The travelogue poem is among the best
known in Horace's first book of satires, and it has been treated at length by many scholars. I
content myself to remark briefly upon the occasions of laughter in the poem and otherwise direct
curious readers to Gowers' treatments of the poem in her 1994 article,  “Horace,  Satires 1.5 an
inconsequential journey,” and her 2012 commentary.
Some basic orientation to the poem is nevertheless helpful. Horace recounts a journey in
86 Illudo appears in 1.4.139 and ludo in 1.10.37, but I do not interpret these terms as being gelastically loaded.
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which he accompanied Maecenas to Brundisium for a meeting “regarding great things” (magnis
de rebus in v. 28), but political details are eclipsed throughout the narrative by Horace's personal
interests.  The first  fit  of  laughter  overcomes Horace  shortly  after  his  high-powered contacts
arrive on the scene.87 Maecenas, Cocceius, and Capito Fonteius arrive together in vv. 31-33, just
moments after Horace smears ointment on his ailing eyes—as if to ensure that he will see as little
of the big show as possible. Within three verses of the appearance of these well-known names in
the poem, Horace is eagerly speaking in the first-person plural of “our” collective movements
and likeminded derision for small-town politics:
Fundos Aufidio Lusco praetore libenter
linquimus, insani ridentes praemia scribae, 35
praetextam et latum clauum prunaeque uatillum.
Fundi, where Aufidius Luscus is praetor, we happily
leave behind, laughing at the trappings of the crazy scribe, 35
with his toga praetexta and wide band and coal shovel.
If the satirist is going to laugh haughtily, he now has the proper entourage to do so. He is in the
company of the movers and shakers of contemporary Roman politics, men traveling for business,
not leisure. They are high enough on the social and political ladder that they can laugh at a local
mayor and his blue-collar customs, and who is Horace to abstain? Yet the connections between
Aufidius Luscus and Horace are such that one wonders if Horace may have laughed a little too
loudly.88 Gowers notes that “the nomen Aufidius (cf. Aufidus, H.'s childhood river: 1.58 [. . .])
and the cognomen Luscus, following 20 lippus, make this municipal dignitary an alter ego for H.
from his restricted past.”89 Tack on a reference to a professional writer (scriba, v. 35) and the
(self-)portrait is sketched all the more vividly.
87 Horace is not alone before this point, but the only evidence of his rhetorical traveling companion Heliodorus
after  his  naming in  v.  2  are  scattered  first-person  plural  verbs,  nominative  plural  adjectives,  and  personal
pronouns (e.g., v. 5 hoc iter ignaui diuisimus, altius ac nos [. . .]).
88 Taking the verse in sequence, the reader may wonder at first whether insani, sandwiched between linquimus and
ridentes, describes the subjects' frenzied laughter.
89 Gowers (2012) 195.
213
The second occasion of laughter occurs when the group, augmented by the arrival of
Vergil, Varius, and Plotius, is lodging with Cocceius, whose villa affords them a superior view of
the  cauponae in Caudium. This occasion of laughter in  Satires 1.5 resembles that of 1.7 and
appears within a mock-epic exchange, although this one is lengthier and more detailed than its
successor  in  the  collection.90 The  verbal  agon is  recounted  in  vv.  51-69  complete  with  an
invocation of the Muse (v. 53) and Odyssean allusions to a distinguishing scar (cicatrix in v. 60)
and a cyclops (v. 63).91 The speaker quotes the opening attack of the scurra Sarmentus against
the “cocky” (Cicirrus) Messius before narrating the audience's collective response in a vivid
present  tense:  “We laugh” (ridemus  in  v.  57).  He thus claims a  share in  the laughter,  again
participating in the laughter as a plurality with his highly-esteemed friends, and again leaving
himself only as exposed as they are.92
The stakes of the quarrel are admittedly low, and so too is the risk posed to the satirist by
his laughter, both because of his accompanists and the circumstances. In the earliest part of the
exchange, the insulted Messius “accepts” Sarmentus' abuse (accipio  in v. 58), and by horsing
around in a mime of the insult, he participates “affably” in the slight.93 The ridemus of v. 57 also
specifies no object—no recipient of derision. Sandwiched as it is between the initial insult of
Messius and his accommodating response, the laughter contributes to a general atmosphere of
playfulness.  Unlike  the  “great  business  affairs”  that  compel  Persius'  litigation  in  Satires  1.7
(permagna negotia in v. 4), the insults of 1.5 are explicitly identified as jokes (permulta iocatus
in v. 62) and the reasons for the contest left undeclared. 
90 The narrative structures also differ.  The back-and-forth of 1.5 begins with quoted speech and transitions to
indirect discourse, the opposite of what occurs in 1.7. 
91 Barnes (1988) 59 n. 12.
92 The nos of v. 50, fast on the heels of references to Maecenas and Vergil in v. 48, is sufficient reason to include
Horace's companions among those laughing. For his personal regard for all of them, cf. vv. 39-44 and v. 93.
93 Gowers (2012) 202 sets forth a potential interpretation of Messius' “affability” alongside two less convincing
takes on his response.
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The  exchange  between Sarmentus  and Messius  is  an  inset  of  a  larger  story,  and the
speaker offers a closing assessment of the episode in v. 70: “In short, we prolong that dinner
pleasantly”—prorsus iucunde cenam producimus illam. The verbal duel is treated as part of the
dinner  entertainment,  after  which  the  satirist  and  his  fellow  “laughers”  stroll  through  the
remainder of the narrative unblemished (but for a wet dream that stains the satirist's belly in vv.
84-85 and some friendly tears he sheds when Varius separates from the company in v. 93). The
final occasion of  laughter  in  vv.  97-98 of  Satires  1.5  marks  a  return  to  the  caution  Horace
elsewhere observes in his satires. “Laughs and jokes” (risusque iocusque, v. 98) are provoked by
a  specific  city  (Gnatia,  v.  97)  through  which  the  travelers  pass  on  the  way  to  the  poem's
conclusion, but they are neither claimed by nor assigned to anyone in particular.
 Reckford (1999) draws upon the mock-epic episode to consider what it  may indicate
about Horatian satire more generally:
If the little agon is a microcosm of the larger satire, then we may become alerted to the
truth that satire is itself a game, a most civilized and civilizing game, to be sure, yet in the
end only a game, played out within the bounds of a (for now) protected literary and social
playground. But outside, in the unmapped larger world of politics and war, can any limits
hold? Virgil asks similar questions in his Eclogues. His sheltered, hypercivilized world of
pastoral, and of poetry and friendship, has an almost Orphic power to transform nature,
yet is finally vulnerable to the invasive passions of love and war and the displacements of
history. So too with satire. Can Horace's game, however well played, really exorcize the
forces  of  aggressiveness  and  violence?  How  long  can  his  mild  satiric  laughter,  his
"educated mockery," keep them at bay?94
In focusing on this agon, Reckford has selected an episode in the Liber Sermonum in which the
boundaries of the “game of satire” are particularly well defined: 1) the players are all willing, 2)
gameplay is turn-based and fast moving, and 3) the stakes, although they initially seem high
(pugna in v. 52 and v. 56), are low enough that the outcome can be pleasant (iucunde in v. 70).95
In all  three of  these  ways,  Horace  models  elements  of  the  experience  one  may have  while
94 Reckford (1999) 543. Emphases are his own.
95 The notion of “play” is a concept I treat in Chapter 2 and one to which I return in Chapter 5.
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reading his own satires. First, as the speaker explains in Satires 1.4.73, he shares his work with
no one but friends (nec recito cuiquam nisi amicis), so an audience only encounters his creations
willingly. Second, the medium is the rapid back-and-forth of speech and conversation (sermo in
Satires  1.4.48). Third, the style oscillates between high and low, epic in its hexametrical form,
quotidian in content, but with a declared objective of pleasing the  audience.96
One implicit extension of these parallels between the  agon of  Satires  1.5 and Horace's
wider satiric project is that the activity of the satirist becomes the spectacle itself.97 If we are the
audience (rather than Horace) and the Sermones themselves are the agonistic exchange, Horace
plays the roles of Sarmentus and Messius simultaneously. He is the willing scurra (v. 52) as well
as the  scriba  (v. 66), the scarred cock (cicatrix  in v. 60 and  Cicirrus  in v. 52) and the rustic
Cyclops (pastorem [. . .] Cyclopa in v. 63).98 And should the reader find herself at a loss as to
how to respond to the show, Horace and his companions model the proper response: laughter.
Thus,  despite  the  satirist's  caution  in  laughing  only  in  the  company  of  powerful
companions in  Satires  1.5, the two occasions on which he confesses to laughter in the  Liber
Sermonum  portray him laughing at, or because of, figures who bear striking resemblances to
96 Cf. Satires 1.10.84-90:
ambitione relegata te dicere possum,
Pollio, te, Messalla, tuo cum fratre, simulque 85
uos, Bibule et Serui, simul his te, candide Furni,
conpluris alios, doctos ego quos et amicos
prudens praetereo, quibus haec, sint qualiacumque,
adridere uelim, doliturus, si placeant spe
deterius nostra. 90
---
With flattery set aside, I am able to speak of you,
Pollio, you, Messalla, with your brother, and at the same time 85
you, Bibulus and Servus, and with them you, pure Furnius,
and many others, learned men and friends whom I
prudently omit, to whom I would like these things, whatever
they may be, to be worth a laugh. I would be pained if these men
were pleased less than our hope. 90 
97 Oliensis (1998) 29 is attuned to the “satiric” elements of the inset  agon.  Gowers (2012) 200 observes that
Horace “unearths double roots for verse satire” in the course of the exchange.
98 Gowers (2012) 200, 203 points to scriba in v. 66 as a similarity between Sarmentus and Horace.
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himself: the bumpkin scribe in v. 35 and the two laugh-provoking buffoons in v. 57. By way of
these  illustrations  of  “personal”  laughter,  Horace  reminds  us  of  how  unstable  and  prickly
laughter can be. A laugh that begins at another's expense or even as a source of shared pleasure
can abruptly change direction and end up directed at the laugher himself.
To return to the analogy with which I began the chapter, I have examined in the previous
pages what I consider to be a particularly influential collection of pieces in the generic puzzle of
Horace's satire: laughter. The vocabulary for laughter and the risible recurs throughout the Liber
Sermonum, and although the satirist draws attention to how he relegates laughter to the edges of
his puzzle, it soon becomes apparent that the genre is bounded—even defined—by laughter and
the  satirist's  own relationship  with  it.  Laughter  appears  at  moments  of  tension  between  the
claimed “conversational” status of the compositions and the reality of the finely-tuned, metrical
poems. Laughter also appears in both the attacks on and defenses of satire; insofar as the satirist
is responsible for relaying both of these, he doubly confirms that laughter is a fixture within the
genre. Laughter even seems to appear right in front of the reader when it is conspicuously absent.
Or it appears right behind the person who sent it confidently in the opposite direction. 
It is these varied and variable experiences of laughter that I believe reflect the reader's
experience in Horace's first book of Satires. Any attempt to interpret a sermo of Horace entails a
particular brand of foolhardiness. Each poem opens itself up to multi-layered interpretations, and
the  reader,  in  the  very  act  of  engaging  the  text,  becomes  a  potential  target  of  the  satire.
Furthermore, in advocating a “hard line” interpretation of any of Horace’s satires—of restricting
the laughter in any one way, a reader runs the additional risk of diluting the complexity of the
poetry. Throughout  the  Liber  Sermonum,  laughter  is  an  indicator  of  instability  as  well  as  a
destabilizing force. In other words, laughter, in its many shapes and sizes and puzzling locations,




CHAPTER 5: GELASTIC SYMPATHY
VERGIL'S ECLOGUES
In  Before  Pastoral:  Theocritus  and  the  Ancient  Tradition  of  Bucolic  Poetry,  David
Halperin describes the challenges that arise from an attempt to define the pastoral genre: 
Pastoral presents a special problem for genre theory because its distinguishing features
belong almost exclusively to the category of 'inner form.' The doctrine of genres admits
of classification according to tone or purpose in certain special cases (satire is another
example), 'but the critical problem will then be to find the other dimension,' the specific
literary structure or structures appropriate to the expression of a specific attitude [. . .].1 
As Halperin hints, the “special problem” that he believes pastoral to present for genre theory is
not  unique  to  the  genre  under  discussion;  both  satire  and pastoral  are  “special  cases.”2 The
characteristic features of these genres reside in their tone or purpose because “outer form” (e.g.,
meter) does not distinguish them sufficiently from other genres. Whether laughter is a “literary
structure” or “a specific attitude,” a “tone” or a “purpose” (I might be tempted to call it all of
these),  I  assert  in  the  pages  that  follow that  laughter  is  a  genre-specific  feature  of  Vergil's
Eclogues.
Let us return for a moment to the genre jigsaw puzzle I describe in the introduction to
Part 2. Remember that in this puzzle of genre, each feature of a poem, external or internal, easily
articulated or nearly ineffable, is a piece. There exist a point-of-view piece, a metrical piece, a
tone piece, a register-of-diction piece, and countless other pieces representing various aspects of
a work, well-defined and less-concrete alike. When all of the pieces are assembled, the final
composition offers a portrait of the genre as a whole. Yet after the puzzle is complete, the task of
identifying individual pieces may prove exceedingly difficult.  The metrical piece in Classical
1 Halperin (1983) 33-34, citing Wellek and Warren's Theory of Literature (1962).
2 Both pastoral and satire are sometimes identified as “modes” rather than “genres.” See Halperin (1983) 34: “The
recent trend in criticism has therefore emphasized literary manners or means instead of kinds: it has tended to
substitute the literary mode for the literary genre.” For satire as a “mode”, cf. Griffin (1994) 4 (and passim).
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Greek  and  Latin  genres  remains  nonetheless  eye-catching  in  size  and  shape.3 In  Vergil's
Eclogues,  the metrical  piece resembles  that of  every other  genre that  makes use  of dactylic
hexameter (such as Lucretian didactic and Lucilian satire), but the primary resonance remains the
Homeric  epos  piece.  Some  believe  that  pastoral's  metrical  piece  carries  a  distinct  marking,
namely,  the  bucolic  diaeresis.  The  marking  is  not  unique  to  pastoral,  however:  the  bucolic
diaeresis  is  observed with  considerable  frequency in  Homeric  epic  as  well  as  Callimachean
epigram.4 The reader of Vergilian pastoral,  like the reader of the Horatian  sermones,  is  thus
confronted with an incongruity. In the same puzzle as the “epos piece” appear the “rustic setting
piece,”  the  “low-brow diction  piece”  (already familiar  to  the  puzzler  of  Roman  satire),  the
“agonistic play piece,” and other assorted—and decidedly un-epos—pieces.  The juxtaposition
itself,  as  discussed  in  the  foregoing treatment  of  Horace's  Satires,  could  very  well  provoke
laughter, but this alone is not how literary laughter becomes a distinguishing feature of Vergil's
Eclogues. To better understand the role laughter performs within the  Eclogues,  we must first
consider  how  laughter  is  used  by  Vergil's  generic  predecessor,  the  archetypal  bucolic  poet
Theocritus.
Halperin  endeavors  to  distinguish  between  bucolic  poetry  (“bucolic”  being  the  term
Theocritus uses to refer to poetic production in specific Idylls) and pastoral poetry.5 He identifies
pastoral  as  a  Vergilian  tradition  that  has  continuously  refashioned  and  redeployed  itself
throughout late antiquity and early modernity to survive still, albeit in somewhat altered form, in
modern literature and criticism. His conclusion is that Theocritus invented bucolic poetry, while
3 One might suppose that these pieces can even be assembled in a variety of ways, but so long as the same pieces
are used, the genre remains essentially the same. Then again, perhaps a new author substitutes pieces or entire
sections, with fresh pieces introduced, old pieces set aside. Thus new life, new ideas, and new practices are
injected into the genre. 
4 Bassett (1905).
5 The verb βουκολιάζομαι appears in Id. 5.44 and 60, Id. 7.36, and Id. 9.1 and 5.
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Vergil, through his reception of Theocritus, popularized pastoral.6 The distinction has not gained
traction, as the Oxford Classical Dictionary entry for “bucolic” makes clear (“See PASTORAL
POETRY, GREEK; PASTORAL POETRY, LATIN.”7),  nor do I  maintain it  in  the following
pages. But Halperin's reasons for differentiating between Theocritus' and Vergil's creations are
understandable—Vergil casts a long shadow, and the Greek poet and his budding genre fare well
when freed from it. But the role of reception in the delineation of nascent generic boundaries
cannot be ignored, especially in a study that focuses on the recipient. If a reader should wish to
divorce Vergil's Eclogues from a generic association with Theocritus, Vergil himself invites the
comparison, through allusions to the Theocritean poet (e.g., Ecl. 4.1: “Sicilian Muses, let us sing
slightly greater things”—Sicelides Musae, paulo maiora canamus) and to his poetic creations
(e.g., the opening lines of Ecl. 3 and Id. 4).8 Frances Muecke states the point concisely: “When a
genre already exists the various demands imposed by the writer's choice of it are known, both to
him and his audience, but when it is in its earliest stage what is typical of it is not so obvious.”9 
I argue that Vergil interpreted the presence of laughter in Theocritus' Idylls as something
“typical” of the genre. In the course of observing this typicality (i.e., by writing laughter into his
Eclogues), he may also have played a pivotal role in making laughter a “demand” for future
writers in the genre. In the pages that follow, I focus on the use of laughter in Theocritus' Idylls 7,
11, and 1—with a brief examination of laughter's appearance in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura 5—
before I turn to Vergil's integration of laughter into the fabric of the Eclogues themselves.
6 In his closing pages, Halperin (1983) 254 boldly offers a definition of bucolic poetry “as it was invented by
Theocritus,”  wherein  he  remarks  upon  peculiarities  of  “theme,”  “form,”  and  “language”  that  feature  in
Theocritus'  poetry.  I  believe  that  all  of  the  features  he  identifies  are  “pieces”  in  the  generic  puzzles  of
Theocritean and Vergilian pastoral.
7 OCD s.v. bucolic.
8 Ecl. 3 closely resembles Id. 4 in the first 6 verses. See Chapter 2, p. 103 n. 32.
9 Muecke (1975) 170. See also Gutzwiller (1991) 3-19 and Hunter (2006) 263-4. 
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SECTION IA: THE GRINNING GOATHERD: FANTASY, REALITY, AND CULTIVATED AMBIGUITY 
IN THEOCRITUS' PASTORAL IDYLLS
In  Idyll  7 of Theocritus, the narrator Simichidas tells of his chance-encounter with the
goatherd Lycidas.  In the verses before Lycidas  first  addresses him, Simichidas describes the
goatherd’s bearing:  καί μ’ ἀτρέμας εἶπε σεσαρώς /  ὄμματι μειδιόωντι, γέλως δέ οἱ εἴχετο
χείλευς—“And he addressed me calmly, grinning with a smiling eye, and a laugh played on his
lips”  (vv.  19-20).  A. S.  Gow observes  that  the  vocabulary used in  this  description typically
suggests  malice  (σεσαρώς  from  σαίρειν)  and  is  often  indicative  of  fake  laughter,  yet  he
concludes  that  Lycidas  is  simply  “amused”  when  he  addresses  Simichidas  and  the  fellow
travelers “with friendly mockery.”10 Others detect jollity and benevolence in this interchange,11
while still others observe “a certain superior detachment”12 or “calm superiority”13 in Lycidas'
approach and address of Simichidas. In the remainder of the Idyll, the two singer-poets exchange
songs and appear to part ways amicably after Lycidas gives Simichidas his staff, a gesture the
narrator interprets as an act of poetic friendship.
The  varied  scholarly  interpretations  of  Lycidas’  comportment  as  he  approaches
Simichidas in  Idyll  7 suggest that the laughter and smiling in this passage are fundamentally
unclear in tone, a reflection of ambiguity both in the gelastic vocabulary and in the narrative
context.  The  first  term  for  laughter  appearing  in  the  passage,  σεσαρώς,  throws  the  reader
something of a curveball. The primary LSJ definition for σαίρειν—“part the lips and show the
closed teeth; grin”—lists several textual citations before citing  Id. 7.19 at the end of the entry
with  the  comment  “but  also  without  any  bad  sense.”14 Why  “without  any  bad  sense”?  No
10  Gow II (1954) 137.
11  Crane (1987) 167.
12  Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004) 134.
13  Hunter (1999) 157. Hunter also hypothesizes that “Lykidas' smile is the poet's recognition” of a limitation of the
“metaphorical code” inherent in bucolic poetry (148).
14  LSJ s.v. σαίρω n.1; Chaintraine (1968) s.v. σέσηρα.
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evidence is offered to support the exception.  The modern-day reader of the  Idyll  is presented
with a choice. She can take the words in 7.19-20 at their prevailing lexical value (ignoring the
note on σαίρειν specific to  Id.  7) and picture Lycidas grinning insincerely or condescendingly,
but she might do well to ask whether such insincerity is reconcilable with the words and actions
attributed to Lycidas later in the poem. After all, the men seem to part ways on good terms.
Alternatively,  she  might  choose  to  take  the  exception  noted  in  LSJ  under  advisement  and
interpret Lycidas' demeanor as being “without any bad sense,” like the laughs and smiles of a
friend or patron, but she is then left to wonder why Theocritus uses the terminology—σαίρειν in
particular—that he does.
One  might  consider  this  confusion  of  how  to  interpret  Lycidas'  laughing,  smiling
appearance in vv. 19-20 of Idyll 7 to be evidence of a potential failure—a failure to adequately
define the “feel” of the poem. Could they instead be evidence of a particular strength?15 What if
we regard Theocritus' deployment of laughter in Idyll 7 as a successful cultivation of ambiguity,
an invitation extended to the  reader to  make a  choice,  to  interpret,  and thus,  in  a  sense,  to
participate in the poem? I propose in the following pages that the persistent ambiguity of the
vocabulary for laughter in Idyll 7, the imbalance in the attribution of laughter throughout poem,
and laughter's  role  in the unresolved mystery of Lycidas'  identity all  contribute to a  tone of
ambiguity and uncertainty that aligns with other fantastic aspects of the bucolic genre. I then
briefly  consider  how  laughter  may  be  seen  to  establish  a  tone  of  ambiguity  elsewhere  in
Theocritus' bucolic poems. 
Little need be said about the ambiguity of the general vocabulary for laughter; I treat the
subject in some detail in my introduction, and I suspect it will be familiar to English speakers
15 In his preface to  Genres and Readers  (1994), Conte observes,  “Polysemy arises from the poets' strength, not
from the historically determined readers' limitations” (xix).
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who, when recounting an interaction, might feel compelled to distinguish between laughter  at
and laughter  with  an interlocutor, whether by choosing different terms or by emphasizing the
prepositions. To be clear, I am here thinking not about the action of laughing but about attempts
to describe or narrate the behavior of laughter in words. If one intends to describe psychological
motivation,  saying  that  someone  “laughed”  is  considerably  more  vague  than  saying  “she
cackled” or “he giggled.”
Theocritus'  narration  of  ambiguous  laughter  in  Idyll  7  warrants  closer  consideration,
primarily because the author selects a negatively-charged term for laughter—σαίρειν, only to
render  its  meaning  ambiguous  in  his  broader  contextualization  of  it.  The  verb  σαίρειν  and
participle σεσαρώς regularly indicate a movement of the lips that is bitter, sardonic, deviant, and
ostensibly motivated by bad humor—that is, in every text but Idyll 7. The “bad sense” of σαίρειν
alluded to in LSJ is even preserved elsewhere in the Theocritean corpus; the term appears in
Idyll 5.116 and Idyll 20.14, and in both citations a negative (deviant or cruel) sense is retained.
But  in  Idyll  7,  the  ongoing  interaction  between  Simichidas  and  Lycidas  bears  no  marks  of
bitterness and no indication of enmity, and thus the semantic charge of  σαίρειν is called into
question.  The prevailing  (positive—or,  at  least,  not  negative)  tone  of  the  poem becomes an
indicator of the term's ambiguity. However, it is important to note that the ambiguity becomes
evident only as the narrative unfolds. When a fluent reader first encounters σαίρειν in v. 19, she
has no reason to assign any sense to the term other than its typical (negative) one—the same
sense the word carries when it appears elsewhere in Theocritus.
The tension between the prevailing meaning of σαίρειν and the tone of the remainder of
Idyll 7 deprives the term of a bad sense but stops far short of endowing it with a good one. So is
there a particular moment when the ambiguous sense of σαίρειν gains traction and the old, “bad”
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sense slips away? Perhaps when the other terms for laughter appear? If so, the shift in sense does
not occur by virtue of any clear, positive charge conveyed by  γέλως  or  μειδιόωντι, the two
other  terms for  laughter  and smiling  that describe Lycidas in  v.  20.  Because  γελᾶν and its
nominal form γέλως depend upon context to establish a positive or negative tone, the fact that
σεσαρώς (σαίρειν) appears in close proximity to  γέλως when Lycidas approaches Simichidas
does not lend additional color.16 The other term appearing in this passage—μειδιόωντι—also
fails to temper the otherwise “bad” connotation of σαίρειν. μειδιᾶν is defined in LSJ simply as
the verb “smile” or “grin,” where a grin indicates a more sinister disposition than a smile, even
when there may be no physical distinction between the two expressions.17 In short, both μειδιᾶν
and γέλως derive their tone—good or bad—from their context.  The final detail in Simichidas'
description of Lycidas when they first meet pertains to the curious location of laughter in v. 20:
“laughter was hanging from his (Lycidas') lips”—γέλως δέ οἱ εἴχετο χείλευς. What does this
mean? The middle-verb  εἴχετο renders the description particularly difficult  to  imagine.  It  is
possible  that  the  laughter  is  not  actually  vocalized  but  is  rather  perceived  as  “clinging”  to
Lycidas'  lips—like  a  visual  laugh.  Or  the  γέλως may  be  vocalized  as  a  normal  laugh that
somehow  draws  attention  to  Lycidas'  lips.  The  second  interpretation  has  the  advantage  of
maintaining the distinction between a laugh and a smile.18 In the end,  no single term for, or
description of, laughter and smiling in vv. 19-20 mitigates the negative sense of  σαίρειν. As I
suggest above, the shift in tone happens only gradually over the course of Idyll 7.19 The strongest
16 These terms also appear together with an ostensibly negative sense in Plutarch's Moralia, 223b-c: καὶ ὕστερον
δὲ τῶν φρενῶν ἔξω γενόμενον δράξασθαί τινος μαχαιρίου καὶ αὑτὸν ἀνατεμεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν σφυρῶν ἕως ἐπὶ
τοὺς καιρίους τόπους, καὶ οὕτως ἐκλιπεῖν τὸν βίον γελῶντα καὶ σεσηρότα (“And later, out of his mind, he
grabbed a knife and cut himself open from his calf to his vital parts, and thus he departed life  laughing and
grinning [σεσηρότα]”).
17 LSJ s.v. μειδιάω. See also the OED s.v. grin and smile and the discussion in the introduction, pp. 4-8.
18 See Halliwell (2008) 522-3 for his argument urging that “smile” is not a primary meaning of  γελᾶν or its
compounds.
19 Maybe the concentration of laughter-related vocabulary and the single-mindedness of the description of Lycidas
set the semantic shift of σαίρειν in motion. The negatively-charged σαίρειν becomes another term for laughter
225
conclusion one might assert from the description of Lycidas in vv. 19-20 is that the narrator
Simichidas is intent on describing him as a laughing, smiling figure who may have derisive or
scornful  motivations.  Such  a  conclusion  is  supported  by  two  more  occasions  on  which  the
vocabulary of laughter is applied to Lycidas in Idyll 7.
The remaining two instances of Lycidas' laughter occur as participial forms of the verb
γελᾶν.  Lycidas  is  described  as  "having  laughed  sweetly,”  ἁδὺ  γελάσσας,  in  v.  42  before
speaking and then again in v. 128 before giving Simichidas his staff. The words appears in the
same metrical sedes (following the bucolic diaeresis) in both verses, and the narrator highlights
the recurrence by attaching  ὡς πάρος ("as before") when the phrase appears in v. 128. The
repetition of ἁδὺ γελάσσας here is an appropriate nod to the formulaic nature of the collocation
in Homeric  texts.20 In  Le Rire et  les larmes dans la  litterature grecque Dominique Arnould
observes  that  Homeric  uses  of  ἡδύ to  modify  laughter “indicate,  first  and  foremost,  the
satisfaction of he who laughs: the laughter is sweet for the laugher.” She refines the point: “If the
laughter  is  sweet  for  the  laugher,  this  is  precisely  because  it  assures  and  reassures  his
superiority.”21 In  the  Odyssey the  suitors  (collectively  and  individually)  are  said  to  laugh
“sweetly” on several occasions when derision and assertions of superiority are implications of
in a mishmash of gelastic vocabulary. Rather than add any other words that  confirm a negative attitude on
Lycidas' behalf, the narrator Simichidas simply describes the goatherd as a smiling, laughing figure, even if he
leaves the motivation of his laughter and smiling a mystery.
20 In Homer, the same combination of words appears in the same metrical sedes at Il. 11.378 and Il. 21..508. There
are several other morphological variations pairing “sweetness” and “laughter” in Homer that utilize finite forms
of  γελᾶν and  ἐκγελᾶν,  e.g.,  Od. 20.358 where all the suitors laughed after Theoklymenos relates his vision:
Ὣς ἔφαθ',  οἱ δ'  ἄρα πάντες ἐπ'  αὐτῶι ἡδὺ γέλασσαν.  That  the suitors  here “laughed sweetly”  at (ἐπὶ)
Theoklymenos strongly allows that the laughter can be sweet for the laugher and simultaneously charged with
derision.
21 Arnould (1990) 164. She acknowledges that laughter can lack malice and even be sweet for the object of the
laughter, but maintains that the primary charge of ἡδύ applies to the person who is laughing or smiling (165).
Levine (1983) 104 views laughter as  an indicator  of  claimed superiority  and smiles as indicators of  actual
superiority: “The poet does not give the suitors any smiles of superiority because that expression is used only of
characters  who are in fact superior. Whereas laughter can occur in ironical  situations, smiling is never used
ironically.”
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their laughter.22 In Iliad Book 21 v. 508, Zeus laughs sweetly when he hears Artemis' complaint
of  mistreatment  at  the  hands  of  Hera.  He  does  not  seem  simply  to  be  asserting  his  own
superiority  (which  is  uncontested)  but  also  to  be  comforting his  daughter.  Reading Lycidas'
laughs in Idyll 7 with these Homeric echoes in mind does not reflect positively on the goatherd.
On the one hand,  he mimics a characteristically shameless and inhospitable  behavior by the
suitors. On the other, the implications of superiority and gentle condescension that the Iliadic
Zeus' “sweet laughter” conveys lend a patronizing tone to Lycidas' laughter at Simichidas.
Two conclusions can now be articulated regarding the laughter Theocritus writes into
Idyll  7.  First,  laughter  in  the  poem  is  persistently  ambivalent,  in  both  sense  and  context.
Beginning with σαίρειν in v. 19, every laugh and smile that appears in Idyll 7 carries a question
with it. Is Lycidas being disingenuous? Playful? Condescending? Kind? Even when his laughter
is explicitly described as sweet, it  retains a bitter flavor from a Homeric intertext. A second
conclusion pertains to the imbalance in the deployment of laughter in the poem. Except for a
final optative of γελᾶν which is attributed to Demeter in the closing verses of the poem, the five
remaining occasions of the vocabulary of laughter and smiling in Idyll 7 are ascribed to Lycidas.
No words for laughter or smiling describe Simichidas, but Lycidas is surrounded in the text by
omnipresent  laughter.  A reader  might  reasonably interpret  this  asymmetry as an indicator of
dissonance in the characters' interaction, an interpretation that finds support in the ambiguous
terms for laughter and smiling used throughout. The two conclusions reinforce one another. 
One additional point warrants emphasizing: we experience the poem as a whole through
the words of Simichidas. A reader's knowledge of Lycidas, from the goatherd's clothing to his
22 Crane (1987) 164 cites several examples of the suitors' laughter to support his assertion that under the stronger
reading of  ἡδὺ γελᾶν,  “the laughter is  only pleasant for the one who is laughing” (my emphasis).  He also
proposes a secondary reading under which ἡδύ is confined to the how the laughter is perceived. Arnould urges
against this secondary reading (see n. 21, above).
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laughter to his quoted speech, is mediated through Simichidas' narration. As a result, we can go
further than to  observe that  Theocritus repeatedly employs ambiguous laughter  in  Idyll  7 to
characterize Lycidas.  Theocritus also characterizes Simichidas through the use of ambiguous
laughter. The narrator's ambivalent read on the goatherd is constructed and conveyed by the same
vocabulary of laughter.
The identity of Lycidas is a vexed issue in Theocritean scholarship on  Idyll  7. Many
attempts to identify the mysterious goatherd draw upon a widely held interpretation of Idyll 7 as
an account of poetic initiation—a Dichterweihe  of Simichidas by Lycidas.23 The Hesiodic and
Archilochean models of poetic initiation present interactions between human and divine figures:
a mortal poet and the immortal Muses. Because of these models, there is poetic precedent for
interpreting  the  initiator—in  this  case  Lycidas—as  a  divine  figure.  Theocritus  is  assuredly
presenting an initiation scene here, but the tone of the initiation is so ambiguous that I am left
unsure as to whether it is an authentic, divine initiation or instead a parody. Some scholars have
attempted to identify Lycidas with a particular divine figure, but I make no attempt to further
identify  Lycidas.24 I  am  content  with  the  broad  conclusions  that  Idyll  7  presents  a  poetic
initiation, genuine or ironic, and that Lycidas is depicted as an indeterminate and otherworldly
figure. I draw attention to the question of Lycidas' identity only because various scholars who
propose  that  the  goatherd's  appearance  in  Idyll  7  represents  a  theophany  use  the  gelastic
vocabulary  of  the  poem  as  evidence.  They  argue  that  Lycidas'  laughter  and  grinning  are
manifestations of a “divine smile,” and yet so ambiguous is the goatherd's behavior that the same
terms for laughter and smiling are used by scholars (among other arguments) to support his
23 Puelma (1960), Serrao (1971), and Giangrande (1968). Giangrande, like me, detects strong irony in the episode
and the Dichterweihe.
24 Williams  (1971)  and  Brown  (1981)  are  noteworthy  proponents  of  Lycidas'  divinity.  Clauss  (2003)  291
summarizes several of their arguments and supports an identification with Pan.
228
identification with different  gods.25 In  the end,  the goatherd's  identity remains as much of a
mystery as his disposition. One could imagine that his laughter and smiles are provoked in part
by our ongoing efforts to identify him as someone other than a goatherd “since he was altogether
like a goatherd”—ἐπεὶ αἰπόλῳ ἔξοχ’ ἐῴκει (v. 14).
Having proposed that laughter plays a key role in lending an ambiguous tone to Idyll 7,
both through the particular gelastic terms that  appear and in their  repeated attribution to the
goatherd Lycidas, let us consider briefly why we might interpret this ambiguity as a deliberate,
cultivated  effect  in  the  poem.  Simichidas'  encounter  with  Lycidas  in  Idyll  7 constitutes  the
longest  section  of  the  poem and  ultimately  assumes  the  role  of  the  primary  narrative.  The
narrator's physical description of Lycidas, the account of their conversation, and their exchange
of songs offer the Idyll's reader various experiences of the mysterious goatherd; the narrative is
replete with opportunities to contextualize the initiation and to establish a clear psychological
background  to  the  interactions  between the  characters.  No such  background—no clarity—is
granted. 
The  narrator  himself  never  fully  interprets  Lycidas'  laughter  or  takes  a  stand  on the
goatherd's psychology. This is left for the reader to do. The various forms of psychologizing
involved in the interpretation of nonverbal communication allow the narrator to use a simple
word for laughter, such as  γέλως in v. 20,  and to invite the reader's participation. Simichidas
requires the reader to interpret the goatherd's smiling and laughing expressions throughout the
interchange and to evaluate the ongoing ambiguities of his character. By not describing himself
in any detail, Simichidas does not open himself to these same ambiguities. He does, however,
call into question his own comprehension of the situation. As readers, we perceive elements of a
25 Puelma (1960), Giangrande (1968), Williams (1971), Brown (1981), and Clauss (2003) all incorporate Lycidas'
laughing and/or grinning into their divine identifications.
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poetic initiation in the interaction between Simichidas and Lycidas. We also read a rich, genre-
specific description of a locus amoenus by the narrator in the closing verses of the Idyll (vv. 131-
157). Simichidas abstains from weighing in too heavily on either of these issues. Neither as
character nor as narrator does Simichidas confirm that he is engaged in a literary initiation when
he meets with Lycidas. Nor does he even let on that he is describing a bucolic locus amoenus. In
fact, in the framing narrative, Lycidas betrays no overt poetic self-consciousness. A reader might
quickly  assume  that  Simichidas  writes  about  this  day  because  he  is  in  fact  aware  of  its
significance, but the poem is far too casual to make such an assumption safe. The Idyll could just
as easily be a response to the question, “What was the Thalysia harvest-festival like back in the
day?” or “How did you get that walking stick?” as to “How did you become a bucolic poet?”
Simichidas narrates a text that contains abundant clues for a literate Hellenistic audience, but, as
narrator, he remains elusive as to whether he is offering these clues intentionally or to what
mystery the clues may pertain. He leaves the ultimate interpretation to the reader without making
his own interpretation clear. In fact, he does not even suggest that “interpretation” may be an
appropriate demand to make of the text.
It can be seen that Idyll  7's ambiguity not only capitalizes on the inherent ambiguity of
smiles and laughter but also draws upon the complexity of the poem's narrative structure. This is
not ambiguity for its own sake. On the contrary, the ambiguity present in descriptions of laughter
and smiles contributes to a more realistic atmosphere within the poem. The lack of clarity invites
the  reader  to  make  the  same  decisions  about  laughter  that  any  individual  present  at  the
interchange would have to make. The reader must attempt to “read” Lycidas and his gelastic
behaviors through the lens of Simichidas' narrative and any potential distortion therein. Even
where Simichidas hints  at  his  own interpretations by the vocabulary of laughter he uses,  he
leaves enough unsaid—or said vaguely—to retain ambiguity within the episode.
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Lest  one  think  the  confluence  laughter,  ambiguity,  and  characterization
coincidental in Idyll 7, Theocritus uses the ambiguity of laughter and smiles (and the vocabulary
for it) in a similar manner in others of his bucolic poems, thus implying a measured pairing of
the two. In Idyll 11, the Cyclops Polyphemus ends his seaside address to Galatea by reminding
himself (and her) that he has other options should she continue to avoid him:
τί τὸν φεύγοντα διώκεις;
εὑρησεῖς Γαλάτειαν ἴσως καὶ καλλίον’ ἄλλαν. 
πολλαὶ συμπαίσδεν με κόραι τὰν νύκτα κέλονται,
κιχλίζοντι δὲ πᾶσαι, ἐπεί κ’ αὐταῖς ὑπακούσω.
δῆλον ὅτ’ ἐν τᾷ γᾷ κἠγών τις φαίνομαι ἦμεν. (75-79)
Why do you pursue the one fleeing?
You will find perhaps another even more beautiful Galatea.
Many maidens tell me to play with them during the night,
and they all titter when I pay attention to them.
It is clear that on land even I appear to be someone.
As σεσαρώς from v. 19 of Idyll  7 typically marks a certain type of smile, the verb κιχλίζοντι
designates  a  particular  type  of  laughter.  The  context  of  Idyll  11 grants  the  word  decidedly
feminine and sexual associations which are confirmed by ancient and modern lexicographers
alike.26 Those  who  Polyphemus  says  titter  are  young  women,  and,  in  addition  to  Hunter's
observation that “verbs of 'playing' often carry a sexual sense” in his note on συμπαίσδεν,27 the
26 The word appears first in Aristophanes (Clouds, v. 983) in which the immediate context implies that laughter of
this sort is indicative of extravagance and weak masculinity:
οὐδ’ ἀνελέσθαι δειπνοῦντ’ ἐξῆν κεφάλαιον τῆς ῥαφανῖδος,
οὐδ’ ἄννηθον τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἁρπάζειν οὐδὲ σέλινον,
οὐδ’ ὀψοφαγεῖν οὐδὲ κιχλίζειν οὐδ’ ἴσχειν τὼ πόδ’ ἐναλλαξ. (983-5)
---
Nor was it possible for him, while eating, to grab the head of a radish,
nor to snatch from older men dill or celery,
nor to eat delicacies nor to giggle nor to hold his legs crossed.
The scholia on this passage gloss κιχλίζειν as κίχλας ἐσθίειν ἢ γελᾶν ἀτάκτως: “to eat thrushes or to laugh in
a disorderly manner.” In his note on the verb's use in Idyll 11, Gow II (1954) 220 directs the reader to Bekker's
Anecdota Graeca:  κιχλισμός· πορνικὸς γέλως πολύς καὶ ἄκοσμος (A.B. 270.31)—“the great and disorderly
laughter  of  prostitutes.”  The  Suda  (s.v.  κιχλισμός;  1695)  also  defines  the  nominal  form:  ὁ  λεπτὸς  καὶ
ἀκόλαστος γέλως—“light and licentious laughter.” See also LSJ s.v.  κιχλίζω and Chaintraine (1968) s.v.
κίχλη.
27 Hunter (1999) 242.
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fact that this “play” is to take place during the night (τὰν νύκτα) leaves little doubt as to the
sexual sense. 
Polyphemus states that women express sexual interest in him and giggle in response to
his attention. The conclusion that he draws from this is self-affirming: he's a “somebody.” The
scholia  on  11.78 detect  something  different  in  the  laughter,  glossing  κιχλίζοντι  as σφόδρα
γελῶσι καὶ διαχέονται (“Excessively they laugh and relax themselves”) and then hypothesizing
ἴσως  δὲ  καταγελῶσιν  αὐτοῦ  (“Perhaps  they  laugh at  him”).  The  psychological  charge  of
κιχλίζοντι is inconclusive. The Cyclops uses it to suggest the excited tittering of desirous girls,
but the scholia read it as a dissolute or patronizing laughter. These disparate interpretations of
κιχλίζειν point  to  a  semantic  meaning that  is  neither  exclusively good-natured  nor  derisive,
though under all readings the term remains typical of females and conveys sexual undertones. As
in  Idyll  7, the reader is drawn into the narrative of  Idyll  11 by being required to interpret the
laughter where no certain conclusion is offered. 
And as in Idyll 7, forming such an interpretation requires a consideration not only of the
vocabulary used but of the broader context of the laughter. In the Cyclops' song, the ambiguity of
the  laughter  is  further destabilized by the varied narrative voices  in the passage  in  which it
appears.28 Beginning with a vocative self-address in v. 72 (he shouts “Oh Cyclops, Cyclops”) and
continuing through v. 76 with the verb  εὑρησεῖς, the Cyclops exhorts himself in the second-
person. He otherwise uses first-person speech throughout the internal frame of the poem (in vv.
19 to 71) in which he frequently invokes a narrative “I” and repeatedly addresses and calls upon
28 Much has been written about Idyll 11. Because this poem is not the focus of my investigation, I have contented
myself with a few relevant observations. See Gow II (1954) 208-220 and Hunter  (1999) 215-243 for  their
extensive discussions of this poem. Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004) offer a succinct description of the poem's ironic
cast: “[T]he whole of  Idyll  11 is coloured by an irony arising from the ambiguous definition of the Cyclops's
song as a φάρμακον for his love” (165).
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Galatea.29 In vv. 77 to 79, he resumes this use of a first-person voice (με, ὑπακούσω, κἠγών and
φαίνομαι). It is only in vv. 72-6 that he speaks in the second-person. 
By shifting to the second-person for these 5 verses near the end of the poem, the Cyclops
offers himself something of a pep-talk. The urgency, frustration and despair conveyed by the
repetition of Κύκλωψ in v. 72 are immediate. Polyphemus attempts to enact his abandonment of
Galatea as a desired lover by abandoning her as his addressee; he claims new ownership of his
song when he commands himself to move on rather than to seek her acceptance. 
But in v. 77, just as he retreats into his previous mode of first-person narrative, he brags
of the giggling women who express interest in him. With his use of the narrative “I,” Galatea
silently resumes her role as his addressee. Polyphemus does not tell himself about these other
potential, laughing lovers; he tells Galatea. The effects of his self-motivation are short-lived as
he attempts to persuade Galatea immediately after swearing her off.
The shifts between first-  and second-person narrative at  the end of Polyphemus'  song
indicate his emotional instability by way of the instability of his narrative voice. The adverb
ἴσως in v. 76 shows him to lack confidence in ever finding “another, fairer” Galatea. He makes a
final attempt at attracting Galatea's attention . . . by trying to make her jealous. His first-person
narrative  allows  him to  have  an  implied  addressee  precisely  when  he  claims  to  have  other
romantic options—a claim that does not even need to be true in order to fulfill its purpose.30 The
words used to describe the desires and attentions of the interested maidens are sexually charged
(συμπαίσδεν and κιχλίζοντι) not necessarily because the women actually bid him to “play with”
29 He addresses her as  Γαλάτεια (vv.  19 and 63),  (χαρίεσσα) κόρα (vv.  25 and 30),  κόριον (v. 60), and uses
second-person verbs, pronouns, and possessive adjectives to refer to her throughout.
30 The parallel in a modern relationship can be easily imagined: A man mentions to an estranged girlfriend that
other women have been seeking his company, but he does this only to stoke her jealousy and win her back.
There may not be any other women. A wonderful irony of Idyll 11 is that there is never any indication within the
poem that Galatea hears the Cyclops. His attempts at persuasion, including this desperate effort, may fall on no
ears at all.
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them or titter at his response. Polyphemus uses these words for the very reason that they are
suggestive. And yet the scholia see the potential for derision. The shifting of the narrative voice
near the end of  Idyll  11 compounds the ambiguity of the laughter Polyphemus describes. The
laughter is not only psychologically ambiguous within the scenario in which it is presented, but
its  very  existence  depends  upon  the  reliability  of  the  Cyclops  as  narrator.  Why  would  the
Cyclops allow for such ambiguity in the vocabulary and context of the laughter when he, as
narrator, is the one framing it? Is it deliberate, or is it evidence of his clumsiness as a poet? Or is
it a means of characterization by the ultimate “framer” Theocritus?
Ultimately, the conclusions to be drawn from these inquiries  are  strikingly similar  to
those arrived at in the exploration of laughter and smiling in Idyll 7. Theocritus uses laughter and
smiling  to  cultivate  an  indefinite  atmosphere  that  invites  the  reader's  involvement  in  the
interpretation of characters and narrative voices. The other famous occasion of laughter in the
Theocritean corpus can be briefly cited in support of such a hypothesis. In Idyll 1, the laughter of
Aphrodite is a vehicle for unfixed characterization:
ἦνθέ γε μὰν ἁδεῖα καὶ ἁ Κύπρις γελάοισα, 
λάθρη μὲν γελάοισα, βαρὺν δ’ ἀνὰ θυμὸν ἔχοισα [. . .] (vv. 94-5)
The discussion and debate these two verses have inspired among scholars is ample evidence of
the passage's ambiguity and sufficient reason to leave them untranslated.31 Whether Aphrodite is
visibly laughing while hiding her anger or restraining laughter while exhibiting her anger, her
twice repeated “laughter” (sweet and/or hidden) features prominently in the narrative. Of course
other words contribute to the ambiguity of the passage. The use of θυμόν may refer to an inward
expression or the passionate source of an outward one.32 The verb ἀνέχω has the contradictory
31 The passage is treated at length in Crane (1987).
32 Cf. Odysseus' sardonic smile “in his heart” after dodging the cow's foot thrown by the suitor Ktesippus in Od.
20.300-302.
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meanings of “to hold up” and “to hold back.”33 The reader is required to make several decisions
about diction and context in the space of just one sentence, and each of these decisions has the
potential to contribute to vastly different interpretations of the atmosphere of the scene, of the
character  of  Aphrodite  and  her  relationship  to  Daphnis,  and  even  of  the  authority  of  the
narrator.34 Nevertheless, laughter is at the root of the ambiguity, and how the reader interprets
Aphrodite's laughter colors the poem as a whole.
In this  Theocritean detour,  I  have proposed that the laughter  and smiling in  three of
Theocritus'  most  influential  and imitated  poems—and all  three are  touched upon to  varying
degrees by Vergil—function as a source of deliberate  ambiguity.  The effect of this laughter-
catalyzed “ambiguation”  is  not  as  destabilizing  as  one  might  expect.35 On the  contrary,  the
indefinite atmosphere and characterization established by descriptions of gelastic behavior mirror
the actual  ambiguities of many real-life occasions of laughter and smiles.  The psychological
give-and-take involved in the interpretation of a laugh—or the interpretation of the individual
narrating the laugh—is recreated for the reader in Idyll  7 and others of Theocritus' poems. The
poet draws upon the inherent ambiguity of laughter, the specific polyvalence of particular terms
for laughter and smiling, and the flexibility offered by various narratological techniques to create
a bucolic atmosphere in which the reader can experience first-hand realistic uncertainties by way
of parsing the characters' ways of perceiving and dealing with these uncertainties.
The  foregoing  treatment  of  laughter  in  Theocritus  raises  the  issues  I  address  in  the
remainder of this section. If one accepts that Idyll 7 makes programmatic gestures and presents a
Dichterweihe in which Lycidas is cast as a gatekeeper for the genre, one cannot ignore the fact
that this figure with a real or ironic power of initiation is portrayed repeatedly as smiling and
33 LSJ s.v. ἀνέχω. Cf. also Crane (1987) 169-70
34 Once again, our vocabulary of laughter appears in an inset, consciously-poetic narrative, i.e., the song of Thyrsis
to the goatherd.
35 I like to think of “ambiguity” as the cheese of Theocritean bucolic and laughter as the rennet.
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laughing.36 Are laughter and smiles—sweet, sneering, or otherwise—simply secondary-indicators
of a playfulness and irreverence that more broadly typify and characterize elements of bucolic
poetry, or might they, in their potential to communicate and embody ambiguity, function as ends
in themselves? 
Simichidas concludes his  description of the harvest festival  (and ends the poem as a
whole) with an explicit hope for laughter:
[. . .] Δάματρος ἁλωίδος; ἇς ἐπὶ σωρῷἇς ἐπὶ σωρῷ
αὖτις ἐγὼ πάξαιμι μέγα πτύον, ἃ δὲ γελάσσαι
δράγματα καὶ μάκωνας ἐν ἀμφοτέραισιν ἔχοισα. (vv. 155-7)
[. . .] of Demeter of the Threshing Floor; on whose heap
may I once again plant a great winnowing-fan, and may she laugh
while holding stalks and poppies in both hands.
The intuitive explanation of the passage is that a laugh from this divinity communicates her
beneficence.  Yet the correspondence between laughter  and agricultural  bounty is  not,  strictly
speaking, a necessary one; Demeter could be equally bountiful  without laughing. Why, then,
does Simichidas hope for her laughter? He even seems to privilege it over her accompanying
gifts by making γελάσσαι the primary verb of the clause. As the only occurrence in Idyll 7 of a
term for  laughter that  does not  describe Lycidas,  Demeter's  desired laugh harks  back to the
persistent laughter and smiling of the mysterious goatherd.37 Perhaps Simichidas is hoping not
only for an encounter with a kindly goddess but for a repeat of his run-in with Lycidas and his
introduction to the Theocritean bucolic world, where laughs and smiles toe a line of ambiguity—
36 Hunter  (1999)  150 ventures  that  Lycidas'  “ever  present  smile  marks  the  irony at  the heart  of  the  'bucolic'
tradition—'true' knowledge of the countryside is not in fact important for the productions of 'bucolic song.'”
Though I  do not  think  it  is  possible  to  link  Lycidas'  smiles  directly  with  statements  about  knowledge  (or
ignorance) of the countryside, I find the suggestion that smiles and laughter are in some sense representative of
the genre appealing.
37 The laugh of Demeter distinguishes itself by its unambiguous positive valence, but this laugh is not (yet) real; it
is narrated in Simichidas' wish.
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between positive and negative, divine and human, urban and rural, and even fantasy and reality
—just as the puzzling genre in which they appear.
SECTION IB: LATIN LAUGHTER LOCALIZED VIA LUCRETIUS
The laughter that Vergil incorporates into the fabric of his  Eclogues constructs a very
“Theocritean”  ambiguity  in  given  passages  and  poems,  an  argument  that  I  advance  in  the
following  reading of  Eclogue  4.  Vergil  also  draws  repeatedly  upon laughter  as  a  feature  in
pathetic fallacies—those moments in pastoral poems (and literature in general) when the world is
described as being sympathetic with the emotions of particular  inhabitants.38 Laughter  offers
itself as a recurring form that this sympathy takes in Vergil's predecessors, appearing in Homer's
Iliad (Bk. 19.362) and the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (v. 14) as well as in Demeter's final laugh
of  Idyll  7  discussed  above.39 More  temporally  proximate  to  Vergil's  Eclogues  than  the
aforementioned Greek texts, Lucretius' De Rerum Natura presents a strong “pathetic” connection
between laughter and a pastoral-poetic world. Lucretius' depiction of the origins of music and
pastoral poetry in Book 5 of his hexameter didactic epic features such a high concentration of the
vocabulary of laughter that a connection between pastoral and laughter may have been all but
obligatory when Vergil embarked upon his own pastoral project.
In Book 5 of De Rerum Natura, Lucretius presents an atomistic account of the history of
the  physical  world  and  the  origins  of  terrestrial  life  and  human  civilization—his
38 I use the term “pathetic fallacy” more restrictedly than as a synonym for “personification,” although there is
unavoidable overlap. I regard as “pathetic fallacies” those moments in which an emotional state, which may be
(and often is) indicated by either laughter or tears, is 1) ascribed to nature and 2) purported to be a sympathetic
response to the human world. See Abrams (1999) 203: “Pathetic Fallacy. A phrase invented by John Ruskin in
1856  to  signify  any  representation  of  inanimate  natural  objects  that  ascribes  to  them  human  capabilities,
sensations, and emotions [. . .].” 
39 Demeter's desired smile at the end of Idyll 7 offers a variation on a pathetic fallacy wherein the harvest goddess
is a metonym for the agricultural world. A more conventional pathetic fallacy would be if Simichidas expressed
a wish that the harvest itself laugh for—or smile upon—him.
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Kulturgeschichte. Shortly after detailing the beginnings of agriculture (vv. 1361-1378), the poet
chronicles the birth of the arts—music and dancing, in particular—among primitive humans:
at liquidas auium uoces imitarier ore
ante fuit multo quam leuia carmina cantu 1380
concelebrare homines possent aurisque iuuare.
et zephyri, caua per calamorum, sibila primum
agrestis docuere cauas inflare cicutas.
inde minutatim dulcis didicere querellas,
tibia quas fundit digitis pulsata canentum, 1385
auia per nemora ac siluas saltusque reperta,
per loca pastorum deserta atque otia dia.
haec animos ollis mulcebant atque iuuabant 139040
cum satiate cibi; nam tum sunt omnia cordi.
saepe itaque inter se prostrati in gramine molli
propter aquae riuom sub ramis arboris altae
non magnis opibus iucunde corpora habebant,
praesertim cum tempestas ridebat et anni 1395
tempora pingebant uiridantis floribus herbas.
tum ioca, tum sermo, tum dulces esse cachinni
consuerant. agrestis enim tum musa uigebat;
tum caput atque umeros plexis redimire coronis
floribus et foliis lasciuia laeta mouebat, 1400
atque extra numerum procedere membra mouentis
duriter et duro terram pede pellere matrem;
unde oriebantur risus dulcesque cachinni,
omnia quod noua tum magis haec et mira uigebant.
But the imitation of the fluid voices of birds with the mouth
far preceded men's ability to practice 1380
polished songs by singing and to delight the ears.
And the whistles of Zephyr through the hollows of reeds first
taught rustic men to blow into hollow pipes.
Thereupon, little by little, they learned sweet laments
which the flute poured forth, struck by the fingers of singers, 1385
heard through the remote woods, forests, and glades,
through the deserted places of shepherds and the divine retreats.
These laments soothed their spirits and delighted them 1390
after the satisfaction of food, for then are all things pleasant.
Often in this way, lying down together in the soft grass
near a stream of water beneath the branches of a high tree,
at minimal expense they kept themselves pleased,
especially when the weather laughed and the year's 1395
40 Following Costa  (1984),  whose  Latin text  and  punctuation I  quote  above and who in this  section  follows
Bailey's OCT. I do not include vv. 1388-1389 in this passage.
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seasons were coloring the greening fields with flowers.
Then jokes, then conversation, then sweet cackles were wont
to happen. For then the rural muse was flourishing;
then glad playfulness moved them to encircle head and shoulders 
with crowns woven from flowers and leaves, 1400
and to proceed unrhythmically, dancing
harshly, and to strike the earth mother with a harsh foot;
From which arose laughs and sweet cackles,
because all of these things, more new and wondrous, were flourishing.
The passage's bucolic  qua  Theocritean credentials are immediately apparent in the personnel,
setting, and aesthetic terms.41 The singers are rustics and shepherds (v. 1383 and v. 1387), the
setting is beneath a tree (v. 1393; cf.  Id. 1.21), and sweetness (variants on  dulcis  in vv. 1384,
1397, and 1403; cf.  ἁδύ and  ἅδιον in  Id. 1.1, 1.2 and 1.7) and softness (molle  in v. 1392; cf.
μαλακώτερα in Id. 5.51 and 5.57) abound.42 Lucretius could very well be offering an external
observer's description of episodes in Theocritus' pastoral Idylls or Vergil's Eclogues.43
A comprehensive pathetic  fallacy appears in  vv.  1394-1397 as  positive emotions  and
emotional displays are relayed from humanity to the natural world and then back to humans. The
pleasure of the singers in v. 1394 (iucunde corpora habebant) is given a natural outlet in the
laughing of the weather in v. 1395. The pathetic fallacy is particularly effective insofar as the
sympathy between the human and natural realms clarifies the emotional register of each, with
iucunde's  positive charge forestalling potential  negative associations with nature's  subsequent
laughter, and laughter itself concretizing the broad emotional state expressed by iucunde.44 The
poet then states that joking, conversing, and cackling (v. 1397) occur, all presumably among
41 Gale (1994) notes the many verbal  correspondences between this passage and  DRN  4.580-594 (134 n.  16)
before noting that Lucretius is “evoking the idealized countryside of bucolic poetry” (135). 
42 Rumpf (2008) remarks of Theocritus' Idylls that “there is no elaborate system of adjectives: only a few of them
(e.g., ἁδύς, καλός, and μαλακός) occur frequently or regularly” (68 n. 6). Hunter (1999) notes of ἁδύ in Id. 1.1
that “'sweetness' is to be the key quality of T.'s bucolic verse” (70).
43 Mollis is used attributively 14 times in the Eclogues and dulcis 22 times. See Rumpf (2008) 67-68 n. 5 and n. 6.
Boyle (1977) 123-5, Hardie (1998) 10-12, and Breed (2000b) 7-14 examine this passage of DRN as evidence of
Lucretius' influence on Vergil.
44 The temporal clause introduced by cum in v. 1395 qualifies the independent clause in v. 1394 and allows the two
events to be read as occurring simultaneously, but the poet, by presenting the verses in the above order, creates
the illusion that the human pleasure precedes the laughing of the weather.
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humans, in the wake of the weather's laughing. The sympathy between nature and humans in vv.
1396-1397 proceeds, significantly, in the opposite direction: rather than nature taking on human
emotions, human cackles echo and amplify the laughter of the weather.45 The gelastic vocabulary,
spreading contagiously from nature to humans, crescendoes from ridebat in v. 1396 to cachinni
in v. 1397. The narrator is  nonetheless careful to  soften these “cackles” with the pastorally-
resonant dulces, and he rounds out v. 1398 with mention of the agrestis musa—the “rustic muse”
whose invocation serves as a reminder to the reader that the occasion for such bonhomie is the
sharing of newly-discovered music.
Gale (1994) identifies the passage as a description of a locus amoenus (a concept I treat at
greater length when we turn to the  Eclogues) and regards flowers and springs as “symbols of
pleasure.” Indeed, pleasure remains the dominant emotion within the passage.46 The verb iuuare
appears twice (v. 1381 and v. 1390), and the potentially-mournful querellae of v. 1384, like the
potentially abrasive cachinni  of v. 1397, are colored by their explicit sweetness—dulces.47 The
passage continues to evoke abundance, softness, leisure, and beauty in its diction until the adverb
and adjective duriter and durus appear in v. 1402. Yet even these “harsh” words used to describe
the earliest dances present no challenge to the atmosphere of pleasure; the dancing, harsh though
it may be, provokes in v. 1403 a concentration of laughter and sweet cackles.48
The recurrence of laughter in nature and among humans in vv. 1379-1404 reinforces the
feeling of pleasure that predominates in the passage. More could be said of how this pleasure
interacts with Lucretius'  poetic and Epicurean programs, and Epicurus' own relationship with
45 It should be noted that this sympathy is not a proper “pathetic fallacy.” That nature may impact human emotion
is not “fallacious” and is surely familiar to any reader who has felt her mood affected by natural surroundings. 
46 See Furley (2007) 178 for a list of words that he associates with pleasure in this passage.
47 Gale (1994) 147-8.
48 Gale (1994) is wide of the mark in asserting of this passage that “poetry and music appear in a more ambiguous
light,  associated with both simple pleasure  and unnecessary and unlimited desires” (140).  The section that
follows  the  passage  under  discussion  (specifically  vv.  1422-1435)  offers  examples  of  what  happens  when
pleasure is sought excessively, but poetry and music do not feature in these examples.
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laughter certainly warrants additional attention.49 For the present, it suffices to note that Lucretius
portrays the origin of music as a pastoral phenomenon set in a locus amoenus and populated by a
contagious vocabulary of laughter (v. 1395, v. 1397, and twice in v. 1403). The passage recasts
Theocritean figures, setting, and terminology (gelastic and otherwise) in a Latin idiom that sets
the stage for the pastoral world of Vergil's Eclogues. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I consider how Vergil's pastoral poetry draws upon the
two distinct “kinds” of laughter discussed in the preceding pages. The  Eclogues  play textual
home to the ambiguous laughter of Theocritus and to the sympathetic laughter of Lucretius, the
former a  laughter  of  character and the  latter,  effectively,  a  laughter  of  place.  Both kinds  of
laughter,  like  two  playful  sides  of  the  same  puzzle  piece,  play  complementary  roles  in
establishing the tone of the Eclogues and in coloring Vergil's approach to his selected genre.
SECTION IIA: NATURE'S LAUGHTER IN ECLOGUES 7 AND 4
My examination of laughter in Vergil's Eclogues begins with the “laughter of place” and
attributions of laughter to the natural world in two short passages from Eclogues 7 and 4. Before
I leave behind Lucretius' pastoral passage in De Rerum Natura, however, I would like to consider
how an odd detail in this excerpt of Book 5 might invite readers to draw a natural connection
between laughter and the pastoral world. The oddity hinges upon the sequence in which laughter
appears  in  these  verses  dedicated  to  considerations  of  imitatio.  The  origin  of  vocal  song is
ascribed by the narrator to the imitation of a natural occurrence, namely, of the singing of birds.
49 Cf.  Epicurus,  Sent.  Vat.  41:  γελᾶν  ἅμα δεῖ  καὶ  φιλοσοφεῖν  καὶ  οἰκονομεῖν  καὶ  τοῖς  λοιποῖς  οἰκειώμασι
χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λήγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας—“It is necessary to laugh and at
the same time to philosophize and to manage domestic affairs and to make use of remaining advantages and in
no way to abandon those sayings proceeding from true philosophy.” Halliwell (2008) assigns programmatic
force  to  the  foregrounding  of  γελᾶν,  “as  though  laughter  should  colour  the  whole  of  life,  serving  as  a
psychological  underpinning  of  philosophy  itself”  (358).  Halliwell  briefly  (358-359)  provides  evidence  of
laughter's  ambiguous  status  in  surviving  texts  associated  with  Epicureanism:  is  this  laughter  a  product  of
ataraxia or of mockery?
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The  origin  of  flute  playing  is  ascribed  by  the  narrator  to  another  imitation  of  a  natural
occurrence,  namely,  of  the  whistling  of  winds  in  reeds.  How fitting,  then,  that  the  laughter
narrated in v. 1395—the first laughter in the passage—is attributed not to humans but to the
weather (tempestas). Human cackles only materialize in the subsequent verses, as if they too
were imitations of a natural occurrence. Laughter, at least as it is presented within Lucretius'
pastoral sketch, is indigenous to the locus amoenus itself—a behavior in the natural world that
precedes  what  in  Lucretius'  account  of  the  origins  of  culture  is  the  first  human  laugh.  The
passage invites readers to consider that the connection between laughter and pastoral pathetic
fallacies may be, quite literally, “natural,” and that laughter features in pathetic fallacies because
these are not always fallacies but, in some sense, aetiologies for how humans learned to laugh.
The clattering of waves, the chirping of birds—these were nature's first laughs, and as with vocal
song and flute music, humans learned to laugh through imitation of the natural world.50
Whatever the merits of this suggestion, laughter appears in two descriptions of nature in
Vergil's  Eclogues.  In  the  poetic  competition  between  Corydon  and  Thyrsis  recounted  by
Meliboeus in  Eclogue  7, one particular exchange between the poets in vv. 53-60 offers up a
concentration  of  claims  of  sympathy  between  human  emotions  and  the  natural  world,  and
universal laughter seems to follow from natural bounty.
Corydon
stant et iuniperi et castaneae hirsutae,
strata iacent passim sua quaeque sub arbore poma,
omnia nunc rident: at si formosus Alexis 55
montibus his abeat, videas et flumina sicca.
Thyrsis
aret ager, uitio moriens sitit aëris herba,
Liber pampineas inuidit collibus umbras:
Phyllidis aduentu nostrae nemus omne uirebit,
Iuppiter et laeto descendet plurimus imbri. 60




Standing are both the junipers and the bristled chestnuts;
strewn everywhere there lies beneath each tree its own fruit;
everything now laughs: but if beautiful Alexis should 55
depart from these mountains, you would see even the rivers dry.
Thyrsis
The field is parched, by failing of air the dying grass thirsts,
Liber refuses vined shades to the hills:
with our Phyllis' arrival, all the forest will grow green,
and Jupiter will descend with abundance of fertile rain. 60
The eight verses are beautifully balanced in content. Corydon's quatrain narrates a shift from
bounty to drought before Thyrsis' verses reverse the order to return from drought to verdant
abundance. Balance is also achieved in the use of poetic constructions: both shepherds, in the
course of narrating one pathetic fallacy, imply another.
Corydon's description of nature in vv.  53-54 seems at  first  to be just  that,  namely,  a
realizable  description  of  natural  abundance.  When  he  adds  the  detail  that  “everything  now
laughs” before the caesura of v. 55, the phrase becomes an occasion of personification of the
natural world wherein universal laughter greets the plentitude of the previous two verses. It is as
if  Corydon  hears  the  bountiful  laughter  that  Simichidas  desires  of  Demeter  at  the  end  of
Theocritus' Idyll 7. Corydon then hypothesizes a straightforward occasion of sympathy between
the human and natural worlds in the second half of v. 55 and v. 56 when he declares that rivers
would run dry if the object of his affection Alexis should disappear. The pathetic fallacy is clear-
cut, albeit yet to be realized, but the terms of the condition offer ample information about the
status quo. In order for Alexis potentially to depart in v. 55-56, he must be present in the verses
that precede. Moreover, if his departure is to be felt so strongly in the natural world, his presence
becomes the implicit explanation for the bounty of vv. 53-55. Corydon's verses thus contain two
pathetic fallacies, one realized and the other conditional; the first only becomes apparent when
the possibility of the second is raised. 
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The two pathetic fallacies in Thyrsis' quatrain unfold similarly, with the first offered as if
it  were  a  narration  of  fact  and the  second anticipated in  the  future.  The verses  differ  from
Corydon's for the order in which they proceed, beginning with Phyllis'  implied absence and
resolving  with  her  anticipated  return,  and  for  their  own internal  balance,  with  each  fallacy
allotted two complete lines.51 Thyrsis' conception of abundance also distinguishes itself through
its retained focus on water throughout his verses: the rain mentioned in the final world of v. 60
responds to the dryness declared in the first word of v. 57. Surprising, however, in a passage built
upon pathetic fallacies and in verses that are constructed in response to a claim of omnipresent
laughter, is the fact that Thyrsis uses rain to illustrate the positive sympathetic response in nature.
Crying would seem to be the human emotional response with which rain would naturally be
identified. The ominous rains that Zeus sends for his soon-to-perish son Sarpedon in Iliad 16.459
offer  clear  precedent  for  an  association  of  rain  (admittedly  unnatural,  in  this  case)  with
anthropomorphic grief.52 But sadness and crying among individuals in the pastoral world do not
precipitate  a  corresponding  moisture-related  response.  Grief  is  signposted  elsewhere  in  the
Eclogues by weeping (e.g., that of the nymphs in Ecl. 5.21), by groaning (e.g., that of the lions in
Ecl. 5.27), and even by the effects on the natural world of human neglect of duties (e.g., the
hanging fruit  in  Ecl.  1.37), but not by rain. Water is too much of a boon to the growth and
abundance that characterize pastoral settings.53 
To return to the laughter in v. 55, its defining feature is its universality, with its sole
localization  being  temporal:  everything  now (nunc)  laughs.  In  the  moment  pinpointed  in
51 Fantazzi and Querbach (1985) 357 deem this exchange the only one in which Thyrsis emerges as the clear
victor,  although their  reasons for declaring as  much are not offered. Clausen (1994) 210 summarizes other
critical assessments of the competition in which the fifth exchange is repeatedly judged to be a draw or a victory
for  Thyrsis.  I  offer  potential  reasons  for  (and,  later,  against)  such  a  critique  below. Egan (1996)  makes a
persuasive case for Corydon's victory from the final two quatrains but does not comment on the previous ones,
although he comments intriguingly that because of the poem's abrupt and inscrutable conclusion, “the ludic
qualities of the contest are thus extended beyond the contest itself, and indeed beyond the poem” (233).
52 See Lateiner (2002).
53 umor is modified by the pastorally charged dulce in Ecl. 3.82.
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Corydon's narration, laughter overwhelms all of its surroundings and, in so doing, becomes the
tonal lynch-pin of a taut, four-verse pastoral vignette. This is the “laughter of place,” and its
place in these verses,  implied by the subject  omnia,  is  everywhere.  Yet such laughter,  when
examined against the ambiguous “laughter of character” described in the preceding treatment of
Theocritus, hardly seems a secure bet when it comes to discerning tone. What is to keep this
“laughter of place” from being similarly ambiguous, especially when, as will  be seen in the
following treatment of Eclogue 4, it uses the very same vocabulary of laughter and risible? The
answer, I contend, resides in the locus amoenus. The edenic setting of pastoral, if we approach it
in analogy with the “laughter of character,” is a unique character who, in name and nature, is
essentially beautiful. Furthermore, this character is known to all for being desirable in every way;
everyone wants to spend time in his presence. Laughter that occurs within the context of a locus
amoenus serves to reflect and construct a setting's inherent positive valence.
Does the laughter in Ecl. 7.55 occur within a locus amoenus? The question requires some
clarification. Because of its extensive (and relatively stable) literary history from Homer through
Plato to Theocritus, I regard the locus amoenus as an established ontological category, or a “set
description,”  by  the  time Vergil  writes,  and  his  use  of  the  topographical  description  further
cements  it  features.54 The  landscape  comprises  a  collection  of  standard features  that  can be
deployed severally to represent the category.55 Let us look at Corydon's verses again:
stant et iuniperi et castaneae hirsutae,
strata iacent passim sua quaeque sub arbore poma,
omnia nunc rident: at si formosus Alexis 55
54 For the locus amoenus as a “set description,” see OCD s.v. locus amoenus: “used by modern scholars to refer to
the literary topos of the set description of an idyllic landscape, typically containing trees and shade, a grassy
meadow, running water, song-birds, and cool breezes.” I consider laughter to be something of a second-order
member of this list (alongside, for example, birdsong).
55 Curtius (1953) 195 notes of the locus amoenus that its “minimum ingredients comprise a tree (or several trees),
a meadow, and a spring or brook. Birdsong and flowers may be added. The most elaborate examples also add a
breeze.” In listing the “usual attributes” of  “an almost stereotypical sylvan scenery” that shares many features
with the  locus amoenus, Segal (1969) identifies “quiet water” along with a grove, shade, cool temperatures,
grass, and perhaps a cave (4).
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montibus his abeat, videas et flumina sicca.
Standing are both the junipers and the bristled chestnuts;
strewn everywhere there lies beneath each tree its own fruit;
everything now laughs: but if beautiful Alexis should 55
depart from these mountains, you would see even the rivers dry.
One component of the locus amoenus is present at the outset. Sprawling chestnut trees, if not the
typically-narrow junipers, would cast ample shade, especially when standing tall. A shepherd or
goatherd could sing or play music while reclining in soft grass beneath the shade of such trees,
much as Tityrus lounges beneath a beech tree in the first verses of the book of Eclogues.56 More
trees are mentioned in v. 54, but because of their production of fruit so ripe to have fallen of its
own accord, a visitor might hesitate to recline beneath them. A comparable image features in the
locus amoenus from the conclusion of Idyll 7:
ὄχναι μὲν πὰρ ποσσί, παρὰ πλευραῖσι δὲ μᾶλα 144
δαψιλέως ἁμῖν ἐκυλίνδετο, τοὶ δ' ἐκέχυντο
ὄρπακες βραβίλοισι καταβρίθοντες ἔραζε· 
And pears at our feet, and at our sides apples 144
in abundance were rolling, and saplings drooped,
weighed down toward the ground with prunes.
The natural production in the grove visited by Simichidas and his friends resembles the
bounty  of  fruit  “strewn  everywhere  [.  .  .]”  in  Eclogue  7.54,  and  one  might  think  that  the
description of fruit in Vergil's verse speaks for itself as an unambiguously positive representation
of bounty. However, in Eclogues 1.37, fruit that hangs long on the branches—a natural precursor
of  fruit  that  lies  scattered  on  the  ground—is  associated  with  grief  (maesta)  by  the  speaker
Meliboeus.57 Such an association would hardly be welcome in a locus amoenus. But a subtle hint
that the fruit in Ecl. 7 is not a product of grief-borne neglect is apparent in the order implied in
the remainder of Corydon's v. 54—“[. . .] there lies beneath each tree its own fruit.” Fruit falls
56 Tityrus  reclines  patulae .  .  .  sub tegmine fagi  in  v.  1 and  lentus  in  umbra  in  v.  4.  Cf.  Ecl.  7.10,  wherein
Meliboeus narrates Daphnis' gentle command: et, si quid cessare potes, requisce sub umbra.
57 mirabar quid maesta deos, Amarylli, vocares, / cui pendere sua patereris in arbore poma.
246
everywhere, as passim still lends an element of chaos to the image, but it does so in a pseudo-
orderly fashion. With the exception of this detail, however, the reader is granted few indicators in
these first two verses as to the emotional charge of Corydon's quatrain. A cautious reader might
reasonably believe that trees and abundant fruit do not a locus amoenus make. 
We must examine the aftermath of the laughter that Corydon narrates in v. 55. In the
wake of omnia nunc rident, a disjunctive “but” (at in v. 55) follows the caesura. Laughter is cut
short,  and  the  possible  frustrations  unfold  in  the  subsequent  conditional  sentence.58 In  his
relationship to Alexis,  this frustration is imagined to be abandonment by his beloved. In the
physical, pastoral world, Corydon projects that this frustration would manifest as drought. 
Corydon's placement of laughter and dryness at opposite ends of the nature's pathetic
spectrum renders laughter an indicator not only of a generalized positive emotion but also, by
extension, of water. A correspondence between laughter and water is also apparent when the
reader steps back from the specifics of Corydon's verses and considers the overall balance of the
quatrains in this fifth exchange between Corydon and Thyrsis. The laughter of v. 55 mirrors the
Jupiter-sent  downpour  that  Thyrsis  narrates  in  the  second  half  of  his  own  quatrain.  The
responsion between the pathetic fallacies of the two quatrains can be visualized as follows:
(Corydon's Quatrain, vv. 53-56)
First half (vv. 53-55½): upright tress, abundant fruit, universal laughter
Second half (vv. 55½-56): dry rivers
(Thyrsis' Quatrain, vv. 57-60)
First half (vv. 57-58): parched fields, bad air, excessive sun
Second half (vv. 59-60): verdant growth and abundant rains
The simple visualization may offer an indication of why some scholars have considered Thyrsis'
composition the stronger of the two in this particular exchange. There is a balance in his verses,
58 Alper (1979) 81 remarks on the commonality of frustration between Tityrus and Meliboeus in Ecl. 1. If laughter
is the mark of pastoral setting when it is “high,” what does it look like when it is low?
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with two allotted to each of his pathetic fallacies, as well as the even thematic movement from
drought to rain. Conversely, a reader might regard Corydon's two-and-a-half dactyls narrating
universal laughter in v. 55 as a source of deficiency in his verses, at least from the perspective of
lineation. His quatrain lacks the simple visual proportionality of Thyrsis' verses, and the phrase
omnia  nunc rident  intrudes  upon the textual  real  estate  of  the  third of  the  four  verses.  The
pathetic fallacy of dry rivers must then be compressed into a verse and half. Should a reader wish
to identify a thematic weakness in Corydon's mention of laughter in this quatrain, laughter and
drought may not be considered natural opposites any more than laughter and water seem natural
companions.
Yet in the pastoral world, they are natural enough. We have already encountered laughter
and water in close proximity to one another in the Lucretian and Theocritean passages treated in
the previous pages. In Lucretius' Bk. 5.1379-1404, the evolution of shepherding songs occurs
“near a stream of water” (propter aquae riuom  in v. 1393), and the weather is  described as
having laughed (ridebat in v. 1395) only two verses later. The laughter then precipitates, in the
sequence  of  verses,  a  natural  flourishing  in  v.  1396.  In  Theocritus'  Idyll  7,  just  before  the
mysterious goatherd Lycidas departs following the exchange of songs, he is said to have laughed
sweetly (ἁδὺ γελάσσας  in v. 128). Simichidas thereafter narrates in vv. 131-136 his and his
traveling companions' arrival at their destination, the farm of Phrasydamus, where they recline
on reed couches beneath rustling trees: “And, nearby, the sacred water of the Nymphs babbled,
falling from a cave” (vv. 136-7).59 The occasions of laughter and water in Idyll 7 are not as close
(at 9 verses) as in the Lucretian passage (3 verses), but the passage in the Idyll  is all the more
interesting for its thematic movement from narrated laughter to the description of abundance—
59 τὸ δ' ἐγγύθεν ἱερὸν ὕδωρ / Νυμφᾶν ἐξ ἄντροιο κατειβόμενον κελάρυζεv. 
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water included. It is as if the laughter cues the description qua celebration that follows.60 In case
the  cue  is  missed,  laughter  returns  in  the  final  verses  when  the  description  concludes  with
Simichidas' wish to encounter a laughing, well-disposed Demeter in his future.61 The vocabulary
of laughter ultimately surrounds the trees, water, and entire landscape described in the closing
verses of the Idyll.62
Manifest in my revisitation of the pastoral passage in Lucretius' Bk. 5 and of the closing
verses of Theocritus' Idyll 7 (vv. 131-157) is that water and laughter are common threads that run
throughout these selections. Neither one, however, is the red thread that binds things together.
For this we must broaden our scope to consider the broader literary experience of the  locus
amoenus. Trees, shade, fruit, soft grass, caves, and water can—and often do—feature, but neither
are all of these components necessary for an idealized landscape description nor are they even
sufficient. The literary topos of the locus amoenus is, by the time of Vergil's composition of the
Eclogues,  a  whole  greater  than  the  sum of  its  parts,  both  because  of  the  setting's  frequent
deployment  in  previous  literature,  from  Homer  to  the  Greek  bucolic  poetry  of  Theocritus,
Moscus, and Bion, and because the landscape itself is not ultimately the essential ingredient. The
indispensable feature of a locus amoenus is a positive relevance, emotional or aesthetic, of the
natural setting to a human perspective. In other words, the place must be said to feel good.
I do not intend to argue that Vergil had the set phrase locus amoenus in mind whenever he
embarked upon an idealized landscape description in his Eclogues.63 I do, however, believe that
60 For a similar argument regarding laughter as a “cue” (in Vergil's Eclogue 3), see Chapter 2. There I propose that
proximity,  sequence,  and  location  are  particularly  germane  to  the  metacommunicative  potential  of  the
vocabulary of laughter and the risible.
61 See above (pp. 236-237) for a treatment of these verses.
62 Theocritus mentions water  twice  in the opening exchange of  Idyll  1. The first  mention in v. 2 (ποτὶ ταῖς
παγαῖσι) refers only to the proximity of water, but the second in vv. 7-8 draws attention to the sound (τὸ
καταχές / τῆν' ἀπὸ τᾶς πέτρας καταλείβεται ὑψόθεν ὕδωρ. The interlocutors, Thyrsis and the unnamed
goatherd, enumerate many of what are later regarded as the requisite features of a locus amoenus. 
63 Although the phrase is attested twice in the writings of Cicero (de Fin. 2.107 and ad Att. 12.19) and may have
been in circulation as a set phrase, Cicero is not referring to a stable literary trope that aligns neatly with what is
typical in pastoral poetry. The locus amoenus he describes to Atticus in the first sentence of Epistle 12.19 is in
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Vergil considered topographical treatments to be part and parcel of his pastoral project, and that
these treatments involve attention to a human experience rather than just an idealized description
of nature. What I am proposing becomes clearer when one considers the second word in the
designation that came to refer in later literature (although perhaps as early as Horace)64 to these
descriptions:  amoenus.  A  locus  is  spatially  determined,  whether  topographically  (e.g.,  in
geographic  space)  or  literarily  (e.g.,  in  a  place  in  a  work  of  literature),  but  amoenus  is  an
aesthetic designation. The setting is not beautiful unless accompanied by a human response that
confirms it as such. Thus the creator of a literary locus amoenus must lean all the more heavily
on those of Rumpf's Bucolica nomina that assign aesthetic value to a landscape, whether in part
or as a whole.65 For example, it is not enough to assert that because there are trees and grass,
shade and streams, a locus amoenus is being described. The trees must be verdant, the grass soft,
the  shade  cool,  and  the  streams laughing.  With  the  addition  of  aesthetically  or  emotionally
resonant vocabulary, the reader is compelled to imagine herself within the locus amoenus and to
consider both how it would feel and how it would make her feel.
One of the earliest occasions of a literary  locus amoenus  illustrates the argument. The
description of the isle of Calypso in Odyssey 5.55-77 directs the reader's attention to the goddess'
cave before turning to the surrounding woods, chirping birds, a lush vine, numerous springs, and
flowers. All of the requisite landscape pieces of the locus amoenus are present. Yet the passage
ends with an emphatic illustration of the aesthetic state that Hermes occupies in viewing the
landscape:
mari ipso, a setting that aligns with no one of the Eclogues and perhaps only the Cyclops' seaside lament in Idyll
11. 
64 Horace, with his mention of “rushing waters” (and perhaps even the “river Rhine”) in A.P. 14-19, presents water
as  an  integral  component  of  “purple  patches”  of  topographia.  His  diction,  which  includes  lucus  in  v.  16,
amoenos in v. 17, and locus in v. 19, even invites a verbal identification of these “patches” with descriptions of a
locus amoenus.
65 Rumpf (2008) observes that a handful of adjectives (ἁδύς, καλός, and μαλακός) occur regularly in Theocritus 
(68 n. 6). The remainder of his article on “Bucolic nomina” examines the adjectives that occur considerably 
more frequently in Vergil's Eclogues.
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ἀμφὶ δὲ λειμῶνες μαλακοὶ ἴου ἠδὲ σελίνου
θήλεον. ἔνθα κ' ἔπειτα καὶ ἀθάνατός περ ἐπελθὼν
θηήσαιτο ἰδὼν καὶ τερφθείη φρεσὶν ᾗσιν.
ἔνθα στὰς θηεῖτο διάκτορος Ἀργεϊφόντης.  75
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντα ἑῷ θηήσατο θυμῷ,
αὐτίκ' ἄρ' εἰς εὐρὺ σπέος ἤλυθεν.
And, surrounding, soft meadows of violet and celery
were flourishing. And then after the immortal god entered,
he wondered while seeing and was delighted in his mind.
And then the messenger Argeiphontes stood and wondered. 75
But when indeed he had wondered in his heart at everything,
straightaway into the wide cave he went.
The Homeric poet takes pains to convey that Hermes is impressed. With  θεάομαι, a semantic
field broader than a basic  sense of “to see” is suggested by the verb's juxtaposition with an
unmarked participle for “seeing” (ἰδὼν) in v. 74, and the verb τερφθείη, appearing in syntactical
parallel with θηήσαιτο, confirms that Hermes was pleased with what he beheld. The emphasis
on internalization in v. 76 (ἑῷ θηήσατο θυμῷ) also implies a response beyond mere perception,
Additional evidence of the importance of θεάομαι is its repetition. The verb is used three times
in three verses (vv. 74-76), and nearly appears a fourth time: the use of θήλεον in v. 72 contains
the same first syllable as the verb θηήσαιτο that appears at the start of the following verse. With
the auditory near-pun, the Homeric poet blurs boundaries on the literal level between abundant
growth and wondrous viewing.
Aesthetic terms appear throughout the landscape description that precedes (the mention
of λειμῶνες μαλακοὶ—soft meadows—in v. 72 is one example), but the scene draws to a close
by foregrounding the anthropomorphic god's reaction to the description. The verses detailing
Hermes' viewing and appreciation of the landscape offer the reader an opportunity to share the
experience. Hence, in this prototypical locus amoenus, a positive human (or human-like, in the
case of Hermes) perspective is not merely conveyed but emphasized. And such an emphasis
251
becomes the  sine qua non  of subsequent landscape set-pieces. Here I return to the universal
laughter of Eclogue 7. More important to the tone of the passage than implied shade and water,
or explicit  trees and scattered fruit,  laughter  plays the critical  role of establishing a positive
human perspective within the locus amoenus of vv. 53-56.
The description of nature in vv. 53-54 is devoid of positive aesthetically- or emotionally-
resonant  terms.  Then,  with  the  eruption  of  laughter  in  v.  55,  the  arboreal  uprightness  and
scattered fruit in the previous verses are colored by a human emotional response and confirmed
to be desirable.  In other words, the locus  becomes  amoenus  (or, more appropriately, formosus;
Corydon names the beautiful—formosus—Alexis in the final feet of v. 55). The moment in which
Corydon declares that everything laughs marks a pinnacle of pastoral fulfillment in his verses.
Comprehensive pleasure and satisfaction occur in the immediate context of bountiful nature and
amatory contentment. And things can only go downhill from here: the universal laughter is as
positive and desirable as the hypothetical departure of Alexis and the ensuing drought are not.
When everything laughs in the world of Eclogue 7, a locus amoenus is confirmed and a pastoral
ideal is realized. This “laughter of place” creates and confirms the tone of its immediate context
The potential  impact  of these four verses and the one occasion of laughter contained
therein may seem insignificant in the context of a poem of six pairs of traded quatrains, all of
which are further nested in a narrator's frame of memory. It is to this framing layer that the reader
is recalled in Meliboeus' second-to-last verse: “These things I remember, and that a conquered
Thyrsis in vain contended.”66 The poem draws attention to itself as a recollected event, and it
demands  structural  dissection  and  consideration  in  parts,  not  only  between  frame  and
recollection but between the parts of the recollection itself. I have thus far followed the general
trend  of  scholarship on  Eclogue  7 by treating a  pair  of  quatrains  (in  my case,  the  fifth)  in
66 Ecl. 7.69: haec memini, et uictum frustra contendere Thyrsin.
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isolation from the others.67 Before I  turn to a second occasion of “laughter  of place” in  the
Eclogues, I will explore how this laughter that occurs relatively late in Eclogue 7 (in v. 55 of 70)
contributes to the tone of the poem more broadly—how it transcends its immediate quatrain and
interacts with other sections of the poem. In a sense, I want to consider how this laughter may be
read metacommunicatively.
In  Chapter  2,  I  explain  how two occasions  of  laughter  early in  Eclogue  3—the first
explicit (in v. 9) and the second implied and following immediately (in v. 10)—ask the reader to
become alive to the possibility that laughter is itself a desired response to the text. I conclude that
this invitation is  accepted by the text itself when it  proceeds playfully  through the  agonistic
badinage of the shepherds to a conclusion of shared, aporetic riddles. Whereas the laughter in vv.
9-10 of Eclogue 3 is understood to project a play frame onto the rest of the poem that follows
(and to retroject one onto the 8 verses that precede), one hopes of Eclogue 7 that by v. 55, the
tone of the poem has already been established.68 The late-coming universal laughter of Eclogue 7
does not parallel  that of  Eclogue  3 precisely because it  appears after much of the poem has
already passed the reader by.
The laughter in v. 55 of Eclogue 7 is not itself the opening or, for that matter, the closing
of a play frame but the maintenance of one that has already opened in  Eclogue  7. If a reader
zooms-out just enough from Corydon's fifth quatrain (vv. 53-56) to read it in tandem with his
fourth (vv. 45-48), the laughter in v. 55 becomes the climax of a longer a set-piece. 
muscosi fontes, et somno mollior herba, 45
et quae uos rara uiridis tegit arbutus umbra,
solstitium pecori defendite: iam uenit aestas
torrida, iam lento turgent in palmite gemmae.
67 In his article arguing that Corydon's sixth quatrain is a “technical knockout” in the poetic competition, Egan
(1996) 238 compares the general scholarly tendency to a boxing match: “Many, if not most, interpreters have
scored the contest as if it were something like a boxing match with Corydon winning some, but not necessarily
all, rounds, or in some way accumulating a higher score over the whole course of the contest.”
68 As in Chapter 2, p. 87, I use “play frame” colloquially and without the considerable weight of “play theory.”
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[. . .]
stant et iuniperi et castaneae hirsutae;
strata iacent passim sua quaeque sub arbore poma;
omnia nunc rident: at, si formosus Alexis 55
montibus his abeat, uideas et flumina sicca.
Mossy fountains and grass softer than sleep, 45
and green arbutus which protects with scattered shade, you all,
defend the herd from the solstice-sun! Already summer is coming
hot, already on the pliant bough buds swell.
[. . .]
Standing are both the junipers and the bristled chestnuts;
strewn everywhere there lies beneath each tree its own fruit;
everything now laughs: but if beautiful Alexis should 55
depart from these mountains, you would see even the rivers dry.
A locus amoenus  begins to take shape in the first verses of Corydon's fourth quatrain. “Grass
softer  than sleep”  (somno mollior  herba  in  v.  45)  describes  a pastoral  landscape  feature  of
considerable pedigree, and it appears alongside explicit mention of water, trees and shade.69 The
remainder of the quatrain elucidates an imminent threat that the heat of summer poses to the
vegetation.70 
When one reads these two quatrains of Corydon in sequence, the landscape description in
Book  5  of  the  Odyssey  offers  a  neat  parallel.  Following  the  extensive  cataloguing  of  the
surrounds on Calypso's island, the Homeric poet highlights the thrice-pronounced effect of this
landscape  on  Hermes.  A divine  experience  of  the  landscape  is  given  the  “final  word”  after
numerous  topographical  descriptions.  Corydon's  fourth  and  fifth  quatrains,  when  read
69 Arnold (1995) 148 comments that mollis “defines as well as any other word the essence of Vergil's rustic Muse.”
See also Rumpf (2008) 67 n. 5 for  mollis as a bucolic adjective. On this verse, Coleman (1977) and Clausen
(1994) identify other occasions of “soft” and “sleep” appearing together in Theocritus, Homer, Lucretius, and
elsewhere in Vergil.
70 There are both syntactical and topical parallels between the two quatrains. The movement in Corydon's fourth
quatrain from idealized description to  threat  of  summer  heat  resembles  how, in  the  wake of  the  universal
laughter in his fifth quatrain,  the sense of pastoral fulfillment is  threatened by the conditional departure of
formosus Alexis and the drought that will accompany it. Both loci amoeni in the two quatrains are under threat,
and,  curiously,  each  threat  offers  an  alternative  portrait  of  the  effects  of  intense  heat.  Additionally,  the
enjambment of the phrase solstitium pecori defendite (v. 47) between the second and third verse in the quatrain
resembles the enjambment occurring in the same location in Corydon's fifth quatrain when the phrase  omnia
nunc rident seems to trespass on the verses about Alexis. 
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sequentially, chronicle a similar progression from description to impact. The laughter becomes
the  climactic  human  response  not  only  in  its  own  quatrain  but  extending  from  Corydon's
preceding quatrain. This laughter, in its universality, is not an exclusively human response, but it
remains a personification—an attribution of human behavior to nature.
This is simply to situate the laughter that appears late in Eclogue 7 in a slightly broader
context,  and  to  do  so  has  required  the  potentially-objectionable  practice  of  muting  the
intervening quatrain of an agonistic exchange. To situate and explain the universal laughter in v.
55 in the poem as a whole, the reader must look for evidence of playfulness or an invitation to
laughter  much earlier  in the poem. Such evidence is  offered in vv.  17-20 when the narrator
Meliboeus transitions from the framing narrative to the contest itself:
posthabui tamen illorum mea seria ludo.
alternis igitur contendere uersibus ambo
coepere; alternos Musae meminisse uolebant.
hos Corydon, illos referebat in ordine Thyrsis. 20
For all that, I postponed my serious things for their play.
In alternating verses then they began both
to contend; the Muses wanted to recall alternating verses.
These Corydon, those Thyrsis was returning in sequence. 20
Meliboeus, having acknowledged that the significance of the competition (certamen erat  [. . .]
magnum in v. 16), professes his willingness to set aside his serious concerns for the time being.
The proof is in the fifty verses to follow. Yet it is with his explicit mention of ludus in v. 17 that
Meliboeus offers the verbal cue to open the play frame. The rules are established, and everything
in the subsequent verses that adheres to those rules (which is to say everything but the return of
Meliboeus in vv. 69-70) is part of “their play” (illorum ludo). Thus it is in the context of this
frame that laughter in v. 55 is offered.  When the competition has passed its midpoint and is
approaching its conclusion, Vergil puts universal laughter in the quatrain of one of his players to
serve as a reminder that the contest is a game in which omnia nunc rident.
255
Thus the “laughter of place” in Eclogue 7 is more aptly regarded as a “laughter of play,”
confirming and maintaining the tone established in Meliboeus' opening narrative frame when he
refers to the poetic competition as a  ludus. But I believe that certain preparations for the play
frame are already underway in the verses leading up to its opening in v. 17. These preparations
take the form of a topographical description. Daphnis alerts Meliboeus to shade (umbra in v. 10),
offered by either the ilex in v. 1 or the quercus in v. 13. He also acknowledges the presence of
water fit for livestock (v. 11), the verdant shores (uiridis ripas in v. 12) of the river Mincius (vv.
13-14), and the humming of bees (resonant examina in v. 13).71 With that, Daphnis' description
ends, but after three verses of deliberation, Meliboeus confirms that the setting will carry the
light-hearted and positive valence of being a place of play. That is to say, he contributes the
human response that frames the landscape as a  locus amoenus  or, more appropriately, a  locus
ludibundus.72
My detailed treatment of the “laughter of place” in Eclogue 7 and its relationship to the
concept of the  locus amoenus  as a juncture of natural and emotional flourishing allows me to
treat  the second occasion of natural  laughter  more briefly.  This laughter  appears  in  v.  20 of
Eclogue 4 and proves a fitting transition to the remainder of this exploration insofar as it shades
gradually throughout the rest of the poem into the more ambiguous “laughter of character”:
at tibi prima, puer, nullo munuscula cultu
errantis hederas passim cum baccare tellus
mixtaque ridenti colocasia fundet acantho. 20
ipsae lacte domum referent distenta capellae
ubera, nec magnos metuent armenta leones;
ipsa tibi blandos fundent cunabula flores.
occidet et serpens et fallax herba veneni
occidet; Assyrium vulgo nascetur amomum. 25
71 Daphnis does not refer to honey, but this is a small leap from the presence of busy bees. Arnold (1995) 147
observes that “honey [. . .] is commonly associated in Theocritean bucolics with master singers and pastoral
performances.”
72 Cf. the locus turbatus with which a shepherd sharing his name is confronted in 1.11-18.
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But first little gifts to you, boy, with no cultivation
the earth pours forth, wandering ivy everywhere with herbs
and lotus mixed with laughing acanthus. 20
The goats themselves carry home teats swollen
with milk, nor do flocks fear great lions;
To you, the cradle itself pours forth pleasing flowers.
Both the serpent will die and the herb deceitful with poison
will die; Assyrian amomum will be be born universally. 25
Although this passage begins with a topographical description that shares general features with
the idealized pastoral setting examined in Eclogue 7, the flocks that are fearless of lions in v. 22
transport the reader to a different literary topos. Eclogue 4 does not describe an idealized location
so much as an idealized atmosphere—a Golden Age.73 Nevertheless, the concepts of the  locus
amoenus and Golden Age both hinge upon the construction of an ideal—“the joining of nature
and man in the same state of felicity.”74 And the felicity that comes from a Golden Age must
draw upon the idealization of a space as well as of a time. There exists a difference between
these two  topoi: their potential to be realized—a difference reflected in the divergent ways in
which laughter is used throughout Eclogue 4 as compared to Eclogue 7. 
The  abundance  of  scholarship  on  Eclogue  4  testifies  to  the  fundamental  perplexities
provoked by even a casual reading of the poem.75 Who is the boy? When will this Golden Age
dawn? That  Eclogue  4 has provoked such a wide range of interpretations throughout its two
thousand years of existence,76 ranging from confident Roman historical claims77 to readings that
73 Clausen (1994) begins his overview note on vv. 18-30, “The Golden Age was a time of ease and abundance, for
the earth produced everything spontaneously [. . .],” and ends it “V. imagines a restoration of that golden time
coincident with the birth and early manhood of the boy.” See Baldry (1952) 87-92 for an argument that the
“golden age” is an Augustan era recasting of the Hesiodic “golden race” (χρύσεον γένος) in Works and Days v.
109. Vergil, however, refers to a Hesiodic gens aurea in Ecl. 4.9.
74 Baldry (1952) 84.
75 The bibliography in Volk's (2008) “Oxford Readings” volume comprising influential papers on the  Eclogues
written in the past fifty years is among the most comprehensive.
76 If Servius (on Eclogue 4.11) is to be believed, the identity of the puer was contested as early as the generation
following the publication of the Eclogues:  quidam Saloninum Pollionis filium accipiunt, alii Asinium Gallum,
fratrem Salonini, qui prius natus est Pollione consule designato. Asconius Pedianus a Gallo audisse se refert,
hanc eclogam in honorem eius factam. 
77 See Clausen's (1994) 121-122 confident assertion that a reader in Vergil's own time could not help but conclude
that the child referred to is the (expected) offspring of Antony and Octavia.
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draw on Messianic qua Sibylline prophecies,78 reflects a curious balance in its indeterminacies:
readers are granted enough information to feel that the mystery is solvable but not so much that
any given solution has proved widely persuasive to subsequent interpreters. After setting forth in
great detail one such potential solution, Du Quesnay (1976) eloquently summarizes the effect of
the poem:
The  infinite  variety  and  endless  fascination  of  this  poem  perhaps  lies  more  in  the
combination of its various elements than in any one aspect. It is an occasional poem; but
because it concentrates on the emotions of the occasion rather than on historical facts it
transcends the moment to become of universal and perennial interest. If a critic insists
that  a poem should contain within itself  all that is necessary for understanding it,  he
would judge Eclogue 4 a failure. It has manifestly not failed as a poem, if we judge from
the interest shown in it over two thousand years. The difficulties that do arise add to the
interest and fascination [. . .].79
What Du Quesnay fails to observe is what Petrini (1997) notes almost in passing: “Vergil has
purposely created enigmas [. . .].”80 The point cannot be overstated. As I argue in my preceding
treatment of laughter's role in several of Theocritus' Idylls, ambiguity is a cultivated effect in this
literary work. Petrini's quotation invites the reader of Eclogue 4 to realize that the fundamental
question needs to be not “Who is the boy?” or “When will the Golden Age dawn?” but “Why
does  the  text  make  these  questions  seem  so  important?”  or  “Why  are  these  questions  left
unanswered?” There are riddles undoubtedly built into the fabric of Eclogue 4. To acknowledge
this while resigning oneself to the possibility that the riddles may be unsolvable, and deliberately
so, effects an immediate change in the reader's experience. When the poem ceases to be a narrow
question that requires a single answer, new questions can be asked to which the poem itself may
already be a thoroughly convincing answer.
I return to this idea shortly when I examine the “laughter of character” occupying the
78 Nisbet (1978).
79 Du Quesnay (1976) 84.
80 Petrini (1997) 113. Northrop (1983) 111 volunteers reasons why Vergil might have intentionally left the identity
of the child uncertain: “[. . .] first, because it would have enhanced the mystical tone of the entire piece; second,
because it would have minimized his chances of offending any number of potentially important people.
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final lines of Eclogue 4. The laughter in v. 20, as the second occasion of “laughter of place” in
the  Eclogues  and one bearing a resemblance to the universal laughter in  Eclogue  7, is a more
straightforward affair: a sympathetic laugh appearing in a description of the natural world. That it
reflects a positive emotional state is attested by its accompaniments and the circumstances of its
appearance.  The  diminutive  term  munuscula (v.  18)  indicates  that  the  items  to  follow  are
welcome offerings, cute, little ones that are congruent with the age and size of their recipient.
These vegetal gifts of ivy (hedera, v. 19), herbs (baccar, v. 19), lotus (colocasium, v. 20), and
acanthus (v. 20) appear of their own accord (nullo [. . .] cultu in v. 18), a circumstance that, along
with the goats that come to their milking unbidden (vv. 21-22) and the cradles that pour forth
flowers (v. 23), thoroughly establishes the miraculousness of the boy.
Vergil's choice of plants has itself been regarded as pastorally significant,81 but because
the  acanthus  appears  in  a  list  with  three  other  plants  (two  of  which  are  also  modified  by
participles),  one  hesitates  to  place  special  emphasis  on  one  particular  plant's  description  as
“laughing” (ridens). Yet one scholar has done precisely this. In a short article published in The
Classical Review in 1928, Ernest Robson sets forth a reading of the ridenti acantho that hinges
upon “an element of humour in the main outline of the poem.”82 The humor he detects is vaguely
situated,  residing  somewhere  in  an  incongruity  he  detects  between  the  first  verses  and  the
remainder of the poem: the speaker claims to wish to sing something “a little grander” (paulo
maiora in v. 1) but he persistently conceives of his project in pastoral terms, as early as in the
third verse (“If we sing of woods, let us sing woods worthy of a consul.”) and again near the
81 Berg (1974) 172 “Not only are the flowers, herds, and smiles of traditional Greek pastoral present; motifs have
also been cited from Vergil's previous works: the hedera and baccar from Eclogue 7.25-28, the acanthus from
3.45, and the amomum from 3.89.” Northrop (1983) 118 quotes Thyrsis' verses on ivy and baccar in Ecl. 7.25-
28 to support claims that, to Vergil, “ivy is the sign of a future poet” and that “baccar was effective at warding
off the 'evil tongue.'” Arnold  (1995) 152 asserts that “Vergil has given a specific pastoral coloring to the golden
age theme by including a variety of plants [. . .].”
82 Robson (1928) 124.
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poem's conclusion: “May even Pan say that he has been conquered with Arcadia as judge.”83
Robson draws upon the humor he detects “in the outline” to explain the presence of “humour in
some details,”84 such as the perennially problematic self-dyeing sheep of vv. 42-45. He then turns
his attention to the “laughing acanthus” of v. 20.85
I detail Robson's argument not because I find it persuasive in its specifics but because of
how he deploys those specifics to support an interpretation that is far-reaching in its implications.
The article's existence also provides anecdotal evidence of laughter's status as a provocation.
Even a laugh that appears in a description of a plant warrants interrogation. The scholar claims to
have, over the course of a season, “carefully examined four kinds of acanthus and seen nothing
in habit leaf, flower, or fruit that would in any way suggest laughing or smiling” (124). Similar to
the question of the child's identity that has vexed generations of readers of Eclogue 4, the term
for laughter in v. 20 poses a question for Robson. But his answer, while purporting to explain the
laughing acanthus, goes much further by situating this explanation in an “element of humour”
that he reads into the poem as a whole. Thus Robson's argument pertains to tone; the laughing
acanthus is appropriate to  Eclogue  4 because the poem contains what he identifies in a  post
script as “sallies of humour.”86 
My reservations about  the equating of humor and laughter  notwithstanding, Robson's
alignment of ridens in v. 20 with his take on the prevailing tone of the poem models a variation
on the correspondence between laughter and a playful tone for which I argue in the foregoing
83 v. 59: Pan etiam Arcadia dicat se iudice victum.
84 Robson (1928) 124.
85 Robson  argues  ingeniously  that  the  mention  of  acanthus  and colocasium  is  meant  to  conjure  to  the
contemporary reader's mind the image of a wine-cup made of colocasium leaves and decorated with images of
acanthus.  Robson's  vague  explanation  as  to  how  this  explains  the  participle  ridens seems  to  be  that  the
connection between laughter and wine (and the enjoyment thereof) is intuitive enough:  “In such society the
acanthus might well be described as 'ridens.'” Robson might have bolstered his argument with references to the
“fluid” verb that Vergil uses for the earth's production of these plants (fundet) and to  the participle  mixta, so
appropriate to a context of wine-preparation, that modifies colocasia.
86 Robson (1928) 124.
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treatment of Eclogue 7. The laughing acanthus of v. 20 embodies a sympathy between the natural
and human world—a localizing of positive emotion in an idealized place.87 Its effect can perhaps
be more easily understood through its imagined absence. If the acanthus were not “laughing” but,
instead, “spreading” (tendenti) or, metrics aside, “greening” (viridanti),88 the miraculousness of
the other features in vv. 18-25 would in no way be diminished; homing goats, sheep fearless of
lions, flowering cradles, and the death of all poison remain remarkable. Yet what is remarkable is
not by default pleasant. The inexplicable can, under certain circumstances, take on the coloring
of  adynata that instill fear rather than pleasant wonder. Of course the passage from vv. 18-25
does not become apocalyptic in the absence of the laughing acanthus of v. 20. Munuscula in v. 18
and blandos in v. 23 both contribute a sense of pleasantness in the verses. The laughter of v. 20
simply establishes this pleasantness earlier and more infectiously. Its effect resonates beyond its
immediate  context  precisely  because  the  acanthus  is  not  easily  imagined  to  laugh;  the
unsuitability of the epithet (i.e., the “fallacy” of nature's pathetic response) compels the reader to
transfer it elsewhere and interpret it  more broadly. And so the laughing acanthus sets forth a
guiding tone to precede the list of miracles, conveying to the reader that these miracles, at least
during this stage in the child's development, can be observed with laughter on the lips because
the nature itself laughs for the child.
SECTION IIB: WORLD CHANGING LAUGHTER IN ECLOGUE 4
Although the description of the Golden Age in  Eclogue  4 begins with an occasion of
“laughter of place,” the ambiguous “laughter of character” dominates the poem's end. The pivot
comes with the fact that a Golden Age, especially one as strange at Vergil's, is temporally as well
as spatially located. A challenge peculiar to any attempted interpretation of the Golden Age of
87 Northrop (1983) 118:  “[T]he  'laughing [ridenti]  acanthus'  reflects  the  sportive  nature  of  the  Eclogues as  a
whole.”
88 I wonder if in the blending of mixtaque ridenti, one might hear hints of uiridanti: mixtaq' u(i)rid(a)nti?
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Eclogue  4 is that its atypical dawning occurs in stages over the course of the poem. Williams
(1974) summarizes the curiosity succinctly:
In other writers Golden Ages were magical times: they existed, they ceased to exist, but
one could not possibly imagine a Golden Age gradually coming into being, growing little
by little, and no writer before Virgil conceived such a picture.89 
Williams identifies “three installments” in Vergil's coming-of-Golden-Age narrative. After the
first  stage  of  the  boy's  infancy  (vv.  18-25)  is  endowed  with  a  sense  of  desirability  by  the
“laughter of place” relayed through the acanthus in v. 20, the positive tone sustains itself through
the narration of additional miraculous behavior by (and in) the landscape of the Golden Age's
second stage. This installment coincides with the beginning of the boy's education (vv. 26-27),
but his ability to read places him within a temporal, generational world that is aware of “praises
of heroes and the deeds of his parent.”90 Any lingering effect of the laughter of v. 20 dissipates
rapidly when the “few footprints of ancient crime” appear in v. 31.91 Seafaring, city-building,
agriculture, and wars follow in vv. 32-36, only to depart again after the boy reaches adulthood in
the third and final installment of his (and the Age's) maturation (from vv. 37-45).92 During and
after  this  stage,  wonders  commence  anew,  from  the  self-coloring  sheep  in  v.  42-45  to  a
firmament that nods approval  in v.  50-51. Before the poet  apostrophizes himself  in v.  53,  a
command  is  given:  “Look,  how  all  things  rejoice  for  the  age  to  come!”—aspice,  uenturo
laetantur ut omnia saeclo (v. 52). The universalizing subject resembles that of Ecl. 7.55: omnia
nunc rident, and, indeed, where rejoicing occurs, one might reasonably expect laughter to follow.
Laughter does follow, but it is not the “laughter of place.” The “laughter of character”
erupts twice in the concluding verses of the Eclogue:
89 Williams (1974) 39.
90 Ecl. 4.26-27: at simul heroum laudes et facta parentis / iam legere et quae sit poteris cognoscere virtus [. . .].
91 Ecl. 4.31: pauca tamen suberunt priscae vestigia fraudis. The temporal puzzle is foregrounded here, as the poet
identifies the crime with the past: priscae [. . .] fraudis.
92 This fluctuation from Golden Age to Heroic Age and back again offers what I consider the best support for
literary interpretations of the boy's identity (e.g., Berg (1974), Northrop (1983), and Arnold (1995)).
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incipe, parue puer, risu cognoscere matrem; 60
matri longa decem tulerunt fastidia menses.
incipe, parue puer. qui non risere parenti,
nec deus hunc mensa dea nec dignata cubili est.
Begin, little boy, to recognize your mother with a laugh; 60
Ten months bore long bothers to your mother.
Begin, little boy. He who does not laugh for his parent,
neither a god deems him worthy of his table nor a goddess of her bed.93
The vocabulary in  no way distinguishes itself  from the vocabulary for laughter  that appears
elsewhere in Vergil.94 All that has changed is the source; a human laughs rather than nature, and
ambiguity takes hold of the verses. In his article “On Vergil  Eclogue iv. 60-63,” Stuart (1921)
offers an apt summary of the effect that these lines have had in subsequent scholarship, and his
observations remain accurate nearly a century later:
It is the irony of fate that these four charming and tender verses, the meaning of which
hinges on a question of “innocent merriment,” should have proved to be a business so
serious, should have evoked a volume of anything but lightsome discussion. However,
the elusive shades of the poet's language, baffling to any unanimity of opinion, and the
incidents of textual tradition have so ordered.95
 I judge the sense of the passage to be clear enough: the boy is encouraged to laugh, first in
explicit recognition of his mother in v. 60 (although the Latin and my translation preserve the
possibility that the risus could be the mother's or the boy's), and then again in v. 62. In the second
iteration of the command, the reader must supply the complementary infinitive noun clause risu
cognoscere matrem, but the identical line beginnings of v. 60 and v. 62 suggest that the poet is
establishing a refrain, familiar from Theocritean bucolic (Id. 2) and occurring elsewhere in the
poetic book (Ecl. 8).96 In place of the elided half of the refrain, the remainder of v. 62 and v. 63
93 I  read  Coleman's  (1977)  text  of  v.  62-63  (148-149).  Stuart  (1921)  offers  an  approachable  and  thorough
discussion of this textual crux along with an assessment of other scholars' readings of these verses (211 n. 1).
Coleman's reading differs from Stuart's in the use of a dative parenti in v. 62 rather than the accusative parentes.
94 Cf. risuque soluto in Georg. 2.386 (discussed on p. 286, below) and risere in Ecl. 3.9 (discussed in Chapter 2).
The syntax has received some attention but seems understandable as an occasion of rideo with the dative “as a
sign of goodwill” (OLD s.v. rideo (2)).
95 Stuart (1921) 209.
96 Cf. the use of incipe at the beginning of the verse/refrain that repeats verbatim 9 times in Damon's first song.
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explain why a child should laugh for his parens.97 The significance of this explanation requires
additional untangling, and the particular threads of this tangle are first spun in the aftermath of
the Fates' song in Catullus' c. 64.
Correspondences  between  Catullus'  c.  64  and  Eclogue  4  have  been  numerously  and
thoroughly documented,98 but I regard one, specific motif in Catullus' description of the Golden
Age to  be relevant  to  the laughter  in  the  conclusion of  Ecl.  4:  the interaction  between and
“cohabitation” of the world by immortals and mortals.99 In the final section of Catullus' poem
(vv. 384-408), the narrator draws attention to the end of divine and human corporeal interactions.
The location of the passage is important, and some scene-setting is in order. In v. 381, the Parcae
conclude their prophetic song foreshadowing the birth of Achilles and the ruin that will come of
it. The songs final verse is an imperative-led refrain (currite [. . .]). The transition in vv. 382-383
—talia praefantes quondam felicia Pelei / carmina diuino cecinerunt pectore Parcae—reminds
readers  that  the  previous  59  verses  were  the  words  of  the  Fates  and  that,  with  their  song
complete, what follows is voiced by the narrator.
Rather than quote the section in full, which details the occasions when gods would visit
the earth before humans began to visit heinous crimes upon one another, I focus on the beginning
and end of the passage:
praesentes namque ante domos inuisere castas 384
heroum, et sese mortali ostendere coetu,
caelicolae nondum spreta pietate solebant.
[. . .]
quare nec talis dignantur uisere coetus, 407
nec se contingi patiuntur lumine claro.
For present, before, they were accustomed to look in on chaste homes 384
97 Quintilian cites vv. 62-63 at Inst. 9.3.8-9 as an occasion of figura [. . .] in numero. The compression of clauses in
v. 63 also seems rhetorically self-conscious.
98 See, for example, Berg (1974) 165, Williams (1974) 45, Du Quesnay (1976) 28, Coleman (1977) 135, Arnold
(1995) 149-151 and 153-155, Hubbard (1995b) passim, Petrini (1997) 115.
99 This circumstance of the Golden Age is alluded to in Hesiod's Works and Days (vv. 109-120).
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of heroes and to show themselves to moral gatherings,
when piety for the heaven dwellers had not yet been scorned.
[. . .]
Wherefore they neither deign to look upon such gatherings 407
nor suffer themselves to be touched by bring light.
The bookending repetition of “gathering” (coetus) in vv. 385 and 407 confirms human-divine
interaction as the focus of the passage, and the interactions that Catullus details in c. 64 seem to
occur on an emphatically visual plane.100 The verb uisere appears twice, the first time prefixed in
v. 384 and the second in v. 407. As the gods view the houses of heroes and show themselves to
mortals in vv. 384-385, their presence is felt visually rather than aurally or even physically. 101
After relations sour between vv. 397 and 406 because of persistent human injustice, the gods
cease to look (v. 407) on humans and no longer allow themselves to be seen in daylight (v. 408).
The verb dignantur in v. 407 presents the intertextual link between Catullus' second-to-
last verse in c. 64 and Vergil's final verse in Eclogue 4, and the nec / nec parallel constructions
are also used in both texts: nec deus hunc mensa dea nec dignata cubili est—“[. . .] neither a god
deems him worthy of his table nor a goddess of her bed.”102 Attempts have long been made to
account for the mention of mensa and cubile, but many of these explanations suffer from either
banality or inscrutability.103 The poet of Eclogue 4, while allusive and mysterious, is neither trite
nor so recherché as to be incomprehensible. But a straightforward interpretation of the verses,
100 Unless Catullus is being considerably more cheeky with the prefixed inuisere in vv. 384-385. The gods “look in
on” the houses of heroes, but the verb may also carry the sense “to visit.” Might these be sexual visits by the
gods that lead to heroic offspring? An allusion to such inter-mortal dalliances while the adjective castas appears
in the final foot of v. 384 and coetus in the final foot of v. 384 would be playful, but not so playful as to detract
from the prevailing solemnity of c. 64's conclusion.
101 Verbs of seeing occur in the intervening verses: revisens (387) and conspexit (389).
102 Clausen (1994) 145 and Arnold (1995) 150 note in passing the textual similarities between the conclusions of
the two poems.
103 Of the Servius of Daniel's explanation of the table and bed in v. 63 (proinde nobilibus pueris editis in atrio
domus Iunoni lectus Herculi  mensa ponebatur), Coleman (1977) rightly points out, “If  this custom actually
existed, an allusion to it here would be very flat; for what was commonplace among the Roman gentry would
hardly be an honour worthy of this miraculous Child” (149). Having identified the banality in Servius' reading,
Coleman volunteers an interpretation that draws upon a description of Hercules (buried) in the Odyssey (149),
and Clausen (1994) agrees, labeling the table “a Hellenistic detail” and citing Nonnus (145).
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such  as  that  offered  by  Arnold  (1995),  proves  eminently  reasonable  while  preserving  the
exceptionality of the boy: “Just as Peleus shared a banquet with Jupiter and a marriage bed with
the goddess Thetis in Catullus' poem, so also the puer is destined to exemplify that golden-age
state where gods and men enjoy intimate social intercourse” (150). My reading is more general
and does not restrict the comparison to the particular figure of Peleus: the poet describes two
variations on potential coetus between a male human and gods of either sex—the social and the
physical. The mention of gods of both sexes reveals the comprehensiveness of the realization of
the  Golden Age.  The poet  does  not  describe  passing  glances  between a  single  god and the
Wunderkind but the necessities of life in food and sex (or sleep).
What is absent from the closing verses of  Ecl. 4 is any reference to vision, the sense-
perception and means of interaction on which Catullus focuses in his final section. But vision is
not absent from the poem as a whole. On the contrary, it receives particular attention in vv. 15-16
before the description of the Golden Age commences:
ille deum uitam accipiet diuisque uidebit 15
permixtos heroas et ipse uidebitur illis [. . .].
That one will accept the life of the gods and with the gods will see 15
heroes thoroughly mixed and he himself will be seen by them [. . .].
So  comprehensive  and  immediate  the  communion  between  the  boy  and  the  gods  from the
beginning of v. 15 and the end of v. 16 that they are referred to by the same demonstrative
pronoun (ille and  illis), reflections of one another with a line of symmetry falling on the verb
accipiet by which the boy will accept “the life of the gods.” A mirroring effect is also achieved as
the  narrator  weaves  two  occasions  of  uidere into  two  verses.  The  active  and  passive
constructions  indicate  that  the  interaction—the  coetus—between  gods  and  human  will  not
proceed in one direction, and the passive  uidebitur in particular confirms the child's singular
status. To witness the commingling of heroes and gods is exceptional enough; to be witnessed by
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the gods is to attain a different status altogether.
The final four verses of  Eclogue  4 thus hark back, in the first place, to the concluding
section of Catullus c. 64 wherein the loss of the Golden Age is described as the breakdown in the
relationships between gods and mortals and, in the second, to vv. 15-16 of Eclogue 4 wherein the
dawning of the new Golden Age is characterized by the realization of interaction between gods
and mortals. What remains to be situated in this triangulation of texts is the laughter of vv. 60
and 62:
incipe, parue puer, risu cognoscere matrem; 60
matri longa decem tulerunt fastidia menses.
incipe, parue puer. qui non risere parenti,
nec deus hunc mensa dea nec dignata cubili est.
Begin, little boy, to recognize your mother with a laugh; 60
Ten months bore long bothers to your mother.
Begin, little boy. He who does not laugh for his parent,
neither a god deems him worthy of his table nor a goddess of her bed.
This “laughter of character” can be located precisely in the middle of the triangle—a riddling end
to a riddling beginning and middle, as if the poet has garnished an enigma with a concentrated
dollop of ambiguity.104 What I regard as the Theocritean effect of this “laughter of character,”
namely, the creation of a sense of realism as the reader engages with polyvalent laughter, also
attains; Petrini (1997) deems the attention to the boy's physicality through his laughter to be an
intrusion  of  realism  at  precisely  the  moment  that  the  child  should  be  transcendent.105 The
puzzling laughter thus dots the question mark that follows the unanswered (and unanswerable)
question that first arises in v. 8, “Who is the nascens puer who will ring in the Golden Age?” In
laughing in response to the impossible attempts to answer that question, the laughter provides the
reader of Eclogue 4 with an answer to a different, but perhaps equally important, question: “How
104 And a sprig of laughing acanthus.
105 Petrini (1997): “Why recall the particulars of the mother's pregnancy and confirm the boy's ordinary, physical
reality, just when we should be assured that he is an abstraction?” (114).
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will the Golden Age begin?” With laughter, of course.
The end of Eclogue 4 presents the child's laughter as the prerequisite for the dawning of
the Golden Age, although this does not become clear until the final line. The solicited laugh of v.
60 appears at first to be a plea for recognition by the child, yet by the following verse, it has
taken  on  greater  significance  and  is  weighted  with  conveying  a  sense  of  gratitude  for  the
mother's pains of pregnancy. In the final two lines,  the laughter balloons in importance even
more,  becoming a sort of litmus test.  For the child not to laugh for his parent is to stop the
requisite circumstances of the Golden Age before they have begun; the gods would not deign to
look upon a somber child who does not laugh for his parents. Not articulated by the poet but
immediately intuitable is what this means for the alter-ego of the laugh-less child, namely, the
child who laughs. The child who laughs for his parent—and the puer of Eclogue 4 may yet do so
when the poem ends106—opens himself up to the possibility of communing with the gods, of
sharing a table or a bed, of seeing the mixing of gods and men and of being seen. For the child of
Eclogue 4, to laugh for his parent is, as the ellipsis of v. 62 suggests, simply to allow the Golden
Age to begin: incipe.
SECTION III: PLAYING WITH THE REST OF THE PUZZLE IN VERGIL'S ECLOGUES
The final occasion in the Eclogues of the laughter of character appears in Eclogue 6. Two
boys named Chromis and Mnasyllos (v. 13) bind Silenus in his  drunken sleep. He wakes to
address his captors, who are aided by a young Naiad named Aegle (vv. 19-20), before giving in
to their demands:
adgressi (nam saepe senex spe carminis ambo
luserat) iniciunt ipsis ex uincula sertis.
addit se sociam timidisque superuenit Aegle. 20
106 The figura in numero in v. 62 allows the poet to generalize for a clause and thus not to indict the specific parue
puer when he explains the consequences of a child's not smiling.
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Aegle, Naiadum pulcherrima, iamque uidenti
sanguineis frontem moris et tempora pingit.
ille dolum ridens: "quo uincula nectitis?" inquit.
"soluite me, pueri; satis est potuisse uideri.
carmina quae uoltis cognoscite; carmina uobis, 25
huic aliud mercedis erit." simul incipit ipse.
After they approach (for often with hope for a song the aged one had
gamed the two), they throw on fetters made of the wreaths themselves.
Aegle comes upon the fearful boys and adds herself as an ally. 20
Aegle, most beautiful of Naiads, with him already looking,
paints his face with blood-red berries and his temples.
He, laughing at the trick, says, “Why do you tie on fetters?
Release me, boys; it is enough for me to have been seen.
The songs which you want, hear them; songs for you two, 25
for this one, a different repayment.” At once, he himself begins.
The dolus at which Silenus laughs in v. 22 is ambiguous, two possibilities presenting themselves
in the immediate context. One is the nymph Aegle's painting of his face, explained by Coleman
(1977) “as a way of subduing the supernatural creature to the will of mortals and pacifying his
wrath” (181).107 Thus the nymph's painting accomplishes a form of pacification that preempts all
but a favorable response from Silenus—a trick (dolus) to the extent that he is ritually subdued
while  physically  restrained.  A second  possible  referent  of  the  “trick”  is  the  ambush  itself,
accomplished by the pueri while their victim drunkenly sleeps. On this reading, the trick could
refer even more specifically to the boys' creative appropriation of the wreaths that have already
fallen far from Silenus' head (v. 16) at the time that they first see him. 
Although Aegle's actions are presented immediately before the narrative focuses upon
Silenus, the captive's first words—question and command alike—refer to his bindings, indicating
that  these  occupy the  bulk of his  attention.  He identifies the  pueri  as  his  addressees  with a
vocative in v. 24 and continues to speak exclusively to them through v. 25, wherein he indicates
that  the  song  they  have  desired  is  forthcoming.  Aegle  is  also  promised  a  reward  for  her
107 Clausen (1994) more meanderingly refers to the face painting as “a common trick” played upon drunk victims,
as a comic resonance via the typically-Plautine phrase os alicui sublinere (meaning “to trick someone”), or as a
customary practice in rustic celebrations of Bacchus (185-186). 
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participation in v. 26, a promise that Servius interprets as a masked sexual threat.108 Ultimately
the  dolus may be seen to encompass the entire situation of the ambush, from the impromptu
restraints used by the boys to Aegle's artistic contribution. The detail indispensable for any reader
attempting to determine the tone of the passage, however, is Silenus' reaction, which reveals his
disposition and thus confirms that the stakes of his unwilling capture are not such that any wrath
should be anticipated. On the contrary, the captors are immediately offered what they are said to
have long sought. 
Silenus' laughter nevertheless contributes a sense of mystery and otherworldliness to the
opening frame of Eclogue 6 as the reader is left to puzzle what kind of character responds in such
a way to being ambushed while sleeping. He wakes up from his inebriated slumber without any
apparent ill-effects,  but,  to the contrary, with a laugh, a fact that Coleman (1977) regards as
“proof of his supernatural constitution,”109 The colorful detail  that at the time of his capture,
Silenus is “swollen in the veins, as always, with yesterday's wine”110 stresses that his previous
encounter with alcohol was far from a moderate one. Yet while still restrained, Silenus laughs
and then in the following two lines deploys two imperatives (soluite in v. 24 and cognoscite in v.
25)  and threatens  (under  Servius'  reading)  the  nymph Aegle.  Despite  his  apparent  bindings,
Silenus behaves as if in a position of authority.
This incongruity is less striking when considered in its already fantastic narrative context.
The location of Silenus' ambush and subsequent song is never specified, but the episode must be
understood to occur in a quasi-Golden Age space wherein pueri like Chromis and Mnasyllos can
come into contact with—can “see” (uidere in v.14)—an immortal figure overcome by the effects
of wine. An emphasis on sight and seeing, similar to the one occurring in vv. 15-16 of Eclogue 4
108 Servius Ecl. 6.26.1-2: nymphae minatur stumprum latenter.
109 The opening verses of Persius Sat. 3 offer what is perhaps a more familiar account of the mindset of one who
may have overindulged the previous day or night.
110 Ecl. 6.1.15: inflatum heterno uenas, ut semper, Iaccho.
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and the conclusion of Catullus' c. 64, continues throughout the quoted passage of Eclogue 6, both
when the narrator Tityrus notes that Silenus watches Aegle (uidenti in v. 21) paint him and when
Silenus cryptically tells the boys in v. 24, “[I]t is enough for me to have been seen.”111 Thus
Silenus' laugh, especially if Eclogue 6 is read after the invitation to laughter in the final verses of
Eclogue  4, carries with it undertones of his divine status. Just such an exceptional, unnatural
figure can laugh even when bound.112
The  laughter  of  Silenus,  like  many  of  the  laughs  and  smiles  in  Theocritus'  Idylls
(particularly those of Lycidas in Id. 7) and the laugh of the puer in Eclogue 4, invites the reader
to pause for a moment and ponder the possible reasons for laughter at this point in the poem. The
mysterious behavior coupled with the indefinite atmosphere colors the narrative with just enough
detail to remind a reader of the ambiguities that often unfold in everyday occurrences of laughter.
Eclogue 6, however, has already taken the reader outside of the norm of “everyday occurrences.”
If the familiar interaction of two deities—i.e., a sleeping Silenus and an ambush-aiding Aegle—
with two boys does not indicate this sufficiently, the reader is invited to imagine that, had she
been there for Silenus' song, she would have seen other extraordinary happenings as soon as he
began singing:
tum uero in numerum faunosque ferasque uideres 27
ludere, tum rigidas motare cacumina quercus.
Then truly you would have seen fauns and wild beasts 27
playing in rhythm, then rigid oaks moving their tops.
111 The ambiguity of this statement is noted in Servius and by most readers since. Some scholars (e.g., Heyne: 'ut
uideamini  me uincire potuisse') wish to  understand an ellipsed complementary infinitive with  uideri,  while
others (e.g., Coleman (1977)) read it as I do and supply in translation an ellipsed mihi. There are problems with
either reading. Heyne and others (like Clausen (1994)) might be asked why Silenus would need to demand his
release if the boys only seem to have been able to bind him. Against my reading, the narrative provides the detail
in vv. 18-19 that Silenus had “often” (saepe) deluded the boys with hope of a song, suggesting that this was not
a one-off encounter between the trio.
112 Cf. the smile Dionysus offers after being captured by pirates in the opening lines of the Homeric Hymn to
Dionysus (Hom. Hymn 7.14-15). The bonds fall from his limbs as the pirates attempt to restrain him, and then
he sits down, “smiling with his dark eyes” (ὁ δὲ μειδιάων ἐκάθητο / ὄμμασι κυανέοισι.)
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These are not the sympathetic natural happenings of a pathetic fallacy.  Fauni are said to have
been visibly present, moving in time (in numerum) with wild beasts to Silenus' production. As
narrator, Tityrus draws additional attention to the fantastic nature of the occurrences with  tum
uero at the beginning of v. 27, as if declaring “No, really . . .”, immediately before offering the
most outlandish details of his story. The movement of the trees in v. 28 is less marvelous in light
of  the  sympathetic  behavior  observed  in  trees  elsewhere  in  the  Eclogues113 (one  can  easily
imagine treetops swaying in a breeze), but the explicit attention to the otherwise rigid nature of
these oaks does lend their movement an air of the extraordinary. Ultimately, the addition to the
narrative of more sylvan deities, the  fauni  of v. 27, serves as yet another reminder, following
Aegle's appearance and Silenus' laughter, that the world of  Eclogue 6 is home to preternatural
occurrences. 
And the preternatural occurrences do not originate with the narrative of the capture of
Silenus in v. 13. Tityrus, the poem's narrator, recounts in vv. 3-5 a personal interaction that he
shared with the god Cynthius (Apollo) after implying a familiar relationship (nostra [. . .] Thalia
in v. 2) with the presumably divine Thalia114 in the poem's opening couplet:
prima Syracosio dignata est ludere uersu
nostra, neque erubuit siluas habitare, Thalia.
cum canerem reges et proelia, Cynthius aurem
uellit, et admonuit: "pastorem, Tityre, pinguis
pascere oportet ouis, deductum dicere carmen." 5
nunc ego (namque super tibi erunt, qui dicere laudes,
Vare, tuas cupiant, et tristia condere bella)
agrestem tenui meditabor harundine Musam.
113 Cf. the learned echoing of the woods in Eclogue 1.5 and the drooping of trees and calling of Tityrus in vv. 36-
39.
114 The identity of Thalia is complicated by the fact that this seems the earliest, undisputed appearance of the name
in  extant  Latin  literature.  Some  scholars  conjecture,  based  upon Servius'  note  on  Ecl.  1.57, that  Cicero
composed an elegiac poem entitled  Thalia Maesta, but the Servian text is uncertain. To the extent that later
iconography of the muse Thalia associates her with the grinning, comic mask, I can only assume that had a
Ciceronian poem with the title Thalia Maesta survived to the present, it would have featured in my study. The
Greek term θαλία appears throughout Homer with the sense of “abundance.” The proper name Θάλεια appears
in reference to one of the Muses (although not associated with any particular genre) in Hesiod Theogony v. 77. 
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First in a Syracusan verse she deigned to play,
our Thalia, nor did she blush to inhabit the woods.
When I was singing of kings and battles, Cynthius plucked
my ear and urged: “The shepherd, Tityrus, ought
to pasture plump sheep, to sing a fine-spun song.” 5
Now I (for there will be a surfeit to you, Varus, who desire
to speak your praises and to compose sad wars)
will ponder the rustic Muse with a slender reed.
The recusatio in these verses has received no small share of scholarly attention, but the substance
of the  recusatio is less relevant to the current discussion than the dramatic circumstances in
which it appears.115 The temptation is to focus upon the recusatio as Vergil's own rather than that
of the internal narrator Tityrus.116 This aligns with a tendency to identify Tityrus as a stand-in for
Vergil throughout the Eclogues117—an identification that Vergil himself seems to invite when he
has Tityrus, speaking in the first-person, address a familiar “Varus.” The distinctively Roman
name is in tension with the Greek atmosphere established by the speaker's own name Tityrus and
the names identifying the divine figures Thalia and Cynthius; “Varus” adds a particular layer of
ambiguity insofar as the name belongs to a late-Republican contemporary of Vergil.
The fluctuations in narrative  voice would be disorienting even if  Tityrus were not  to
claim physical and aural contact with the god. When this occurs in vv. 3-4 (despite the fact that
Tityrus makes no reference to having seen Apollo), the Golden Age coetus of mortals and gods is
realized nonchalantly. Cynthius enters the mortal realm to address the narrator by name and to
offer gnomic wisdom, and Tityrus ostensibly takes this wisdom to heart and announces in vv. 6-8
(with a parenthetical aside to Varus), “[N]ow [. . .] I will ponder the rustic Muse with a slender
115 See Lyne (1995) 31-39 on Latin recusationes with accompanying bibliography.
116 E.g., Coleman (1977) casually states that “Vergil is addressed by the name of the typical lowly herdsman” (176).
117 Ovid's  Amores 1.15.25-26 suggests that this identification may have been in effect as early as the generation
after Vergil's composition of the Eclogues. The speaker lists his poetic predecessors by name but refers to Vergil
without using his name but seemingly using that of Tityrus: Tityrus et segetes Aeneiaque arma legentur / Roma
triumphati  dum caput orbis erit [.  .  .].  It  is also possible that  Tityrus is being used metonymically for the
Eclogues as  a  whole  (just  as  segetes  and  arma  appear  in  the  first  lines  of  the  Georgics  and  the  Aeneid,
respectively.)
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reed.” Thus even before the fantastic exchange commences in vv. 13 between the boys, Silenus,
and the nymph Aegle, the narrator Tityrus invites the reader of Eclogue 6 into a surreal universe
that bears a distinguishing feature of the Golden Age: familiar interaction between mortals and
immortals.
Additional  situational  parallels  between  the  opening  verses  of  the  Eclogue  and  the
beginning  of  the  narrator's  internal  song  on  the  capture  of  Silenus  offer  themselves  for
consideration. In both episodes, an individual is physically accosted. The plucking of Tityrus' ear
by Apollo is less invasive than the restraining of Silenus while he sleeps, but Tityrus' attention to
the god is nevertheless compelled through the physical contact. Similarly, Silenus is forced by
the impromptu fetters the boys fashion from wreaths to attend to their hope for a song. In neither
case  is  the  compulsion  hostile.  The  interactions  shade  toward  playfulness,  and  a  form  of
figurative binding seems the ultimate objective behind each occasion of physical contact. Each
act  of  binding  ultimately  bears  fruit.  Even  though  Apollo's  restrictions  are  offered  in  an
enigmatic,  impersonal  pronouncement  on  the  proper  song-material  for  a  shepherd,  Tityrus
proceeds  as  if   “bound”  by  the  restrictions  in  vv.  6-8.118 Likewise,  the  boys  Chromis  and
Mnasyllos trap Silenus with the goal of eliciting a song from him, and the haphazard nature of
their bindings confirms that physical restraint is only the means to an end that is realized as soon
as Silenus begins singing. The focus on song is maintained throughout the two episodes. Those
initiating the physical contact have poetic-musical motivations, and those being contacted have
poetic-musical talents. Thus the status of Eclogue 6 as a poem about poetry is revealed in these
inset episodes as well as the remaining verses.119 
118 Much of the meaning of Cynthius' words is conveyed through the frame in which they are presented. The god
says nothing about kings and battles (reges et proelia); the reader learns that these are not the material of “fine-
spun song” when Tityrus announces his change of topic in vv. 6-8.
119 Stewart  (1959)  summarizes  preceding  scholarly  readings  of  Silenus'  song in  Eclogue  6 and  states  that  an
identification of Silenus' verses as “a literary catalog” is “the only balanced and inclusive view of the song”
(183).  Scholarship  since  Stewart  has  regularly  taken this  point  for  granted (See,  e.g.,  Elder  (1961),  Leach
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Verbal repetitions and parallels between the passages reinforce the playful self-reference
at work in the situational parallels of human-divine interaction, physical compulsion, and song-
solicitation. In fact, all three of the selections quoted from Eclogue 6 in the preceding pages (vv.
18-26, vv. 27-28, and vv. 1-8) share, along with their mentions of divine beings appearing in the
human world, references to play. The verb  ludere  occurs three times in the first thirty verses
(ludere in v. 1, luserat in v. 19, and ludere in v. 28) of Eclogue 6. Together with the vocabulary of
laughter in v. 23, this terminology of play establishes the light-hearted tone of the poem and,
because of this poem's special status as a declaration of program at the midway point of the
Eclogues,  of  the  Vergilian  pastoral  collection  as  a  whole.  I  conclude  this  chapter  with  a
consideration of the overlap of laughter and play in Vergil's first poetic book.
I draw upon the idea of the “play frame” in my treatment of Eclogue 3 in Chapter 2 and
previously in this same chapter in my treatment of  Eclogue  7. In Chapter 2, I assert that the
laughter of the nymphs in v.  9 opens for the reader  a frame of playfulness that  is sustained
throughout the poem and culminates in the unanswered riddles at the poem's conclusion. The
tone of playfulness persists amid more serious, amatory concerns that are raised near the end of
the Eclogue, and though the sense of play fades on occasion in the poem, it is never altogether
eclipsed.  Earlier  in  this  chapter,  I  propose that  a  play frame is  opened in  Eclogue  7 by the
vocabulary of play appearing early in the poem and then is reinforced by the vocabulary of
laughter nearly forty verses later. I would like to propose a similar argument now of Eclogue 6. I
began the current examination of Eclogue 6 through the lens of Silenus' laughter in v. 23, but I
one can approach this laughter from a different angle—as a symptom rather than the cause. By
the time Silenus laughs (ille dolum ridens), a frame of play has already been opened at the very
beginning of the poemwith the vocabulary of play itself:
(1968), and Breed (2000a)).
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prima Syracosio dignata est ludere uersu
nostra, neque erubuit siluas habitare, Thalia.
First in a Syracusan verse she deigned to play,
our Thalia, nor did she blush to inhabit the woods.
As I mention previously, these verses presume something akin to the Golden Age interaction
between humans and gods. Tityrus speaks of Thalia as his—“our”—own and places her among
the siluae of a presumably mortal sphere. The finite verb dignata est in v. 1 is the same verb that
appears  in  the  final  verse  of  Ecl.  4  when  the  coetus  of  gods  and  humans  is  previously
hypothesized: nec deus hunc mensa dea nec dignata cubili est—“[. . .] neither a god deems him
worthy of his table nor a goddess of her bed.” Tityrus nonchalantly presents himself as one with
whom the goddess deigns to commune. Although she does not share in his bed, she willingly
plays in and inhabits his poetic realm.
With  ludere uersus following the bucolic diaeresis of the first verse, Vergil orients the
reader toward a consideration not merely of poetry but of a particular kind of poetry. Servius
remarks of Syracosius, the adjective modifying uersus, that Vergil uses the geographical epithet
“because  he follows Theocritus  in particular,  although many others wrote bucolic  poems.”120
Servius then glosses the phrase  siluas habitare  as “to imitate Theocritus the Syracusan and to
write  bucolic.”121 It  is  no  coincidence  that  the  Servian  text  seems  particularly  attuned  to
considerations of genre in this opening couplet. Vergil, in the voice of Tityrus, is ticking the
boxes of poetic self-consciousness. Poetic primacy is claimed in the first word  prima, and the
naming of the Muse at the conclusion of the second verse gestures, as if in direct address, toward
an invocation that would be immediately realized if the verbs were in the second-person. The
mention of  siluae, I believe to be considerably more representative of specific generic trends
120 Serv. Ecl. 6.1.2-3: quia Theocritum praecipue sequitur, quamuis multi alii bucolica scripserint.
121 Serv. Ecl. 6.1.6-7: [. . .] id est imitari Theocritum Syracusanum et bucolica scribere.
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than previous scholars have noted,122 but I first wish to consider the verb ludere.123
In an article translated into English in 1956 but originally published in Dutch in 1935,
Hendrik Wagenvoort writes of the “Ludus Poeticus” in such a comprehensive and methodical
way, compiling quotations from Catullus to Gellius of the term of ludere (and its derivatives) and
assembling his arguments in clear outline, that one begins to understand why little more than
notes  in  commentaries  have  been  published  on  the  topic  in  the  intervening  decades.124 His
conclusion nevertheless leaves something to be desired:
Ludus and ludere referring to verse-making point to a relative notion of variable import,
which as a rule can only be determined by the establishment of the other notion to which
it stands in relation and contrast. It may indicate playful or trifling versifying in contrast
to serious, true poetry, but also true poetry of a lighter nature in contrast to epics and
tragedies  as  a  superior  kind;  it  may even—though  only  in  very  exceptional  cases—
include the whole of poetry in contrast to a political life-work, considered as the more
important. Hence the inaccuracy of the assertion that the Romans should have considered
all poetry as a mere game.125
The most dangerous phrases in Wagenvoort's assessment may seem those of a qualitative and
comparative nature—“true poetry” and “a superior kind”—but his argument suffers not so much
from these  comparisons  to  tragedy  and  epic  as  from  the  fact  that  the  conclusion  is  rather
unsurprising.  That  ludere  operates  in  “relation”  to  something  else  seems  to  reflect  a
commonsense approach to “play,” in much the same way that laughter is juxtaposed in texts
against  seriousness  or  sadness.126 Indeed,  the  very  notion  of  a  “play  frame”  presumes  that
something exists outside of (or perhaps within) that frame. One takes for granted, therefore, that
ludere, whether in reference to poetic composition or other topics, reflects a “relative notion.” 
122 Quint.  10.3.17:  Diuersum est huic eorum uitium qui primo decurrere per materiam stilo quam uelocissimo
uolunt, et sequentes calorem atque impetum ex tempore scribunt: hanc siluam uocant. Repetunt deinde et
componunt quae effuderant: sed uerba emendantur et numeri, manet in rebus temere congestis quae fuit leuitas.
123 Of  Ecl. 10.1, Servius offers a surprising explanation of Vergil's use of the term laborem:  nam scribere apud
poetas ludus est, ut “et ipsum ludere quae uellem” [. . .].
124 See, e.g., Nisbet-Hubbard (1989) on Horace's Odes 1.32.2 and Clausen (1994) on Ecl. 1.10.
125 Wagenvoort (1956) 39.
126 See the introduction, pp. 31-32 on  the laughable  (τὸ γελοῖον) and the serious  (τὸ σπουδαῖον) as relative
notions in Plato's Phlb. 30e6-7.
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The shortcomings in Wagenvoort's conclusion reflect, on the one hand, the position that
prompts his argument and, on the other, the enormous body of literature he examines. To treat the
“other” hand first, it seems unreasonable to expect the notion of poetic play to have remained
stable through centuries of literature and various metrical types of poetry, especially during the
politically  tumultuous  centuries  witnessing  the  transition  from  Republic  to  Empire  and  the
accompanying transitions in literary tastes and (at times) permissions. As for the position of
Wagenvoort's “opponents,” he quotes contemporaries, namely, Kroll and Immisch, as asserting
that poetic composition was a ludus. He does not argue against this position so much as refine it
to assert that a ludus can be serious business, just never the most serious.
All three occasions of ludere that Vergil writes into Eclogue 6 fall under the scope of the
ludus poeticus,  and they collectively  construct the frame of play in  the poem. As discussed
previously via Servius, poetic terminology resonates throughout the opening two verses. Tityrus
confirms the poetic valence of ludere by packaging it with uersus in the final two feet of the first
line,  and  this  is  where  the  play  frame initially  opens.  In  vv.  18-19,  Tityrus  refers  to  song
(carmen) in his framing narrative of the capture of Silenus when he explains why the boys wish
to bind the old god: “[. . .] for often with hope for a song the aged one had / gamed the two.” 127
Although  the  way in  which  Silenus  disappoints  the  boys  is  not  specified,  the  proximity  of
carmen colors the context poetically: he “played” the boys by not offering them the poetic play
they desired (and I like to think he may have deceived them with riddling, poetic speech). The
vocabulary of play reminds the reader of the wider play frame and is soon thereafter reinforced
by the vocabulary of laughter when Silenus laughs in v. 23. The final explicit reminder of the
play frame occurs when the fauns and wild beasts are imagined to be playing in vv. 27-28, and
the term  ludere  again appears.  They play in sympathetic rhythm (in numerum)  with Silenus'
127 Ecl. 6.18-19: nam saepe senex spe carminis ambo / luserat.
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performance.128 
The collocation in numerum [. . .] ludere registers not only through context as a reference
to dance but, by way of Catullus' c. 50, as an additional allusion to poetic play:
hesterno, Licini, die otiosi
multum lusimus in meis tabellis,
ut conuenerat esse delicatos:
scribens uersiculos uterque nostrum
ludebat numero modo hoc modo illoc, 5
reddens mutua per iocum atque uinum.129
Yesterday, Licinius, at leisure and
in abundance we played in my notebooks,
as it had been agreed to be refined:
writing little verses, each of us
was playing, now in this number, now in that, 5
repaying loans in joke and wine.
Catullus emphasizes that his and his addressee's compositions were committed to the page (in
meis tabellis in v. 2 and scribens uersiculos in v. 4), but in Eclogue 6, the narrator Tityrus allows
ludere wider range. The Vergilian play operates on a written, literary plane (ludere uersu in v. 1),
a seemingly verbal one (spe carminis ambo / luserat  in vv. 18-19), and a visual one (uideres  /
ludere in vv. 27-28). And as if to destabilize the early mention of uersus, Tityrus stresses in vv. 3-
11 the oral aspect of his poetic endeavors with verbs denoting song and speech: canerem in v. 3,
dicere carmen in v. 5, dicere in v. 6, cano in v. 9, and canet in v. 11. He delays until the end of
his pseudo-dedicatory opening any additional references to reading (leget  in v. 10) or writing
(praescripsit and pagina in v. 12). 
The poetic play that Vergil portrays in the opening of Eclogue 6 is not so firmly rooted in
the sphere of written composition as that of Catullus' c. 50, and, consequently, the play itself can
128 Cf. Leach (1968) 28: “What before had been the limited and personal activity of the Eclogue poet is now the
animated yet orderly response of nature to song. Song raises nature from its ordinary inanimation and raises it to
something nearer the human level. The activity of the poet thus shifts from a self-contained world of literature
and literary terms to the wider sphere of nature.”
129 I believe that reddens in v. 6 must be a pun on ridens.
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continue for as long as script, song, or speech does. In  Eclogue  6, the written poem is all but
coterminous with the sung one, and Silenus' song remains the focus of the rest of the Eclogue,
never quoted verbatim but paraphrased until v. 81. When Silenus stops singing,130 one imagines
that the trees stop swaying, the fauns and wild animals cease their rhythmic play to return to their
lairs, and the boys and Silenus part ways. But the reader of  Eclogue 6 never sees these things
occur. The final sentence of the poem (vv. 84-86) begins with Silenus still singing (canit in v.
84), his surroundings echoing  (pulsae referunt ad sidera ualles  in v. 84), and even Olympus
resisting the end of the song and the simultaneous close of the play frame.
Much more could be said about the function of play in poetry in general, but this would
be to embark upon another study altogether, albeit one that dovetails with my current exploration
of laughter. I must content myself with two final assertions: 1) that Vergil portrays play, via the
word ludere, as an indicator of his bucolic project in Eclogue 1 and, consequently, the rest of the
book; and 2) that the Vergilian  ludus of the  Eclogues  operates in conjunction with laughter to
comprise and, in a sense, assemble a recurring section of the puzzle of Vergil's bucolic genre.
Echoing Servius'  sensitivity  to  genre in  his  notes  on the opening lines  of  Eclogue  6
(quoted previously) and pointing to some of the very same words and phrases, Zeph Stewart
(1959) recognizes a “characterization” of bucolic in the terms Syracosio uersu, siluas, deductum
carmen, agrestem Musam, tenui harundine, ludere, and meditabor.131 Stewart does not need to
explain the  basis  of  this characterization.  Although many of  the words recur  throughout  the
Eclogues,  a  reader  of  the  opening of  Eclogue  1  will  quickly  tally  several  of  the  words  in
Stewart's list:
Meliboeus
Tityre, tu patulae recubans sub tegmine fagi
130 Where the song concludes and the narrator resumes is the source of some disagreement. See Stewart (1959) 196.
131 Stewart (1959) 197.
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siluestrem tenui Musam meditaris auena;
nos patriae fines et dulcia linquimus arua.
nos patriam fugimus; tu, Tityre, lentus in umbra
formosam resonare doces Amaryllida siluas.   5
Tityrus
o Meliboee, deus nobis haec otia fecit.
namque erit ille mihi semper deus, illius aram
saepe tener nostris ab ouilibus imbuet agnus.
ille meas errare boues, ut cernis, et ipsum
ludere quae uellem calamo permisit agresti. 10
Meliboeus
Tityrus, as you recline beneath the shadow of the sprawling beech,
you ponder the woodland Muse with a thin pipe;
we are leaving the borders of our fatherland and sweet lands.
We are fleeing our fatherland; you, Tityrus, at ease in the shade
are teaching the woods to echo beautiful Amaryllis. 5
Tityrus
O Meliboeus, a god made these leisures for us.
For he will always to me be a god, his altar
a tender lamb from our folds will often soak.
He has permitted my cattle to roam, as you see, and myself
to play what I wish with my rustic reed. 10
For ease of comparison, I offer again the first eight verses of Eclogue 6:
prima Syracosio dignata est ludere uersu
nostra, neque erubuit siluas habitare, Thalia.
cum canerem reges et proelia, Cynthius aurem
uellit, et admonuit: “pastorem, Tityre, pinguis
pascere oportet ouis, deductum dicere carmen.” 5
nunc ego (namque super tibi erunt, qui dicere laudes,
Vare, tuas cupiant, et tristia condere bella)
agrestem tenui meditabor harundine Musam.
First in a Syracusan verse she deigned to play,
our Thalia, nor did she blush to inhabit the woods.
When I was singing of kings and battles, Cynthius plucked
my ear and urged: “The shepherd, Tityrus, ought
to pasture plump sheep, to sing a fine-spun song.” 5
Now I (for there will be a surfeit to you, Varus, who desire
to speak your praises and to compose sad wars)
will ponder the rustic Muse with a slender reed.
The similarities in diction and tone are apparent.  For example,  the long-recognized parallels
between Eclogue 6.8 and Eclogue 1.2 are representative of many others:
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Ecl. 6.8: agrestem tenui meditabor harundine Musam.
Ecl. 1.2: siluestrem tenui Musam meditaris auena.
There are five words in each verse, three terms shared between both verses (tenuis,  Musa, and
meditor), two of these appearing in the same morphological form (tenui and Musam), and one
occurring in the same location in the verse (tenui).132 In addition to adopting a synonymous term
for “reed” (harundo for auena) and shifting the person and tense of meditor (first-person future
for  second-person  present133),  Eclogue 6  also  alters  the  landscape  with  which  the  Muse  is
identified (agrestis  for  siluestra) and marks the change by placing the respective terms first in
their verses.134
Other  parallels  exist  between  the  two  passages,  and  because  of  the  poetic  self-
consciousness of these parallels and the locations of the passages in which they occur, namely, at
the beginning and midway point of the collection, a case can be—and has been135—made for the
programmatic relevance of passages and parallels alike. I have already demonstrated that ludere
in Ecl. 6.1 is embedded among numerous other bucolic sign-posts at the beginning of that poem.
Because this same term for play (ludere) offers itself as another verbal parallel in the opening of
Eclogue 1, I contend that the concept of play is fundamental (although not exclusively so) to the
generic identity of the Eclogues as a whole.
132 These are the only two lines in the whole of the Eclogues in which Vergil uses tenuis.
133 The shift in person also confirms, to my thinking, one of the many fine arguments outlined by Alpers (1977) in
his chapter “Eclogue 1: An Introduction to Vergilian Pastoral.” Alpers argues that the shepherds Tityrus and
Meliboeus “sing each other's songs” (95) in Eclogue 1 and thus present complementary and dependent “versions
of pastoral.” Although Alpers does not employ this observation as proof, Meliboeus sings the words in Ecl. 1.2
that Tityrus claims for himself in Ecl. 6.8.
134 I do not think that a different muse is meant but believe the alteration is nonetheless deliberate. Cf. Lucretius'
use of siluestrem [. . .] Musam (4.589) and agrestis [. . .] Musa (5.1398) to refer to what appears to be the same
pastoral  muse.  That  similar  semantic  fields  are indicated by  siluestra  and  agrestis in  the Lucretian  text  is
confirmed by Lucretius' use of  agricolum in close proximity to  siluestrem  (4.586) and his use of  siluas  and
siluestre in close proximity to  agrestis  (5.1386 and 5.1411). Similar proximities are apparent in the Vergilian
text.
135 Elder (1961) 117 proclaims (or, more accurately, exclaims) the programmatic nature of the opening of Eclogue
6: “Verses 1-12 are directly concerned, in personal terms, with the theory and practice of pastoral—out and out
programmatic!” Van Sickle (2000) offers a thorough treatment of the programmatic nature of Eclogue 1.
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When Tityrus declares in vv. 9-10, “He has permitted my cattle to roam, as you see, and
myself / to play what I wish with my rustic reed” (ille meas errare boues, ut cernis, et ipsum /
ludere quae uellem calamo permisit agresti), he describes his poetic-musical activity as play—as
ludus poeticus, through and through.136 But just as important as the use of this vocabulary of play
to portray the nature of Tityrus'  poetry is its location. When Vergil attributes these words to
Tityrus at the beginning of the 1st Eclogue, he opens two play frames simultaneously: one that
persists in the remainder of Tityrus' verses of  Eclogue 1 and another that remains open for the
duration of the collection, sometimes drawing attention to itself with pleasant, natural laughs (of
place) in poems like  Eclogues  3, 4, and 7, sometimes with bursts of laughter (of character) in
portions of Eclogues  4 and 6, and at other times seeming to disappear when both laughter and
play are altogether absent. This is because Tityrus' play in Eclogue 1 operates as a complement to
another frame opened in the first five verses by Meliboeus, a frame that accounts for a different
version of Vergilian pastoral and that makes use of different puzzle pieces. I believe Meliboeus'
frame also stays open throughout the remainder of the collection and thus contributes to the
oscillation of tone that becomes apparent even in a casual  reading of the book of  Eclogues.
Whatever this tone is—I might volunteer “community” or “sympathy” or, even more abstractly,
“responsibility”—it operates in tandem with “play” and “laughter.”
Here I should explain and qualify my second assertion regarding how the Vergilian ludus
of the Eclogues operates in conjunction with laughter. Although very little has been written about
the role of “play” in in Latin literature since Wagenvoort's article, I note in Chapter 1  that a field
of  “play  theory”—or “ludism”—has  boomed in  the past  decades,  drawing from such varied
136 Tityrus positions ille of v. 9 in a similar role to that of Thalia in Ecl. 6.2. By judging “him” a god, he establishes
by default the Golden Age coetus of humans and immortals, and he also ascribes authority—the power to permit
—to “him” in much the same way that Thalia has the superiority that allows her to deign to play: dignata est
ludere.
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fields as musicology, anthropology, psychology, and evolutionary-biology.137 My arguments in
the previous pages regarding a play frame in Eclogues 7, 6, and the Eclogues as a whole (along
with those I propose in Chapter 2 and those that will appear briefly in Chapter 6) are not intended
to be situated within this field. My study of play in the Eclogues, just like my study of laughter,
remains intimately bound up with words, derivatives of ludere, in particular.
It remains nonetheless important to distinguish between the “vocabulary of laughter and
the risible” and the “vocabulary of play.” I do not, in my introduction,  include  ludere  in the
vocabulary  of  laughter  and the  risible  for  the  simple  reason that  that  not  all  play  involves
laughter. Laughter is not “visible” in ludic vocabulary in the same way that vestiges of ridere can
be seen in terms like ridiculus and even risus. The semantic fields of play and laughter overlap at
many points, but it is because they do not overlap at  all  points that I maintain a distinction
between the two vocabularies.
Because  of  where  laughter  and play do overlap and coincide,  particularly  in  Vergil's
Eclogues, I have attended to play at length in the preceding pages. Silenus laughs in Eclogue 6 in
the midst of a constellation of the vocabulary of play. “Everything laughs” in  Eclogue  7 after
seriousness has been dismissed and play embraced. But there is no laughter in Eclogue 1. And
there is no play in Eclogue 4. A disclaimer regarding the concept of a play frame therefore seems
necessary:  the  play  frame,  as  I  use  it,  does  not  take  shape  through  a  simple  recurrence  of
vocabulary but through a persistence of tone. A profound difference between the vocabularies of
laughter and play here becomes relevant, namely, that the vocabulary of laughter, insofar as I
detect in it exceptional metacommunicative potential,  is more effective in establishing a play
frame than the vocabulary of play. I suspect that one can more easily read about play without
feeling an invitation to play than one can read about laughter without feeling a provocation to
137 See Chapter 1, p. 82 n.28.
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laugh. But if one reads of play and laughter together? That is a powerful combination, and it is
one that features in Vergil's  Eclogues, sometimes with the concurrence of terms for play and
laughter, as in Eclogues 6 and 7, but other times, as in Eclogue 3, first with laughter alone and a
subsequent tone of play.
A quantitative glance at the vocabulary of laughter and the risible in Vergil immediately
suggests some interesting correspondences. One may be struck by the imbalance in the occasions
of laughter throughout Vergil's  three works.  Of the nineteen instances of  rideo/risus  (and its
prefixed versions  inrideo/inrisus  and  subrideo),  six occur  in the  Eclogues,  one occurs in the
Georgics,  and the remaining twelve occur in the  Aeneid.  The numbers are more striking when
one considers how many times laughter appears compared to the number of total verses in each
poem: a word indicating laughter is used roughly once for every 140 lines of the Eclogues, once
in all 2188 lines of the Georgics, and once for every 830 lines of the Aeneid. At a distance, there
are  not  all  that  many  occasions  of  laughter  in  the  corpus,  and  Vergil,  though  undoubtedly
sensitive to word choice and frequency, presumably was not keeping a concordance of his own
poetry.  This  presumed  unintentionality  makes  the  preponderance  of  laughter  in  portions  of
Vergil's corpus—and the Eclogues in particular—most interesting. 
The one occasion of laughter in the Georgics is the closest concurrence in the Vergilian
corpus of the vocabulary of laughter and play. The terms appear together in v. 386 of Bk. 2 in an
aetiology of dramatic poetic production in Italy.
non aliam ob culpam Baccho caper omnibus aris 380
caeditur et ueteres ineunt proscaenia ludi,
praemiaque ingeniis pagos et compita circum
Thesidae posuere, atque inter pocula laeti
mollibus in pratis unctos saluere per utres
nec non Ausonii, Troia gens missa, coloni 385
uersibus incomptis ludunt risuque soluto,
oraque corticibus sumunt horrenda cauatis,
et te, Bacche, uocant per carmina laeta, tibique
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oscilla ex alta suspendunt mollia pinu.
Not for any other offense to Bacchus is the he-goat slaughtered 380
on all altars, and old entertainments enter upon the stage,
and around the counties and crossroads the descendents of Theseus
set prizes for skills, and happy amidst their cups
they danced on oiled skins in soft meadows,
and some Ausonian settlers, a clan sent from Troy, 385
play with unpolished verses and laughter unbound,
and they put on bristling faces hollowed from cork,
and you, Bacchus, they call in happy songs, and for you
soft masks hang from the high pine.
The broader context is a prescription for the preservation of new-grown vines: keep animals
away. As the didactic poet states in the verses that immediately precede this passage (vv. 376-
379), livestock does greater damage to vines than frost or drought. The particular guilt of the
goat offers opportunity for a repackaging of Aristotle's aetiology of tragedy.
Yet if this were tragedy, there would be something peculiar in the play and unrestrained
laughter of v. 387 (ludunt risuque soluto). The hitch seems to be the laughter. Ludere on its own
might, in a pinch, be associated with theatrical mimesis of a tragic sort, but the collocation of
laughter and ludere hardly conjures images of dithyrambic proto-tragedy. One could make a case
from the setting and vocabulary (e.g., mollibus in pratis in v. 384) that a variation on bucolic is
being described—perhaps one that includes dramatic performances of shepherding songs. The
point is that were it not for the “laughter unbound” in v. 386, a reader might continue to think
that  the  genre  being  referred  to  in  these  verses  was  a  precursor  to  tragedy.  The  laughter
establishes tone which, in turn, offers clues about genre: a Vergilian testament  in nuce to the
importance of laughter in considerations of genre.
Wagenvoort offers in a paragraph appearing in the middle of his article a list of the “kinds
of poetry” to which the ludus poeticus can refer. The “kinds” are numbered, named, and amply
supported with primary citations and quotations. The list, with citations and quotations excised,
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reads as follows:
The  poems  falling  under  this  heading  [of  the  ludus  poeticus]  are  1.  light-hearted
improvisations [. . .]; 2. iambic poems [. . .]; 3. fescennini [. . .]; 4. hendecasyllabics [. . .];
5. erotic elegies [. . .]; 6. other erotic poems [. . .]; 7. lyrics in general [. . .]; 8. bucolics
[. . .]; 9. epyllia [. . .]; 10. epigrams [. . .]; 11. satirae [. . .];  12. minor epic poems [. . .].
The focus of the current chapter appears at “8,” that of the previous chapter at “11,” and that of
the next chapter somewhere between “1” and “5.” But the reason I quote this passage is to turn
once more to the analogy for genre I have used throughout this study: the puzzle. Wagenvoort
presents twelve different genres—twelve more-or-less distinct puzzles, but he asserts that one
piece can be shared—perhaps even exchanged—among them. His piece is the ludus poeticus. I
have proposed and explored laughing pieces that surround Horace's first book of  Satires  and,
most recently, that appear in Vergil's Eclogues. An important fact to remember, however, is that
despite the fact that these pieces can be used in varying combinations and, crucially, in multiple
puzzles, laughter, like play, derives its power in relation to other topics, like seriousness and
work—the “downs” to laughter's “ups.” But what happens when even the downs are ups? In the
next  chapter,  I  explore  what  happens  to  genre  when  the  laughing  piece  seems  to  appear
everywhere in the puzzle.
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CHAPTER 6: LAUGHTER IN LOVE
OVID'S AMORES
In my previous treatments of genre as a jigsaw puzzle, meter has featured as a persistent
and pivotal piece, in large part because of the role that meter plays in ancient discussion of genre.
When Aristotle asserts in Poetics 1447b13-17 that poets are typically identified by the meters in
which they write, he illustrates his explanation with reference to two specific meters: elegy and
epic.  He suggests  that  the  designation  of  poets  as  “elegy-makers”  (ἐλεγειοποιός)  or  “epic-
makers” (ἐποποιός) trumps a designation that might hinge upon the content of the poets' work.
Meter lends its name and, by extension, an identity to the poet. 
A metrical identity as a generic identity,  however,  does not map neatly onto a poem.
Throughout my previous two chapters, I have examined the function of laughter in two books of
poetry, the  Satires  and the  Eclogues, whose authors would rightly be labeled “epic-makers” in
Aristotle's  metrical  sense.  Yet  neither  collection  would  be  designated  an  epic  by  ancient  or
modern readers for a variety of reasons, one of which, I assert, is because of how laughter offers
itself as a textual and tonal presence within these works. Horace's playful and laughter-laden
Satires are more aptly grouped with other instantiations of Roman verse satire than with ancient
epics. Likewise, the ten pastoral poems of Vergil's Eclogues differ markedly—in length, narrative
structure, and tone—from the unified epic of Vergil's Aeneid. The disjoint reveals itself in the use
of the term “epic” as both a metrical and generic designation. Though an instructor may rightly
point out to his students that the  Satires and  Eclogues are written in an “epic meter,” he will
rarely introduce these works as epics.
One might expect elegy to function comparably, as Aristotle's juxtaposition of “elegy-
288
makers” and “epic-makers” in the Poetics implies that both meters, elegy and epic, have potent
enough identities to determine how people identify the poets who use them. But “elegy” does not
suffer from the same disjoint as epic as a designation of meter and genre. The label of “elegy” is
shared comprehensively between the name of the meter, the name of the poets that use it (i.e.,
elegists), and the name of the poetry in which it is used—and this regardless of varying thematic
content. “When we speak of an 'elegy', we usually think of a melancholy and meditative kind of
poem. In ancient literature, however, an 'elegy' is defined only by its metre, by the alternating
sequence of a dactylic hexameter and pentameter.”1 Thus elegy is both a metrical designation and
a generic one.
The elegiac meter was utilized by an assortment of archaic  Greek authors—Callinus,
Archilochus, Tyrtaeus, Mimnermus, Solon—in compositions treating various themes, including
warfare, politics, love, and death. The early history of the genre is muddled enough that a single
auctor is unknown, as is the very origin of the Greek word ἔλεγος.2 The passage in Horace's Ars
Poetica in which the speaker offers an introductory analysis of elegy alongside epic, iambic, and
lyric3 portrays all four genres using a variety of generic attributes, but Horace's verses on elegy
reflect both the variety of topics treated in the elegiac meter and the debated origins of the genre:
uersibus impariter iunctis querimonia primum, 75
post etiam inclusa est uoti sententia compos;
quis tamen exiguos elegos emiserit auctor,
grammatici certant et adhuc sub iudice lis est.
In verses unequally paired laments were first enclosed, 75
1 Luck (1969) 19.
2 In a section entitled “A Brief History of Elegy,” Volk (2010) 35-39 highlights the various topics treated in the
elegiac couplet in Greek poetry before, turning to the Romans, she asserts, “Claiming elegy as an exclusively
amatory genre was an original move that enabled the Roman elegists to construct a distinct type of poetry with
its  own rules  and  with  great  scope  for  self-referential  reflections”  (39).  Luck  (1969)  25-46  offers  another
particularly readable, although in his words “rapid” (42), survey of “The Origin of Elegy” in his chapter of the
same name. Hunter (2013) urges that the symposium would be the ideal setting for what survives of early elegy.
On the uncertain etymology of ἔλεγος, see Luck (1969) 27 and Brink (1971) 165.
3 I examine this passage in greater detail at the beginning of Chapter 4.
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then, also, the sentiment of a discharged vow;
Still, as to who the founder was who put forth short elegies,
the grammarians dispute, and to this day the jury is out.
Along with “laments” (v. 75), the poet remarks that elegy is the metrical home to dedicatory
epigrams (v. 76). A description of contentious grammarians (grammatici certant in v. 78) also
may refer to Callimachus' agonistic claims in the opening of the Aetia,4 thus drawing Hellenistic
elegy into Horace's potted history of the genre.5 In referencing two and perhaps three distinct
variations of elegy, Horace effectively acknowledges the existence of subgenres. The content
varies, but the meter and the generic label remain the same.
Noteworthy in Horace's description is  the absence  of any explicit  mention of Roman
amatory elegy, the subgenre with which this chapter occupies itself.6 As noteworthy in the pages
to follow (although, because I now draw attention to it, arguably less so) will be the absence of
any thoroughgoing treatment of Greek elegy, or even of Catullan, Propertian, and Tibullan elegy.
My focus falls on Ovid, the last of the Augustan elegists and, by some accounts, the end of the
Roman elegiac tradition.7 My reasons for focusing on Ovid are best offered as a simple assertion:
his elegies laugh. The vocabulary of laughter and the risible appear as such a consistent feature
of Ovidian love elegy, especially through his laughing playfulness with the conventions of the
4 See Cameron (1995) 185-232 for the argument that Callimachus is distinguishing his own elegiac undertaking
from those of other elegists (rather than, as often interpreted, epic poets). Strabo 1.2.37 refers to Callimachus as
γραμματικός. A post-Classical reference (via Athenaeus) to Callimachus as ὁ γραμματικός appears in Call. fr.
465 Pf.
5 Brink (1971) detects Callimachus elsewhere in the verses, stating that the adjective exiguus is “probably loaded,
casting a slur on Callimachean pride in the small and highly wrought poem” (167).
6 Brink (1971) 165-166: “Considering the attention paid to love lyric a few verses below (85) and the popularity
of love elegy at the time, the omission can scarcely be accidental [. . .]” (166). I wonder if adhuc sub iudice lis
est could be a reference to how the Roman love elegists (Propertius and Ovid, in particular) present themselves
as auctores of the genre through their personal encounters with an inspiring deity of elegy (Propertius 1.1.1-6
and Ovid in  Am. 1.1.1-4). They do not admit (initially) to writing in a tradition but narrate that they began
writing elegies independently, as if each poet independently created the genre.
7 Luck (1969) 181: “The great period of erotic elegy in Rome ends with Ovid's exile.” See also Boyd (1997) 140-
141, who notes that Ovid's narrative technique “makes the Amores something distinctively new in the Roman
elegiac tradition.” Volk (2010) asserts that Ovid “ended up changing the genre beyond recognition” (39). Ovid
may be claiming this himself in Am. 3.15.2: “this last turning post is scraped by my elegies” (raditur haec elegis
ultima meta meis).
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genre,  that  he  transforms  elegy  into  a  genre  distinctly  his  own.8 One  need  not  look  far  in
scholarship past or present to find a reference to Ovid as, for example, “the gayest and most
playful of Latin writers”9 or for an evaluation of his “unique place among the elegiac poets.”10
Few treatments of the poet or his work will forgo some reference to his humor or genius.11 When
taken collectively, these comments, whether about Ovid's disposition as a writer or the tone of
his poetry, become declarations of his generic singularity. The tone ceases to be just one among
many  features  and  becomes  instead  a  defining  feature.  Rather  than  direct  the  following
discussion to a consideration of Ovid's reception, however, I argue that Ovid offers laughter as a
textual indicator of generic playfulness and, consequently, of generic redefinition.12
In his jigsaw puzzle of love elegy that begins with the Amores, Ovid collects all of the
pieces from the compositions of his predecessors, elegiac and otherwise, and then proceeds to
construct a new puzzle through persistent and playful alteration. Moreover, he calls attention to
these alterations as he performs them. And as he continues to trim tabs on various pieces and to
introduce patterns familiar from other genres only to remove them shortly thereafter, he fashions
a handful of duplicate pieces that resemble one another in shape and size. He places these pieces
at the corners and edges of his puzzle, redefining and anchoring its boundaries. These pieces are
laughter.
LAUGHING AND PLAYING AT THE BOUNDARIES OF GENRE
When one takes the metrical puzzle piece from Homer's Iliad and plunks this “hexameter
8 Miller  (2013) 252 remarks that in the Fasti Ovid “asserts his poetic identity by strongly evoking the heritage of
Latin love elegy even as he is broadening the elegiac genre.” I would substitute “redefining” for “broadening.”
9 Glover (1934) 533 (cited by Luck (1969) 166) refers to Ovid as “the gayest and most playful of Latin writers.”
10 Katz (2009) 163.
11 Quintilian  nimium amator ingenii  sui and Luck (1969) 180: “To read the  Amores provides the privilege of
accompanying their author and protagonist on an infinitely entertaining pilgrimage of pleasure and good-natured
self-deception.”
12 Boyd (1997) 164: “In the Amores, he offers us a new type of elegy, in which love is not an end but a means. This
relationship between style and substance is itself a legacy of Callimachus; but in claiming it for himself, Ovid
personalizes it, giving the narrator his own name.
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piece” down in a puzzle that contains far less war and more lighthearted narrator participation
than  Homer,  a  tension arises.  Expectations  are  frustrated.  When  one  draws attention  to  this
metrical incongruity and treats it as something of a motif, the tension is reinforced.13 Likewise,
after new expectations are set regarding the content of elegy, tension between meter and content
results on those occasions when Ovid invites warfare and its effects into his elegiac narrative.
Although thematic material revolving around war would not have been atypical in the archaic
Greek elegy of Tyrtaeus or Archilochus, Ovid's Roman precursors typically define themselves
and their poetry in opposition to a life of military service,14 and Ovid himself refers to his elegies
as  imbelles.15 One can imagine the tension created at the boundaries between physical puzzle
pieces when those pieces are not usually juxtaposed—not “meant to fit together.” I imagine an
impatient but determined puzzler mashing a tab into the wrong blank, crinkling the cardboard in
the process, and leaving a sliver of space as testament that the pieces did not belong together in
the first place.
But tension, when relieved, can provoke laughter, whether that laughter is motivated by
incongruity, a sense of release, or even a sense of superiority when atypical pieces finally slide
into place. And because readers come to recognize the content of a work by assembling all of the
individual words that constitute its meaning, then words and terms for laughter are the equivalent
so many pieces in the puzzle of genre.
Although the dating of the original publication of Ovid's  Amores  remains uncertain, as
13 For example, Boyd (1997) 141 detects “programmatic material” throughout the collection and argues that it is
necessary to an interpretation of the Amores rather than extraneous. 
14 Murgatroyd (1975) draws upon isolated references in Greek poetry to love and war to argue that the elegiac
opposition of militia amoris to authentic warfare developed originally from “an application of military language
to amatory activities, suggested by their resemblance to military operations” (60). He also notes that Tibullus
and Propertius, by demonstrating a greater opposition to war (76-77), “invested [militia amoris] with a degree of
seriousness and gravity which it had not so far possessed” (77). However, I accept Gale's (1997) final caution
that,  “the  very overt  'literariness'  of  elegy opens  up levels  of  irony  which  make  it  impossible  (or  at  least




does the length of the gap between first publication and republication of the collection in its five-
book and three-book versions,16 the Amores are generally accepted as having been Ovid's earliest
composition—his “debut.”17 As such, this collection of elegiac poems presents a first boundary in
the introduction of a new Augustan poet. Furthermore, Amores 1.1, by nature of its being the first
in the collection, offers an even more finely delineated boundary.18 I examine other occasions of
laughter that occur in the three books of Ovid's collection, but I focus on Amores 1.1, reading the
poem sequentially, both to demonstrate how the meaning is gradually constructed and to stress
how  Ovid's repeated association of laughter, love, and elegy in the  Amores  reflects a playful
generic self-consciousness and creates a distinctly Ovidian take on elegy.
The  first  elegy in  Ovid's  Amores  foregrounds  an acute  sensitivity  to  the  relationship
between meter, content, and genre:
arma graui numero uiolentaque bella parabam
    edere, materia conueniente modis.
par erat inferior uersus—risisse Cupido
    dicitur atque unum surripuisse pedem.
Weapons in a weighty rhythm and violent wars I was preparing
    to put forth, with the material suiting the meter.
The second verse was equal to the first—Cupid is said
    to have laughed and to have snatched away one foot.
Ovid draws explicit attention to meter in the phrase “in a weighty rhythm” (graui numero)19 and
to the intersection of metrical form and a poem's subject in v. 2: “with the material suiting the
meter” (materia conveniente modis). Like Horace, Ovid in the opening of the Amores seems to
16 For the problems of dating the Amores, see Syme (1978) 1-8 and McKeown (1987) 74-89. A summary of the
(inconclusive)  discussion  of  the  two  editions  appears  with  bibliography  in  Boyd (1997)  143  n.  27.  Boyd
suggests that the first edition may never have existed (146), a position with which I am sympathetic.
17 Conte (1994b) 343.
18 The finest boundary would be the four-verse epigram with which Ovid introduces the Amores, but I treat this
later in the chapter. 
19 For weight in meter (gravis), cf. Aristotle's use of ὀγκώδης at Poetics 1459b31-1460: “[T]he heroic meter is the
most stately and weighty of the meters” (τὸ γὰρ ἡρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων
ἐστίν).
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subscribe to the belief that specific content is best conveyed in specific meters.20 Horace suggests
in Ars Poetica v. 73 to what genre and in what meter the discussion of “sorrowful wars” (tristia
bella) belongs, and, indeed, Ovid not only writes wars into his first verse of dactylic hexameter
but weapons too, beginning his poem with the same word that Vergil uses at the beginning of the
Aeneid—arma.21 These are the first puzzle pieces the poet places before his reader, and offered as
they are in a rapid line of hexameter,  Ovid offers his  readers ample reason to  believe he is
embarking upon a work of epic. It appears that everything was moving along smoothly enough
until the poet heard laughter.
Cupid's  reported  laughter  in  the  third  verse  announces  itself  with  a  mischievous,
snickering sibilance—risisse.22 The laugh seems to jar the speaker out of his expectations of
composing poetry about war and weaponry, and the poet preserves some of this surprise for his
readers by placing the laughing infinitive first in its clause, immediately after the strong caesura
and  before its source and governing verb (dicitur) are known. The speaker's poetic revery is
broken not by the sight of the boy Cupid but by the laughing sound he is said to have made.
“Is said to have made” is a curious formulation, but it is Ovid's own, and I return to it
shortly.  In  any  case,  the  speaker's  epistemological  relationship  to  Cupid's  actions  remains
ambiguous at this point in the poem. It is not clear in the first four verses that he even sees the
boy. Instead, Cupid's laughter and thievery are reduced to “hearsay”—dicitur in v. 4, as if Ovid
only found out that Cupid was responsible for the theft some time later. The speaker's subsequent
address to Cupid, beginning in v. 5 and continuing for 16 verses, does little to clarify matters:
20 In Remedia Amoris vv. 371-398, Ovid makes the connection between content and meter most plain (e.g., fortia
Maeonio gaudent pede bella referri, v. 373).
21 McKeown (1987) 106 remarks upon the convention of using opening words to refer to a literary work and
proceeds to note on p. 107 n. 11 that “the Amores were sometimes actually referred to as the Arma during the
Middle Ages.”
22 The sibilance begins to voice itself with the previous word uersus, but there is otherwise a dearth of S's in the
first two verses.
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“Who, cruel boy, gave you this degree of authority over songs?” (“quis tibi, saeue puer, dedit
hoc in carmina iuris?”). The speaker's direct speech to the boy could establish the fact that the
two figures are inhabiting the same space, but the skepticism created through the word dicitur
could offer readers reason to believe that the poet is cursing Cupid in his absence. In either case,
Ovid scolds Cupid aloud and proceeds to illustrate a topsy-turvy world that would result if gods
were to abandon their traditional responsibilities. In vv. 17-20, Ovid arrives at the real source of
his concern: his own poetry.
cum bene surrexit uersu nova pagina primo,
    attenuat nervos proximus ille meos;
nec mihi materia est numeris leuioribus apta,
    aut puer aut longas compta puella comas.' 20
“When a new page has started well with the initial verse,
    that next one diminishes my powers.
Nor do I have material that accommodates lighter meters,
    neither a boy nor a girl adorned with long hair.” 20
As in his opening verses, content, meter, and by extension, genre occupy his attention. He even
buries a sly allusion to the proper content of hexameter when he hides the word rex in plain sight
in  v.  17:  surrexit.23 In  something  of  an  unprecedented  move, Ovid  claims  to  have  been
successfully engaged in the writing of an epic. This is not a recusatio in which a poet appeals to
his inability to write in a “higher” genre so as to excuse his more humble pursuits.24 Quite the
contrary, Ovid's problem is not a lack of ability or content but, he stresses, meter: the shorter line
of the pentameter is simply too weak for the weighty material he wishes to address. Nor do the
problems stop there. Should the poet attempt to compose in elegiac couplets, his issue becomes
one of content: he lacks a beloved to inspire his “lighter meters.”
23 Cf. Horace A.P. 73: res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella.
24 McKeown (1989) notes, “It was conventional that a poet should attempt to justify his adherence to a humble
genre by declaring that he lacked the ability to aspire to another which was superior and preferable,” and cites
Vergil's Ecl. 6.3ff as evidence (among others). Conte (1994a) refers to the recusatio as “the most characteristic,
most  constant  element  of  Augustan  poetry”  (123),  and  goes  on  to  state  that  “the  recusationes are  better
explained as a spectacle of literary genres and of the related genres of life” (123-124).
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A reader can imagine, when reading the poem sequentially up to this point, that Ovid was
not actually addressing an embodied Cupid but ranting at the idea of Love. He was shaking his
fist in the air because he was suffering from a strange case of writer's block—a tic that only
permitted him to write in a specific meter. But the poem makes a rapid turn toward the surreal. It
turns out that Cupid was physically present  to react and respond to the speaker's rant. Ovid
narrates in vv. 21-24 that after he finished his complaint, the boy opened his quiver, grabbed an
arrow,  curved  his  bow,  and  said,  “What  sort  of  work  you'll  sing—take  it!”  It  seems  most
reasonable in hindsight that the speaker and the boy were inhabiting the same physical space all
along, and at least since that moment in the inset narrative when the speaker's addresses Cupid in
v. 5.
With this in mind, the use of dicitur in v. 4 becomes all the more puzzling. McKeown is
content to regard the  dicitur  as “problematic.”25 One possible explanation is that Cupid only
appears in response to the poet's rant. This would mean that the poet is genuinely unsure about
what happened to his epic endeavors. Someone tells him it was that rascal Cupid, and he shouts
at Cupid, who then shows up. But this reading raises two big questions. Where was Ovid when
the theft occurred, and who tattled on Cupid?
Moles  (1991) offers  an  alternative reading of  dicitur  in  presenting  his case  for  “The
Dramatic Coherence of Ovid Amores 1.1 and 1.2”:
'It is said', 'they say', 'there is a story' etc. are often used as 'distancing' formulae whereby
the writer does not commit himself to the veracity of certain material, particularly when it
is of a supernatural character. He thus avoids violation of the canons of realism or the
charge of personal naïveté. (The technique is of course particularly common in, though
not restricted to, historiography.)
     Here we may regard Ovid as either using such a formula directly or knowingly
alluding to it in, as it were, inverted commas: 'Cupid “is said” to have laughed.' In either
case Ovid's application to what purports to be his own experience of a formula normally
25 McKeown (1989)  14:  “It  cannot  be  an  appeal  to  literary  authority  [.  .  .],  because  the  experience  here  is
personal.”
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applied to  material  from which the writer distances himself  creates an effect  at  once
impudent, humorous, paradoxical, ironic and spuriously rationalist.26
That  Ovid  rigorously  subscribes  to  a  compulsion  to  preserve  any  “canons  of  realism”  is
particularly unlikely in light of later poems in the collection (e.g., the aural epiphany of Cupid
and Venus in 1.6.11-12). Moreover, a poem from considerably later in his elegiac career reveals
the poet capable of signaling clearly when a potentially unrealistic interaction is experienced in
the course of a dream-state.27 In any case, the latter half of Moles' explanation with its emphasis
on impudence, humor, and irony seems closer to the mark.
I believe that Ovid introduces a new variation on the “Alexandrian footnote” with his use
of dicitur. 28 An Alexandrian footnote distinguishes itself for the fact that it marks the passage in
the text without explicitly identifying the source text. At its least forgiving, the footnote presents
readers with the equivalent of a little super-script number in a word like dicitur, but when the
reader looks to the bottom of the page, she finds nothing. Slightly more forgiving is when the
footnote reminds the reader that the text before her is in literal dialogue with other texts and
possibly presenting a variant tradition. The hope and expectation on the part of the footnoter are
presumably that the readership catches the references or notices the deviation, in which case the
footnote functions as a knowing nod, if also a challenge, saying, “If you are well-read, you will
know where this is from.” 
A simple illustration of an Alexandrian footnote appears in the opening lines of Aeneid 6
wherein the poet begins his description of the doors to the Temple of Apollo at Cumae:
26 Moles (1991) 553.
27 See Ex Ponto 3.3.65-66 and, most explicitly, v. 7: publica me requies curarum somnus habebat / fusaque erant
toto languida membra toro [. . .]. The poet's revisitation of an encounter with Cupid in this poem occurs on his
bed and mirrors one of his earliest encounters with love in Amores 1.2.
28 Ross (1975) 78 coins the term but directs readers (in his own n. 2) to Norden (1926) on Aeneis VI, 123-124, who
glosses such phrases as “das Zeichen der diffidentia des Dichters” (123) before offering a footnote of his own.
See also Nisbet-Hubbard (1970) on 1.7.23 and Hinds (1987) 8-9. For a variation on the concept of “footnoting”
that hinges upon the vocabulary of memory, see Miller (1993).
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Daedalus, ut fama est, fugiens Minoia regna
praepetibus pennis ausus se credere caelo [. . .] 15
Daedalus, as the story goes, fleeing Minoan kingdoms
and having dared on fleet wings to entrust himself to the sky [. . .] 15
Servius originally supposed that ut fama est  was Vergil's attempt to communicate to the reader
that he was about to say something fantastic, not unlike the first explanation of dicitur espoused
by  Moles,  but  the  footnote  ultimately  reveals  Vergil  to  be  letting  readers  know  that  he  is
presenting a traditional tale with allusive echoes of Catullus 64.29
A more challenging footnote signposting a variant tradition appears in Book 2 vv. 567-
568 of Ovid's Ars Amatoria:
a, quotiens lasciva pedes risisse mariti
     dicitur, et duras igne vel arte manus. 
Ah, how often the wanton one is said to have laughed at
     the feet of her husband and his hands rough from fire or craft.
The similarities to Cupid's laughter in Amores 1.1.3 are immediately apparent, but the footnote
makes considerably more sense in light of the fact that just six verses earlier in vv. 561-562, the
praeceptor amoris relays the status of the upcoming story as a “very well-known tale”:
fabula narratur toto notissima caelo,
    Mulciberis capti Marsque Venusque dolis.
 The very well-known tale is told throughout the heavens,
    Mars and Venus both captures by the tricks of Mulciber.
The story is indeed very well known to readers of Odyssey Book 8 wherein the bard Demodocus
sings  of  Ares'  and  Aphrodite's  adulterous  liaison.   When  Hephaestus  catches  the  lovers  in
flagrante and  exposes  their  relations  to  the  other  gods,  the  gods  greet  the  spectacle  with
unquenchable laughter (8.326-7) and shortly thereafter laugh again at the smart-alecky remarks
29 Austin (1986) on verse 14 of Book 6. The allusion is particularly evident in Vergil's variation on Catullus' use of
inobservabilis error in c. 64.115 with his own inextricabilis error in the same metrical sedes of Aen. 6.27. Both
hexasyllabic terms are new coinages.
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of Hermes (8.342):
ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνῶρτο γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι 
τέχνας εἰσορόωσι πολύφρονος Ἡφαίστοιο. 
ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον· 
“οὐκ ἀρετᾷ κακὰ ἔργα· κιχάνει τοι βραδὺς ὠκύν, 
ὡς καὶ νῦν Ἥφαιστος ἐὼν βραδὺς εἷλεν Ἄρηα, 8.330
ὠκύτατόν περ ἐόντα θεῶν, οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσι, 
χωλὸς ἐών, τέχνῃσι· τὸ καὶ μοιχάγρι' ὀφέλλει.” 
ὣς οἱ μὲν τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγόρευον· 
Ἑρμῆν δὲ προσέειπεν ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων· 
“Ἑρμεία Διὸς υἱέ, διάκτορε, δῶτορ ἑάων, 8.335
ἦ ῥά κεν ἐν δεσμοῖσ' ἐθέλοις κρατεροῖσι πιεσθεὶς
εὕδειν ἐν λέκτροισι παρὰ χρυσῇ Ἀφροδίτῃ;” 
τὸν δ' ἠμείβετ' ἔπειτα διάκτορος Ἀργεϊφόντης· 
“αἲ γὰρ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἄναξ ἑκατηβόλ' Ἄπολλον. 
δεσμοὶ μὲν τρὶς τόσσοι ἀπείρονες ἀμφὶς ἔχοιεν, 8.340
ὑμεῖς δ' εἰσορόῳτε θεοὶ πᾶσαί τε θέαιναι, 
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν εὕδοιμι παρὰ χρυσῇ Ἀφροδίτῃ.” 
ὣς ἔφατ', ἐν δὲ γέλως ὦρτ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν. 
[A]nd unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods
as they saw the works of ingenious Hephaestus.
And thus someone looking on said to another nearby:
'Cheater's never prosper. Look. The slow overtakes the swift,
as even now Hephaestus, being slow, captures Ares, 8.330
the swiftest of the gods who inhabit Olympus
by his works, although lame; the adulterer's fine is owed.'
In this way the gods said such things to one another.
But lord Apollo son of Zeus addressed Hermes:
'Hermes, son of Zeus, messenger and giver of good things, 8.335
would you be willing, weighed down among strong bindings,
to sleep in bed alongside golden Aphrodite?'
To him, then, the messenger and slayer of Argus replied:
'If only this could happen, lord Apollo, far-darting one.
Let three times as many inescapable bindings encircle me, 8.340
and all you gods and goddesses look on,
but I would sleep alongside golden Aphrodite.'
Thus he spoke, and laughter arose among the undying gods.
The subsequent  narrative identifies Poseidon as the only god who does not laugh in v.  343.
Instead, he vouches for Ares and arranges for the release of the shamed adulterers.
Let us return now to the laughter attributed to Venus in the  Ars Amatoria, who, in her
earlier  incarnations as Aphrodite  in the Odyssean Song of Demodocus,  did not laugh at  all.
299
Venus' laughter, conveyed by the same  risisse  that Cupid is said to have offered, is distinctly
derisive  as  she  impersonates  her  blue-collar  and  hobbled  husband.  Perhaps  she  even  limps
around as Hephaestus does in Iliad 1 in an attempt to make her divine audience—her lover Mars
—laugh along with her.30 One might argue that any telling of this fabula notissima must include
laughter because of the central role that laughter plays in Homer's version, and an occasion of
laughter closely resembling that prompted by Hermes' comment in Book 8 appears near the end
of Ovid's account. Whether because the laughter of Venus, failing as it does to appear in any
comparable manner in Odyssey 8, appears in a since-lost source to which the poet was drawing
attention,  or  because  an  ingenious  way to  validate  a  new addition  within  a  narrative  is  by
suggesting that it  is not in fact  new, the  praeceptor amoris footnotes his deviation from the
Homeric account with dicitur. 
An Alexandrian  footnote can be  introduced by any number of  words,  but  those  that
appear most frequently in Augustan poetry are verbs of speech that are typically third-person
plural or impersonal, such as dicunt, ferunt, dicitur (as we have in Amores 1.1.4), or ut fama est.
They say, it is said, as the story goes. Some of these are familiar to English speakers as the way
“words of wisdom” are passed down: “They say that a bird in hand is worth two in a bush.” But
if someone said, “They say that to be or not to be, that is the question,” a listener might be
tempted to respond, “Well no,  they don't really say that, unless by they you mean Shakespeare
and  Hamlet.” But if someone  did say that, you might suppose that person was having a good
time and being, in a word, playful. Ovid offers an even more extreme example in his opening to
Amores 1.1. He impersonalizes a personal story. It is as if a professor were to walk into a room
and say, “I was preparing this lecture, and things were coming along superbly, but then they say
30 The narrator draws explicit attention to Vulcan's feet (pedes  in 2.567) at the object of Venus' laughter.  If she
were to impersonate him and limp, as Elegy herself is said to in Am. 3.1.7-10, a reader might recall the reference
to uneven lines of elegy and Cupid's theft of a foot in Am. 1.1.3-4.
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that my baby tore up some pages.” Students' first and second questions would likely be, “Who
are they? And where were you?”
Ovid parodies the idea of the Alexandrian footnote by creating, in essence, a “dangling
footnote.” He refers to a tradition that does not actually exist and offers a “nonsense” footnote
that  says  no  more  than,  “This  is  a  footnote,”  and  he  thus  disrupts  readers'  expectations.  A
potential response to this disruption is presented in the very same clause: laughter. As he self-
consciously writes about the boundaries of genre and sets himself apart from epic as if compelled
to do so, he writes a laugh in the narrative fabric itself. The incongruity of dicitur  is jarring, a
little disorienting, but ultimately a type of poetic play—a relief made possible by the idea that
Ovid is shifting from a weightier (grauis) genre to a lighter (leuior) one. 
Ovid eventually draws the poem to a close:
sex mihi surgat opus numeris, in quinque residat: 
    ferrea cum uestris bella ualete modis. 
cingere litorea flauentia tempora myrto,
    Musa, per undenos emodulanda pedes. 30
May the work rise for me with six beats, may it settle in five;
    unyielding war with your meter, farewell.
You, wreath your golden temples with shore-born myrtle,
    you, Muse who must be celebrated through eleven feet. 30
If one steps back to examine the boundaries of this boundary poem—its beginning and end,
Ovid's fixation upon meter cannot go unrecognized. He frames the poem with references to his
transition  from  heroic  to  elegiac  verse,  and  a  relentless  poetic  self-consciousness  operates
throughout the intervening verses. The poem is unabashedly about poetry and about poetic qua
metrical genre in particular.31 
Yet isolated occasions of “self-consciousness” do not seem sufficient for sustaining a tone
of playfulness. Vergil's beginning to the Aeneid is also poetry about poetry: arma uirumque cano
31 Boyd (1997) Chapter 4 stresses this.
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—“I sing of arms and a man.” Scholars have long noted how Vergil compresses the themes of
Homer's  Iliad  and  Odyssey into the first two words of his new epic—the war of the  Iliad, the
individual man of the  Odyssey,32 and the poet places himself in the poem too—“I  sing.” The
agonistic edge contains elements of playfulness,33 but the poem quickly shifts away from this
marked poetic self-consciousness. The narrator of the Aeneid fades into the background only to
emerge  sporadically  in  the  remainder  of  the  epic.  The  weightier  nature  of  the  Aeneid's
competitive play becomes more apparent when set against the beginning of another Vergilian
poem, Eclogues 6:
prima Syracosio dignata est ludere uersu
nostra, neque erubuit siluas habitare, Thalia.
cum canerem reges et proelia, Cynthius aurem
uellit, et admonuit: "pastorem, Tityre, pinguis
pascere oportet ouis, deductum dicere carmen." 5
nunc ego (namque super tibi erunt, qui dicere laudes,
Vare, tuas cupiant, et tristia condere bella)
agrestem tenui meditabor harundine Musam.
First in a Syracusan verse she deigned to play,
our Thalia, nor did she blush to inhabit the woods.
When I was singing of kings and battles, Cynthius plucked
my ear and urged: “The shepherd, Tityrus, ought
to pasture plump sheep, to sing a fine-spun song.” 5
Now I (for there will be plenty men for you, Varus, who desire
to speak your praises and to compose sad wars)
will ponder the rustic Muse with a slender reed.
Eclogue 6 narrates another boundary of genre. It contains another recusatio, another occasion of
generic self-awareness, of not singing the tristia bella that Horace later regards as the domain of
epic. Appearing in the first verse is the key word: ludere—to play.34 This is quite literally “play”
at the boundary of genre. And the explanation for how this play marks itself as more lighthearted
than the play of the Aeneid is provided by the other verb in the first verse of the poem: dignata
32 Barchiesi (1997), for example.
33 Considerations of the poetic ἀγών and its potential ties to laughter are explored in Chapter 2; see also Huizinga
(1955) 105-118.
34 See the discussion in Chapter 5, pp. 275-288.
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est. She deigned. As discussed above,35 Vergil uses the same word at the end of Eclogue 4 for a
god who is willing to associate with humans. So Thalia in a sense “tolerated” the shift in genre.
She condescended. The language of descent narrates a descent in genre.36
With this in mind, we can return to Amores 1.1. I assert above that an important feature of
the tonal effect of Ovid's generic play is that the poet narrates a shift from weighty to lighter
poetry: grauis in v. 1 to leuior in v. 19. Heavy epic disappears. Lighter elegy prevails. Familiar to
anyone who has been unburdened of a physical weight, release of tension and a sense of relief
follow a shift from heavy to light, dark to bright, and difficult to easy much more readily than
shifts in the opposite direction.37 Noteworthy of the laughter in v. 3 is its simultaneous status as
both cause of the tension and effect of the tension's release. Risisse establishes some degree of
the tonal tension between themes by voicing the shift to levity after the martial terminology in v.
1 and thus creating incongruity, but the laughter also presents itself as a fitting response to this
incongruity, diffusing the tension it creates and establishing a sense of levity.
I pick the word “levity” deliberately. The risisse of v. 3 is not the first occasion of levity
announced in the corpus of Ovid's Amores, nor, for that matter, is the word leuior in v. 19. Before
Cupid laughs his way into Amores 1.1 and snatches away a foot of the speaker's nascent epic and
before the speaker's work even begins with the arma of the first word, Ovid announces the levity
of his three-book collection of elegiac works with an epigram that has proved the source of
seemingly-unresolvable scholarly speculation:
qui modo Nasonis fueramus quinque libelli,
    tres sumus; hoc illi praetulit auctor opus.
ut iam nulla tibi nos sit legisse uoluptas,
    at leuior demptis poena duobus erit.
35 Chapter 5, pp. 265-266.
36 Volk (2010) 40: “[T]o the Roman poets of the 1st century BCE, the Aetia prologue became a blueprint for their
own rejection of “high” genres such as epic, tragedy, and political panegyric and election instead of “low” types
of poetry such as bucolic and elegy.”
37 For a description of the relief theory of laughter, see the Introduction, pp. 31-32.
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We who had formerly been the five books of Naso
    are three; the author preferred this work to that.
Though even now you may receive no pleasure from reading us,
    at least the punishment will be lighter with two books removed.
The epigram suggests to readers that the Amores were published in two editions, but decades of
speculation about the composition and dating of these suggested editions has yet to yield any
degree of certainty on either  topic.38 Setting aside questions of  the composition,  dating,  and
perhaps the very existence of two separate editions, one can see how these verses may serve a
programmatic function in Ovid's text:
[T]he  trimming of  the  Amores implied by the  epigram is  in  fact  intended to  have  a
distinctly Callimachean character to it, as it recalls by example the precept handed down
to us by a number of Callimachean testimonia, μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακόν (Call. fr. 465
Pf.); the collection tells us that it is made better insofar as it has been made smaller. 39 
Boyd goes on to draw attention to the “playful contradiction” at work in Ovid's use of the word
auctor which, via  augeo, appears to be at odds with Callimachean principles of compression
evident elsewhere in the epigram, i.e.,  in the claimed process of editing by trimming and the
Catullan refinement and polish implied in the diminutive libelli. 
The term leuior in v. 4 of the epigram garners no comment from Boyd, but Ovid's use of
the same word in his description of the elegiac meter in v. 19 of  Amores  1.1 marks  leuis as
programmatically  significant.40 A clear  thematic  parallel  also extends between the four-verse
epigram and the thirty-verse poem that it precedes: each poem refers to the previous existence of
a grander work—a collection in five books or an epic poem in six beats—that, through removal
of elements, has assumed a smaller and “lighter” form. Hence, leuis functions an apt descriptor
38 See  Cameron  (1968)  for  a  summary  of  many  influential  arguments  about  the  two  editions,  including  a
bibliography (referring to other bibliographies) on p. 320 n. 1. What Cameron and most other scholars take for
granted (with the previously noted exception of Boyd (1997), for which see n. 13, above) is the existence of two
editions. 
39 Boyd (1997) 145.
40 “[. . .] nec mihi materia est numeris levioribus apta—“[. . .] Nor do I have material that accommodates lighter
meters.”
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of the result from a transition from five to three books as well as from the shift in epic to elegiac
meters.  Conspicuously  absent from  Ovid's  introductory  epigram,  however,  are  what  some
scholars regard as the programmatic adjectives characteristic of love elegy:  tenuis and  mollis.
Although these terms and their etymological cousins (e.g., attenuat in Am. 1.1.18 and mollia . . .
uerba in Am. 1.12.22) appear with generic significance elsewhere in the collection, they do not
feature in the Ovidian books' epigrammatic self-presentation. Arguments have long existed for
the equivalence of  tenuis  with an aesthetic encompassing Hellenistic ideals more broadly (and
beyond  elegy),  namely,  λεπτότης,41 but  Ovid  strikes  out  in  a  different  direction  than  his
predecessors, hexametric and elegiac alike: 
Love-elegy before Ovid was fundamentally paradoxical. The genre was conventionally
regarded, even by its exponents themselves, as being light and lacking in seriousness, but
the elegists nevertheless write about their love-affairs in an essentially serious manner.
[. . .] The originality of the Amores lies largely with Ovid's resolution of this paradox: he
handles  the  light  genre  with  unrelenting  lightness.  The  emotional  intensity  which
characterises the great majority of the elegies of Tibullus and Propertius is entirely absent
from the  Amores,  being  replaced by a  robust  and cheerfully  detached attitude  to  the
sufferings which love inflicts.42
Ovid's  verses in  the epigram and in  Amores  1.1 identify  the  poems not  simply as  leuis,  an
adjective in the positive degree used frequently by Propertius and Tibullus, but as leuior, with the
comparative announcing Ovid's perpetual awareness of—and desire to distinguish himself from
41 Keith (1994) focuses on  tenuis  (27-30) and  mollis  (34-35) as representative terms for elegy and places them
against  durus  as  an  adjective  representative  of  hexametric  poetry.  She  neglects  to  mention  leuis  as  an
elegiacally-loaded  term that  appears  frequently  throughout  the  Propertian  and  Tibullan  corpora.  We  have
previously seen the use of these adjectives in (descriptions of) hexametric poetry, such as Horace's  Satires
1.10.44 when the satirist describes Vergil's poetic compositions, or throughout Vergil's Eclogues, for which see
Rumpf (2009).  Clausen (1964) 194 equates  tenuis  with  λεπτός:  “In the first  Eclogue the adjective  tenui is
ornamental, necessary rather to the balance of the verse than to its sense—siluestrem tenui musam meditaris
auena; the involved word order is suggestive of Hellenistic elegance. But in the sixth Eclogue tenui is more than
ornamental—agrestem tenui meditabor harundine musam; it implies a concept of style; it is the Latin equivalent
of λεπτός or λεπταλέος:  μοῦσαν . . . λεπταλέην, λεπταί / ῥήσιες. His pastoral poetry, Virgil thus obliquely
asserts, is Callimachean in character. Failure to recognize this has impaired the quality of much that has been
written about the Eclogues.” For a counterargument against the privileging of λεπτότης as a Hellenistic ideal,
see Porter (2011).
42 McKeown (1987) 13-14.
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—his forebears. And should the Greek term or its cognates43 have been on Ovid's mind, leuis and
leuior have  the  added  advantage  over  tenuis  and  mollis  of  drawing  upon  an  alliterative
connection to  λεπτότης. In any case, through his use of  leuior  Ovid declares his espousal of
greater levity.44 His poetry manages to be lighter than its former self (by two books!) before the
reader has even worked through the two distichs of the epigram, just as his elegies are identified
as being lighter than epic by the end of  Amores  1.1. And this increased buoyancy of tone is
accompanied, fittingly, by laughter.
But it must be recognized that Ovid merely hints at pleasure (uoluptas) and levity (leuior)
in the 3rd and 4th verses of the epigram before juxtaposing these themes with the vocabulary of
punishment (poena  in v. 4 of the epigram), weapons, weightiness, and war (arma,  graui, and
bella in  Am.  1.1.1).  Just  as  readers begin  to  set  their  expectations  in  the  opening verses of
Amores  1.1, laughter erupts and the thematic tension resolves back in the direction of levity.
sustained throughout the poem. Setting out from the first occasion of tension and its laughing
resolution in the opening couplets of  Amores  1.1, Ovid's poetic  self-consciousness bombards
readers with other reasons to laugh in the remainder of his first poem. The inversion of the divine
order in vv. 7-16 illustrates incongruity on a cosmic scale, and that the poet casts his metrical
difficulties as quite literally the end of the world is an expansion of this incongruity.
I suggest that the tonal shift begins with the laughter of v. 3, nor can one underestimate
this laughter's metacommunicative impact on the tone of the work as a whole. The effect of the
laughter in v. 3 on the remainder of Amores 1.1 becomes quickly apparent as the frame of play
opened in v. 3 is reinforced in the immediate context and sustained throughout the remainder of
the poem by unflagging poetic self-consciousness and by potential provocations to laughter via
43 λεπτός or λεπταλέος.
44 OLD s.v. levis, n. 14 offers the definition “Intended for amusement, not serious, light,” and represents this use
with references to poetic production.
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illustrations  of  incongruity.  The  metacommunicative  effect  of  the  laughter,  levity,  and
playfulness in Amores 1.1 on the remainder of the collection likewise becomes apparent through
a  cataloguing  of  the  sources,  location,  and  frequency  of  laughter  throughout  the  remaining
Amores.  Just  as laughter at the beginning of a single poem can lend a particular tone to the
remainder of that poem, the placing of a laugh at the beginning of a multivolume poetic project
stands to amplify this effect,  especially if  its reinforced throughout.45 The laughter  in Ovid's
Amores 1.1 becomes programmatic—a defining attribute of the generic puzzle he is assembling
before his readership.
LOOK WHO'S LAUGHING 
There  is  a  paucity  of  laughter  in  what  are  considered  the  programmatic  poems  of
Propertian  and  Tibullan  elegy,46 but  Ovid  reinforces  the  idea  that  laughter  functions
programmatically in his poetry in his portrayal of particular “laughers” at marked places in the
Amores,  both  in  the  physical  book  and  in  the  context  of  the  narrative.  In  this  way,  the
metacommunicative power of laughter is reinforced periodically, and almost always where genre
is under discussion.
While  I  have  placed  a  great  deal  of  emphasis  on  the  location  and  epistemological
uncertainty (via hearsay) of the laughter in Amores 1.1, I have yet to stress its source. Cupid is
said to laugh at the beginning of Ovid's first book. He is the offspring of Venus, the goddess of
love's lovechild, a divine embodiment of youthful love. The other name for this puckish puer, as
readers are reminded near the end of Amores 1.1 and in the opening verses of the Ars Amatoria,
is Amor:
45 I make a similar argument about the laughter at the beginning of Horace's Satires 1.1 in Ch. 4.
46 Morgan (1977) 8 identifies Propertius' programmatic poems as 2.1, 2.10, 2.34, 3.1, 3.3, and 3.9 and states that
“[t]here are no programmatic poems in Book I [. . .]” (n. 8). Tibullus' programmatic poems are identified by
Cairns (1979) 42 as 1.1 and 2.1.
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me miserum! certas habuit puer ille sagittas. 25
    uror, et in uacuo pectore regna Amor.
Wretched me! That boy had reliable arrows. 25
   I'm burning, and in an empty heart reigns Love. 
(Amores 1.1.25-26)
me Venus artificem tenero praefecit Amori;
    Tiphys et Automedon dicar Amoris ego.
ille quidem ferus est et qui mihi saepe repugnet:
    sed puer est, aetas mollis et apta regi. 10
Venus placed me as maestro in charge of tender Love;
    The Tiphys and Automedon of Love I'll be called.
He indeed is wild and the type to fight against me often:
    but he is a boy, soft of age and suitable to be guided. 10
(Ars Amatoria 1.7-10)
When Cupid laughs in the third verse of the opening poem of the  Amores, love itself laughs,
which is to say that the figure who gives his name to the title of the work laughs. Moreover, he
does so before he does anything else—even before he steals the foot that seems to change the
direction of the speaker's poetic project. This is not only the poet's first impression of Cupid but
also the reader's.
In  Amores  1.6.9-13, when in a flashback the poet recalls his initiation to his role as a
lover and, by extension, as a love poet, Cupid is again coupled with laughter:
at quondam noctem simulacraque uana timebam;
    mirabar, tenebris quisquis iturus erat. 10
risit, ut audirem, tenera cum matre Cupido
    et leuiter “fies tu quoque fortis” ait.
nec mora, uenit amor [. . .].
But formerly I feared the night and false phantoms;
   I was amazed at anyone who was about to go through the shadows. 10
He laughed, so that I could hear, Cupid with his tender mother,
    and lightly said, “You also will become brave.”
Without delay, love came [. . .].
Thus twice in the first  six poems of a fifty-poem collection,  the figure of love is  presented
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laughing, and laughing deliberately.47 His mother laughs along.48 In addition, he laughs to send a
message at a moment in which the poet recounts his entry into a generic topos of amatory elegy:
the paraclausithyron. 
Near  the  structural  boundary  between  the  2nd and  3rd books  of  the  Amores,  in  the
eighteenth of nineteen poems in Book 2,49 Ovid recounts to his friend Macer how he had become
ashamed of his light topic and had decided to try his hand at tragedy. He donned the garb of the
tragedian—cloak, boots, and scepter. But laughter erupts at the beginning of the v. 15, with its
source offered in the next word. It's Amor once again:
risit Amor pallamque meam pictosque cothurnos
    sceptraque privata tam cito sumpta manu.
Love laughed at my cloak and my painted boots
   and the scepter so quickly taken up by my ordinary hand.
After having been caught playing dress-up, the poet quickly strips back to his amatory clothes.
By poem's end, he suggests that Macer,  who writes of war,  may be happier writing of love.
Generic concerns are foremost in his mind.
And then in Amores 3.1, the first poem of Ovid's final book in the collection and another
spatial boundary point, the poet forecasts his departure from love elegy (which is accomplished
in the appropriately laughless  Amores  3.15). The poet tells how he was walking in a beautiful
locale and thinking about what poetry to write when, lo and behold, Elegy herself approached
him. She was limping—one of her feet is longer than the other, after all—but Ovid thought that
her gait, far from detracting from her beauty, contributed to it. Before Elegy could say anything,
Tragedy rushed at Ovid in a huff and asked him when he would finish up with his worthless love
47 He also speaks leuiter in v. 12. Venus laughs in Fasti 4.5.
48 Venus laughs in Ars Amatoria 2.567 (discussed above), Heroides 16.83, and Fasti 4.5.
49 Lateiner (1978) offers a compelling explanation of the ways in which Callimachean and Hellenistic ideals latent
in Ovid's final boundary poem of Amores  Book 2 invests the poem with programmatic force. He even draws
upon play theory and Huizinga . . . a man after my own heart.
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poetry. The poet's attention then shifts back to the first of the two representatives of genre, to
Elegy in v. 33: “The other, if I recall, smiled sidelong with her eyes [. . .]”— altera, si memini,
limis  subrisit  ocellis.  Elegy  herself—itself—smiles  or  even offers  a  subdued  little  laugh.  If
nothing else, the textual smile appears as the word for a smile contains the laughter: subrisit.
I draw three conclusions from the passages I have catalogued: 1) laughter in the Amores
repeatedly  occurs  at  the seams between books,  or  spatial  boundaries;  2)  laughter  repeatedly
coincides with moments in the narrative when Ovid is referring to his beginnings as a love poet
or to his potential departures to other genres, which is to say boundaries in content; and 3) two
figures represented as laughing are those who give their  names to  his  love elegy:  Love and
Elegy. The only other figure to laugh in Ovid's Amores is the speaker's puella herself.50
In  the  opening  verses  of  Amores  1.1,  the  poet  sets  expectations  of  genre  and  then
immediately—and  laughingly—frustrates  them.  In  so  doing,  he  draws  our  attention  to
boundaries  between  genres  and sets  new expectations.  His  poetry will  contain  occasions  of
levity,  of  laughter,  and,  importantly,  of  generic  self-consciousness—an awareness  that  he  is
writing at the boundary of genres. He writes elegy, yes, but his own version of elegy: one that
pretends to be epic and attempts to elevate itself with talk of weapons and wars until one of its
legs is yanked out from beneath it by the figurehead of another genre, by Love personified or a
limping Elegy. But as often as the poet plays with and frustrates epic expectations, he does the
same with elegiac ones. His Amores are their own puzzle when it comes to genre—a puzzle that
distinguishes itself for its originality, its unconventional use of pieces from other puzzles, and its
very willingness  to  change and reassemble itself  as the collection progresses.  And whatever
riddles Ovid throws our way as readers and whatever strange pieces he invites us to assemble in
50 The puella laughs in 2.5.51, 3.2.83, and 3.3.20, although she is not explicitly identified as  Corinna in any of
these poems.
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the Amores only to require us to take them apart in the very next poem, we as readers, like Love
and Elegy themselves, can almost always play a role and offer a piece in Ovid's poetic puzzle
simply by laughing. 
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CONCLUSION
Poiesis, in fact, is a play-function. It proceeds within the play-ground of the 
mind, in a world of its own which the mind creates for it. There things have a 
very different physiognomy from the one they wear in “ordinary life”, and are 
bound by ties other than those of logic and causality. If a serious statement be 
defined as one that may be made in terms of waking life, poetry will never rise to 
the level of seriousness. It lies beyond seriousness, on that more primitive and 
original level where the child, the animal, the savage and the seer belong, in the 
region of dream, enchantment, ecstasy, laughter. 
Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens
In the preceding pages,  I have examined how and where laughter appears in specific
works of ancient literature. First,  I  introduced the vocabulary of laughter and the risible and
explained how the terms that constitute this vocabulary serve as the visible boundary stones of
my investigations. I then set another boundary to my study, but this one in passing; poetry, and
the works of Augustan poetry by Vergil, Horace, and Ovid, in particular, occupy my focus. 
Immediately,  and  for  the  remainder  of  my  introduction,  I  overstepped  this  second
boundary to examine ancient perspectives on laughter that appear in the prose works of Plato,
Aristotle, and Cicero. My reasons for doing so were to introduce aspects of the explanations of
laughter that I use elsewhere in my explorations—the superiority, incongruity, and relief theories
—and, furthermore, to highlight the fact that laughter has been an object of fertile and insoluble
inquiry for thousands of years.
My own inquiry has  proceeded along two independent  but  parallel  paths,  to  each of
which I have devoted three chapters. The first path explored laughter's function as text-directed
literary  criticism—what  I  call  a  textual  laugh  track.  This  approach  emphasized  that  the
vocabulary  of  laughter  and the  risible  as  used  by Vergil,  Horace,  and Ovid  often  functions
metacommunicatively, offering to the reader a set of directions for how to respond to particular
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texts. The second path considered laughter's role as a conspicuous piece in the assembling of
specific generic puzzles. Horace's  Satires, Vergil's  Eclogues, and Ovid's  Amores all feature the
vocabulary of laughter and the risible in their verses, and they utilize this vocabulary to various
genre-determined—and genre-determining—ends. 
In my explorations down the first path in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, I emphasized that laughter
as a shared, often-contagious human behavior offers a particularly attractive invitation to reader
response when it  appears in  textual  form. In my first  chapter,  I  focused on Horace's  use of
laughter as a means to negative literary criticism. In Chapter 2, I examined how the concept of
metacommunication enables an isolated occasion of textual laughter, such as the one that occurs
early Vergil's Eclogue 3, to have an impact on the tone of a poem far beyond the verse in which it
appears. My third chapter continued this investigation of laughter's metacommunicative potential
in the midst of inversions and concentrations of the vocabulary of laughter in Horace's Epistle to
Augustus and Ovid's Ars Amatoria.
My explorations along the second path in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 were predicated in large
part  on  my selection of  Augustan  poetic  texts  that  make frequent  use  of  the  vocabulary  of
laughter and the risible. In Chapter 4, I considered how the Horatian satirist self-consciously
invites discussions of laughter—and thus laughter itself—into his poetry and uses this laughter as
a destabilizing presence throughout the Liber Sermonum. My fifth chapter examined occurrences
of laughter in the Theocritean bucolic corpus and drew upon these occurrences as well as ones in
Lucertius to assert that laughter functions as a form of poetic play in Vergil's  Eclogues. In my
final chapter, I observed laughter's marked and repeated presence at generically self-conscious
moments in Ovid's Amores.
Importantly, these paths overlap almost as frequently as terms for laughter and the risible
appear in the texts. The overlap can be illustrated through a metaphor I used in my introduction
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when I compared a textual laugh to a thread.  The two parts of my study (Chapters 1-3; and
Chapters 4-6) treated these threads in two different ways. The first part of my study highlighted
the fact that every laugh is, in essence, a loose thread, but not one that has become loose or been
pulled through wear and tear. Even the most-tightly-woven occasions of laughter in a text will
hang slightly off the page and invite the reader to take hold of them, to engage with them, to
explore their texture, and perhaps even to tug on them to see what happens next. The second part
of my study focuses on these very same threads, but rather than focusing on their texture, it
observed how they are woven into the fabric of the poem itself: where they appear, to what other
threads they are connected, and what patterns they create.  I have tugged upon and interrogated
particular threads of laughter in particular texts, but, in most of these texts, I could just as easily
have interrogated the threads I tugged upon . . . or  tugged upon the threads I interrogated. The
threads remain the very same words for laughter and the risible, simply examined in different
ways.
Similarly, textual laughter does not cease to encourage types of reader response when
genre is under consideration. The two ideas are part of the same textual fabric.  Nevertheless,
each of  the  three authors  I  have  examined employs laughter  to  different  ends:  Horace  uses
laughter in his hexametric poetry to destabilize his text, which he achieves by drawing attention
to laughter and, at the same time, by playfully denying its importance; Vergil does not make
laughter an explicit subject of his poetry, but he instead allows scattered laughs to establish a
tone of poetic play in his Eclogues; Ovid combines elements of Horatian and Vergilian laughter
as he draws attention to laughter but treats it as a more stable means to metacommunicative and
generic play. Despite the fact that the works of these three authors all are typically classified
within different genres, they share common threads of laughter and, by extension, play.
Toward notions of play—this seems to be one direction in which the preceding study of
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literary laughter has led me, and it is for this reason that I include Johan Huizinga's reflections on
poetry and play as an epigraph (one that concludes, fittingly, with laughter). “Poetry as play”
invites  consideration  of  the  serious  consequences  of  play  in  the  broader  Augustan  literary
climate, a topic for further (and, hopefully, future) inquiry and one that would ground my literary
explorations in their historical context. 
Yet the textual threads of play are perhaps not as visible (they do not hang as far from the
text) as those of laughter. For my part, it is only through laughter that I have arrived at the notion
of poetic play at all. Moreover, my investigations of laughter have also led me to explore reader
response  and  genre  criticism as  well  as  the  works  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  Theocritus,  Catullus,
Lucretius, and Cicero, not to mention the numerous scholars who have explored these texts and
ideas before. Thus I hope to have shown how laughter offers itself as a rich and unique subject of
literary interpretation, in general, and of the poetry of Vergil, Horace, and Ovid, in particular. A
literary laugh remains for the modern audience a powerful point of contact  with the ancient
world that can transcend time and space, text and interpretation, author and reader, and tap into
an experience of literature and life that seems, in a word, human. 
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